1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
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ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1<br />
Page 7<br />
he continued to receive his mail and to take showers there, he came and left without making prior arrangements, and on<br />
several occasions when he entered without permission, he had shoved and threatened her and her children; the son thus<br />
fit the definition <strong>of</strong> a "former household member" that was contained in ALM GL c 209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass.<br />
Acts ch. 403, § 2). Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez (2006) 66 Mass App 367, 848 NE2d 779, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 567.<br />
In issuing and extending for a year an abuse protection order pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983<br />
Mass. Acts ch. 678, § 4) against a son on the petition <strong>of</strong> a girlfriend, who was the girlfriend <strong>of</strong> the son's father, a district<br />
court did not abuse its discretion; the son fit within the definition <strong>of</strong> a "former household member" under ALM GL c<br />
209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass. Acts ch. 403, § 2), as he had lived with them for two years and had kept a key and<br />
had continued to use their home after he moved out. The legislature had consistently amended the statute since its<br />
inception in 1978 and had consistently expanded the definition <strong>of</strong> a "family or household member" in, § 1, the<br />
legislature had drafted the statute with a purposeful flexibility, the categories <strong>of</strong> persons covered under the statute had<br />
been continually expanded, and a broad and flexible interpretation was appropriate. Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez<br />
(2006) 66 Mass App 367, 848 NE2d 779, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 567.<br />
Because the ALM GL c 209A affidavit was factually detailed, based on personal knowledge and observation by the<br />
source, the statements arose under circumstances that supported the veracity <strong>of</strong> the source, originated from a<br />
disinterested witness, and was trustworthy, it was admissible in the probation revocation hearing. Commonwealth v.<br />
Henderson (2012) 82 Mass App 674, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 269.<br />
Because a court could issue an order <strong>of</strong> prevention and protection even without personal jurisdiction over the father,<br />
who resided in Florida, but could not impose affirmative obligations on the father if there was no personal jurisdiction,<br />
the order's prohibition against abusing, contacting, or approaching the mother or their child required no personal<br />
jurisdiction. However, that portion <strong>of</strong> the order that required the father to surrender his firearms imposed an affirmative<br />
duty, and such an obligation could only be imposed by a court with personal jurisdiction over the father. accordingly,<br />
that portion <strong>of</strong> the order was invalid. Caplan v. Donovan (2008) 450 Mass. 463, 879 NE2d 117, 2008 Mass. LEXIS 16,<br />
cert den (2008) 170 L. Ed. 2d 817, 128 S. Ct. 2088, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3682.<br />
2. What is "abuse"<br />
Party violates order to refrain from abuse when he or she attempts to cause or causes physical harm, places another<br />
in fear <strong>of</strong> imminent serious physical harm, or causes another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat<br />
<strong>of</strong> force, or duress. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 9<strong>15</strong>, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197.<br />
Definition <strong>of</strong> "abuse" in ALM GL c 209A, § 1, i.e., placing another in fear <strong>of</strong> imminent serious physical harm,<br />
closely approximates common-law description <strong>of</strong> crime <strong>of</strong> assault. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340,<br />
553 NE2d 9<strong>15</strong>, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197.<br />
There was insufficient evidence that defendant's words carried an indicia <strong>of</strong> proximate execution <strong>of</strong> the substantive<br />
abuse violation <strong>of</strong> causing physical harm under ALM GL c 209A, § 1(a), to support a finding that he attempted to violate<br />
the protective order. Commonwealth v. Fortier (2002) 56 Mass App 116, 775 NE2d 785, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 1219.<br />
Child protective order was vacated as the allegations against the father constituted improper parenting, as opposed<br />
to inflicting physical harm on the child where the father: (1) told his seven-year-old child about peculiar and frightening<br />
dreams; (2) tossed a milk container at the child; (3) cuffed the child under the chin in irritation; (4) gave the child a kick<br />
in the back <strong>of</strong> her legs while both were in bed, again because he was irritated; and (5) pinched his daughter on the arm<br />
so that it left a mark. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (2003) 57 Mass App 284, 782 NE2d 1085, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 164.<br />
3. --Fear <strong>of</strong> imminent serious physical harm<br />
Evidence <strong>of</strong> defendant's violation <strong>of</strong> ALM GL c 209A order to refrain from abusing victim was sufficient, where<br />
jury could find that actions and words <strong>of</strong> defendant placed victim in reasonable apprehension that physical force might