1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
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ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7<br />
Page 62<br />
witness because defendant's testimony that he did not know that the victim was in the residence would have been<br />
irrelevant, as his guilt did not depend on his knowledge <strong>of</strong> the victim's presence. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73<br />
Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947,<br />
2009 Mass. LEXIS 479.<br />
Although defendant was acquitted <strong>of</strong> a prior charge <strong>of</strong> assault with a dangerous weapon in connection with an<br />
incident against his brother, evidence <strong>of</strong> the prior charge was admissible in defendant's trial for violating an abuse<br />
prevention order obtained by the brother against defendant because the previous assault charge was introduced to show<br />
defendant's hostility and motive. Commonwealth v. Barboza (2010) 76 Mass App 241, 921 NE2d 117, 2010 Mass. App.<br />
LEXIS 125.<br />
Defendant's convictions <strong>of</strong> violating a ALM GL c 209A order were not duplicative <strong>of</strong> his conviction <strong>of</strong> criminal<br />
harassment, as the two crimes had different elements, and the conduct forming the basis <strong>of</strong> the criminal harassment<br />
charge predated service <strong>of</strong> the 209A order and violations there<strong>of</strong> and thus was distinct from that forming the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
209A order violations. Commonwealth v. Kulesa (2009) 455 Mass. 447, 917 NE2d 762, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 902.<br />
Defendant's conviction <strong>of</strong> violating a protective abuse order under ALM GL c 209A, § 7 did not violate due process<br />
as a telephone call between defendant and the victim provided adequate notice <strong>of</strong> the restraining order (RO), defendant's<br />
response to the information evidenced that defendant knew <strong>of</strong> the RO, and defendant violated the RO by calling the<br />
victim the next day. Commonwealth v. Melton (2010) 2010 Mass. App. LEXIS 1176.<br />
In a prosecution for violation <strong>of</strong> an abuse prevention order, a return <strong>of</strong> service completed by an out <strong>of</strong> state police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer did not fall under the <strong>of</strong>ficial or public records exception, under ALM GL c 233, § 76, and Mass.R.Crim.P. 40,<br />
due to being maintained by the court, because the statute and Rule pertained to the authenticity <strong>of</strong> a record, which was a<br />
precondition to, not the equivalent <strong>of</strong>, admissibility. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 288.<br />
In a prosecution for violation <strong>of</strong> an abuse prevention order, a return <strong>of</strong> service completed by an out <strong>of</strong> state police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer was admissible without the <strong>of</strong>ficer's testimony to demonstrate defendant's knowledge <strong>of</strong> the order because (1) the<br />
completed return <strong>of</strong> service fell within an exception to the hearsay rule for public documents, as the return was prepared<br />
by an <strong>of</strong>ficial in the performance <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficial duty, and (2) the return's admission, absent the <strong>of</strong>ficer's live testimony or<br />
a prior opportunity to cross-examine the <strong>of</strong>ficer, did not violate the confrontation clause, as the primary purpose for<br />
which the return <strong>of</strong> service was created was to serve the routine administrative functions <strong>of</strong> the court system, and the<br />
return was not created to prove a fact at a potential future criminal trial, was not per se testimonial, and was not<br />
testimonial in fact. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 288.<br />
10. --Jury instructions<br />
Judge was not required to include language on circumstantial evidence in jury instruction regarding elements <strong>of</strong><br />
abuse. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359.<br />
At trial <strong>of</strong> defendant for violating abuse prevention order prohibiting defendant from contacting former wife in<br />
person or by telephone or otherwise, judge erred in refusing to instruct jury that it could find that defendant's contacts<br />
with former wife, which occurred in course <strong>of</strong> attempt to speak to daughter by telephone, were "incidental" and that if<br />
jury so found, such contacts did not constitute violation <strong>of</strong> ALM GL c 209A order. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52<br />
Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.<br />
Where ALM GL c 209A "no-contact" order prohibited defendant from contacting former wife but did not limit<br />
right <strong>of</strong> defendant to have contact with his children, judge should have instructed jury to consider whether defendant's<br />
telephoning <strong>of</strong> former wife with whom children lived, including repeated calls after wife hung up, was incidental to<br />
legitimate attempt to telephone daughter, and if so, that such incidental contact was not violation <strong>of</strong> ALM GL c 209A<br />
restraining order. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.