21.01.2015 Views

1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...

1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...

1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7<br />

Page 62<br />

witness because defendant's testimony that he did not know that the victim was in the residence would have been<br />

irrelevant, as his guilt did not depend on his knowledge <strong>of</strong> the victim's presence. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73<br />

Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947,<br />

2009 Mass. LEXIS 479.<br />

Although defendant was acquitted <strong>of</strong> a prior charge <strong>of</strong> assault with a dangerous weapon in connection with an<br />

incident against his brother, evidence <strong>of</strong> the prior charge was admissible in defendant's trial for violating an abuse<br />

prevention order obtained by the brother against defendant because the previous assault charge was introduced to show<br />

defendant's hostility and motive. Commonwealth v. Barboza (2010) 76 Mass App 241, 921 NE2d 117, 2010 Mass. App.<br />

LEXIS 125.<br />

Defendant's convictions <strong>of</strong> violating a ALM GL c 209A order were not duplicative <strong>of</strong> his conviction <strong>of</strong> criminal<br />

harassment, as the two crimes had different elements, and the conduct forming the basis <strong>of</strong> the criminal harassment<br />

charge predated service <strong>of</strong> the 209A order and violations there<strong>of</strong> and thus was distinct from that forming the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />

209A order violations. Commonwealth v. Kulesa (2009) 455 Mass. 447, 917 NE2d 762, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 902.<br />

Defendant's conviction <strong>of</strong> violating a protective abuse order under ALM GL c 209A, § 7 did not violate due process<br />

as a telephone call between defendant and the victim provided adequate notice <strong>of</strong> the restraining order (RO), defendant's<br />

response to the information evidenced that defendant knew <strong>of</strong> the RO, and defendant violated the RO by calling the<br />

victim the next day. Commonwealth v. Melton (2010) 2010 Mass. App. LEXIS 1176.<br />

In a prosecution for violation <strong>of</strong> an abuse prevention order, a return <strong>of</strong> service completed by an out <strong>of</strong> state police<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer did not fall under the <strong>of</strong>ficial or public records exception, under ALM GL c 233, § 76, and Mass.R.Crim.P. 40,<br />

due to being maintained by the court, because the statute and Rule pertained to the authenticity <strong>of</strong> a record, which was a<br />

precondition to, not the equivalent <strong>of</strong>, admissibility. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 288.<br />

In a prosecution for violation <strong>of</strong> an abuse prevention order, a return <strong>of</strong> service completed by an out <strong>of</strong> state police<br />

<strong>of</strong>ficer was admissible without the <strong>of</strong>ficer's testimony to demonstrate defendant's knowledge <strong>of</strong> the order because (1) the<br />

completed return <strong>of</strong> service fell within an exception to the hearsay rule for public documents, as the return was prepared<br />

by an <strong>of</strong>ficial in the performance <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficial duty, and (2) the return's admission, absent the <strong>of</strong>ficer's live testimony or<br />

a prior opportunity to cross-examine the <strong>of</strong>ficer, did not violate the confrontation clause, as the primary purpose for<br />

which the return <strong>of</strong> service was created was to serve the routine administrative functions <strong>of</strong> the court system, and the<br />

return was not created to prove a fact at a potential future criminal trial, was not per se testimonial, and was not<br />

testimonial in fact. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 288.<br />

10. --Jury instructions<br />

Judge was not required to include language on circumstantial evidence in jury instruction regarding elements <strong>of</strong><br />

abuse. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359.<br />

At trial <strong>of</strong> defendant for violating abuse prevention order prohibiting defendant from contacting former wife in<br />

person or by telephone or otherwise, judge erred in refusing to instruct jury that it could find that defendant's contacts<br />

with former wife, which occurred in course <strong>of</strong> attempt to speak to daughter by telephone, were "incidental" and that if<br />

jury so found, such contacts did not constitute violation <strong>of</strong> ALM GL c 209A order. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52<br />

Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.<br />

Where ALM GL c 209A "no-contact" order prohibited defendant from contacting former wife but did not limit<br />

right <strong>of</strong> defendant to have contact with his children, judge should have instructed jury to consider whether defendant's<br />

telephoning <strong>of</strong> former wife with whom children lived, including repeated calls after wife hung up, was incidental to<br />

legitimate attempt to telephone daughter, and if so, that such incidental contact was not violation <strong>of</strong> ALM GL c 209A<br />

restraining order. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!