1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7
Page 58
LEXIS 613.
"No contact" provision in abuse prevention order did not violate defendant's right of free speech. Commonwealth v.
Thompson (1998) 45 Mass App 523, 699 NE2d 847, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1040, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1108,
707 NE2d 366, 1998 Mass LEXIS 739.
Oral orders of judge are not effective to modify restraining orders issued pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, which
contemplates that orders be transmitted in written form to law enforcement agencies and to defendant. Commonwealth
v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1102,
751 NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275.
Where the third party and ex-girlfriend found a hidden video camera in the ex-girlfriend's bedroom in a clock
installed by the ex-boyfriend and the ex-boyfriend left an answering machine message with the ex-girlfriend denying
the installation of the camera and stating that had the ex-boyfriend installed the camera the ex-girlfriend would not have
found it, the trial court erred in issuing a protective order against the ex-boyfriend and any record of the order was to be
destroyed pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 7; although the ex-boyfriend allegedly had a temper, joked that the
ex-boyfriend could have someone taken care of, and had guns, there was nothing in the record that showed a history of
violence, threats, or hostility between the parties that would have objectively placed the ex-girlfriend in fear of
imminent serious physical harm pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 1. Keene v. Gangi (2004) 60 Mass App 667, 805 NE2d
77, 2004 Mass App LEXIS 299.
6.5. District Judge's authority to vacate order
District Judge had the inherent authority to expunge a record of a ALM GL c 209A civil abuse protection order
from the statewide domestic violence registry system in the rare and limited circumstance that: (1) the judge found
through clear and convincing evidence that the order was obtained through fraud on the court; (2) neither vacation of the
order, nor sealing of the record was sufficient to protect the integrity of the courts, did not send an appropriate message
to the public, and left a record of the order in the system; and (2) the potential harm to the courts and to the victim of the
order outweighed the governmental interest in maintaining and disseminating the fraudulently obtained order, because it
contained absolutely no informational purpose; however, because the action was initiated by a private plaintiff, ALM GL
c 261, § 14 did not authorize the District Court judge to levy costs against the Commissioner due to the Commissioner's
failure to attend a hearing on a motion to destroy all copies of the ALM GL c 209A order. Comm'r of Prob. v. Adams
(2006) 65 Mass App 725, 843 NE2d 1101, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 262.
7. --Violation
In prosecution of defendant for violating protective order by coming within 100 yards of former wife and in so
doing placing her in fear of imminent serious physical harm, Commonwealth was required to prove that defendant
intended to do act that resulted in violation, where defendant was passenger in car driven by son in threatening manner
three feet from former wife as she was entering parking garage after leaving court. Commonwealth v. Collier (1998)
427 Mass 385, 693 NE2d 673, 1998 Mass LEXIS 182.
Although evidence was sufficient to warrant finding that defendant acted intentionally to do act that resulted in
violation of protective order, (i.e., while defendant was passenger in car driven by his son, he directed or assented to
son's driving car in threatening manner three feet from former wife as she was entering parking garage after leaving
court), conviction of violation of protective order reversed because judge did not instruct jury that defendant must have
intended to commit act that resulted in violation. Commonwealth v. Collier (1998) 427 Mass 385, 693 NE2d 673, 1998
Mass LEXIS 182.
In prosecution of defendant for twice violating restraining order not to contact his former wife by telephone,
evidence that defendant placed telephone calls to former wife's home and place of employment was insufficient to prove
essential element of "contacting," because there was no evidence that defendant left message or reached former wife's