1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7
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did not require reversal of guilty verdict. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995
Mass LEXIS 359.
Commonwealth could not prosecute defendant for stalking under ALM GL c 265, § 43(b) without violating
defendant's double jeopardy rights. In trying to prosecute defendant for that offense, the Commonwealth was relying on
conduct for which defendant had been prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating a ALM GL c 209A abuse
prevention order in violation of ALM GL c 209A, § 7, and, thus, the Commonwealth was trying to prosecute the same
violations twice. Edge v. Commonwealth (2008) 451 Mass. 74, 883 NE2d 928, 2008 Mass. LEXIS 209.
4. Order to vacate household
Defendant ordered to "vacate" marital home must not only surrender legal occupancy but must remain away
without right to enter at any time. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS
197.
Abuse prevention order issued under ALM GL c 209A, § 7, was not vague or overbroad, as a person of ordinary
intelligence could not have reasonably understood that the order requiring defendant to stay away from the residence he
and the victim had resided in would have sanctioned his return to the residence without requesting permission from the
court, as expressly provided for in the order. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73 Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008
Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 479.
5. --Violation
Defendant could be found criminally liable under ALM GL c 209A, § 7 for violating order to vacate household,
where he returned to marital home for visits after being ordered "to immediately leave and remain away from"
household. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197.
Defendant was properly convicted of violating a restraining order issued under ALM GL c 209A, § 7, by going to a
residence where he and the victim used to live. The order did not unconstitutionally violate defendant's right to remain
in his residence, as that right could be suspended by an abuse prevention order obtained in accordance with due process
principles. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73 Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review
denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 479.
6. No contact order; protective order
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had knowledge of extension of protective order, where service of
initial order placed defendant on constructive, if not actual, notice of order's existence and terms. Commonwealth v.
Henderson (2001) 434 Mass 155, 747 NE2d 659, 2001 Mass LEXIS 213.
"No contact" order mandates that defendant not communicate by any means with protected party in addition to
remaining physically separate and is broader than "stay away" order, which prohibits defendant from coming within
specified distance of protected party but not from written or oral contact between parties. Commonwealth v. Finase
(2001) 435 Mass 310, 757 NE2d 721, 2001 Mass LEXIS 642.
Judge's order for defendant not to "contact" former girlfriend in person, by telephone, in writing, or otherwise was
not unconstitutionally vague. Commonwealth v. Butler (1996) 40 Mass App 906, 661 NE2d 666, 1996 Mass App LEXIS
99.
Where defendant was served with temporary restraining order and had read its contents and order was extended for
one year at hearing at which defendant did not appear, and there was evidence that defendant knew terms of extended
order, personal service of extended order on defendant was not required. Commonwealth v. Bachir (1998) 45 Mass App
204, 696 NE2d 948, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 513, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1104, 702 NE2d 812, 1998 Mass