1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
1 of 15 DOCUMENTS ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ...
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ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3<br />
Page 26<br />
c 261, § 14 did not authorize the District Court judge to levy costs against the Commissioner due to the Commissioner's<br />
failure to attend a hearing on a motion to destroy all copies <strong>of</strong> the ALM GL c 209A order. Comm'r <strong>of</strong> Prob. v. Adams<br />
(2006) 65 Mass App 725, 843 NE2d 1101, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 262.<br />
Appellate Division <strong>of</strong> District Court Department lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review ALM GL c 209A cases<br />
in District Courts. Burrill v. Burrill (1993) 1993 Mass App Div 178, 1993 Mass App Div LEXIS 63.<br />
No error occurred when a district court extended an abuse protection order, which a girlfriend had obtained on an<br />
emergency basis against her boyfriend's son, pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983 Mass. Acts ch. 678,<br />
§ 4). The son had lived with them in the same house for two years, he kept a kept a key to the house after he moved out,<br />
he continued to receive his mail and to take showers there, he came and left without making prior arrangements, and on<br />
several occasions when he entered without permission, he had shoved and threatened her and her children; the son thus<br />
fit the definition <strong>of</strong> a "former household member" that was contained in ALM GL c 209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass.<br />
Acts ch. 403, § 2). Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez (2006) 66 Mass App 367, 848 NE2d 779, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 567.<br />
In issuing and extending for a year an abuse protection order pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983<br />
Mass. Acts ch. 678, § 4) against a son on the petition <strong>of</strong> a girlfriend, who was the girlfriend <strong>of</strong> the son's father, a district<br />
court did not abuse its discretion; the son fit within the definition <strong>of</strong> a "former household member" under ALM GL c<br />
209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass. Acts ch. 403, § 2), as he had lived with them for two years and had kept a key and<br />
had continued to use their home after he moved out. The legislature had consistently amended the statute since its<br />
inception in 1978 and had consistently expanded the definition <strong>of</strong> a "family or household member" in § 1, the legislature<br />
had drafted the statute with a purposeful flexibility, the categories <strong>of</strong> persons covered under the statute had been<br />
continually expanded, and a broad and flexible interpretation was appropriate. Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez (2006) 66<br />
Mass App 367, 848 NE2d 779, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 567.<br />
Where a mother stated in her affidavit in support <strong>of</strong> a ALM GL c 209A abuse prevention order that defendant, her<br />
husband, had punched her son, but testified at the assault and battery trial that defendant had accidently struck her son,<br />
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 NE2d 483, 1984 Mass LEXIS 1737 (1984), the trial court<br />
properly allowed the affidavit to be used as substantive evidence. Commonwealth v Belmer (2010) 78 Mass App 62,<br />
935 NE2d 327, 2010 Mass. App. LEXIS 1320.<br />
Trial court impermissibly prevented plaintiff from calling defendant as a witness at the hearing on an application<br />
for a ALM GL c 209A abuse prevention order because defendant never asserted a privilege not to testify, and trial court<br />
did not inquire if defendant chose to do so; it was not the trial court's prerogative to make that choice for him. S.T. v.<br />
E.M. (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 1192.<br />
In a case in which defendant appealed the extension <strong>of</strong> an abuse prevention order, defendant waived any due<br />
process objection to the procedure followed by the judge. Defense counsel actively participated in requesting, and<br />
crafting the scope <strong>of</strong>, the out-<strong>of</strong>-court inquiry that the judge undertook, and defense counsel never mentioned due<br />
process, either before or after the judge obtained a police sergeant's statements. Diaz v. Gomez (2012) 82 Mass App 55,<br />
2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 209.<br />
In a case in which defendant appealed the extension <strong>of</strong> an abuse prevention order, he unsuccessfully argued that the<br />
evidence was insufficient to support the judge's finding by a preponderance <strong>of</strong> the evidence that his former spouse was<br />
reasonably in fear <strong>of</strong> imminent physical harm. The judge found credible the former spouse's testimony that defendant<br />
previously put a gun to her head and threatened to kill her if she left him, and neither that finding, nor any <strong>of</strong> the others<br />
made by the judge, was clearly erroneous. Diaz v. Gomez (2012) 82 Mass App 55, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 209.<br />
Under ALM GL c 209A, household members, including petitioner's stepdaughter who resided with him, are<br />
protected from domestic abuse; thus, petitioner's conviction for indecent assault and battery under ALM GL c 265, §<br />
13H satisfied second prong <strong>of</strong> 8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), notwithstanding that stepdaughter never obtained protective