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ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3
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Judge properly excluded evidence offered by defendant that clerk-magistrate had declined to issue process on
earlier complaint arising out of similar conduct by defendant, i.e., his effort to telephone daughter at former wife's
residence, inasmuch as order clearly prohibited defendant from contacting wife by telephone and what defendant may
have thought order meant was irrelevant. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass
App LEXIS 761.
Where defendant was on notice that on February 6, 1998 judge of District Court had extended protective order on
permanent basis, there could be no reasonable doubt on his part that order prohibited him from calling his former wife
on April 21, 1999. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.
Complaints for violation of 209A protective orders are not immune from requirement of show-cause hearing under
ALM GL c 218, § 35A, but notice and opportunity to be heard need not be provided if one of three exceptions set forth
in § 35A applies. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.
Applications for retaliatory abuse prevention orders were only allowed if the predicate conditions were shown and
not as a prophylactic agent to prevent putative violations; neither ALM GL c 209A, nor the decisions interpreting it,
contained any authority allowing the fear of arrest, even upon innocent contact, as a basis for a reciprocal restraining
order. Uttaro v. Uttaro (2002) 54 Mass App 871, 768 NE2d 600, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 736.
Woman who had previously been granted a one-year abuse prevention order could automatically obtain a
permanent order without establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that without such an order she would be in
danger. Jones v. Gallagher (2002) 54 Mass App 883, 768 NE2d 1088, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 745.
Given a husband's history of assaults upon the husband's wife and the husband's conviction for illegal possession of
a machine gun, trial court did not exceed its discretion by ordering the husband to stay at least 500 yards away from the
wife and 1 mile away from the wife's home. Litchfield v. Litchfield (2002) 55 Mass App 354, 770 NE2d 554, 2002 Mass
App LEXIS 841.
The 29-year-old daughter did not present any evidence that abuse might resume if the protective order were not
issued; her "generalized apprehension" based on past abuse by her mother was insufficient to justify issuance of a
restraining order. Dollan v. Dollan (2002) 55 Mass App 905, 771 NE2d 825, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 985.
Trial court erred in issuing a protective order where there was no evidence that defendant threatened plaintiff, either
implicitly or explicitly, with physical harm and plaintiff's subjective and unspecified fear was an insufficient basis for
the order. Carroll v. Kartell (2002) 56 Mass App 83, 775 NE2d 457, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 1213.
Denial of an ex-wife's request for a permanent order was vacated, and remanded as it was error to refuse, on the
basis of personal preference or philosophy, a request to give consideration to a permanent order permitted by the law.
Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen (2003) 57 Mass App 746, 785 NE2d 1285, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 430.
Permanent protective order was granted against two abusers who had allegedly threatened the victim's life, anally
raped him, and abused him, where there was sufficient credible evidence to support such an order and where it was clear
that the victim was still in fear of the abusers; it did not matter that a grand jury had not indicted the abusers on the anal
rape charge, nor that the victim had not been in contact with the abusers for more than two years. Doe v. Keller (2003)
57 Mass App 776, 786 NE2d 422, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 457.
Defendant's convictions for violation of a no contact order were upheld where defendant contended that the
comments he made about his ex-wife were not directed to her, but rather, were directed to a passenger in his vehicle, as
one could not undermine a no contact order by simple expedient of ricocheting prohibited comments off third persons;
the legislature rationally concluded that prohibiting contact, whether or not the contact was itself abusive, sometimes
might be necessary to reduce the likelihood that abuse would occur, under ALM GL c 209A, §§ 3(b), 7. Commonwealth
v. Consoli (2003) 58 Mass App 734, 792 NE2d 1007, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 831, review denied (2003) 440 Mass 1103,