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1 of 15 DOCUMENTS 

ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 

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*** Current through Acts 464 of the 2012 Legislative Session *** 

PART II REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 

TITLE III DOMESTIC RELATIONS 

Chapter 209A Abuse Prevention 

GO TO MASSACHUSETTS CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY 

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 (2012) 

§ 1. Definitions. 

As used in this chapter the following words shall have the following meanings: 

"Abuse", the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members: 

(a) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; 

(b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; 

(c) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress. 

"Court", the superior, probate and family, district or Boston municipal court departments of the trial court, except 

when the petitioner is in a dating relationship when "Court" shall mean district, probate, or Boston municipal courts. 

"Family or household members", persons who: 

(a) are or were married to one another; 

(b) are or were residing together in the same household; 

(c) are or were related by blood or marriage; 

(d) having a child in common regardless of whether they have ever married or lived together; or 

(e) are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship, which shall be adjudged by district, 

probate or Boston municipal courts consideration of the following factors: 

(1) the length of time of the relationship; (2) the type of relationship; (3) the frequency of interaction between

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 2 

the parties; and (4) if the relationship has been terminated by either person, the length of time elapsed since the 

termination of the relationship. 

"Law officer", any officer authorized to serve criminal process. 

"Protection order issued by another jurisdiction", any injunction or other order issued by a court of another state, 

territory or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, or tribal 

court that is issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or contact or 

communication with or physical proximity to another person, including temporary and final orders issued by civil and 

criminal courts filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection. 

"Vacate order", court order to leave and remain away from a premises and surrendering forthwith any keys to said 

premises to the plaintiff. The defendant shall not damage any of the plaintiff's belongings or those of any other occupant 

and shall not shut off or cause to be shut off any utilities or mail delivery to the plaintiff. In the case where the premises 

designated in the vacate order is a residence, so long as the plaintiff is living at said residence, the defendant shall not 

interfere in any way with the plaintiff's right to possess such residence, except by order or judgment of a court of 

competent jurisdiction pursuant to appropriate civil eviction proceedings, a petition to partition real estate, or a 

proceeding to divide marital property. A vacate order may include in its scope a household, a multiple family dwelling 

and the plaintiff's workplace. When issuing an order to vacate the plaintiff's workplace, the presiding justice must 

consider whether the plaintiff and defendant work in the same location or for the same employer. 

HISTORY: 1978, 447, § 2; 1983, 678, § 2; 1986, 310, § 15; 1990, 403, § 2; 1996, 298, § 1; 1996, 450, § 232. 

NOTES: Editorial Note 

The 1983 amendment rewrote the definition of "Court" to include the family or Boston municipal court 

departments of the trial court. 

The 1986 amendment rewrote the definition of "Family or household member" by adding former household 

member, and parent of the plaintiff's minor child. 

The 1990 amendment in the opening paragraph, substituted "As used" for "The following words as used"; in 

paragraph (c) of the definition of "Abuse", substituted "threat" for "threat of force"; in the definition of "Court", inserted 

", except when the petitioner is in a dating relationship when 'Court' shall mean district, probate, or Boston municipal 

courts"; restructured and changed the definition of "Family or household member" to be applicable and refer to "Family 

or household members"; and inserted the definition of "Vacate order." Sections 14 through 16 provide: 

Section 14. The secretary of public safety shall establish a policy for law enforcement response to domestic 

violence consistent with the provisions of this act; provided, however, that he may revise, terminate, or revoke such 

policy at his discretion. Such policy shall be developed after consultation with the director of the victim assistance 

office, at least two representatives of a certified or provisionally certified batterer's treatment program, and at least four 

representatives from the governor's anti-crime council including at least one district attorney, one member of the 

Massachusetts bar experienced in criminal defense, one police chief and one judge or his designee. Such policy for law 

enforcement response to domestic violence shall be promulgated within six months of the effective date of this act. 

Section 15. Each law enforcement agency shall establish and implement specific operational guidelines consistent 

with the policy established under the provisions of section fourteen or adopt said policy. Local operational guidelines 

shall be submitted to the secretary of public safety for review within sixty days of the adoption of said policy. The 

secretary shall provide written notice of approval of the local guidelines within thirty days of receipt of said guidelines. 

Upon approval, said guidelines shall be effective immediately at the local law enforcement agency. Prior to, or in the 

absence of approved guidelines, the law enforcement agency shall implement said policy.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 3 

Section 16. Within six months of the effective date of this act, guidelines and standards for the certification of 

batterer's treatment programs by the department of public health shall be set up by a commission to be established by 

the chief justice of the trial court department, one member of which shall be a district attorney or his designee, two of 

which shall be members of a recognized batterer's treatment program with training experience, two of which shall be 

members of a domestic violence program or the statewide coalition of programs which provide services to victims of 

domestic violence and one of whom shall be a member from a probation department. Prior to the establishment of such 

guidelines and standards, the department of public health may provisionally certify batterer's treatment programs 

pursuant to regulations promulgated by the department. Such provisional certification shall expire upon establishment 

of guidelines under this section. 

The department of public health shall thereafter certify and monitor batterer's treatment programs according to the 

standards established and promulgated by the commission. Programs so certified shall be the only batterer's treatment 

programs appropriate for court referrals. 

The first 1996 amendment, (ch 298), inserted the definition "Protection order issued by another jurisdiction". 

The second 1996 amendment, (ch 450), made grammatical changes in subparagraph (d) of the definition "Family 

or household members." 

Cross References 

State Police forms for reporting incidents to include space to indicate abuse as defined in this section, ALM GL c 

22C, § 49. 

Protection and care of children, and proceedings against them, ALM GL c 119, § 1 et seq. 

Jurisprudence 

24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce & Separation §§ 265-268. 

Annotations 

Validity and application of statute allowing endangered child to be temporarily removed from parental custody. 38 

ALR4th 756. 

"Cohabitation" for purposes of domestic violence statutes. 71 ALR5th 285. 

Treatise References 

Blumenson, Fisher, & Kanstroom, Massachusetts Criminal Practice (Michie) § 50. 

Brisk, Hoag, MacLaughin-Barck, Massachusetts Elder Law (Michie) §§ 1.7, 2.4. 

CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 6.720, Violation of an Abuse Prevention 

Order. 

Estate Planning for the Aging or Incapacitated Client § 11.3.1, Abuse. 

Harvey, Moriarty, Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 2d Ed. (Michie) §§ 4.05, 4.09, 22:8-22:10, 22:26, 

22:29, 22:41, 51:2, Form 208. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.7, Renewal of Protective Orders. 

Law Reviews

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 4 

Garvey, The Race Card: Dealing with Domestic Violence in the Courts. 11 Am UJ Gender Soc Pol'y & L 287 

(2003). 

Maytal, Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Are They Worth the Trouble In Massachusetts. 18 B.U. Pub. Int. 

L.J. 197 (Fall, 2008). 

Volovski, Crime And Punishment Law Chapter: Domestic Violence. 5 Geo J Gender & L 175 (Spring, 2004). 

Rousseve, Sixth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: II. Criminal Law Chapter: Domestic Violence and 

the States. 6 Geo. J. Gender & L. 431 (2005). 

Hickey, Ninth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: Criminal Law Chapter: Domestic Violence and the 

State. 9 Geo. J. Gender & L. 625 (2008). 

Solon, Domestic Violence. 10 Geo. J. Gender & L. 369 (2009). 

Morao, Domestic Violence and the State. 7 Geo. J. Gender XXX L. 787 (2006). 

Buel, Violence Against Women: Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative 

Construct. 26 Harv Women's LJ 217. 

Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers. 54 Hastings LJ 525 (March, 2003). 

Taylor, Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing Access To Judicial Process Has Eased the 

Possibility for Abuse of the Process. 18 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 83 (Fall, 2008). 

Harrington, Commonwealth v. Finase: The Scope of Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Order Prosecution and 

Efficacy. 29 NE J on Crim & Civ Con 193 (Summer, 2003). 

Long, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves: Erroneously Expanding the Concept of Police Interrogation Set Forth in 

Crawford v. Washington to Include Investigatory Police Interrogations. 33 N.E. J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. 171 (Winter, 

2007). 

Syrnick, Shifting the Burden: An Argument for a Rebuttable Presumption against Visitation during a 209A 

Restraining Order Proceeding. 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 645 (Spring, 2009). 

Alter, Recent Developments in New York Law: Article: What's an Intimate Relationship, Anyway Expanding 

Access to the New York State Family Courts for Civil Orders of Protection. 29 Pace L. Rev. 455 (Spring, 2009). 

Tracia, Navigating the Waters of Massachusetts Child Relocation Law: Assessing The Application of the Real 

Advantage Standard. 13 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Adv. 139 (2008). 

Seidman and Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform. 38 Suffolk U L 

Rev 467 (2005). 

Gresens, Denying Choice of Forum: An Interference by the Massachusetts Trial Court with Domestic Violence 

Victims' Rights and Safety. 43 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 293 (2010). 

Buel and Drew, Do Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer's Duty to Warn in Domestic Violence Cases. 75 U. 

Cin. L. Rev. 447 (Winter, 2006). 

Womack, Please Check One - Male or Female: Confronting Gender Identity Discrimination in Collegiate 

Residential Life. 44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1365 (May, 2010).

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 5 

Cokler, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence. 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1841 (April, 2006). 

Wright and Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense 47 Wm and Mary L. 

Rev. 2045 (April, 2006). 

Saperstein, Teen Dating Violence: Eliminating Statutory Barriers to Civil Protection Orders. 39 Fam. L.Q. 181 

(Spring, 2005). 

Web References 

ABA Domestic Violence Section, see www.abanet.org/domviol/home.html 

ABA Family Law Section, see www.abanet.org/family/home.html 

Department of Social Services, see www.state.ma.us/dss/ 

Legal Information Institute's Divorce Law Overview, see www.law.cornell.edu/topics/divorce.html 

Legal Information Institute's Marriage Law Overview, see www.law.cornell.edu/topics/marriage.html 

Probate and Family Court, see www.state.ma.us/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/probateandfamilycourt/ 

CASE NOTES 

1. In general 2. What is "abuse" 3. --Fear of imminent serious physical harm 4. Warrantless arrest 5. Violation of 

order 5.5. Testimony 

1. In general 

ALM GL c 209A provides statutory mechanism by which victims of family or household abuse can enlist aid of 

state to prevent further abuse. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Where man referred to complainant as "former girlfriend," saw her 2-3 times per week, and was sexually active 

with her for 14-month period, "substantive dating relationship" existed for purposes of Abuse Prevention Law. 

Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't (1994) 417 Mass 183, 629 NE2d 295, 1994 Mass LEXIS 87. 

Judge was not required to include language on circumstantial evidence in jury instruction regarding elements of 

abuse. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359. 

Probate Court may issue domestic relations protective order during pendency of divorce proceeding to prohibit 

party from imposing restraint upon personal liberty of other party, to order spouse to vacate marital home, and for 

temporary relief from actual abuse or immediate threats of physical harm. Champagne v. Champagne (1999) 429 Mass 

324, 708 NE2d 100, 1999 Mass LEXIS 136. 

Paternal grandmother of child whose parents were not married is "related by blood" to child's mother, and thus has 

right to invoke protection from domestic abuse under ALM GL c 209A. Turner v. Lewis (2001) 434 Mass 331, 749 

NE2d 122, 2001 Mass LEXIS 329. 

Trial court erred in denying a boy's motion to vacate an order for protection from abuse entered pursuant to ALM 

GL c 209A, § 4; trial court erred in finding that the boy and a girl he allegedly sexually assaulted had engaged in a 

substantive dating relationship as defined by ALM GL c 209A, § 3, and ALM GL c 209A, § 1(e), as the trial court did not

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 6 

apply the four factors provided by ALM GL c 209A, § 1(e)(1)-(4) in determining whether a substantive dating 

relationship existed, and the trial court erred in refusing to allow the boy to present evidence and cross examine 

witnesses at the hearing in question. C.O. v. M.M. (2004) 442 Mass 648, 815 NE2d 582, 2004 Mass LEXIS 665. 

Because the trial court made no specific findings and conclusions of law, the supreme judicial court was unable to 

determine the standard that was applied in denying a girlfriend's motion to extend a protective order under ALM GL c 

209A, § 3; the trial court's sua sponte vacation of the original ALM GL c 209A, § 1 order was error because the only 

issue before it was whether the order should be extended. Iamele v. Asselin (2005) 444 Mass 734, 831 NE2d 324, 2005 

Mass LEXIS 421. 

Where plaintiff lived with her mother and mother's husband for ten years in same household until mother and her 

husband were divorced, plaintiff and former husband "resided in same household" and "were related . . . by marriage" as 

stepfather and stepdaughter within meaning of ALM GL c 209A, § 1(b) and (c). Sorgman v. Sorgman (2000) 49 Mass 

App 416, 729 NE2d 1141, 2000 Mass App LEXIS 470. 

There is no time limitation on application of ALM GL c 209A, §§ 1 and 3, so that stepdaughter who last lived with 

stepfather in same household in 1977, but who continued to have contact and involvement with stepfather, was not 

precluded from seeking protective order under ALM GL c 209A. Sorgman v. Sorgman (2000) 49 Mass App 416, 729 

NE2d 1141, 2000 Mass App LEXIS 470. 

ALM GL c 209A attempts to remedy violence among family or household members; the proceedings are civil in 

nature, and the appellate court accords the trial judge's findings great deference prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 

which may be supplemented by inspection of the transcript. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (2003) 57 Mass App 284, 782 


Appellate court reads conflicting evidence in an ALM GL c 209A proceeding granting relief to the plaintiff in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (2003) 57 Mass App 284, 782 NE2d 1085, 2003 Mass 

App LEXIS 164. 

Court should not issue an ALM GL c 209A order simply because it seems to be a good idea or because it seems it 

will not cause the defendant any real inconvenience as a ALM GL c 209A order will infallibly cause inconvenience; in 

considering whether to issue a ALM GL c 209A order, the judge must focus on whether serious physical harm is 

imminent, and a generalized apprehension does not rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm. 

Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (2003) 57 Mass App 284, 782 NE2d 1085, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 164. 

In considering an application for an ALM GL c 209A order, a judge must be alert against allowing the process to be 

used, as it sometimes is, abusively by litigants for purposes of discovery and harassment. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski 

(2003) 57 Mass App 284, 782 NE2d 1085, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 164. 

Although the judge is entitled to reject the ultimate evaluation of a Department of Social Services social worker, a 

judge, in the exercise of discretion, may consider the factual content of reports as to an investigation into charges of 

abuse and neglect into account in an ALM GL c 209A proceeding. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (2003) 57 Mass App 

284, 782 NE2d 1085, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 164. 

Where the trial judge found that abuse had not occurred but the trial judge extended abuse prevention orders to 

keep plaintiff and the fiance apart pending resolution of a property dispute, the trial judge erred; where abuse under 

ALM GL c 209A, § 1 had not occurred, the remedies under ALM GL c 209A, § 3 were unavailable. Corrado v. Hedrick 


No error occurred when a district court extended an abuse protection order, which a girlfriend had obtained on an 

emergency basis against her boyfriend's son, pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983 Mass. Acts ch.678, 

§ 4). The son had lived with them in the same house for two years, he kept a kept a key to the house after he moved out,

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 7 

he continued to receive his mail and to take showers there, he came and left without making prior arrangements, and on 

several occasions when he entered without permission, he had shoved and threatened her and her children; the son thus 

fit the definition of a "former household member" that was contained in ALM GL c 209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass. 

Acts ch. 403, § 2). Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez (2006) 66 Mass App 367, 848 NE2d 779, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 567. 

In issuing and extending for a year an abuse protection order pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983 

Mass. Acts ch. 678, § 4) against a son on the petition of a girlfriend, who was the girlfriend of the son's father, a district 

court did not abuse its discretion; the son fit within the definition of a "former household member" under ALM GL c 

209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass. Acts ch. 403, § 2), as he had lived with them for two years and had kept a key and 

had continued to use their home after he moved out. The legislature had consistently amended the statute since its 

inception in 1978 and had consistently expanded the definition of a "family or household member" in, § 1, the 

legislature had drafted the statute with a purposeful flexibility, the categories of persons covered under the statute had 

been continually expanded, and a broad and flexible interpretation was appropriate. Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez 


Because the ALM GL c 209A affidavit was factually detailed, based on personal knowledge and observation by the 

source, the statements arose under circumstances that supported the veracity of the source, originated from a 

disinterested witness, and was trustworthy, it was admissible in the probation revocation hearing. Commonwealth v. 

Henderson (2012) 82 Mass App 674, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 269. 

Because a court could issue an order of prevention and protection even without personal jurisdiction over the father, 

who resided in Florida, but could not impose affirmative obligations on the father if there was no personal jurisdiction, 

the order's prohibition against abusing, contacting, or approaching the mother or their child required no personal 

jurisdiction. However, that portion of the order that required the father to surrender his firearms imposed an affirmative 

duty, and such an obligation could only be imposed by a court with personal jurisdiction over the father. accordingly, 

that portion of the order was invalid. Caplan v. Donovan (2008) 450 Mass. 463, 879 NE2d 117, 2008 Mass. LEXIS 16, 

cert den (2008) 170 L. Ed. 2d 817, 128 S. Ct. 2088, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3682. 

2. What is "abuse" 

Party violates order to refrain from abuse when he or she attempts to cause or causes physical harm, places another 

in fear of imminent serious physical harm, or causes another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat 

of force, or duress. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Definition of "abuse" in ALM GL c 209A, § 1, i.e., placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm, 

closely approximates common-law description of crime of assault. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 

553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

There was insufficient evidence that defendant's words carried an indicia of proximate execution of the substantive 

abuse violation of causing physical harm under ALM GL c 209A, § 1(a), to support a finding that he attempted to violate 

the protective order. Commonwealth v. Fortier (2002) 56 Mass App 116, 775 NE2d 785, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 1219. 

Child protective order was vacated as the allegations against the father constituted improper parenting, as opposed 

to inflicting physical harm on the child where the father: (1) told his seven-year-old child about peculiar and frightening 

dreams; (2) tossed a milk container at the child; (3) cuffed the child under the chin in irritation; (4) gave the child a kick 

in the back of her legs while both were in bed, again because he was irritated; and (5) pinched his daughter on the arm 

so that it left a mark. Szymkowski v. Szymkowski (2003) 57 Mass App 284, 782 NE2d 1085, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 164. 

3. --Fear of imminent serious physical harm 

Evidence of defendant's violation of ALM GL c 209A order to refrain from abusing victim was sufficient, where 

jury could find that actions and words of defendant placed victim in reasonable apprehension that physical force might

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 8 

be used against her (defendant drove to front of victim's home, got out of car and yelled obscene language to and made 

obscene gesture at victim and soon thereafter told victim over telephone that he would kill her)]. Commonwealth v. 

Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359. 

Hearsay statements attributed to defendant's son by complainant warranted finding that complainant was in fear of 

imminent serious physical harm from defendant (defendant told son he should use toy sword to slit his mother's throat). 

Flynn v. Warner (1995) 421 Mass 1002, 654 NE2d 926, 1995 Mass LEXIS 358. 

Testimony before District Court was not sufficient to warrant extension of ALM GL c 209A order entered ex parte 

10 days earlier, where complainant's testimony that she suffered emotionally and experienced aggravation of ulcer 

condition as result of receiving defendant's notices of lawsuit and court proceedings did not constitute threat of serious 

physical harm or "abuse;" petition for relief under ALM GL c 211, § 3 should have been allowed. Larkin v. Ayer Div. of 

the Dist. Court Dep't (1997) 425 Mass 1020, 681 NE2d 817, 1997 Mass LEXIS 174. 

Where the third party and ex-girlfriend found a hidden video camera in the ex-girlfriend's bedroom in a clock 

installed by the ex-boyfriend and the ex-boyfriend left an answering machine message with the ex-girlfriend denying 

the installation of the camera and stating that had the ex-boyfriend installed the camera the ex-girlfriend would not have 

found it, the trial court erred in issuing a protective order against the ex-boyfriend and any record of the order was to be 

destroyed pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 7; although the ex-boyfriend allegedly had a temper, joked that the 

ex-boyfriend could have someone taken care of, and had guns, there was nothing in the record that showed a history of 

violence, threats, or hostility between the parties that would have objectively placed the ex-girlfriend in fear of 

imminent serious physical harm pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 1. Keene v. Gangi (2004) 60 Mass App 667, 805 NE2d 

77, 2004 Mass App LEXIS 299. 

Plaintiff established her and her 14-year-old son's reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm from 

defendant with evidence that defendant spent eight years in prison for raping two of the parties' other children, 

physically and sexually assaulted plaintiff, engaged in ominously controlling and wrathful behavior towards his family 

while in prison, and after his release planned to live in the same general area as plaintiff and the son. Vittone v. 

Clairmont (2005) 64 Mass App 479, 834 NE2d 258, 2005 Mass App LEXIS 852, review denied Vittone v. Clairmont 

(2005) 445 Mass 1106, 836 NE2d 1096, 2005 Mass LEXIS 633. 

Trial court did not err in issuing an ex parte abuse prevention order pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 against the 

fiance and son, as both of them, who resided with plaintiff, were household members under ALM GL c 209A, § 1, the 

fiance and plaintiff were in a substantive dating relationship, and plaintiff's affidavits established a sufficient factual 

basis for the conclusion that the fiance and son had caused plaintiff physical harm or placed plaintiff in fear of imminent 

serious physical harm. Corrado v. Hedrick (2006) 65 Mass App 477, 841 NE2d 723, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 80. 

Permanent protective order was improperly entered under ALM GL c 209A as a boyfriend's improper behavior was 

directly tied to his refusal in the immediate aftermath of a breakup to accept that his lengthy romantic relationship was 

over and that the girlfriend preferred to stay with her husband; nothing suggested that the boyfriend's intensity persisted 

for the two-year period between the date of the original order and when the girlfriend sought the permanent order. 

Smith v. Jones (2009) 75 Mass App 540, 915 NE2d 260, 2009 Mass. App. LEXIS 1280. 

4. Warrantless arrest 

ALM GL c 209A, permitting warrantless arrest for certain misdemeanors in context of domestic abuse (including 

placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm) could not be relied on to justify warrantless arrest of 

defendant for making threats, where record did not establish that defendant's threats constituted "abuse" as defined by 

statute. Commonwealth v. Jacobsen (1995) 419 Mass 269, 644 NE2d 213, 1995 Mass LEXIS 1. 

If police officers has reason to believe that defendant's conduct with respect to person protected under ALM GL c 

209A placed person in fear of imminent serious physical harm, warrantless arrest for assault may be made.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 1 

Page 9 

Commonwealth v. Jacobsen (1995) 419 Mass 269, 644 NE2d 213, 1995 Mass LEXIS 1. 

Officers had probable cause to submit request for plaintiff's arrest for assault and battery, even though plaintiff 

suggests that "probable cause" analysis went afoul when officers erroneously obtained temporary protective order for 

victim stripper under ALM GL c 209A, § 1(e) since plaintiff and stripper were not involved in "substantive dating 

relationship," because, while choice to seek ALM GL c 209A order may well have contributed to same sense of gravity 

that informed decision to arrest, wisdom of obtaining ex parte restraining order has no bearing on question of whether 

police had probable cause to arrest. White v. Town of Marblehead (1997) 989 F Supp 345, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 20902. 

5. Violation of order 

Mother's conduct, threatening the father through his attorney with economic harm unless her demands in a custody 

suit were met, violated a ALM GL c 209A no contact order. As a result, the judge did not err in holding the mother in 

contempt. L.F. v. L.J. (2008) 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 571. 

Since a father claimed that a mother's actions in a New Jersey proceeding violated the integrity of a Massachusetts 

order, that claim was properly addressed by a Massachusetts court; thus, the trial judge correctly denied the mother's 

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the father's complaint for civil contempt in violating a ALM GL 

c 209A order. L.F. v. L.J. (2008) 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 571. 

5.5. Testimony 

Trial court impermissibly prevented plaintiff from calling defendant as a witness at the hearing on an application 

for a ALM GL c 209A abuse prevention order because defendant never asserted a privilege not to testify, and trial court 

did not inquire if defendant chose to do so; it was not the trial court's prerogative to make that choice for him. S.T. v. 

E.M. (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 1192.

Page 10 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 2 (2012) 

§ 2. Venue. 

Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard and determined in the superior court department or the Boston 

municipal court department or respective divisions of the probate and family or district court departments having venue 

over the plaintiff's residence. If the plaintiff has left a residence or household to avoid abuse, such plaintiff shall have 

the option of commencing an action in the court having venue over such prior residence or household, or in the court 

having venue over the present residence or household. 

HISTORY: 1978, 447, § 2; 1983, 678, § 3. 


The 1983 amendment rewrote this section, inserting the Boston municipal and family court departments, and 

adding language further specifying venue in the case where a plaintiff has left a residence to avoid abuse. 


Venue, generally, ALM GL c 223, §§ 1-15. 

Jurisprudence 


Annotations 


ALR4th 756.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 2 

Page 11 




Cross, Fleischner, Elder, Guardianship and Conservatorship in Massachusetts, 2d Ed. (Michie) § 9.02. 

Harvey, Moriarty, Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 2d Ed. (Michie) §§ 4.10, 9.05, 51:2, Form 208. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 11.2.3, Abuse Prevention. 

Law Reviews 






2007). 












CASE NOTES 

Appellate Division of District Court Department lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review ALM GL c 209A cases 

in District Courts. Burrill v. Burrill (1993) 1993 Mass App Div 178, 1993 Mass App Div LEXIS 63. 



did not inquire if defendant chose to do so; it was not the trial court's prerogative to make that choice for him. S.T. v.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 2 

Page 12 

E.M. (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 1192.

Page 13 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 (2012) 

§ 3. Remedies Available Through Order for Protection From Abuse. 

A person suffering from abuse from an adult or minor family or household member may file a complaint in the court 

requesting protection from such abuse, including, but not limited to, the following orders: 

(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether the defendant is an adult or minor; 

(b) ordering the defendant to refrain from contacting the plaintiff, unless authorized by the court, whether the 

defendant is an adult or minor; 

(c) ordering the defendant to vacate forthwith and remain away from the household, multiple family dwelling, 

and workplace. Notwithstanding the provisions of section thirty-four B of chapter two hundred and eight, an order to 

vacate shall be for a fixed period of time, not to exceed one year, at the expiration of which time the court may extend 

any such order upon motion of the plaintiff, with notice to the defendant, for such additional time as it deems necessary 

to protect the plaintiff from abuse; 

(d) awarding the plaintiff temporary custody of a minor child; provided, however, that in any case brought in the 

probate and family court a finding by such court by a preponderance of the evidence that a pattern or serious incident of 

abuse, as defined in section 31A of chapter 208, toward a parent or child has occurred shall create a rebuttable 

presumption that it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed in sole custody, shared legal custody or shared 

physical custody with the abusive parent. Such presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that 

such custody award is in the best interests of the child. For the purposes of this section, an "abusive parent" shall mean a 

parent who has committed a pattern of abuse or a serious incident of abuse; 

For the purposes of this section, the issuance of an order or orders under chapter 209A shall not in and of itself 

constitute a pattern or serious incident of abuse; nor shall an order or orders entered ex parte under said chapter 209A be 

admissible to show whether a pattern or serious incident of abuse has in fact occurred; provided, however, that an order

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 14 

or orders entered ex parte under said chapter 209A may be admissible for other purposes as the court may determine, 

other than showing whether a pattern or serious incident of abuse has in fact occurred; provided further, that the 

underlying facts upon which an order or orders under said chapter 209A was based may also form the basis for a finding 

by the probate and family court that a pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred. 

If the court finds that a pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred and issues a temporary or permanent 

custody order, the court shall within 90 days enter written findings of fact as to the effects of the abuse on the child, 

which findings demonstrate that such order is in the furtherance of the child's best interests and provides for the safety 

and well-being of the child. 

If ordering visitation to the abusive parent, the court shall provide for the safety and well-being of the child and 

the safety of the abused parent. The court may consider: 

party; 

(a) ordering an exchange of the child to occur in a protected setting or in the presence of an appropriate third 

(b) ordering visitation supervised by an appropriate third party, visitation center or agency; 

(c) ordering the abusive parent to attend and complete, to the satisfaction of the court, a certified batterer's 

treatment program as a condition of visitation; 

(d) ordering the abusive parent to abstain from possession or consumption of alcohol or controlled substances 

during the visitation and for 24 hours preceding visitation; 

(e) ordering the abusive parent to pay the costs of supervised visitation; 

(f) prohibiting overnight visitation; 

(g) requiring a bond from the abusive parent for the return and safety of the child; 

(h) ordering an investigation or appointment of a guardian ad litem or attorney for the child; and 

(i) imposing any other condition that is deemed necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the child 

and the safety of the abused parent. 

Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the right of the parties to a hearing under the rules of domestic 

relations procedure or to affect the discretion of the probate and family court in the conduct of such hearing. 

(e) ordering the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or any child in the plaintiff's custody or both, 

when the defendant has a legal obligation to support such a person. In determining the amount to be paid, the court shall 

apply the standards established in the child support guidelines. Each judgment or order of support which is issued, 

reviewed or modified pursuant to this chapter shall conform to and shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions 

of section 12 of chapter 119A; 

(f) ordering the defendant to pay the person abused monetary compensation for the losses suffered as a direct 

result of such abuse. Compensatory losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings or support, costs for 

restoring utilities, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, replacement costs for locks or personal property removed 

or destroyed, medical and moving expenses and reasonable attorney's fees; 

(g) ordering information in the case record to be impounded in accordance with court rule; 

(h) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing or contacting the plaintiff's child, or child in plaintiff's care or 

custody, unless authorized by the court;

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 15 

(i) the judge may recommend to the defendant that the defendant attend a batterer's intervention program that is 

certified by the department of public health. 

No filing fee shall be charged for the filing of the complaint. Neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's attorney shall be 

charged for certified copies of any orders entered by the court, or any copies of the file reasonably required for future 

court action or as a result of the loss or destruction of plaintiff's copies. 

Any relief granted by the court shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year. Every order shall on its 

face state the time and date the order is to expire and shall include the date and time that the matter will again be heard. 

If the plaintiff appears at the court at the date and time the order is to expire, the court shall determine whether or not to 

extend the order for any additional time reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff or to enter a permanent order. 

When the expiration date stated on the order is on a weekend day or holiday, or a date when the court is closed to 

business, the order shall not expire until the next date that the court is open to business. The plaintiff may appear on 

such next court business day at the time designated by the order to request that the order be extended. The court may 

also extend the order upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it deems necessary to protect from abuse 

the plaintiff or any child in the plaintiff's care or custody. The fact that abuse has not occurred during the pendency of 

an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend the order, of allowing an order 

to expire or be vacated, or for refusing to issue a new order. 

The court may modify its order at any subsequent time upon motion by either party. When the plaintiff's address is 

inaccessible to the defendant as provided in section 8 of this chapter and the defendant has filed a motion to modify the 

court's order, the court shall be responsible for notifying the plaintiff. In no event shall the court disclose any such 

inaccessible address. 

No order under this chapter shall in any manner affect title to real property. 

No court shall compel parties to mediate any aspect of their case. Although the court may refer the case to the 

family service office of the probation department or victim/witness advocates for information gathering purposes, the 

court shall not compel the parties to meet together in such information gathering sessions. 

A court shall not deny any complaint filed under this chapter solely because it was not filed within a particular time 

period after the last alleged incident of abuse. 

A court may issue a mutual restraining order or mutual no-contact order pursuant to any abuse prevention action 

only if the court has made specific written findings of fact. The court shall then provide a detailed order, sufficiently 

specific to apprise any law officer as to which party has violated the order, if the parties are in or appear to be in 

violation of the order. 

Any action commenced under the provisions of this chapter shall not preclude any other civil or criminal remedies. 

A party filing a complaint under this chapter shall be required to disclose any prior or pending actions involving the 

parties for divorce, annulment, paternity, custody or support, guardianship, separate support or legal separation, or 

abuse prevention. 

If there is a prior or pending custody support order from the probate and family court department of the trial court, 

an order issued in the superior, district or Boston municipal court departments of the trial court pursuant to this chapter 

may include any relief available pursuant to this chapter except orders for custody or support. 

If the parties to a proceeding under this chapter are parties in a subsequent proceeding in the probate and family 

court department for divorce, annulment, paternity, custody or support, guardianship or separate support, any custody or 

support order or judgment issued in the subsequent proceeding shall supersede any prior custody or support order under 

this chapter.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 16 

HISTORY: 1978, 447, § 2; 1983, 678, § 4; 1990, 403, § 3; 1998, 64, § 204; 1998, 179, § 5; 1999, 127, § 155; 2000, 

236, §§ 22, 23, 2002, 184, § 113. 


Acts 1978, 447, § 2, enacted this section. Section 6 provides: 

Section 6. The chief justice of the superior court and the chief judge of the probate court and the chief justice of the 

district courts shall jointly promulgate a form of petition for chapter two hundred and nine A of the General Laws, 

inserted by section one of this act, which shall be simple and permit a person to file a petition himself. 

The 1983 amendment rewrote this section, making, among others, the following changes: (1) adding language to 

clause (b) relative to the duration of an order to vacate the household; (2) adding clause (f) relative to the impounding of 

plaintiff's address; (3) adding a sentence to the second paragraph providing that plaintiff shall not be charged for copies 

of orders entered by the court; (4) adding a sentence to the fifth paragraph requiring the complaining party to disclose 

any prior or pending divorce actions; and (5) adding two new paragraphs to the end of the section relative to procedures 

to be followed where there exists a prior or pending order for divorce. 

The 1990 amendment rewrote this section. Sections 14 through 16 provide: 













absence of approved guidelines, the law enforcement agency shall implement said policy. 









of guidelines under this section. The department of public health shall thereafter certify and monitor batterer's treatment 

programs according to the standards established and promulgated by the commission. Programs so certified shall be the 

only batterer's treatment programs appropriate for court referrals. 

The first 1998 amendment, (ch 64), in the first paragraph, revised subparagraph (e). 

The second 1998 amendment, (ch 179), in the first paragraph, rewrote subparagraph (d). 

The 1999 amendment in paragraph (g) of the first paragraph, substituted "8" for "nine".

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 17 

The 2000 amendment, effective Sept 28, 2000, by § 22, substituted paragraph (g) of the first paragraph, which 

formerly read: "ordering the plaintiff's address to be impounded as provided in section 8" and by § 23, substituted the 

fourth paragraph of paragraph (i) of the first paragraph, which formerly read: "The court may modify its order at any 

subsequent time upon motion by either party. When the plaintiff's address is impounded and the defendant has filed a 

motion to modify the court's order, the court shall be responsible for notifying the plaintiff. In no event shall the court 

disclose any impounded address." Section 100 provides: 

Section 100. Sections 22, 23 and 24 shall apply to complaints filed pursuant to chapter 209A of the General Laws, 

on or after 90 days following enactment. 

The 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, in paragraph (i) of the first paragraph, substituted "batterer's 

intervention program that is certified by the department of public health" for "recognized batterer's treatment program." 


Age limitation as to reports concerning abused and neglected children, ALM GL c 119, § 51A. 

Abuse of child under 16 years of age, ALM GL c 265, § 23. 

Penalty for committing crime of stalking in violation of order or judgment issued pursuant to this section, ALM GL 

c 265, § 43. 

Jurisprudence 


33 Am Jur Proof of Facts 3d 303, Proving Child Sexual Abuse in Custody or Visitation Dispute. 

Annotations 

Admissibility of expert medical testimony on battered child syndrome. 98 ALR3d 306. 


ALR4th 756. 




CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 6.180, Assault and Battery on a Person 

Protected by an Abuse Prevention Order. 

CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 6.360, Assault and Battery with a Dangerous 

Weapon on a Person Protected by an Abuse Prevention Order. 

CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 6.680, Stalking. 

Cross, Fleischner, Elder, Guardianship and Conservatorship in Massachusetts, 2d Ed. (Michie) § 9.02. 

Harvey, Moriarty, Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 2d Ed. (Michie) §§ 4.11, 4.16, 6.02, 9.02, 17.01, 

22:12, 22:17, 22:27-22:38, 22:44-22:46, 51:2, Form 208.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 18 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 3.2.3, Current Use. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 10.2.3, Chapter 209A: Abuse Prevention. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 11.2.3, Abuse Prevention. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.2.1, Defining and Proving Domestic Violence. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.4.2, Mutual Restraining Order Actions Filed by Batterers. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.5.1, The Rebuttable Presumption Against Custody to Domestic 

Abuse Perpetrators. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.5.3, The Threshold of Abuse to Trigger the Presumption and 

Related Issues. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.7.2, The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof at the Renewal Hearing. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.7.3, Attorney Fees in Chapter 209A Actions. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.7, Renewal of Protective Orders. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.10, Litigation Strategy and the Future of Our Clients. 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual Exhibit 3M, Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution. 

Massachusetts Guardianship and Conservatorship § 8.2.2, Private Custody Actions. 

Law Reviews 

Domestic Violence. The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law (2012). 

Saperstein, Teen Dating Violence: Eliminating Statutory Barriers to Civil Protection Orders. 39 Fam. L.Q. 181 

(Spring, 2005). 

Gonzalez and Reichmann, Representing Children in Civil Cases Involving Domestic Violence. 39 Fam. L.Q. 197 

(Spring, 2005). 










Kohn, Why Doesn't She Leave The Collision of First Amendment Rights and Effective Court Remedies for Victims

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 19 

of Domestic Violence. 29 Hastings Const LQ 1 (Fall, 2001). 




Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect. 

50 Loy L Rev 565. 



2007). 







Balos, Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in the Civil Context: Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for 

Appointed Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings. 15 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 557 (Summer, 2006). 










CASE NOTES 

ALM GL c 209A, § 3 is clear legislative statement of public policy which is of assistance in construing 1974 

revision of rape statutes to eliminate common law spousal exclusion. Commonwealth v. [Name Redacted] (1981) 383 

Mass 123, 417 NE2d 1203, 1981 Mass LEXIS 1142. 

Evidence of restraining order requiring defendant-husband to vacate marital home issued more than 7 months

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 20 

before wife was murdered was admissible as showing continued hostility between husband and wife and motive for 

husband to murder wife. Commonwealth v. Gil (1984) 393 Mass 204, 471 NE2d 30, 1984 Mass LEXIS 1787. 

Orders issued by court for protection from family abuse are for fixed period not to exceed one year but may be 

extended if needed. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Only violation of order to refrain from abuse or to vacate household represents criminal offense. Commonwealth v. 

Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Defendant ordered to "vacate" marital home must not only surrender legal occupancy but must remain away 

without right to enter at any time. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 

197. 

Plaintiff could invoke ALM GL c 211, § 3 to review issuance of restraining order under ALM GL c 209A, since 

ALM GL c 209A provided no express appellate remedy from issuance of restraining order by Municipal or District 

Court. Callahan v. Boston Municipal Court Dep't (1992) 413 Mass 1009, 604 NE2d 1287, 1992 Mass LEXIS 622. 

Municipal Court was proper party defendant in plaintiff's proceeding under ALM GL c 211, § 3 to review issuance 

of restraining order under ALM GL c 209A, where plaintiff alleged that court personnel denied her access to tape 

recordings of court proceedings; tapes ordered released to plaintiff. Callahan v. Boston Municipal Court Dep't (1992) 

413 Mass 1009, 604 NE2d 1287, 1992 Mass LEXIS 622. 

Even if complainant signed notice of voluntary dismissal several months after protective order had issued and wrote 

letter to court asking court to dismiss order, no judicial action was taken on request for voluntary dismissal and order 

therefore was not vacated. Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't (1994) 417 Mass 183, 629 NE2d 

295, 1994 Mass LEXIS 87. 

There is no statutory or constitutional requirement that ALM GL c 209A complainant's affidavit in support of 

issuance of complaint be served on defendant with order. Flynn v. Warner (1995) 421 Mass 1002, 654 NE2d 926, 1995 


Without legislative change, only route of appeal from District Court's ALM GL c 209A order is to seek relief from 

Single Justice of Supreme Judicial Court, and then, if necessary, from full court. Flynn v. Warner (1995) 421 Mass 

1002, 654 NE2d 926, 1995 Mass LEXIS 358. 

Order entered in ALM GL c 209A abuse prevention proceeding is not interlocutory order of trial court subject to 

SJC Rule 2:21. Parekh v. Parekh (1996) 421 Mass 1009, 659 NE2d 740, 1996 Mass LEXIS 9. 

Failure to serve defendant with copy of extended abuse prevention order did not deprive District Court of subject 

matter jurisdiction and was not required before defendant could be convicted of violating order, where defendant was 

served with temporary order at his last and usual place of abode and that order warned that if he failed to appear 

extended order may remain in effect. Commonwealth v. Delaney (1997) 425 Mass 587, 682 NE2d 611, 1997 Mass 

LEXIS 187, cert den (1998) 522 US 1058, 139 L Ed 2d 655, 118 S Ct 714, 1998 US LEXIS 216. 

Complainant's testimony was insufficient to support issuance of ALM GL c 209A order against complainant's 

former husband and father of her two children, where former husband was incarcerated for kidnapping of complainant 

during time complainant alleged she was placed in fear of imminent serious physical harm, and complainant's fear that 

former husband knew of her home and work addresses or of children's school address did not constitute abuse. Jordan 

v. Clerk of the Westfield Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't (1997) 425 Mass 1016, 681 NE2d 276, 1997 Mass LEXIS 156. 

Testimony before District Court was not sufficient to warrant extension of 209A order entered ex parte 10 days 

earlier, where complainant's testimony that she suffered emotionally and experienced aggravation of ulcer condition as

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 21 

result of receiving defendant's notices of lawsuit and court proceedings did not constitute threat of serious physical harm 

or "abuse;" petition for relief under ALM GL c 211, § 3 should have been allowed. Larkin v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. 

Court Dep't (1997) 425 Mass 1020, 681 NE2d 817, 1997 Mass LEXIS 174. 

Probate Court may issue domestic relations protective order during pendency of divorce proceeding to prohibit 

party from imposing restraint upon personal liberty of other party, to order spouse to vacate marital home, and for 

temporary relief from actual abuse or immediate threats of physical harm. Champagne v. Champagne (1999) 429 Mass 

324, 708 NE2d 100, 1999 Mass LEXIS 136. 

Probate and Family Court has authority to issue or extend permanent protective orders in final judgments to 

married parties, separated parties, and unmarried parties with children. Champagne v. Champagne (1999) 429 Mass 

324, 708 NE2d 100, 1999 Mass LEXIS 136. 

Judge in District Court or any court with jurisdiction of request for protective order is empowered to issue 

permanent protective order at renewal hearing. Crenshaw v. Macklin (2000) 430 Mass 633, 722 NE2d 458, 2000 Mass 

LEXIS 12. 

District Court judge erred in ruling that she had no power to issue permanent protective order at renewal hearing 

and in refusing to entertain request for such order; case remanded for reconsideration. Crenshaw v. Macklin (2000) 430 

Mass 633, 722 NE2d 458, 2000 Mass LEXIS 12. 

Paternal grandmother of child whose parents were not married is "related by blood" to child's mother, and thus has 

right to invoke protection from domestic abuse under ALM GL c 209A. Turner v. Lewis (2001) 434 Mass 331, 749 

NE2d 122, 2001 Mass LEXIS 329. 



substantive dating relationship as defined by ALM GL c 209A, § 3, and ALM GL c 209A, § 1(e), as the trial court did not 




Evidence consisting of assault victim's affidavit in support of application for 209A abuse prevention order and 

order, both identifying defendant as assailant, and police officer's serving of order on defendant were not admissible in 

prosecution for assault and battery under judicial notice doctrine or official records exception to hearsay rule, where 

victim was available, did not testify, and was not subject to cross-examination; conviction violated article 12 of 

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.Commonwealth v. Kirk (1995) 39 Mass App 225, 654 NE2d 938, 1995 Mass App 

LEXIS 754. 

Findings of District Court judge were insufficient to justify revocation of defendant's probation imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to violating ALM GL c 209A protective order, where only evidence was that another court had revoked 

probation for unknown violations on unknown dates. Commonwealth v. Michaels (1996) 39 Mass App 646, 659 NE2d 


Judge's order for defendant not to "contact" former girlfriend in person, by telephone, in writing, or otherwise was 

not unconstitutionally vague. Commonwealth v. Butler (1996) 40 Mass App 906, 661 NE2d 666, 1996 Mass App LEXIS 

99. 

Defendant who arranged for flowers to be sent to former girlfriend violated "no contact" order. Commonwealth v. 

Butler (1996) 40 Mass App 906, 661 NE2d 666, 1996 Mass App LEXIS 99. 

Protestations of "nonhostile intent" or "desire to make amends" are irrelevant to enforcement of no-contact order.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 22 

Commonwealth v. Butler (1996) 40 Mass App 906, 661 NE2d 666, 1996 Mass App LEXIS 99. 

Defendant's motion for required finding of not guilty on charge of violating extended ALM GL c 209A order 

should have been allowed because Commonwealth failed to establish that defendant was served with copy of order or 

had actual knowledge of its existence and terms. Commonwealth v. Molloy (1998) 44 Mass App 306, 690 NE2d 836, 

1998 Mass App LEXIS 29, review denied (1998) 427 Mass 1107, 699 NE2d 851, 1998 Mass LEXIS 452. 

Domestic protective order may contain one or more of following restraints: (a) refrain from abusing complainant; 

(b) refrain from contacting complainant; and (c) vacate forthwith and remain away from household, multiple family 

dwelling, and workplace. Commonwealth v. Johnson (1998) 45 Mass App 473, 700 NE2d 270, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 

1031. 

Where domestic protective order forbade defendant from abusing complainant but judge's instructions to jury stated 

that Commonwealth had to prove that defendant violated order by abusing and/or contacting her, instruction was 

erroneous, and although defendant did not object to instruction, error created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice in 

light of admitted evidence that while incarcerated defendant sent complainant over 300 letters. Commonwealth v. 

Johnson (1998) 45 Mass App 473, 700 NE2d 270, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1031. 

Three convictions of defendant for threatening to commit crime (murder, assault and battery, and malicious damage 

to property) were not duplicative of conviction of violation of domestic protective order, and judge could impose 

consecutive sentences on each threatening charge to run on and after two and one-half year sentence for violating 

protective order. Commonwealth v. Johnson (1998) 45 Mass App 473, 700 NE2d 270, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1031. 

Evidence from complainant that defendant had physically abused her at least eight or nine times previously was 

admissible at trial of defendant for violating domestic protective order because it was probative of defendant's hostility 

toward complainant and his pattern of acting on that hostility and of complainant's fear that defendant would harm her. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson (1998) 45 Mass App 473, 700 NE2d 270, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1031. 

"No contact" provision in abuse prevention order did not violate defendant's right of free speech. Commonwealth v. 

Thompson (1998) 45 Mass App 523, 699 NE2d 847, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1040, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1108, 

707 NE2d 366, 1998 Mass LEXIS 739. 

Where judge realized need for former wife to establish that she feared imminent serious physical harm from former 

husband and transcript contained inaudible portions of former wife's testimony that may have described her fear of 

repeat of past physical harm, appellate court would not disturb judge's issuance of protective order, especially since as 

appellant former husband did not furnish appellate court with all evidence and did not utilize procedure to repair 

inaudible portions of transcript. Wooldridge v. Hickey (1998) 45 Mass App 637, 700 NE2d 296, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 

1112. 

Where evidence was that former husband subjected children to verbal harassment and hit son and grabbed him 

when angry, evidence of imminent serious physical harm to children was lacking; order for former husband to stay 

away from children vacated. Wooldridge v. Hickey (1998) 45 Mass App 637, 700 NE2d 296, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 

1112. 

Where judge conducted evidentiary hearings and took evidence from both parties before making 209A restraining 

order permanent, defendant was not denied fair hearing. Pike v. Maguire (1999) 47 Mass App 929, 716 NE2d 686, 

1999 Mass App LEXIS 1081. 

Permanent extension of 209A abuse prevention order was justified by former wife's genuine fear of defendant for 

five years, which arose from defendant's past abusive acts, recent smashing of windshield of family car, and defendant's 

agitated conduct in court. Pike v. Maguire (1999) 47 Mass App 929, 716 NE2d 686, 1999 Mass App LEXIS 1081.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 23 

Past as well as present relationships are within ambit of ALM GL c 209A, § 3. Sorgman v. Sorgman (2000) 49 

Mass App 416, 729 NE2d 1141, 2000 Mass App LEXIS 470. 

Where plaintiff lived with her mother and mother's husband for ten years in same household until mother and her 

husband were divorced, plaintiff and former husband "resided in same household" and "were related . . . by marriage" as 

stepfather and stepdaughter within meaning of ALM GL c 209A, § 1(b) and (c). Sorgman v. Sorgman (2000) 49 Mass 

App 416, 729 NE2d 1141, 2000 Mass App LEXIS 470. 

There is no time limitation on application of ALM GL c 209A, §§ 1 and 3, so that stepdaughter who last lived with 

stepfather in same household in 1977, but who continued to have contact and involvement with stepfather, was not 

precluded from seeking protective order under ALM GL c 209A. Sorgman v. Sorgman (2000) 49 Mass App 416, 729 


Modification of custody or support order in divorce action does not operate to modify orders in 209A proceeding 

which were entered to protect plaintiff from defendant's abuse. Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 

NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1102, 751 NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275. 

If there is preexisting order of Probate and Family Court relative to custody or support, Superior Court, District 

Court, or Boston Municipal Court must abstain in 209A proceeding from making orders concerning custody and 

support. Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied 


Where probate judge in divorce action issued visitation order which did not specifically modify existing 209A order 

issued by Probate Court against husband and was not inconsistent with 209A order, latter order was not modified. 

Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 


If orders entered in 209A proceeding and another action in Probate Court are inconsistent, protections afforded by 

209A order will take precedence over orders for custody or visitation entered in other proceeding. Commonwealth v. 

Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1102, 751 

NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275. 

Judge was warranted in concluding that there was continued need for abuse prevention order and did not err in 

extending order beyond initial one-year period, where defendant persisted in contacting wife although prohibited by 

order from doing so and wife testified that she continued to be extremely afraid of defendant. Rauseo v. Rauseo (2001) 

50 Mass App 911, 740 NE2d 1063, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 9, review denied Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 434 Mass 

1103, 751 NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275. 

Where one home occupant successfully sought protective order against two other occupants in Orleans District 

Court and a few days later two occupants sought protective order against individual occupant in Plymouth District 

Court, orders were "mutual" and judge in Plymouth Court was required to make specific written findings of fact; 

restraining orders issued by Plymouth court vacated for failure of judge to make findings of fact. Sommi v. Ayer (2001) 

51 Mass App 207, 744 NE2d 679, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 210. 

In issuing mutual protective order, judge is required to set forth bases for concluding that mutual abuse occurred 

and that reciprocal order is warranted. Sommi v. Ayer (2001) 51 Mass App 207, 744 NE2d 679, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 

210. 

Purpose of requiring judge to provide specific written findings of fact when mutual restraining order or no-contact 

order is to be issued is to ensure that judge will carefully consider evidence presented to determine who is real victim 

and aggressor in abusive relationship and if mutual order is warranted. Sommi v. Ayer (2001) 51 Mass App 207, 744 

NE2d 679, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 210.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 24 

Judge properly excluded evidence offered by defendant that clerk-magistrate had declined to issue process on 

earlier complaint arising out of similar conduct by defendant, i.e., his effort to telephone daughter at former wife's 

residence, inasmuch as order clearly prohibited defendant from contacting wife by telephone and what defendant may 

have thought order meant was irrelevant. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass 


Where defendant was on notice that on February 6, 1998 judge of District Court had extended protective order on 

permanent basis, there could be no reasonable doubt on his part that order prohibited him from calling his former wife 

on April 21, 1999. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761. 

Complaints for violation of 209A protective orders are not immune from requirement of show-cause hearing under 

ALM GL c 218, § 35A, but notice and opportunity to be heard need not be provided if one of three exceptions set forth 

in § 35A applies. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761. 

Applications for retaliatory abuse prevention orders were only allowed if the predicate conditions were shown and 

not as a prophylactic agent to prevent putative violations; neither ALM GL c 209A, nor the decisions interpreting it, 

contained any authority allowing the fear of arrest, even upon innocent contact, as a basis for a reciprocal restraining 

order. Uttaro v. Uttaro (2002) 54 Mass App 871, 768 NE2d 600, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 736. 

Woman who had previously been granted a one-year abuse prevention order could automatically obtain a 

permanent order without establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that without such an order she would be in 

danger. Jones v. Gallagher (2002) 54 Mass App 883, 768 NE2d 1088, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 745. 

Given a husband's history of assaults upon the husband's wife and the husband's conviction for illegal possession of 

a machine gun, trial court did not exceed its discretion by ordering the husband to stay at least 500 yards away from the 

wife and 1 mile away from the wife's home. Litchfield v. Litchfield (2002) 55 Mass App 354, 770 NE2d 554, 2002 Mass 


The 29-year-old daughter did not present any evidence that abuse might resume if the protective order were not 

issued; her "generalized apprehension" based on past abuse by her mother was insufficient to justify issuance of a 

restraining order. Dollan v. Dollan (2002) 55 Mass App 905, 771 NE2d 825, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 985. 

Trial court erred in issuing a protective order where there was no evidence that defendant threatened plaintiff, either 

implicitly or explicitly, with physical harm and plaintiff's subjective and unspecified fear was an insufficient basis for 

the order. Carroll v. Kartell (2002) 56 Mass App 83, 775 NE2d 457, 2002 Mass App LEXIS 1213. 

Denial of an ex-wife's request for a permanent order was vacated, and remanded as it was error to refuse, on the 

basis of personal preference or philosophy, a request to give consideration to a permanent order permitted by the law. 

Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen (2003) 57 Mass App 746, 785 NE2d 1285, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 430. 

Permanent protective order was granted against two abusers who had allegedly threatened the victim's life, anally 

raped him, and abused him, where there was sufficient credible evidence to support such an order and where it was clear 

that the victim was still in fear of the abusers; it did not matter that a grand jury had not indicted the abusers on the anal 

rape charge, nor that the victim had not been in contact with the abusers for more than two years. Doe v. Keller (2003) 


Defendant's convictions for violation of a no contact order were upheld where defendant contended that the 

comments he made about his ex-wife were not directed to her, but rather, were directed to a passenger in his vehicle, as 

one could not undermine a no contact order by simple expedient of ricocheting prohibited comments off third persons; 

the legislature rationally concluded that prohibiting contact, whether or not the contact was itself abusive, sometimes 

might be necessary to reduce the likelihood that abuse would occur, under ALM GL c 209A, §§ 3(b), 7. Commonwealth 

v. Consoli (2003) 58 Mass App 734, 792 NE2d 1007, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 831, review denied (2003) 440 Mass 1103,

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 25 

797 NE2d 379, 2003 Mass LEXIS 777. 

Standard for determining whether prospective relief from a ALM GL c 209A order is warranted must be a flexible 

one under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60(b)(5); the level of impact on the underlying risk from harm that a ALM GL c 209A 

order seeks to protect against will vary from case to case. Mitchell v. Mitchell (2005) 62 Mass App 769, 821 NE2d 79, 


Abuse prevention order, entered after a hearing that satisfies due process requirements, should be set aside only in 

the most extraordinary circumstances and where it has been clearly and convincingly established that the order is no 

longer needed to protect the victim from harm or the reasonable fear of serious harm; furthermore, if the judge 

determines that it is appropriate to allow a motion to vacate or terminate a ALM GL c 209A order, the decision should 

be supported by findings of fact. Mitchell v. Mitchell (2005) 62 Mass App 769, 821 NE2d 79, 2005 Mass App LEXIS 

36. 

With regard to prospective relief, a husband's motion to vacate an abuse prevention order was improperly granted 

because the wife's voluntary contact with the husband regarding family pets and a funeral was insufficient to show that 

the order was not needed to protect the wife from harm or the threat of serious harm. Mitchell v. Mitchell (2005) 62 


Motion that seeks to vacate retroactively an order issued under ALM GL c 209A on the ground of newly 

discovered evidence cannot properly be granted unless it is found that the evidence relied on was not available to the 

party seeking relief for introduction at the original trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and that such evidence is 

material not only in the sense that it is relevant and admissible but also in the sense that it is important evidence of such 

a nature that it likely would have affected the result had it been available at the time. Mitchell v. Mitchell (2005) 62 


With regard to retroactive relief from an abuse prevention order, a trial court improperly granted a husband's 

motion to vacate because, even if a wife's voluntary contact with the husband concerning pets and a funeral amounted to 

newly discovered evidence, a new trial was not warranted based on the fact that the evidence merely impeached the 

wife's credibility. Mitchell v. Mitchell (2005) 62 Mass App 769, 821 NE2d 79, 2005 Mass App LEXIS 36. 

Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a permanent restraining order barring defendant from having contact 

with plaintiff or the parties' 14-year-old son after his release from prison, as he spent eight years in prison for raping two 

of the parties' children, had physically and sexually assaulted plaintiff, engaged in ominously controlling and wrathful 

behavior towards his family while in prison, and upon his release, planned to live in the same general area as plaintiff 

and the son. Vittone v. Clairmont (2005) 64 Mass App 479, 834 NE2d 258, 2005 Mass App LEXIS 852, review denied 

Vittone v. Clairmont (2005) 445 Mass 1106, 836 NE2d 1096, 2005 Mass LEXIS 633. 

Trial court did not err in issuing an ex parte abuse prevention order pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 against the 

fiance and son, as both of them, who resided with plaintiff, were household members under ALM GL c 209A, § 1, the 

fiance and plaintiff were in a substantive dating relationship, and plaintiff's affidavits established a sufficient factual 

basis for the conclusion that the fiance and son had caused plaintiff physical harm or placed plaintiff in fear of imminent 

serious physical harm. Corrado v. Hedrick (2006) 65 Mass App 477, 841 NE2d 723, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 80. 

District Judge had the inherent authority to expunge a record of a ALM GL c 209A civil abuse protection order 

from the statewide domestic violence registry system in the rare and limited circumstance that: (1) the judge found 

through clear and convincing evidence that the order was obtained through fraud on the court; (2) neither vacation of the 

order, nor sealing of the record was sufficient to protect the integrity of the courts, did not send an appropriate message 

to the public, and left a record of the order in the system; and (2) the potential harm to the courts and to the victim of the 

order outweighed the governmental interest in maintaining and disseminating the fraudulently obtained order, because it 

contained absolutely no informational purpose; however, because the action was initiated by a private plaintiff, ALM GL

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 26 

c 261, § 14 did not authorize the District Court judge to levy costs against the Commissioner due to the Commissioner's 

failure to attend a hearing on a motion to destroy all copies of the ALM GL c 209A order. Comm'r of Prob. v. Adams 


Appellate Division of District Court Department lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review ALM GL c 209A cases 

in District Courts. Burrill v. Burrill (1993) 1993 Mass App Div 178, 1993 Mass App Div LEXIS 63. 

No error occurred when a district court extended an abuse protection order, which a girlfriend had obtained on an 

emergency basis against her boyfriend's son, pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983 Mass. Acts ch. 678, 

§ 4). The son had lived with them in the same house for two years, he kept a kept a key to the house after he moved out, 

he continued to receive his mail and to take showers there, he came and left without making prior arrangements, and on 

several occasions when he entered without permission, he had shoved and threatened her and her children; the son thus 

fit the definition of a "former household member" that was contained in ALM GL c 209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass. 

Acts ch. 403, § 2). Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez (2006) 66 Mass App 367, 848 NE2d 779, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 567. 

In issuing and extending for a year an abuse protection order pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 3 (as amended by 1983 

Mass. Acts ch. 678, § 4) against a son on the petition of a girlfriend, who was the girlfriend of the son's father, a district 

court did not abuse its discretion; the son fit within the definition of a "former household member" under ALM GL c 

209A, § 1 (as inserted by 1990 Mass. Acts ch. 403, § 2), as he had lived with them for two years and had kept a key and 

had continued to use their home after he moved out. The legislature had consistently amended the statute since its 

inception in 1978 and had consistently expanded the definition of a "family or household member" in § 1, the legislature 

had drafted the statute with a purposeful flexibility, the categories of persons covered under the statute had been 

continually expanded, and a broad and flexible interpretation was appropriate. Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez (2006) 66 


Where a mother stated in her affidavit in support of a ALM GL c 209A abuse prevention order that defendant, her 

husband, had punched her son, but testified at the assault and battery trial that defendant had accidently struck her son, 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 NE2d 483, 1984 Mass LEXIS 1737 (1984), the trial court 

properly allowed the affidavit to be used as substantive evidence. Commonwealth v Belmer (2010) 78 Mass App 62, 

935 NE2d 327, 2010 Mass. App. LEXIS 1320. 



did not inquire if defendant chose to do so; it was not the trial court's prerogative to make that choice for him. S.T. v. 

E.M. (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 1192. 

In a case in which defendant appealed the extension of an abuse prevention order, defendant waived any due 

process objection to the procedure followed by the judge. Defense counsel actively participated in requesting, and 

crafting the scope of, the out-of-court inquiry that the judge undertook, and defense counsel never mentioned due 

process, either before or after the judge obtained a police sergeant's statements. Diaz v. Gomez (2012) 82 Mass App 55, 

2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 209. 

In a case in which defendant appealed the extension of an abuse prevention order, he unsuccessfully argued that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the judge's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that his former spouse was 

reasonably in fear of imminent physical harm. The judge found credible the former spouse's testimony that defendant 

previously put a gun to her head and threatened to kill her if she left him, and neither that finding, nor any of the others 

made by the judge, was clearly erroneous. Diaz v. Gomez (2012) 82 Mass App 55, 2012 Mass. App. LEXIS 209. 

Under ALM GL c 209A, household members, including petitioner's stepdaughter who resided with him, are 

protected from domestic abuse; thus, petitioner's conviction for indecent assault and battery under ALM GL c 265, § 

13H satisfied second prong of 8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), notwithstanding that stepdaughter never obtained protective

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3 

Page 27 

order under ALM GL c 209A. Sutherland v. Reno (2000) 228 F3d 171, 2000 US App LEXIS 23363. 

General protection for household members under ALM GL c 209A applies regardless of whether they avail 

themselves of protective orders. Sutherland v. Reno (2000) 228 F3d 171, 2000 US App LEXIS 23363. 

Petitioner's convicted offense of indecent assault and battery on person over age of 14 ( ALM GL c 265, § 13H) was 

both (1) "crime of violence" under 18 USCS § 16(b) because it involved substantial risk that physical force may have 

been used, and (2) crime committed against person protected by domestic or family violence laws of Massachusetts. 

Sutherland v. Reno (2000) 228 F3d 171, 2000 US App LEXIS 23363. 

Because the trial court made no specific findings and conclusions of law, the supreme judicial court was unable to 

determine the standard that was applied in denying a girlfriend's motion to extend a protective order under ALM GL c 

209A, § 3; the trial court's sua sponte vacation of the original ALM GL c 209A, § 1 order was error because the only 

issue before it was whether the order should be extended. Iamele v. Asselin (2005) 444 Mass 734, 831 NE2d 324, 2005 


Where the trial judge found that abuse had not occurred but the trial judge extended abuse prevention orders to 

keep plaintiff and the fiance apart pending resolution of a property dispute, the trial judge erred; where abuse under 

ALM GL c 209A, § 1 had not occurred, the remedies under ALM GL c 209A, § 3 were unavailable. Corrado v. Hedrick 

(2006) 65 Mass App 477, 841 NE2d 723, 2006 Mass App LEXIS 80.

Page 28 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3A (2012) 

§ 3A. Information Required to be Given to Complainant. 

Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, a complainant shall be informed that the proceedings hereunder are 

civil in nature and that violations of orders issued hereunder are criminal in nature. Further, a complainant shall be 

given information prepared by the appropriate district attorney's office that other criminal proceedings may be available 

and such complainant shall be instructed by such district attorney's office relative to the procedures required to initiate 

criminal proceedings including, but not limited to, a complaint for a violation of section forty-three of chapter two 

hundred and sixty-five. Whenever possible, a complainant shall be provided with such information in the complainant's 

native language. 

HISTORY: 1992, 188, § 3. 

NOTES: Treatise References 


Law Reviews 






2007). 

Web References

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3A 

Page 29 






Probate and Family Court, see www.state.ma.us/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/probateandfamilycourt/

Page 30 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3B (2012) 

§ 3B. Suspension of Firearm License and Surrender of Firearms With Temporary or Emergency Order; 

Petition for Review. 

Upon issuance of a temporary or emergency order under section four or five of this chapter, the court shall, if the 

plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, order the immediate suspension and 

surrender of any license to carry firearms and or firearms identification card which the defendant may hold and order 

the defendant to surrender all firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns and ammunition which he then controls, owns or 

possesses in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and any license to carry firearms or firearms identification 

cards which the defendant may hold shall be surrendered to the appropriate law enforcement officials in accordance 

with the provisions of this chapter and, said law enforcement official may store, transfer or otherwise dispose of any 

such weapon in accordance with the provisions of section 129D of chapter 140; provided however, that nothing herein 

shall authorize the transfer of any weapons surrendered by the defendant to anyone other than a licensed dealer. Notice 

of such suspension and ordered surrender shall be appended to the copy of abuse prevention order served on the 

defendant pursuant to section seven. Law enforcement officials, upon the service of said orders, shall immediately take 

possession of all firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns, ammunition, any license to carry firearms and any firearms 

identification cards in the control, ownership, or possession of said defendant. Any violation of such orders shall be 

punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half 

years in a house of correction, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 

Any defendant aggrieved by an order of surrender or suspension as described in the first sentence of this section 

may petition the court which issued such suspension or surrender order for a review of such action and such petition 

shall be heard no later than ten court business days after the receipt of the notice of the petition by the court. If said 

license to carry firearms or firearms identification card has been suspended upon the issuance of an order issued 

pursuant to section four or five, said petition may be heard contemporaneously with the hearing specified in the second 

sentence of the second paragraph of section four. Upon the filing of an affidavit by the defendant that a firearm, rifle, 

shotgun, machine gun or ammunition is required in the performance of the defendant's employment, and upon a request

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3B 

Page 31 

for an expedited hearing, the court shall order said hearing within two business days of receipt of such affidavit and 

request but only on the issue of surrender and suspension pursuant to this section. 

HISTORY: 1994, 24, § 6; 1996, 298, § 2; 1998, 180, § 48. 


Acts 1994, 24, § 6, enacted this section. Section 9 provides: 

Section 9. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special law to the contrary, a licensing authority as 

defined in section 121 of chapter one hundred and forty of the General Laws who receives or takes possession of any 

firearm, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, ammunition, firearms identification card or license to carry firearms surrendered 

pursuant to the provisions of section three B of chapter two hundred and nine A may transport and present to the State 

Police all said items or store and maintain said items in the care and custody of said licensing authority. The State Police 

or the local licensing authority shall immediately issue a receipt to the owner of said items specifying where said items 

will be held. In all cases where the State Police is charged with the care and custody of said items they shall also 

forward a duplicate receipt to the local licensing authority. The State Police or a local licensing authority shall store and 

keep all said items safely and securely in accordance with standards set forth by the Executive Office of Public Safety 

relative to the storage of such items until an item is returned to its owner; provided that such owner shall have the right, 

at any time up to one year after any such order has been issued, to transfer such firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns 

and ammunition to any licensed dealer and upon notification in writing by the licensed dealer and the owner, the 

licensing authority shall within ten days deliver such firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns and ammunition to the 

licensed dealer. Any item stored by the State Police or the local licensing authority pursuant to such order which is not 

lawfully reclaimed by its owner within one year after such order has been vacated or has expired shall be destroyed. The 

Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety is hereby authorized and directed to promulgate rules and regulations 

necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. 

The 1996 amendment revised the first paragraph. 

The 1998 amendment revised the first paragraph. 

Jurisprudence 

79 Am Jur 2d, Weapons and Firearms § 33. 

Annotations 

Validity of state gun control legislation under state constitutional provisions securing the right to bear arms. 86 

ALR4th 931. 



Law Reviews 





Crawford v. Washington to Include Investigatory Police Interrogations. 33 N.E. J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. 171 (Winter,

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3B 

Page 32 

2007). 








CASE NOTES 

Police chief did not unreasonably determine that an applicant for renewal was no longer a suitable person to hold a 

weapon carry license where the chief discovered that the applicant recently had been subject to domestic relations 

orders that required the surrender of firearms. Howard v. Chief of Police (2003) 59 Mass App 901, 794 NE2d 604, 2003 

Mass App LEXIS 903.

Page 33 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3C (2012) 

§ 3C. Continuation or Modification of Firearm Suspension and Surrender Order. 

Upon the continuation or modification of an order issued pursuant to section 4 or upon petition for review as described 

in section 3B, the court shall also order or continue to order the immediate suspension and surrender of a defendant's 

license to carry firearms, including a Class A or Class B license, and firearms identification card and the surrender of all 

firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns or ammunition which such defendant then controls, owns or possesses if the 

court makes a determination that the return of such license to carry firearms, including a Class A or Class B license, and 

firearm identification card or firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns or ammunition presents a likelihood of abuse to 

the plaintiff. A suspension and surrender order issued pursuant to this section shall continue so long as the restraining 

order to which it relates is in effect; and, any law enforcement official to whom such weapon is surrendered may store, 

transfer or otherwise dispose of any such weapon in accordance with the provisions of section 129D of chapter 140; 

provided, however, that nothing herein shall authorize the transfer of any weapons surrendered by the defendant to 

anyone other than a licensed dealer. Any violation of such order shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 

or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half years in a house of correction or by both such fine and 

imprisonment. 

HISTORY: 1994, 24, § 6; 1996, 450, § 233; 1998, 180, § 49. 


The 1996 amendment substituted "three B" for "3B of this chapter." 

The 1998 amendment rewrote this section. 


Brisk, Hoag, MacLaughin-Barck, Massachusetts Elder Law (Michie) §§ 1.7, 2.4.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 3C 

Page 34 

Law Reviews 






2007). 








CASE NOTES 

Police chief did not unreasonably determine that an applicant for renewal was no longer a suitable person to hold a 

weapon carry license where the chief discovered that the applicant recently had been subject to domestic relations 

orders that required the surrender of firearms. Howard v. Chief of Police (2003) 59 Mass App 901, 794 NE2d 604, 2003 

Mass App LEXIS 903.

Page 35 










§ 4. Temporary Orders; Orders Without Notice. 


ALM GL ch. 209A, § 4 (2012) 

Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, the court may enter such temporary orders as it deems necessary to 

protect a plaintiff from abuse, including relief as provided in section three. Such relief shall not be contingent upon the 

filing of a complaint for divorce, separate support, or paternity action. 

If the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, the court may enter such 

temporary relief orders without notice as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse and shall immediately 

thereafter notify the defendant that the temporary orders have been issued. The court shall give the defendant an 

opportunity to be heard on the question of continuing the temporary order and of granting other relief as requested by 

the plaintiff no later than ten court business days after such orders are entered. 

Notice shall be made by the appropriate law enforcement agency as provided in section seven. 

If the defendant does not appear at such subsequent hearing, the temporary orders shall continue in effect without 

further order of the court. 

HISTORY: 1978, 447, § 2; 1983, 678, § 4; 1984, 189, § 152; 1990, 403, § 4. 


The 1983 amendment rewrote this section, making, among others, the following changes: (1) deleting in the first 

paragraph references to ALM GL c 208, § 34B and ALM GL c 209 § 32, and substituting therein a reference to the 

section three of chapter two hundred and nine A; (2) adding a sentence to the first paragraph providing that relief shall 

not be contingent upon the filing of a complaint for divorce or separate support; and (3) adding two sentences to the 

second paragraph relative to the furnishing of notice to defendant of temporary orders, and providing for the 

continuance of temporary orders where the defendant fails to appear at a hearing on such orders.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 4 

Page 36 

The 1984 amendment purported to substitute "schedule" for "schedule" in the second paragraph, but such 

amendment could not be executed. 

The 1990 amendment in the first paragraph, added at the end ", or paternity action"; in the second sentence of the 

second paragraph, changed from seven to ten the number of days a defendant has to appear; and added the third and 

fourth paragraphs. Sections 14-16 provide: 



























c 265, § 43. 

Jurisprudence 


Annotations 


ALR4th 756. 


Blumenson, Fisher, & Kanstroom, Massachusetts Criminal Practice (Michie) § 50.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 4 

Page 37 






Harvey, Moriarty, Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 2d Ed. (Michie) §§ 4.13, 22:12, 22:20-22:24, 22:35, 

22:62, 51:2, Form 208. 

Law Reviews 

Collaboration and Coercion. Hastings Women's Law Journal (Winter, 2013). 

Closing the Loophole in Massachusetts Protection Order Legislation to Provide Greater Security for Victims of 

Sexual Assault: Has Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258E Closed It Enough 17 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Adv. 102 

(2012). 








2007). 














ALM GL ch. 209A, § 4 

Page 38 

CASE NOTES 

Emergency hearing regarding transfer of custody of child in need of care and protection may be held ex parte. 

Care & Protection of Robert (1990) 408 Mass 52, 556 NE2d 993, 1990 Mass LEXIS 325. 

After District Court judge vacated temporary protective order against husband, judge lacked statutory authority to 

order expungement of husband's name from statewide domestic violence record keeping system created by St. 1992 ch. 

188, § 7. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro (1997) 425 Mass 153, 680 NE2d 55, 1997 Mass LEXIS 121. 






Testimony before District Court was not sufficient to warrant extension of 209A order entered ex parte 10 days 

earlier, where complainant's testimony that she suffered emotionally and experienced aggravation of ulcer condition as 

result of receiving defendant's notices of lawsuit and court proceedings did not constitute threat of serious physical harm 

or "abuse;" petition for relief under ALM GL c 211, § 3 should have been allowed. Larkin v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. 

Court Dep't (1997) 425 Mass 1020, 681 NE2d 817, 1997 Mass LEXIS 174. 

Where incarcerated defendant received actual notice of scheduled hearing on extension of temporary protective 

order which had been granted ex parte, knew order could be extended, and never expressed desire to exercise his right 

to be heard, defendant's due process rights were not violated and his conviction for violation of protective order would 

be affirmed. Commonwealth v. Henderson (2001) 434 Mass 155, 747 NE2d 659, 2001 Mass LEXIS 213. 



substantive dating relationship as defined by ALM GL c 209A, § 3, and ALM GL c 209A, § 1(e), as the trial court did not 










contained absolutely no informational purpose; however, because the action was initiated by a private plaintiff, ALM GL 




Plaintiff could not meet his burden, in action under anti-SLAPP law ( ALM GL c 231, § 59H) to show that 

defendant's exercise of her right to petition court for extended orders for protection from abuse was devoid of any 

reasonable factual support or arguable basis in law where plaintiff had opportunity to be heard before any temporary 

order was extended under ALM GL c 209A, even though he was ultimately acquitted after jury trial for allegedly 

violating such order. Franco v. Mudford (2002) 2002 Mass App Div 63, 2002 Mass App Div LEXIS 26.

Page 39 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 5 (2012) 

§ 5. Granting of Relief When Courts Closed; Notice; Next-Day Certification. 

[Effective until July 1, 2012.] When the court is closed for business or the plaintiff is unable to appear in court 

because of severe hardship due to the plaintiff's physical condition, any justice of the superior, probate and family, 

district or Boston municipal court departments may grant relief to the plaintiff as provided under section four if the 

plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse. In the discretion of the justice, such relief 

may be granted and communicated by telephone to an officer or employee of an appropriate law enforcement agency, 

who shall record such order on a form of order promulgated for such use by the chief administrative justice and shall 

deliver a copy of such order on the next court day to the clerk-magistrate of the court having venue and jurisdiction over 

the matter. If relief has been granted without the filing of a complaint pursuant to this section of this chapter, then the 

plaintiff shall appear in court on the next available business day to file said complaint. If the plaintiff in such a case is 

unable to appear in court without severe hardship due to the plaintiff's physical condition, then a representative may 

appear in court on the plaintiff's behalf and file the requisite complaint with an affidavit setting forth the circumstances 

preventing the plaintiff from appearing personally. Notice to the plaintiff and defendant and an opportunity for the 

defendant to be heard shall be given as provided in said section four. 

[Effective July 1, 2012.] 

When the court is closed for business or the plaintiff is unable to appear in court because of severe hardship due to 

the plaintiff's physical condition, any justice of the superior, probate and family, district or Boston municipal court 

departments may grant relief to the plaintiff as provided under section four if the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial 

likelihood of immediate danger of abuse. In the discretion of the justice, such relief may be granted and communicated 

by telephone to an officer or employee of an appropriate law enforcement agency, who shall record such order on a 

form of order promulgated for such use by the chief justice of the trial court and shall deliver a copy of such order on 

the next court day to the clerk-magistrate of the court having venue and jurisdiction over the matter. If relief has been 

granted without the filing of a complaint pursuant to this section of this chapter, then the plaintiff shall appear in court 

on the next available business day to file said complaint. If the plaintiff in such a case is unable to appear in court

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 5 

Page 40 

without severe hardship due to the plaintiff's physical condition, then a representative may appear in court on the 

plaintiff's behalf and file the requisite complaint with an affidavit setting forth the circumstances preventing the plaintiff 

from appearing personally. Notice to the plaintiff and defendant and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard shall 

be given as provided in said section four. 

Any order issued under this section and any documentation in support thereof shall be certified on the next court 

day by the clerk-magistrate or register of the court issuing such order to the court having venue and jurisdiction over the 

matter. Such certification to the court shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this chapter and invoking 

the other provisions of this chapter but shall not be deemed necessary for an emergency order issued under this section 

to take effect. 

HISTORY: 1978, 447, § 2; 1983, 678, § 4; 1990, 403, §§ 5, 6; 1996, 298, §§ 3, 4; 2011, 93, § 40. 


The 1983 amendment substantially rewrote this section, making, among other changes, the following changes: (1) 

expanding the category of justices who can grant relief under this section; (2) adding other language in the first 

paragraph relative to notice and a subsequent hearing on such relief; (3) deleting the paragraph which provided that 

orders issued under this section would terminate as of the close of business on the next day the court is in session; and 

(4) adding language to the last paragraph to provide that certification of an order shall not be necessary for such order to 

take effect. 

The 1990 amendment in the first paragraph, added the second sentence relative to relief granted and 

communicated by telephone, and in the first sentence of the second paragraph, following "clerk-magistrate", inserted "or 

register." Sections 14-16 provide: 























programs according to the standards established and promulgated by the commission. Programs so certified shall be the

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 5 

Page 41 


The 1996 amendment, by § 3, in the first sentence of the first paragraph, following "business" inserted "or the 

plaintiff is . . . physical condition"; and by § 4, in the first paragraph, inserted the fourth sentence. 

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted "chief justice of the trial court" for "chief administrative 

justice" in the second sentence of the first paragraph. Section 137 provides: 

Section 137. Sections 2 to 7, inclusive, 10 to 54, inclusive, 57 to 117, inclusive, 122, 123, 124, 125 and 127A shall 

take effect on July 1, 2012. 



c 265, § 43. 

Jurisprudence 


Annotations 


ALR4th 756. 









Harvey, Moriarty, Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 2d Ed. (Michie) § 4.13, 51:2, Form 208. 

Law Reviews 






2007). 


Restraining Order Proceeding. 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 645 (Spring, 2009).

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 5 

Page 42 










CASE NOTES 






Personal service of protective order is not required if Commonwealth can show that defendant had actual or 

constructive knowledge of existence and terms of court order. Commonwealth v. Molloy (1998) 44 Mass App 306, 690 

NE2d 836, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 29, review denied (1998) 427 Mass 1107, 699 NE2d 851, 1998 Mass LEXIS 452. 











Page 43 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 5A (2012) 

§ 5A. Protection Orders Issued By Another Jurisdiction. 

Any protection order issued by another jurisdiction, as defined in section one, shall be given full faith and credit 

throughout the commonwealth and enforced as if it were issued in the commonwealth for as long as the order is in 

effect in the issuing jurisdiction. 

A person entitled to protection under a protection order issued by another jurisdiction may file such order in the 

superior court department or the Boston municipal court department or any division of the probate and family or district 

court departments by filing with the court a certified copy of such order which shall be entered into the statewide 

domestic violence record keeping system established pursuant to the provisions of section seven of chapter one hundred 

and eighty-eight of the acts of nineteen hundred and ninety-two and maintained by the office of the commissioner of 

probation. Such person shall swear under oath in an affidavit, to the best of such person's knowledge, that such order is 

presently in effect as written. Upon request by a law enforcement agency, the register or clerk of such court shall 

provide a certified copy of the protection order issued by the other jurisdiction. 

A law enforcement officer may presume the validity of, and enforce in accordance with section six, a copy of a 

protection order issued by another jurisdiction which has been provided to the law enforcement officer by any source; 

provided, however, that the officer is also provided with a statement by the person protected by the order that such order 

remains in effect. Law enforcement officers may rely on such statement by the person protected by such order. 

HISTORY: 1996, 298, § 5. 



Law Reviews

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 5A 

Page 44 






2007). 

93. 

Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform. 23 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 








Page 45 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 6 (2012) 

§ 6. Powers and Duties of Law Officers; Notice of Rights. 

Whenever any law officer has reason to believe that a family or household member has been abused or is in danger of 

being abused, such officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse. The officer shall take, but not be 

limited to the following action: 

(1) remain on the scene of where said abuse occurred or was in danger of occurring as long as the officer has 

reason to believe that at least one of the parties involved would be in immediate physical danger without the presence of 

a law officer. This shall include, but not be limited to remaining in the dwelling for a reasonable period of time; 

(2) assist the abused person in obtaining medical treatment necessitated by an assault, which may include driving 

the victim to the emergency room of the nearest hospital, or arranging for appropriate transportation to a health care 

facility, notwithstanding any law to the contrary; 

(3) assist the abused person in locating and getting to a safe place; including but not limited to a designated 

meeting place for a shelter or a family member's or friend's residence. The officer shall consider the victim's preference 

in this regard and what is reasonable under all the circumstances; 

(4) give such person immediate and adequate notice of his or her rights. Such notice shall consist of handing said 

person a copy of the statement which follows below and reading the same to said person. Where said person's native 

language is not English, the statement shall be then provided in said person's native language whenever possible. 

"You have the right to appear at the Superior, Probate and Family, District or Boston Municipal Court, if you 

reside within the appropriate jurisdiction, and file a complaint requesting any of the following applicable orders: (a) an 

order restraining your attacker from abusing you; (b) an order directing your attacker to leave your household, building 

or workplace; (c) an order awarding you custody of a minor child; (d) an order directing your attacker to pay support for 

you or any minor child in your custody, if the attacker has a legal obligation of support; and (e) an order directing your

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 6 

Page 46 

attacker to pay you for losses suffered as a result of abuse, including medical and moving expenses, loss of earnings or 

support, costs for restoring utilities and replacing locks, reasonable attorney's fees and other out-of-pocket losses for 

injuries and property damage sustained. 

For an emergency on weekends, holidays, or weeknights the police will refer you to a justice of the superior, 

probate and family, district, or Boston municipal court departments. 

You have the right to go to the appropriate district court or the Boston municipal court and seek a criminal 

complaint for threats, assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to kill or other related 

offenses. 

If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to request that an officer present drive you to the 

nearest hospital or otherwise assist you in obtaining medical treatment. 

If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have the right to request that the 

officer present remain at the scene until you and your children can leave or until your safety is otherwise ensured. You 

may also request that the officer assist you in locating and taking you to a safe place, including but not limited to a 

designated meeting place for a shelter or a family member's or a friend's residence, or a similar place of safety. 

You may request a copy of the police incident report at no cost from the police department." 

The officer shall leave a copy of the foregoing statement with such person before leaving the scene or premises. 

(5) assist such person by activating the emergency judicial system when the court is closed for business; 

(6) inform the victim that the abuser will be eligible for bail and may be promptly released; and 

(7) arrest any person a law officer witnesses or has probable cause to believe has violated a temporary or 

permanent vacate, restraining, or no-contact order or judgment issued pursuant to section eighteen, thirty-four B or 

thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and eight, section thirty-two of chapter two hundred and nine, section three, three 

B, three C, four or five of this chapter, or sections fifteen or twenty of chapter two hundred and nine C or similar 

protection order issued by another jurisdiction. When there are no vacate, restraining, or no-contact orders or judgments 

in effect, arrest shall be the preferred response whenever an officer witnesses or has probable cause to believe that a 

person: 

(a) has committed a felony; 

(b) has committed a misdemeanor involving abuse as defined in section one of this chapter; 

(c) has committed an assault and battery in violation of section thirteen A of chapter two hundred and 

sixty-five. 

The safety of the victim and any involved children shall be paramount in any decision to arrest. Any officer 

arresting both parties must submit a detailed, written report in addition to an incident report, setting forth the grounds 

for dual arrest. 

No law officer investigating an incident of domestic violence shall threaten, suggest, or otherwise indicate the arrest 

of all parties for the purpose of discouraging requests for law enforcement intervention by any party. 

No law officer shall be held liable in any civil action regarding personal injury or injury to property brought by any 

party to a domestic violence incident for an arrest based on probable cause when such officer acted reasonably and in 

good faith and in compliance with this chapter and the statewide policy as established by the secretary of public safety.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 6 

Page 47 

Whenever any law officer investigates an incident of domestic violence, the officer shall immediately file a written 

incident report in accordance with the standards of the officer's law enforcement agency and, wherever possible, in the 

form of the National Incident-Based Reporting System, as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The latter 

information may be submitted voluntarily by the local police on a monthly basis to the crime reporting unit of the 

department of criminal justice information services. 

The victim shall be provided a copy of the full incident report at no cost upon request to the appropriate law 

enforcement department. 

When a judge or other person authorized to take bail bails any person arrested under the provisions of this chapter, 

he shall make reasonable efforts to inform the victim of such release prior to or at the time of said release. 

When any person charged with or arrested for a crime involving abuse under this chapter is released from custody, 

the court or the emergency response judge shall issue, upon the request of the victim, a written no-contact order 

prohibiting the person charged or arrested from having any contact with the victim and shall use all reasonable means to 

notify the victim immediately of release from custody. The victim shall be given at no cost a certified copy of the 

no-contact order. 

HISTORY: 1978, 447, § 2; 1983, 678, § 4; 1987, 761; 1990, 403, § 7; 1996, 298, §§ 6, 7; 2010, 256, § 103. 


The 1983 amendment rewrote this section, making, among other changes, the following changes: (1) inserting 

after the word "abused" in the first sentence of the first paragraph, the words "or is in danger of being abused"; (2) 

inserting in clause (1) the word "immediate" before the word "danger" and the words "for a reasonable period of time" 

after the words "dwelling unit"; (3) inserting language in clause (2) relative to transportation to a health care facility; (4) 

inserting in clause (6) a reference to section seven of chapter two hundred and nine A; and (5) inserting a paragraph 

relative to the right to obtain emergency relief on weekends, holidays or weeknights. 

The 1987 amendment added clause (7) to the first paragraph. 

The 1990 amendment restructured and rewrote this section, expanding upon actions and procedures any law 

officer may take whenever he has reason to believe that a family or household member has been abused or in is danger 

of being abused. Sections 14-16 provide: 















batterer's treatment programs by the department of public health shall be set up by a commission to be established by

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 6 

Page 48 










The 1996 amendment, by § 6, in item (7), following "three" inserted ", three B, three C" and by § 7, in item (7), 

following "nine C" inserted "or similar protection order issued by another jurisdiction." 

The 2010 amendment, effective Nov 4, 2010, substituted "department of criminal justice information services" for 

"criminal history systems board" in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph. 

Jurisprudence 


Annotations 


ALR4th 756. 





Law Reviews 

Domestic Violence. The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law (2012). 

Roederer, Another Case in Lochner's Legacy, The Court's Assault on New Property: The Right to The Mandatory 

Enforcement of a Restraining Order is a "Sham," "Nullity," and "Cruel Deception". 54 Drake L. Rev. 321 (Winter, 

2006). 








Buel, Violence Against Women: Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 6 

Page 49 



Hirschel, et al, Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They Influence Police Arrest 

Decisions 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 255 (Fall, 2007). 

Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization. 6 Minn. 

J.L. Sci. & Tech. 505 (May, 2005). 



2007). 

Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State Accountability. 37 

Rutgers L. J. 111 (Fall, 2005). 



Rizer, Mandatory Arrest: Do We Need To Take a Closer Look 36 U. West. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (2005). 








CASE NOTES 

ALM GL c 209A, permitting warrantless arrest for certain misdemeanors in context of domestic abuse (including 

placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm) could not be relied on to justify warrantless arrest of 

defendant for making threats, where record did not establish that defendant's threats constituted "abuse" as defined by 

statute. Commonwealth v. Jacobsen (1995) 419 Mass 269, 644 NE2d 213, 1995 Mass LEXIS 1. 

If police officers has reason to believe that defendant's conduct with respect to person protected under ALM GL c 

209A placed person in fear of imminent serious physical harm, warrantless arrest for assault may be made. 

Commonwealth v. Jacobsen (1995) 419 Mass 269, 644 NE2d 213, 1995 Mass LEXIS 1. 

After husband had acted in threatening and hostile manner in presence of police officers in home, police officer 

acted reasonably and constitutionally in following husband to bedroom in order to protect wife and prevent husband's 

access to weapons; motion to suppress drugs seized from bedroom properly denied. Commonwealth v. Rexach (1985) 

20 Mass App 919, 478 NE2d 744, 1985 Mass App LEXIS 1748, review den Commonwealth v. Rexach (1985) 395 Mass

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 6 

Page 50 

1104, 482 NE2d 328, 1985 Mass LEXIS 1659, and among conflicting authorities noted in, Commonwealth v. Wright 

(1994) 560 Pa 34, 742 A2d 661, 1999 Pa LEXIS 3774, reconsideration den, Commonwealth v. Wright (2000, Pa) 2000 

Pa LEXIS 522. 

Although ALM GL c 209A requires police officers to arrest person who has violated protective order, police 

officers are not made liable for failing to do so, and, accordingly, claim under last paragraph or "savings clause" of ALM 

GL c 258, § 10 (Massachusetts Tort Claims Act) is not supported by police officers' failure to arrest plaintiff's former 

husband for repeatedly violating ALM GL c 209A order. Ford v. Town of Grafton (1998) 44 Mass App 715, 693 NE2d 

1047, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 401, review denied (1998) 427 Mass 1108, 700 NE2d 268, 1998 Mass LEXIS 389 and 

petition for certiorari filed (Sep 30, 1998). 

Complaints for violation of 209A protective orders are not immune from requirement of show-cause hearing under 

ALM GL c 218, § 35A, but notice and opportunity to be heard need not be provided if one of three exceptions set forth 

in ALM GL c 218, § 35A applies. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App 

LEXIS 761. 

Since defendant had been arrested on warrant for violation of 209A restraining order, requirement of show-cause 

hearing under ALM GL c 218, § 35A was obviated. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 


Where woman who entered police station was bruised and disheveled and reported that defendant had punched her 

in face and had done same thing two days earlier, police had probable cause to believe defendant had committed assault 

and battery or misdemeanor involving abuse and could arrest defendant without warrant. Richardson v. City of Boston 


Page 51 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 (2012) 

§ 7. Search of Domestic Violence Records; Outstanding Warrants; Service of Order, Complaint and Summons; 

Enforcement; Violations. 

When considering a complaint filed under this chapter, a judge shall cause a search to be made of the records 

contained within the statewide domestic violence record keeping system maintained by the office of the commissioner 

of probation and shall review the resulting data to determine whether the named defendant has a civil or criminal record 

involving domestic or other violence. Upon receipt of information that an outstanding warrant exists against the named 

defendant, a judge shall order that the appropriate law enforcement officials be notified and shall order that any 

information regarding the defendant's most recent whereabouts shall be forwarded to such officials. In all instances 

where an outstanding warrant exists, a judge shall make a finding, based upon all of the circumstances, as to whether an 

imminent threat of bodily injury exists to the petitioner. In all instances where such an imminent threat of bodily injury 

is found to exist, the judge shall notify the appropriate law enforcement officials of such finding and such officials shall 

take all necessary actions to execute any such outstanding warrant as soon as is practicable. 

Whenever the court orders under sections eighteen, thirty-four B, and thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and 

eight, section thirty-two of chapter two hundred and nine, sections three, four and five of this chapter, or sections fifteen 

and twenty of chapter two hundred and nine C, the defendant to vacate, refrain from abusing the plaintiff or to have no 

contact with the plaintiff or the plaintiff's minor child, the register or clerk-magistrate shall transmit two certified copies 

of each such order and one copy of the complaint and summons forthwith to the appropriate law enforcement agency 

which, unless otherwise ordered by the court, shall serve one copy of each order upon the defendant, together with a 

copy of the complaint, order and summons and notice of any suspension or surrender ordered pursuant to section three 

B of this chapter. The law enforcement agency shall promptly make its return of service to the court. 

Law enforcement officers shall use every reasonable means to enforce such abuse prevention orders. Law 

enforcement agencies shall establish procedures adequate to insure that an officer on the scene of an alleged violation of 

such order may be informed of the existence and terms of such order. The court shall notify the appropriate law 

enforcement agency in writing whenever any such order is vacated and shall direct the agency to destroy all record of

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 52 

such vacated order and such agency shall comply with that directive. 

Each abuse prevention order issued shall contain the following statement: VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A 

CRIMINAL OFFENSE. 

Any violation of such order or a protection order issued by another jurisdiction shall be punishable by a fine of not 

more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half years in a house of correction, 

or by both such fine and imprisonment. In addition to, but not in lieu of, the forgoing penalties and any other sentence, 

fee or assessment, including the victim witness assessment in section 8 of chapter 258B, the court shall order persons 

convicted of a crime under this statute to pay a fine of $25 that shall be transmitted to the treasurer for deposit into the 

General Fund. For any violation of such order, the court shall order the defendant to complete a certified batterer's 

intervention program unless, upon good cause shown, the court issues specific written findings describing the reasons 

that batterer's intervention should not be ordered or unless the batterer's intervention program determines that the 

defendant is not suitable for intervention. The court shall not order substance abuse or anger management treatment or 

any other form of treatment as a substitute for certified batterer's intervention. If a defendant ordered to undergo 

treatment has received a suspended sentence, the original sentence shall be reimposed if the defendant fails to 

participate in said program as required by the terms of his probation. If the court determines that the violation was in 

retaliation for the defendant being reported by the plaintiff to the department of revenue for failure to pay child support 

payments or for the establishment of paternity, the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand 

dollars and not more than ten thousand dollars and by imprisonment for not less than sixty days; provided, however, 

that the sentence shall not be suspended, nor shall any such person be eligible for probation, parole, or furlough or 

receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served sixty days of such sentence. 

When a defendant has been ordered to participate in a treatment program pursuant to this section, the defendant 

shall be required to regularly attend a certified or provisionally certified batterer's treatment program. To the extent 

permitted by professional requirements of confidentiality, said program shall communicate with local battered women's 

programs for the purpose of protecting the victim's safety. Additionally, it shall specify the defendant's attendance 

requirements and keep the probation department informed of whether the defendant is in compliance. 

In addition to, but not in lieu of, such orders for treatment, if the defendant has a substance abuse problem, the court 

may order appropriate treatment for such problem. All ordered treatment shall last until the end of the probationary 

period or until the treatment program decides to discharge the defendant, whichever comes first. When the defendant is 

not in compliance with the terms of probation, the court shall hold a revocation of probation hearing. To the extent 

possible, the defendant shall be responsible for paying all costs for court ordered treatment. 

Where a defendant has been found in violation of an abuse prevention order under this chapter or a protection order 

issued by another jurisdiction, the court may, in addition to the penalties provided for in this section after conviction, as 

an alternative to incarceration and, as a condition of probation, prohibit contact with the victim through the 

establishment of court defined geographic exclusion zones including, but not limited to, the areas in and around the 

complainant's residence, place of employment, and the complainant's child's school, and order that the defendant to 

wear a global positioning satellite tracking device designed to transmit and record the defendant's location data. If the 

defendant enters a court defined exclusion zone, the defendant's location data shall be immediately transmitted to the 

complainant, and to the police, through an appropriate means including, but not limited to, the telephone, an electronic 

beeper or a paging device. The global positioning satellite device and its tracking shall be administered by the 

department of probation. If a court finds that the defendant has entered a geographic exclusion zone, it shall revoke his 

probation and the defendant shall be fined, imprisoned or both as provided in this section. Based on the defendant's 

ability to pay, the court may also order him to pay the monthly costs or portion thereof for monitoring through the 

global positioning satellite tracking system. 

In each instance where there is a violation of an abuse prevention order or a protection order issued by another 

jurisdiction, the court may order the defendant to pay the plaintiff for all damages including, but not limited to, cost for

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 53 

shelter or emergency housing, loss of earnings or support, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained or property 

damaged, medical expenses, moving expenses, cost for obtaining an unlisted telephone number, and reasonable 

attorney's fees. 

Any such violation may be enforced in the superior, the district or Boston municipal court departments. Criminal 

remedies provided herein are not exclusive and do not preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. The 

superior, probate and family, district and Boston municipal court departments may each enforce by civil contempt 

procedure a violation of its own court order. 

The provisions of section eight of chapter one hundred and thirty-six shall not apply to any order, complaint or 

summons issued pursuant to this section. 

HISTORY: 1983, 678, § 5; 1987, 213; 1990, 403, § 8; 1992, 188, § 4; 1994, 24, § 7; 1995, 5, § 81; 1996, 298, § 8; 

2002, 184, § 114; 2003, 26, § 448; 2006, 418, § 1. 


8. 

The 1987 amendment added the tenth paragraph, relative to the applicability of the provisions of ALM GL c 136, § 

The 1990 amendment replaced the former first and second paragraphs with the second through eighth paragraphs. 

Sections 14-16 provide: 

























The 1992 amendment inserted the first paragraph.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 54 

The 1994 amendment in the first sentence of the second paragraph, following "summons", inserted "and notice of 

any suspension or surrender ordered pursuant to section three B of this chapter." 

The 1995 amendment, in the fifth paragraph, added the last sentence. Sections 141 and 142 provide: 

Section 141. Each provision of this act, shall, regardless of whether it includes a specific proviso, be subject to 

federal approval, if required, and federal financial participation. In any case in which the state fails to receive a waiver 

for any said provision of this act or otherwise would fail to receive federal financial participation in the implementation 

of such provision, then such provision shall not be implemented unless the full amount required for said implementation 

without federal participation is appropriated for said implementation. 

Section 142. Any provision of this act that is inconsistent with federal law or regulations shall be void unless the 

department receives an exemption or waiver from the federal government to implement said provision. 

The 1996 amendment in the fifth and eighth paragraphs, following "order" inserted "or a protection order issued 

by another jurisdiction." 

The 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, in the fifth paragraph, substituted the second and third sentences, 

which formerly read: "Where the defendant has no prior record of any crime of violence and where the court believes, 

after evaluation by a certified or provisionally certified batterer's treatment program, that the defendant is amenable to 

treatment, the court may, in addition to any other penalty, order appropriate treatment as specified in this section." 

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, in the fifth paragraph, inserted "In addition to, but not in lieu of, the 

forgoing penalties and any other sentence, fee or assessment, including the victim witness assessment in section 8 of 

chapter 258B, the court shall order persons convicted of a crime under this statute to pay a fine of $25 that shall be 

transmitted to the treasurer for deposit into the General Fund" following the first sentence. 

The 2006 amendment, effective Apr. 3, 2007, inserted the eighth paragraph. 

Jurisprudence 


Annotations 


ALR4th 756. 




CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 2.520, Imposing Sentence. 


CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 6.720, Violation of an Abuse Prevention 

Order. 

Harvey, Moriarty, Bryant, Massachusetts Domestic Relations, 2d Ed. (Michie) §§ 4.15, 9.05, 22:18, 22:37-22:39, 

22:47, 22:49-22:51, 23:62, 51:2, Form 208.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 55 

Massachusetts Divorce Law Practice Manual § 25.7.2, The Plaintiff's Burden of Proof at the Renewal Hearing. 

Law Reviews 




Harrington, Commonwealth v. Finase: The Scope of Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Order Prosecution and 

Efficacy. 29 NE J on Crim & Civ Con 193 (Summer, 2003). 



2007). 







93. 

Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform. 23 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 








CASE NOTES 

1. In general 2. Order to refrain from abuse 3. --Violation 4. Order to vacate household 5. --Violation 6. No contact 

order; protective order 6.5. District Judge's authority to vacate order 7. --Violation 8. Prosecution; trial 9. --Evidence 10. 

--Jury instructions 11. Penalties 

1. In general 

Record identified for destruction in third paragraph of ALM GL c 209A, § 7 is record of order previously 

transmitted to police department called on to serve order and subsequently vacated. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro (1997) 425

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 56 

Mass 153, 680 NE2d 55, 1997 Mass LEXIS 121. 

Section requires judge to search computerized records to determine if person has civil or criminal record involving 

domestic or other violence. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro (1997) 425 Mass 153, 680 NE2d 55, 1997 Mass LEXIS 121. 

ALM GL c 209A, § 7 establishes distinct statutory crime for violation of ALM GL c 209A order, and while 

Commonwealth must show that defendant knew of order, there is no requirement that Commonwealth show intent on 

part of defendant to violate order. Commonwealth v. Delaney (1997) 425 Mass 587, 682 NE2d 611, 1997 Mass LEXIS 

187, cert den (1998) 522 US 1058, 139 L Ed 2d 655, 118 S Ct 714, 1998 US LEXIS 216. 

Challenge to District Court's renewal of 209A order should have been directed to Appeals Court and not made 

subject to petition under ALM GL c 211, § 3. Kraytsberg v. Kraytsberg (1998) 427 Mass 1008, 696 NE2d 124, 1998 


ALM GL c 209A, § 7 criminalizes violation of three orders: orders to vacate household, orders to refrain from 

abusing, and orders to have no contact. Commonwealth v. Finase (2001) 435 Mass 310, 757 NE2d 721, 2001 Mass 

LEXIS 642. 

2. Order to refrain from abuse 

Although abuse prevention orders had expired, defendant's appeal challenging their lawfulness was not moot, since 

defendant could be adversely affected by them in future applications for such orders or in bail proceedings. Wooldridge 

v. Hickey (1998) 45 Mass App 637, 700 NE2d 296, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1112. 

3. --Violation 

Party violates order to refrain from abuse when he or she attempts to cause or causes physical harm, places another 

in fear of imminent serious physical harm, or causes another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat 

of force, or duress. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Although defendant did not physically harm wife or attempt to physically harm her when he arrived at her home 

unannounced, defendant's conduct in preventing wife from closing front door by propping his back against it when wife 

indicated her unwillingness to speak with him could be considered by jury as placing wife in fear of imminent serious 

physical harm. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Evidence that defendant was angry with his wife for seeing another man and that he called her "bitch" and "whore" 

5 days before defendant visited wife at marital home from which he was ordered to stay away was relevant to proving 

that wife was in fear of defendant. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 

197. 

Evidence of defendant's violation of ALM GL c 209A order to refrain from abusing victim was sufficient, where 

jury could find that actions and words of defendant placed victim in reasonable apprehension that physical force might 

be used against her (defendant drove to front of victim's home, got out of car and yelled obscene language to and made 

obscene gesture at victim and soon thereafter told victim over telephone that he would kill her). Commonwealth v. 

Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359. 

First Amendment did not protect defendant's conduct that was threatening to victim and constituted violation of 

ALM GL c 209A order to refrain from abusing victim. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 

1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359. 

Jury verdicts convicting defendant of violating ALM GL c 209A order to refrain from abusing victim and 

acquitting defendant of threatening a crime were inconsistent, but they did not violate defendant's due process rights and

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 57 

did not require reversal of guilty verdict. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 


Commonwealth could not prosecute defendant for stalking under ALM GL c 265, § 43(b) without violating 

defendant's double jeopardy rights. In trying to prosecute defendant for that offense, the Commonwealth was relying on 

conduct for which defendant had been prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating a ALM GL c 209A abuse 

prevention order in violation of ALM GL c 209A, § 7, and, thus, the Commonwealth was trying to prosecute the same 

violations twice. Edge v. Commonwealth (2008) 451 Mass. 74, 883 NE2d 928, 2008 Mass. LEXIS 209. 

4. Order to vacate household 

Defendant ordered to "vacate" marital home must not only surrender legal occupancy but must remain away 

without right to enter at any time. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 

197. 

Abuse prevention order issued under ALM GL c 209A, § 7, was not vague or overbroad, as a person of ordinary 

intelligence could not have reasonably understood that the order requiring defendant to stay away from the residence he 

and the victim had resided in would have sanctioned his return to the residence without requesting permission from the 

court, as expressly provided for in the order. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73 Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 

Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 479. 


Defendant could be found criminally liable under ALM GL c 209A, § 7 for violating order to vacate household, 

where he returned to marital home for visits after being ordered "to immediately leave and remain away from" 

household. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Defendant was properly convicted of violating a restraining order issued under ALM GL c 209A, § 7, by going to a 

residence where he and the victim used to live. The order did not unconstitutionally violate defendant's right to remain 

in his residence, as that right could be suspended by an abuse prevention order obtained in accordance with due process 

principles. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73 Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review 

denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 479. 

6. No contact order; protective order 

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant had knowledge of extension of protective order, where service of 

initial order placed defendant on constructive, if not actual, notice of order's existence and terms. Commonwealth v. 

Henderson (2001) 434 Mass 155, 747 NE2d 659, 2001 Mass LEXIS 213. 

"No contact" order mandates that defendant not communicate by any means with protected party in addition to 

remaining physically separate and is broader than "stay away" order, which prohibits defendant from coming within 

specified distance of protected party but not from written or oral contact between parties. Commonwealth v. Finase 


Judge's order for defendant not to "contact" former girlfriend in person, by telephone, in writing, or otherwise was 

not unconstitutionally vague. Commonwealth v. Butler (1996) 40 Mass App 906, 661 NE2d 666, 1996 Mass App LEXIS 

99. 

Where defendant was served with temporary restraining order and had read its contents and order was extended for 

one year at hearing at which defendant did not appear, and there was evidence that defendant knew terms of extended 

order, personal service of extended order on defendant was not required. Commonwealth v. Bachir (1998) 45 Mass App 

204, 696 NE2d 948, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 513, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1104, 702 NE2d 812, 1998 Mass

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 58 

LEXIS 613. 

"No contact" provision in abuse prevention order did not violate defendant's right of free speech. Commonwealth v. 

Thompson (1998) 45 Mass App 523, 699 NE2d 847, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1040, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1108, 

707 NE2d 366, 1998 Mass LEXIS 739. 

Oral orders of judge are not effective to modify restraining orders issued pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, which 

contemplates that orders be transmitted in written form to law enforcement agencies and to defendant. Commonwealth 

v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1102, 

751 NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275. 

Where the third party and ex-girlfriend found a hidden video camera in the ex-girlfriend's bedroom in a clock 

installed by the ex-boyfriend and the ex-boyfriend left an answering machine message with the ex-girlfriend denying 

the installation of the camera and stating that had the ex-boyfriend installed the camera the ex-girlfriend would not have 

found it, the trial court erred in issuing a protective order against the ex-boyfriend and any record of the order was to be 

destroyed pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 7; although the ex-boyfriend allegedly had a temper, joked that the 

ex-boyfriend could have someone taken care of, and had guns, there was nothing in the record that showed a history of 

violence, threats, or hostility between the parties that would have objectively placed the ex-girlfriend in fear of 

imminent serious physical harm pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 1. Keene v. Gangi (2004) 60 Mass App 667, 805 NE2d 


6.5. District Judge's authority to vacate order 












In prosecution of defendant for violating protective order by coming within 100 yards of former wife and in so 

doing placing her in fear of imminent serious physical harm, Commonwealth was required to prove that defendant 

intended to do act that resulted in violation, where defendant was passenger in car driven by son in threatening manner 

three feet from former wife as she was entering parking garage after leaving court. Commonwealth v. Collier (1998) 


Although evidence was sufficient to warrant finding that defendant acted intentionally to do act that resulted in 

violation of protective order, (i.e., while defendant was passenger in car driven by his son, he directed or assented to 

son's driving car in threatening manner three feet from former wife as she was entering parking garage after leaving 

court), conviction of violation of protective order reversed because judge did not instruct jury that defendant must have 

intended to commit act that resulted in violation. Commonwealth v. Collier (1998) 427 Mass 385, 693 NE2d 673, 1998 


In prosecution of defendant for twice violating restraining order not to contact his former wife by telephone, 

evidence that defendant placed telephone calls to former wife's home and place of employment was insufficient to prove 

essential element of "contacting," because there was no evidence that defendant left message or reached former wife's

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 59 

"voice mail" or that former wife even knew that calls had been made. Commonwealth v. Cove (1998) 427 Mass 474, 

693 NE2d 1385, 1998 Mass LEXIS 196. 

Defendant who arranged for flowers to be sent to former girlfriend violated "no contact" order; protestations of 

"nonhostile intent" or "desire to make amends" are irrelevant to enforcement of no-contact order. Commonwealth v. 

Butler (1996) 40 Mass App 906, 661 NE2d 666, 1996 Mass App LEXIS 99. 

Circumstantial evidence was competent to persuade jury beyond reasonable doubt that defendant violated 

no-contact protective order, where four collect telephone calls were made to telephone number of defendant's wife from 

unit of correctional facility where defendant was incarcerated and later that day wife received call from person whose 

voice she did not recognize asking if defendant could call her collect. Commonwealth v. Russell (1999) 46 Mass App 

307, 705 NE2d 1144, 1999 Mass App LEXIS 93, review denied (1999) 429 Mass 1104, 709 NE2d 1121, 1999 Mass 

LEXIS 256. 

Elements of crime of violating abuse prevention order are (1) existence of order in effect at time of alleged 

violation; (2) defendant's knowledge of terms of order; and (3) violation of terms of order. Commonwealth v. Basile 

(1999) 47 Mass App 918, 712 NE2d 633, 1999 Mass App LEXIS 787, review denied (1999) 430 Mass 1106, 720 NE2d 

468, 1999 Mass LEXIS 790. 

Where defendant was served in hand with abuse prevention order and on next day appeared one block from where 

victim was unloading goods acquired on shopping trip and jumped in air and waved his hands, frightening victim and 

causing her to go into house, evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of violating "no contact" terms of order. 

Commonwealth v. Basile (1999) 47 Mass App 918, 712 NE2d 633, 1999 Mass App LEXIS 787, review denied (1999) 


Where defendant was charged with violating "no contact" order by having telephoned victim twice while confined 

at Bridgewater State Hospital, evidence that defendant was put in fear of imminent serious physical harm, i.e., evidence 

of abuse, was not required. Commonwealth v. Mendonca (2001) 50 Mass App 684, 740 NE2d 1034, 2001 Mass App 

LEXIS 6, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1101, 751 NE2d 418, 2001 Mass LEXIS 236. 

Violation of order not to contact by telephone is established by proof of unexcused conversation with protected 

party over telephone and without proof that protected party was placed in fear. Commonwealth v. Mendonca (2001) 50 

Mass App 684, 740 NE2d 1034, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 6, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1101, 751 NE2d 418, 2001 


Where valid restraining order was in effect requiring defendant to refrain from contacting his wife in person and 

ordering him to stay away from marital home and defendant had knowledge of order when he went to wife's residence, 

rang doorbell and demanded to be let in to see his son, evidence was sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for 

required finding of not guilty. Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App 

LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1102, 751 NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275. 

Where protective order prohibited defendant from contacting or coming within 50 yards of former wife except that 

he could remain in his vehicle when picking up and dropping off his children for visitation, defendant violated order 

when he left vehicle and accompanied child inside foyer of apartment building and stood 4-5 feet away from former 

wife's apartment door. Commonwealth v. Stewart (2001) 52 Mass App 755, 756 NE2d 22, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 953. 

Even though a protected person was not present when defendant knowingly intruded directly into the protective 

person's workplace in violation of a protective order, the evidence was sufficient to show a violation of the order 

pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 7. Commonwealth v. Habenstreit (2003) 57 Mass App 785, 786 NE2d 425, 2003 Mass 

App LEXIS 462, review denied (2003) 439 Mass 1106, 790 NE2d 1089, 2003 Mass LEXIS 490. 

Defendant's convictions for violation of a no contact order were upheld where defendant contended that the

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 60 

comments he made about his ex-wife were not directed to her, but rather, were directed to a passenger in his vehicle, as 

one could not undermine a no contact order by simple expedient of ricocheting prohibited comments off third persons; 

the legislature rationally concluded that prohibiting contact, whether or not the contact was itself abusive, sometimes 

might be necessary to reduce the likelihood that abuse would occur, under ALM GL c 209A, §§ 3(b), 7. Commonwealth 

v. Consoli (2003) 58 Mass App 734, 792 NE2d 1007, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 831, review denied (2003) 440 Mass 1103, 

797 NE2d 379, 2003 Mass LEXIS 777. 

Court would not dismiss an indictment charging defendant with failing to comply with a protective order, as he was 

permanently restrained from contacting his daughter, yet sent her a 21st birthday card; that she was emancipated at the 

time was immaterial. Commonwealth v. Aspen (2003) 17 Mass L Rep 182, 2003 Mass Super LEXIS 439. 

Defendant's claim that indicting him for violating an ALM GL c 209A order violated due process was not valid 

since the protective order had been sufficiently clear to a person of ordinary intelligence to know what conduct was 

prohibited and he had fair notice that the permanent order applied to his daughter, whom he contacted despite the order. 

Commonwealth v. Aspen (2003) 17 Mass L Rep 182, 2003 Mass Super LEXIS 439. 

8. Prosecution; trial 

Judgment for contempt under Abuse Prevention Act ( ALM GL c 209A) did not bar Commonwealth on double 

jeopardy grounds from prosecuting defendant for same conduct that resulted in contempt, since contempt was civil in 

nature. Mahoney v. Commonwealth (1993) 415 Mass 278, 612 NE2d 1175, 1993 Mass LEXIS 276. 






Where incarcerated defendant received actual notice of scheduled hearing on extension of temporary protective 

order which had been granted ex parte, knew order could be extended, and never expressed desire to exercise his right 

to be heard, defendant's due process rights were not violated and his conviction for violation of protective order would 

be affirmed. Commonwealth v. Henderson (2001) 434 Mass 155, 747 NE2d 659, 2001 Mass LEXIS 213. 

Accidental, mistaken, or unknowing violations of distance requirements of abuse prevention order are not 

prosecuted under ALM GL c 209A, § 7. Commonwealth v. Finase (2001) 435 Mass 310, 757 NE2d 721, 2001 Mass 

LEXIS 642. 

Defendant was entitled to hearing pursuant to ALM GL c 218, § 35A prior to issuance of misdemeanor complaint 

against him for alleged violation of abuse prevention order; judge's dismissal of complaint without prejudice affirmed. 

Commonwealth v. Tripolone (1997) 44 Mass App 23, 686 NE2d 1325, 1997 Mass App LEXIS 247. 

Directive of first justice of District Court to clerk magistrate that complaint for violation of ALM GL c 209A abuse 

prevention order should automatically issue without hearing conflicted directly with statutory requirement for hearing 

unless exception set forth in statute is available. Commonwealth v. Tripolone (1997) 44 Mass App 23, 686 NE2d 1325, 


Defendant's motion for required finding of not guilty on charge of violating extended ALM GL c 209A order 

should have been allowed because Commonwealth failed to establish that defendant was served with copy of order or 

had actual knowledge of its existence and terms. Commonwealth v. Molloy (1998) 44 Mass App 306, 690 NE2d 836, 

1998 Mass App LEXIS 29, review denied (1998) 427 Mass 1107, 699 NE2d 851, 1998 Mass LEXIS 452. 

Where defendant was served with abuse prevention order but not with copy of complaint and did not appear to

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 61 

contest extension of order, any error in failing to serve defendant with complaint was harmless. Commonwealth v. 

Munafo (1998) 45 Mass App 597, 700 NE2d 556, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 1107, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1110, 

707 NE2d 1078, 1998 Mass LEXIS 802. 

Commonwealth met its burden of proving defendant's knowledge of existence of extended restraining order, where 

it could be inferred reasonably from order and officer's return of service that service was made either by delivering 

extended order in hand to defendant or by leaving it at his last and usual address. Commonwealth v. Crimmins (1999) 


Where defendant was in court when ALM GL c 209A order was obtained and return of service showed that copy of 

original order had been served on him, and victim testified she told defendant he was not supposed to call, evidence was 

sufficient to show that defendant had actual knowledge of order's terms. Commonwealth v. Mendonca (2001) 50 Mass 

App 684, 740 NE2d 1034, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 6, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1101, 751 NE2d 418, 2001 Mass 

LEXIS 236. 

To establish that defendant violated restraining order issued pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, § 7, Commonwealth must 

prove that (1) there was valid restraining order, (2) defendant knew of order, and (3) defendant violated order. 

Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 


Defendant's conviction for violation of an order under ALM GL c 209A, § 7 was reversed where the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that he was served with the order by any means that satisfied the dictates of due process, and further, that 

he had knowledge of the terms of the order; it was also shown that the Commonwealth had failed to allege facts that 

would have put defendant on notice to conduct a reasonably inquiry into the facts, as the victim's testimony regarding 

her conversations with defendant did not affirmatively indicate that he had been informed of the terms of the order. 

Commonwealth v. Welch (2003) 58 Mass App 408, 790 NE2d 718, 2003 Mass App LEXIS 707. 

9. --Evidence 

Hearsay statements attributed to defendant's son by complainant warranted finding that complainant was in fear of 

imminent serious physical harm from defendant (defendant told son he should use toy sword to slit his mother's throat). 

Flynn v. Warner (1995) 421 Mass 1002, 654 NE2d 926, 1995 Mass LEXIS 358. 

At trial of defendant for violating protective order issued under ALM GL c 209A, defendant was prejudiced by 

admission of evidence of events that provided basis for issuance of 209A order, where only issue was one of credibility 

as to whether defendant appeared at his mother's house on particular day. Commonwealth v. Picariello (1996) 40 Mass 

App 902, 660 NE2d 1102, 1996 Mass App LEXIS 25, review denied (1996) 422 Mass 1107, 664 NE2d 1197. 

In prosecution for stalking, violating domestic protective order and trespassing, evidence of defendant's prior 

uncharged acts of violence against complainant and daughter of complainant and defendant, his previous incarceration, 

his giving of false name to police upon arrest, and his violation of "stay away" provision of protective order was either 

properly admitted, not objected to, or not prejudicial to defendant. Commonwealth v. Martinez (1997) 43 Mass App 

408, 683 NE2d 699, 1997 Mass App LEXIS 188, review denied (1997) 426 Mass 1103, 687 NE2d 643, 1997 Mass 

LEXIS 546. 

At trial of defendant for violation of abuse prevention order, there was no error in admission of certified copy of 

original order indicating on its face that it had been modified, and it was not unfair to place on defendant burden of 

alerting judge to substance of modifications. Commonwealth v. Rauseo (2001) 50 Mass App 699, 740 NE2d 1053, 2001 

Mass App LEXIS 22, review denied (2001) 434 Mass 1102, 751 NE2d 419, 2001 Mass LEXIS 275. 

Defendant was convicted of violating an abuse prevention order issued under ALM GL c 209A, § 7, by going to a 

residence where he and the victim used to live. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call defendant as a

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 62 

witness because defendant's testimony that he did not know that the victim was in the residence would have been 

irrelevant, as his guilt did not depend on his knowledge of the victim's presence. Commonwealth v. Saladin (2008) 73 

Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 902 N.E.2d 947, 

2009 Mass. LEXIS 479. 

Although defendant was acquitted of a prior charge of assault with a dangerous weapon in connection with an 

incident against his brother, evidence of the prior charge was admissible in defendant's trial for violating an abuse 

prevention order obtained by the brother against defendant because the previous assault charge was introduced to show 

defendant's hostility and motive. Commonwealth v. Barboza (2010) 76 Mass App 241, 921 NE2d 117, 2010 Mass. App. 

LEXIS 125. 

Defendant's convictions of violating a ALM GL c 209A order were not duplicative of his conviction of criminal 

harassment, as the two crimes had different elements, and the conduct forming the basis of the criminal harassment 

charge predated service of the 209A order and violations thereof and thus was distinct from that forming the basis of the 

209A order violations. Commonwealth v. Kulesa (2009) 455 Mass. 447, 917 NE2d 762, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 902. 

Defendant's conviction of violating a protective abuse order under ALM GL c 209A, § 7 did not violate due process 

as a telephone call between defendant and the victim provided adequate notice of the restraining order (RO), defendant's 

response to the information evidenced that defendant knew of the RO, and defendant violated the RO by calling the 

victim the next day. Commonwealth v. Melton (2010) 2010 Mass. App. LEXIS 1176. 

In a prosecution for violation of an abuse prevention order, a return of service completed by an out of state police 

officer did not fall under the official or public records exception, under ALM GL c 233, § 76, and Mass.R.Crim.P. 40, 

due to being maintained by the court, because the statute and Rule pertained to the authenticity of a record, which was a 

precondition to, not the equivalent of, admissibility. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 288. 

In a prosecution for violation of an abuse prevention order, a return of service completed by an out of state police 

officer was admissible without the officer's testimony to demonstrate defendant's knowledge of the order because (1) the 

completed return of service fell within an exception to the hearsay rule for public documents, as the return was prepared 

by an official in the performance of an official duty, and (2) the return's admission, absent the officer's live testimony or 

a prior opportunity to cross-examine the officer, did not violate the confrontation clause, as the primary purpose for 

which the return of service was created was to serve the routine administrative functions of the court system, and the 

return was not created to prove a fact at a potential future criminal trial, was not per se testimonial, and was not 

testimonial in fact. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan (2011) 2011 Mass. App. LEXIS 288. 

10. --Jury instructions 

Judge was not required to include language on circumstantial evidence in jury instruction regarding elements of 

abuse. Commonwealth v. Robicheau (1995) 421 Mass 176, 654 NE2d 1196, 1995 Mass LEXIS 359. 

At trial of defendant for violating abuse prevention order prohibiting defendant from contacting former wife in 

person or by telephone or otherwise, judge erred in refusing to instruct jury that it could find that defendant's contacts 

with former wife, which occurred in course of attempt to speak to daughter by telephone, were "incidental" and that if 

jury so found, such contacts did not constitute violation of ALM GL c 209A order. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 


Where ALM GL c 209A "no-contact" order prohibited defendant from contacting former wife but did not limit 

right of defendant to have contact with his children, judge should have instructed jury to consider whether defendant's 

telephoning of former wife with whom children lived, including repeated calls after wife hung up, was incidental to 

legitimate attempt to telephone daughter, and if so, that such incidental contact was not violation of ALM GL c 209A 

restraining order. Commonwealth v. Leger (2001) 52 Mass App 232, 752 NE2d 799, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 761.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 7 

Page 63 

Given the evidence presented, the judge should have instructed the jury that a defendant could not be convicted for 

an inadvertent violation of the a "no-contact" order. Commonwealth v. Raymond (2002) 54 Mass App 488, 766 NE2d 


It was error for the trial court to deny defendant's request for an instruction on accident or mistake based upon 

evidence presented at trial. Defendant admitted that he left a message on his former fiance's answering machine, but 

there was evidence that defendant left the message by mistake when he incorrectly dialed and thought he was leaving a 

message for his friend with the same name. Commonwealth v. McKay (2006) 67 Mass App 396, 853 NE2d 1098, 2006 

Mass App LEXIS 960. 

Defendant was convicted of violating an abuse prevention order issued under ALM GL c 209A, § 7, by going to a 

residence where he and the victim used to live. An instruction on intent adequately conveyed to the jury the fact that the 

only intent required was that defendant voluntarily intended the act that constituted the violation. Commonwealth v. 

Saladin (2008) 73 Mass App 416, 898 NE2d 514, 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 1303, review denied (2009) 453 Mass. 1105, 

902 N.E.2d 947, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 479. 

In a prosecution for violateing an order of protection, as defendant was served with an order informing him of a 

hearing date for extension of a ALM GL c 209A order, he could not escape being charged with knowledge that the 

initial order was extended merely because he failed to attend the hearing on the extension of the order. Therefore, the 

trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury that defendant had to be made aware of the extended order. 

Commonwealth v. Kulesa (2009) 455 Mass. 447, 917 NE2d 762, 2009 Mass. LEXIS 902. 

11. Penalties 

After wife took children out of Massachusetts, husband obtained legal custody of children under ALM GL c 209A, § 

7. Commonwealth v. Beals (1989) 405 Mass 550, 541 NE2d 1011, 1989 Mass LEXIS 235. 

For violation of protective order issued pursuant to ALM GL c 209A, after being found guilty by jury, defendant 

sentenced to one year in house of correction, all but 30 days suspended. Commonwealth v. Gordon (1990) 407 Mass 

340, 553 NE2d 915, 1990 Mass LEXIS 197. 

Convictions of defendant and consecutive sentences on indictments for parental kidnapping and violation of ALM 

GL c 209A restraining order were not duplicative or violative of double jeopardy principles. Commonwealth v. Bachir 

(1998) 45 Mass App 204, 696 NE2d 948, 1998 Mass App LEXIS 513, review denied (1998) 428 Mass 1104, 702 NE2d 

812, 1998 Mass LEXIS 613.

Page 64 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 8 (2012) 

§ 8. Confidentiality of Plaintiff's Address; Records Involving Minors. 

The records of cases arising out of an action brought under the provisions of this chapter where the plaintiff or 

defendant is a minor shall be withheld from public inspection except by order of the court; provided, that such records 

shall be open, at all reasonable times, to the inspection of the minor, said minor's parent, guardian, attorney, and to the 

plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney, or any of them. 

The plaintiff's residential address, residential telephone number and workplace name, address and telephone 

number, contained within the court records of cases arising out of an action brought by a plaintiff under the provisions 

of this chapter, shall be confidential and withheld from public inspection, except by order of the court, except that the 

plaintiff's residential address and workplace address shall appear on the court order and accessible to the defendant and 

the defendant's attorney unless the plaintiff specifically requests that this information be withheld from the order. All 

confidential portions of the records shall be accessible at all reasonable times to the plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, to 

others specifically authorized by the plaintiff to obtain such information, and to prosecutors, victim-witness advocates 

as defined in section 1 of chapter 258B, domestic violence victim's counselors as defined in section 20K of chapter 233, 

sexual assault counselors as defined in section 20J of chapter 233, and law enforcement officers, if such access is 

necessary in the performance of their duties. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to any protection order issued 

by another jurisdiction, as defined in section 1, that is filed with a court of the commonwealth pursuant to section 5A. 

Such confidential portions of the court records shall not be deemed to be public records under the provisions of clause 

twenty-sixth of section 7 of chapter 4. 

HISTORY: 1983, 678, § 5; 1996, 298, § 9; 1999, 127, § 156; 2000, 236, § 24. 


The 1996 amendment revised the first paragraph.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 8 

Page 65 

The 1999 amendment added the third paragraph. 

The 2000 amendment, effective Sept 28, 2000, deleted the former first and third paragraphs and added the current 

second paragraph. The former first paragraph read: "Upon the request of the plaintiff, the court shall impound the 

plaintiff's address by excluding same from the complaint and from all other court documents which are available for 

public inspection or a protection order issued by another jurisdiction, and shall ensure that the address is kept 

confidential from the defendant and defendant's attorney." The former third paragraph read: "The portions of records of 

cases arising out of an action brought by a plaintiff under the provisions of this chapter, which consist of such plaintiff's 

current residential address, former residential address, residential telephone number and workplace name, address and 

telephone number, shall be kept confidential from the defendant and defendant's attorney and shall be withheld from 

public inspection except by order of the court; provided, however, that such portions of such records shall be accessible 

at all reasonable times to inspection by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney and to others specifically authorized by the 

plaintiff to obtain such information; and provided, further, that such portions of such records shall not be kept 

confidential from the defendant and the defendant's attorney if they are required to appear on a court order against such 

defendant issued under the provisions of this chapter. Such portion of the records shall not be deemed to be public under 

the provisions of clause 26th of section 7 of chapter 4. Upon request of the plaintiff, the court shall impound the 

plaintiff's current and former residential address, telephone number and workplace name, address and telephone number 

consistent with this section." Section 100 provides: 

Section 100. Sections 22, 23 and 24 shall apply to complaints filed pursuant to chapter 209A of the General Laws, 

on or after 90 days following enactment. 

Jurisprudence 


Annotations 


ALR4th 756. 




Law Reviews 






2007). 




Cin. L. Rev. 447 (Winter, 2006).

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 8 

Page 66 








CASE NOTES 

Public has access to affidavits filed in support of domestic abuse protective order. Boston Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe 

(2000) 432 Mass 593, 737 NE2d 859, 2000 Mass LEXIS 698.

Page 67 

§ 9. Form of Complaint. 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 9 (2012) 

The administrative justices of the superior court, probate and family court, district court, and the Boston municipal 

court departments shall jointly promulgate a form of complaint for use under this chapter which shall be in such form 

and language to permit a plaintiff to prepare and file such complaint pro se. 

HISTORY: 1983, 678, § 5. 



Law Reviews 






2007). 



Web References

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 9 

Page 68 







Page 69 











ALM GL ch. 209A, § 10 (2012) 

§ 10. Assessment Upon Assignment to Batterers' Treatment Program. 

The court shall impose an assessment of three hundred and fifty dollars against any person who has been referred to a 

certified batterers' treatment program as a condition of probation. Said assessment shall be in addition to the cost of the 

treatment program. In the discretion of the court, said assessment may be reduced or waived when the court finds that 

the person is indigent or that payment of the assessment would cause the person, or the dependents of such person, 

severe financial hardship. Assessments made pursuant to this section shall be in addition to any other fines, assessments, 

or restitution imposed in any disposition. All funds collected by the court pursuant to this section shall be transmitted 

monthly to the state treasurer, who shall deposit said funds in the General Fund. 

HISTORY: 1993, 110, § 217; 1993, 151, § 49; 1996, 151, § 466. 


The 1993 amendment at the end of the final sentence, substituted "General Fund" for "Domestic Violence Victims' 

Assistance Fund." 

The 1996 amendment substituted "three hundred and fifty" dollars for "three hundred" dollars. 



CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 2.520, Imposing Sentence. 

Law Reviews 

Buel, Violence Against Women: Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 10 

Page 70 





2007). 










CASE NOTES 

Trial court's award of legal and primary physical custody to a mother, pursuant to ALM GL c 209C, § 10(a), was 

proper where the substance of the trial court's opinion indicated that the judge applied the "best interests of the child" 

standard and also considered the three required factors of ALM GL c 209C, § 10(a) in making its custody determination; 

the court found that both parents had a close personal and parental relationship with their daughter, it considered where 

and with whom the child resided for the six months prior to the initiation of the proceeding, and it attempted to preserve 

"to the extent possible" the relationship between the child and the primary caregiver. Custody of Kali (2003) 439 Mass 

834, 792 NE2d 635, 2003 Mass LEXIS 574.

Page 71 

15 of 15 DOCUMENTS 










ALM GL ch. 209A, § 11 (2012) 

§ 11. Domesticated Animals -- Possession, Care and Control. 

(a) Whenever the court issues a temporary or permanent vacate, stay away, restraining or no contact order or a 

judgment under section 18, 34B or 34C of chapter 208, or under section 32 of chapter 209, or under section 3, 4 or 5 of 

this chapter, or under section 15 or 20 of chapter 209C, or under section 3 to 7, inclusive, of chapter 258E or a 

temporary restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction relative to a domestic relations, child custody, 

domestic abuse or abuse prevention proceeding, the court may order the possession, care and control of any 

domesticated animal owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by either party or a minor child residing in the household to 

the plaintiff or petitioner. The court may order the defendant to refrain from abusing, threatening, taking, interfering 

with, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming or otherwise disposing of such animal. 

(b) A party to any proceeding listed in subsection (a) may petition the court for an order authorized by said 

subsection (a). 

(c) Whenever the court issues a warrant for a violation of a temporary or permanent vacate, stay away, restraining 

or no contact order or a judgment issued under section 18, 34B or 34C of chapter 208, or under section 32 of chapter 

209, or under section 3, 4 or 5 of this chapter, or under section 15 or 20 of chapter 209C, or section 3 to 7, inclusive, of 

chapter 258E or otherwise becomes aware that an outstanding warrant for such a violation has been issued against a 

person before the court, the judge may make a finding, based upon the totality of the circumstances, as to whether there 

exists an imminent threat of bodily injury to any party to such judgment or the petitioner of any such protective order, a 

member of the petitioner's family or household or to a domesticated animal belonging to the petitioner or to a member 

of the petitioner's family or household. If the court makes a finding that such an imminent threat of bodily injury to a 

person or domesticated animal exists, the court shall notify the appropriate law enforcement officials of such finding 

and the law enforcement officials shall take all necessary actions to execute any such outstanding warrant as soon as is 

practicable. 

HISTORY: 2012, 193, § 50.

ALM GL ch. 209A, § 11 

Page 72 


Acts 2012, 193, § 50, effective Oct 31, 2012, enacted this section.

Page 1 

§ 1. Definitions. 

1 of 12 DOCUMENTS 






PART III COURTS, JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CASES 

TITLE IV CERTAIN WRITS AND PROCEEDINGS IN SPECIAL CASES 

Chapter 258E Harassment Prevention Orders 


ALM GL ch. 258E, § 1 (2012) 

As used in this chapter the following words shall, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, have the following 

meanings:- 

"Abuse", attempting to cause or causing physical harm to another or placing another in fear of imminent serious 

physical harm. 

"Harassment", (i) 3 or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the 

intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or 

damage to property; or (ii) an act that: (A) by force, threat or duress causes another to involuntarily engage in sexual 

relations; or (B) constitutes a violation of section 13B, 13F, 13H, 22, 22A, 23, 24, 24B, 26C, 43 or 43A of chapter 265 

or section 3 of chapter 272. 

"Court", the district or Boston municipal court, the superior court or the juvenile court departments of the trial 

court. 

"Law officer", any officer authorized to serve criminal process. 

"Malicious", characterized by cruelty, hostility or revenge. 

"Protection order issued by another jurisdiction", an injunction or other order issued by a court of another state, 

territory or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, or a tribal 

court that is issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts, abuse or harassment against, or contact or 

communication with or physical proximity to another person, including temporary and final orders issued by civil and 

criminal courts filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection.

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 1 

Page 2 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 


Acts 2010, 23, effective May 10, 2010, enacted this section. 


CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 6.740, Violation of a Harassment Prevention 

Order. 

Law Review References 



(2012). 

CASE NOTES 

Civil harassment act is not constitutionally overbroad because it does not prohibit a substantial amount of protected 

speech, either in an absolute sense or in relation to the statute's legitimate sweep. O'Brien v. Borowski (2012) 461 Mass 

415, 961 NE2d 547, 2012 Mass. LEXIS 19. 

ALM GL c 258E establishes significant prerequisites to any challenge to rude, uncivil, or profane conduct in 

general, let alone by police officials. Ch. 258E provides no easy shortcut to more traditional and appropriate modes of 

challenging police conduct, such as defending criminal proceedings or meeting the burden of proving claims under 

other civil statutes. Palumbo v. Tusino (2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273. 

Police officer's lawful exercise of discretion, even though implemented in an antagonistic, angry, and unnecessarily 

unhelpful manner during two related encounters initiated by plaintiff, was not harassment under ALM GL c 258E. 

Palumbo v. Tusino (2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273. 

"Acts" prohibited by the anti-harassment statute, ALM GL c 258E, include harassing speech. Palumbo v. Tusino 

(2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273. 

Where plaintiff filed a complaint against a police officer for protection from harassment under ALM GL c 258E, 

the court found that while the parties had a rude and angry discussion with raised voices, that conduct did not sink to the 

level of willful and malicious conduct aimed at plaintiff with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or property 

damage. Palumbo v. Tusino (2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273.

Page 3 

§ 2. Jurisdiction. 











ALM GL ch. 258E, § 2 (2012) 

Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard and determined in the superior court department or the respective 

divisions of the district court department or the Boston municipal court department having venue over the plaintiff's 

residence. The juvenile court department shall have exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings under this chapter in which 

the defendant is under the age of 17. Such proceedings shall be filed, heard and determined in the division of the 

juvenile court department having venue over the plaintiff's residence. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23; 2010, 112, § 29. 



The 2010 amendment, effective May 22, 2010, rewrote this section.

Page 4 

§ 3. Filing of Complaint. 











ALM GL ch. 258E, § 3 (2012) 

(a) A person suffering from harassment may file a complaint in the appropriate court requesting protection from such 

harassment. A person may petition the court under this chapter for an order that the defendant: 

(i) refrain from abusing or harassing the plaintiff, whether the defendant is an adult or minor; 

(ii) refrain from contacting the plaintiff, unless authorized by the court, whether the defendant is an adult or 

minor; 

(iii) remain away from the plaintiff's household or workplace, whether the defendant is an adult or minor; and 

(iv) pay the plaintiff monetary compensation for the losses suffered as a direct result of the harassment; provided, 

however, that compensatory damages shall include, but shall not be limited to, loss of earnings, out-of-pocket losses for 

injuries sustained or property damaged, cost of replacement of locks, medical expenses, cost for obtaining an unlisted 

phone number and reasonable attorney's fees. 

(b) The court may order that information in the case record be impounded in accordance with court rule. 

(c) No filing fee shall be charged for the filing of the complaint. The plaintiff shall not be charged for certified 

copies of any orders entered by the court, or any copies of the file reasonably required for future court action or as a 

result of the loss or destruction of plaintiff's copies. 

(d) Any relief granted by the court shall not extend for a period exceeding 1 year. Every order shall, on its face, 

state the time and date the order is to expire and shall include the date and time that the matter will again be heard. If the 

plaintiff appears at the court at the date and time the order is to expire, the court shall determine whether or not to 

extend the order for any additional time reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff or to enter a permanent order. 

When the expiration date stated on the order is on a date when the court is closed to business, the order shall not expire

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 3 

Page 5 

until the next date that the court is open to business. The plaintiff may appear on such next court business day at the 

time designated by the order to request that the order be extended. The court may also extend the order upon motion of 

the plaintiff, for such additional time as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from harassment. The fact that 

harassment has not occurred during the pendency of an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying 

or failing to extend the order, or allowing an order to expire or be vacated or for refusing to issue a new order. 

(e) The court may modify its order at any subsequent time upon motion by either party; provided, however, that the 

non-moving party shall receive sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard on said modification. When the plaintiff's 

address is inaccessible to the defendant as provided in section 10 and the defendant has filed a motion to modify the 

court's order, the court shall be responsible for notifying the plaintiff. In no event shall the court disclose any such 

inaccessible address. 

(f) The court shall not deny any complaint filed under this chapter solely because it was not filed within a particular 

time period after the last alleged incident of harassment. 

(g) An action commenced under this chapter shall not preclude any other civil or criminal remedies. A party filing a 

complaint under this chapter shall be required to disclose any prior or pending actions involving the parties; including, 

but not limited to, court actions, administrative proceedings and disciplinary proceedings. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23; 2010, 112, § 30. 



The 2010 amendment, effective May 22, 2010, added "including, but not limited to, court actions, administrative 

proceedings and disciplinary proceedings" in the second sentence of (g). 




(2012). 

CASE NOTES 

ALM GL c 258E establishes significant prerequisites to any challenge to rude, uncivil, or profane conduct in 

general, let alone by police officials. Ch. 258E provides no easy shortcut to more traditional and appropriate modes of 

challenging police conduct, such as defending criminal proceedings or meeting the burden of proving claims under 

other civil statutes. Palumbo v. Tusino (2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273. 

Police officer's lawful exercise of discretion, even though implemented in an antagonistic, angry, and unnecessarily 

unhelpful manner during two related encounters initiated by plaintiff, was not harassment under ALM GL c 258E. 

Palumbo v. Tusino (2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273. 

"Acts" prohibited by the anti-harassment statute, ALM GL c 258E, include harassing speech. Palumbo v. Tusino 

(2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273. 

Where plaintiff filed a complaint against a police officer for protection from harassment under ALM GL c 258E, 

the court found that while the parties had a rude and angry discussion with raised voices, that conduct did not sink to the

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 3 

Page 6 

level of willful and malicious conduct aimed at plaintiff with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse, or property 

damage. Palumbo v. Tusino (2011) 29 Mass L Rep 125, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 273.

Page 7 

§ 4. Nature of Complaint. 











ALM GL ch. 258E, § 4 (2012) 

Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, a complainant shall be informed that the proceedings hereunder are 

civil in nature and that violations of orders issued hereunder are criminal in nature. Further, a complainant shall be 

given information prepared by the appropriate district attorney's office that other criminal proceedings may be available 

and such complainant shall be instructed by such district attorney's office relative to the procedures required to initiate 

criminal proceedings including, but not limited to, a complaint for a violation of section 13B, 13F, 13H, 22, 22A, 23, 

24, 24B, 26C, 43 and 43A of chapter 265 or section 3 of chapter 272. Whenever possible, a complainant shall be 

provided with such information in the complainant's native language. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 


Acts 2010, 23, effective May 10, 2010, enacted this section.

Page 8 










§ 5. Relief -- Temporary Protection Orders. 


ALM GL ch. 258E, § 5 (2012) 

Upon the filing of a complaint under this chapter, the court may enter such temporary orders as it deems necessary to 

protect a plaintiff from harassment, including relief as provided in section 3. 

If the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of harassment, the court may enter such 

temporary relief orders without notice as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from harassment and shall 

immediately thereafter notify the defendant that the temporary orders have been issued. The court shall give the 

defendant an opportunity to be heard on the question of continuing the temporary order and of granting other relief as 

requested by the plaintiff not later than 10 court business days after such orders are entered. 

Notice shall be made by the appropriate law enforcement agency as provided in section 9. 

If the defendant does not appear at such subsequent hearing, the temporary orders shall continue in effect without 

further order of the court. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 



Page 9 










§ 6. Relief -- When Court is Closed. 


ALM GL ch. 258E, § 6 (2012) 

[Effective until July 1, 2012.] When the court is closed for business or the plaintiff is unable to appear in court 

because of severe hardship due to the plaintiff's physical condition, the court may grant relief to the plaintiff as provided 

under section 5 if the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of harassment. In the 

discretion of the justice, such relief may be granted and communicated by telephone to an officer or employee of an 

appropriate law enforcement agency, who shall record such order on a form of order promulgated for such use by the 

chief justice for administration and management and shall deliver a copy of such order on the next court day to the clerk 

or clerk-magistrate of the court having venue and jurisdiction over the matter. If relief has been granted without the 

filing of a complaint pursuant to this section, the plaintiff shall appear in court on the next available business day to file 

a complaint. If the plaintiff in such a case is unable to appear in court without severe hardship due to the plaintiff's 

physical condition, a representative may appear in court, on the plaintiff's behalf and file the requisite complaint with an 

affidavit setting forth the circumstances preventing the plaintiff from appearing personally. Notice to the plaintiff and 

defendant and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard shall be given as provided in said section 5. 


When the court is closed for business or the plaintiff is unable to appear in court because of severe hardship due to 

the plaintiff's physical condition, the court may grant relief to the plaintiff as provided under section 5 if the plaintiff 

demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of harassment. In the discretion of the justice, such relief 

may be granted and communicated by telephone to an officer or employee of an appropriate law enforcement agency, 

who shall record such order on a form of order promulgated for such use by the chief justice of the trial court and shall 

deliver a copy of such order on the next court day to the clerk or clerk-magistrate of the court having venue and 

jurisdiction over the matter. If relief has been granted without the filing of a complaint pursuant to this section, the 

plaintiff shall appear in court on the next available business day to file a complaint. If the plaintiff in such a case is 

unable to appear in court without severe hardship due to the plaintiff's physical condition, a representative may appear 

in court, on the plaintiff's behalf and file the requisite complaint with an affidavit setting forth the circumstances

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 6 

Page 10 

preventing the plaintiff from appearing personally. Notice to the plaintiff and defendant and an opportunity for the 

defendant to be heard shall be given as provided in said section 5. 

Any order issued under this section and any documentation in support thereof shall be certified on the next court 

day by the clerk or clerk-magistrate of the court issuing such order to the court having venue and jurisdiction over the 

matter. Such certification to the court shall have the effect of commencing proceedings under this chapter and invoking 

the other provisions of this chapter but shall not be deemed necessary for an emergency order issued under this section 

to take effect. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23; 2011, 93, § 113. 



The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted "chief justice of the trial court" for "chief justice for 

administration and management" following "use by the" in the second sentence of the first paragraph. Section 137 

provides: 


take effect on July 1, 2012.

Page 11 











§ 7. Protection Order Issued by another Jurisdiction. 

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 7 (2012) 

Any protection order issued by another jurisdiction shall be given full faith and credit throughout the commonwealth 

and enforced as if it were issued in the commonwealth for as long as the order is in effect in the issuing jurisdiction. 

A person entitled to protection under a protection order issued by another jurisdiction may file such order with the 

appropriate court by filing with the court a certified copy of such order. Such person shall swear under oath in an 

affidavit, to the best of such person's knowledge, that such order is presently in effect as written. Upon request by a law 

enforcement agency, the clerk or clerk-magistrate of such court shall provide a certified copy of the protection order 

issued by the other jurisdiction. 

A law officer may presume the validity of, and enforce in accordance with section 8, a copy of a protection order 

issued by another jurisdiction which has been provided to the law officer by any source; provided, however, that the 

officer is also provided with a statement by the person protected by the order that such order remains in effect. Law 

officers may rely on such statement by the person protected by such order. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 



Page 12 










§ 8. Law Officers -- Emergency Response. 


ALM GL ch. 258E, § 8 (2012) 

Whenever a law officer has reason to believe that a person has been abused or harassed or is in danger of being abused 

or harassed, such officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse or harassment. Law officers shall make 

every reasonable effort to do the following as part of the emergency response: 

(1) assess the immediate physical danger to the victim and provide assistance reasonably intended to mitigate the 

safety risk; 

(2) if there is observable injury to the victim or if the victim is complaining of injury, encourage the victim to 

seek medical attention and arrange for medical assistance or request an ambulance for transport to a hospital; 

(3) if a sexual assault has occurred, notify the victim that there are time-sensitive medical or forensic options that 

may be available, encourage the victim to seek medical attention and arrange for medical assistance or request an 

ambulance for transport to a hospital; 

(4) provide the victim with referrals to local resources that may assist the victim in locating and getting to a safe 

place; 

(5) provide adequate notice to the victim of the victim's rights including, but not limited to, obtaining a 

harassment prevention order; provided, however, that the notice shall consist of providing the victim with a copy of the 

following statement before the officer leaves the scene or premises and after reading the statement to the victim; 

provided further, that if the victim's native language is not English, the statement shall be then provided in the victim's 

native language whenever possible: 

"You have the right to appear at the Superior, Juvenile (only if the attacker is under 17), District or Boston 

Municipal Court, if you reside within the appropriate jurisdiction, and file a complaint requesting any of the following

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 8 

Page 13 

applicable orders: (i) an order restraining your attacker from harassing or abusing you; (ii) an order directing your 

attacker to refrain from contacting you; (iii) an order directing your attacker to stay away from your home and your 

workplace; (iv) an order directing your attacker to pay you for losses suffered as a result of the harassment or abuse, 

including loss of earnings, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained or property damaged, costs of replacement of 

locks, medical expenses, cost for obtaining an unlisted phone number, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 

For an emergency on weekends, holidays or weeknights, the police will assist you in activating the emergency 

response system so that you may file a complaint and request a harassment prevention order. 

You have the right to go to the appropriate court and apply for a criminal complaint for sexual assault, threats, 

criminal stalking, criminal harassment, assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to kill or 

other related offenses. 

If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to request that an officer present drive you to the 

nearest hospital or otherwise assist you in obtaining medical treatment. 

If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have the right to request that the 

officer present remain at the scene until you can leave or until your safety is otherwise ensured. You may also request 

that the officer assist you in locating and taking you to a safe place including, but not limited to, a designated meeting 

place for a shelter or a family member's or a friend's residence or a similar place of safety. 

You may request and obtain a copy of the police incident report at no cost from the police department."; 

(6) assist the victim by activating the emergency judicial system when the court is closed for business; 

(7) inform the victim that the abuser will be eligible for bail and may be promptly released; and 

(8) arrest any person that a law officer witnessed or has probable cause to believe violated a temporary or 

permanent vacate, restraining, stay-away or no-contact order or judgment issued under this chapter or similar protection 

order issued by another jurisdiction; provided, however, that if there are no vacate, restraining, stay-away or no-contact 

orders or judgments in effect, arresting the person shall be the preferred response if the law officer witnessed or has 

probable cause to believe that a person: (i) has committed a felony; (ii) has committed a misdemeanor involving 

harassment or abuse as defined in section 1; or (iii) has committed an assault and battery in violation of section 13A of 

chapter 265; provided further, that the safety of the victim shall be paramount in any decision to arrest; and provided 

further, that if a law officer arrests both parties, the law officer shall submit a detailed, written report in addition to an 

incident report, setting forth the grounds for arresting both parties. 

No law officer shall be held liable in a civil action for personal injury or property damage brought by a party to an 

incident of abuse or for an arrest based on probable cause when such officer acted reasonably and in good faith and in 

compliance with this chapter. 

Whenever a law officer investigates an incident of harassment, the officer shall immediately file a written incident 

report in accordance with the standards of the law officer's law enforcement agency and, wherever possible, in the form 

of the National Incident-Based Reporting System, as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The latter 

information may be submitted voluntarily by the local police on a monthly basis to the crime reporting unit of the state 

police crime reporting unit established in section 32 of chapter 22C. 

The victim shall be provided with a copy of the full incident report at no cost upon request to the appropriate law 

enforcement department. 

When a judge or other person authorized to take bail bails any person arrested under this chapter, reasonable efforts 

shall be made to inform the victim of such release prior to or at the time of the release. When any person charged with

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 8 

Page 14 

or arrested for a crime involving harassment under this chapter is released from custody, the court or the emergency 

response judge shall issue, upon the request of the victim, a written no-contact order or stay-away order prohibiting the 

person charged or arrested from having any contact with the victim and shall use all reasonable means to notify the 

victim immediately of release from custody. The victim shall be provided, at no cost, with a certified copy of the 

no-contact or stay-away order. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23; 2010, 112, § 31. 



The 2010 amendment, effective May 22, 2010, rewrote this section. 




(2012).

Page 15 

§ 9. Review of Records. 











ALM GL ch. 258E, § 9 (2012) 

When considering a complaint filed under this chapter, the court shall order a review of the records contained within 

the court activity record information system and the statewide domestic violence recordkeeping system, as provided in 

chapter 188 of the acts of 1992 and maintained by the commissioner of probation, and shall review the resulting data to 

determine whether the named defendant has a civil or criminal record involving violent crimes or abuse. Upon receipt of 

information that an outstanding warrant exists against the named defendant, a judge shall order that the appropriate law 

enforcement officials be notified and shall order that any information regarding the defendant's most recent whereabouts 

shall be forwarded to such officials. In all instances in which an outstanding warrant exists, the court shall make a 

finding, based upon all of the circumstances, as to whether an imminent threat of bodily injury exists to the petitioner. 

In all instances in which such an imminent threat of bodily injury is found to exist, the judge shall notify the appropriate 

law enforcement officials of such finding and such officials shall take all necessary actions to execute any such 

outstanding warrant as soon as is practicable. 

Whenever the court orders that the defendant refrain from harassing the plaintiff or have no contact with the 

plaintiff under section 3, 5 or 6, the clerk or clerk-magistrate shall transmit: (i) to the office of the commissioner of 

probation information for filing in the court activity record information system or the statewide domestic violence 

recordkeeping system as provided in said chapter 188 of the acts of 1992 or in a recordkeeping system created by the 

commissioner of probation to record the issuance of, or violation of, prevention orders issued pursuant to this chapter; 

and (ii) 2 certified copies of each such order and 1 copy of the complaint and summons forthwith to the appropriate law 

enforcement agency which, unless otherwise ordered by the court, shall serve 1 copy of each order upon the defendant, 

together with a copy of the complaint and order and summons. The law enforcement agency shall promptly make its 

return of service to the court. The commissioner of probation may develop and implement a statewide harassment 

prevention order recordkeeping system. 

Law officers shall use every reasonable means to enforce such harassment prevention orders. Law enforcement 

agencies shall establish procedures adequate to ensure that an officer on the scene of an alleged violation of such order

ALM GL ch. 258E, § 9 

Page 16 

may be informed of the existence and terms of such order. The court shall notify the appropriate law enforcement 

agency in writing whenever any such order is vacated and shall direct the agency to destroy all record of such vacated 

order and such agency shall comply with that directive. 

Each harassment prevention order issued shall contain the following statement: 

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. 

Any violation of such order or a protection order issued by another jurisdiction shall be punishable by a fine of not 

more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than 21/2 years in a house of correction, or both. In addition to, but 

not in lieu of, the foregoing penalties and any other sentence, fee or assessment, including the victim witness assessment 

in section 8 of chapter 258B, the court shall order persons convicted of a violation of such an order to pay a fine of $25 

that shall be transmitted to the treasurer for deposit into the General Fund. For any violation of such order, the court 

may order the defendant to complete an appropriate treatment program based on the offense. 

In each instance in which there is a violation of a harassment prevention order or a protection order issued by 

another jurisdiction, the court may order the defendant to pay the plaintiff for all damages including, but not limited to, 

loss of earnings, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained or property damaged, cost of replacement locks, medical 

expenses, cost for obtaining an unlisted telephone number and reasonable attorney's fees. 

Any such violation may be enforced by the court. Criminal remedies provided herein are not exclusive and do not 

preclude any other available civil or criminal remedies. The court may enforce by civil contempt procedure a violation 

of its own court order. 

Section 8 of chapter 136 shall not apply to any order, complaint or summons issued pursuant to this section. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 



Page 17 










§ 10. Case Records of Minors. 


ALM GL ch. 258E, § 10 (2012) 

The records of cases arising out of an action brought under this chapter in which the plaintiff or defendant is a minor 

shall be withheld from public inspection except by order of the court; provided, however, that such records shall be 

open, at all reasonable times, to the inspection of the minor, such minor's parent, guardian and attorney and to the 

plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney. 

The plaintiff's residential address, residential telephone number and workplace name, address and telephone 

number, contained within the court records of cases arising out of an action brought by a plaintiff under this chapter, 

shall be confidential and withheld from public inspection, except by order of the court; provided, however, that the 

plaintiff's residential address and workplace address shall appear on the court order and be accessible to the defendant 

and the defendant's attorney unless the plaintiff specifically requests that this information be withheld from the order. 

All confidential portions of the records shall be accessible at all reasonable times to the plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, 

to others specifically authorized by the plaintiff to obtain such information and to prosecutors, victim-witness advocates 

as defined in section 1 of chapter 258B, sexual assault counselors as defined in section 20J of chapter 233 and law 

officers, if such access is necessary in the performance of their duties. This paragraph shall apply to any protection order 

issued by another jurisdiction filed with a court of the commonwealth pursuant to section 7. Such confidential portions 

of the court records shall not be deemed to be public records under clause Twenty-sixth of section 7 of chapter 4. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 



Page 18 











ALM GL ch. 258E, § 11 (2012) 

§ 11. Forms. 

[Effective until July 1, 2012.] The chief justice for administration and management shall adopt a form of complaint 

for use under this chapter which shall be in such form and language to permit a plaintiff to prepare and file such 

complaint pro se. 


The chief justice of the trial court shall adopt a form of complaint for use under this chapter which shall be in such 

form and language to permit a plaintiff to prepare and file such complaint pro se. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23; 2011, 93, § 114. 



The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2012, substituted "chief justice of the trial court" for "chief justice for 

administration and management." Section 137 provides: 


take effect on July 1, 2012.

Page 19 

§ 12. Assessment Fee. 











ALM GL ch. 258E, § 12 (2012) 

The court shall impose an assessment of $350 against any person who has been referred to a treatment program as a 

condition of probation. Such assessment shall be in addition to the cost of the treatment program. In the discretion of the 

court, such assessment may be reduced or waived if the court finds that such person is indigent or that payment of the 

assessment would cause the person, or the dependents of such person, severe financial hardship. Assessments made 

pursuant to this section shall be in addition to any other fines, assessments or restitution imposed in any disposition. All 

funds collected by the court pursuant to this section shall be transmitted monthly to the state treasurer, who shall deposit 

such funds into the General Fund. 

HISTORY: 2010, 23. 



Page 1 

§ 17. Definition; Penalty. 







PART IV CRIMES, PUNISHMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL CASES 

TITLE I CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 

Chapter 269 Crimes Against Public Peace 


ALM GL ch. 269, § 17 (2012) 

Whoever is a principal organizer or participant in the crime of hazing, as defined herein, shall be punished by a fine of 

not more than three thousand dollars or by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than one year, or both 

such fine and imprisonment. 

The term "hazing" as used in this section and in sections eighteen and nineteen, shall mean any conduct or method 

of initiation into any student organization, whether on public or private property, which wilfully or recklessly endangers 

the physical or mental health of any student or other person. Such conduct shall include whipping, beating, branding, 

forced calisthenics, exposure to the weather, forced consumption of any food, liquor, beverage, drug or other substance, 

or any other brutal treatment or forced physical activity which is likely to adversely affect the physical health or safety 

of any such student or other person, or which subjects such student or other person to extreme mental stress, including 

extended deprivation of sleep or rest or extended isolation. 

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section to the contrary, consent shall not be available as a defense to 

any prosecution under this action. 

HISTORY: 1985, 536; 1987, 665. 


The 1987 amendment added the third paragraph, relating to the unavailability of consent as a defense, and, in the 

first paragraph, increased the maximum fine from $1000 to $3000 and the maximum prison term from one hundred 

days to one year, and, preceding "both", deleted "by". 

Jurisprudence

ALM GL ch. 269, § 17 

Page 2 

68 Am Jur 2d, Schools § 347. 

Annotations 

Tort liability of college, university, fraternity, or sorority for injury or death of member or prospective member by 

hazing or initiation activity. 68 ALR4th 228. 

Validity, construction, and application of "hazing" statutes. 30 ALR5th 683. 

Law Reviews 

Edelman, How to Prevent High School Hazing: A Legal, Ethical and Social Primer. 81 N. Dak. L. Rev. 309 (2005). 

CASE NOTES 

Brutal treatment or forced physical activity made criminal by ALM GL c 269 § 17 is directed at student 

organizations, not at educational institutions themselves. Perkins v. Commonwealth (2001) 52 Mass App 175, 752 


Cadet who resigned from training at State Police Academy had no claim for constructive discharge from 

employment on ground that hazing by Academy personnel violated public policy, where there was no legislative 

directive or enunciated public policy that precluded Academy from discharging cadet who could not tolerate rigors and 

discipline required of recruits. Perkins v. Commonwealth (2001) 52 Mass App 175, 752 NE2d 761, 2001 Mass App 

LEXIS 745. 

Hazing statute, ALM GL c 269 § 17, did not apply to State Police Academy because Academy was not student 

organization. Perkins v. Commonwealth (2001) 52 Mass App 175, 752 NE2d 761, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 745. 

ALM GL c 269 § 17 does not create private cause of action. Perkins v. Commonwealth (2001) 52 Mass App 175, 

752 NE2d 761, 2001 Mass App LEXIS 745. 

Arbitrator's finding that it was error to redact the names of student witnesses in a teacher disciplinary proceeding 

did not violate: (1) the public policy that incident reports describing harm to a child's health or welfare had to be kept 

confidential set forth in ALM GL c 119, §§ 51A and 51E, or (2) the policy respecting the safety of children inherent in 

statutes prohibiting corporal punishment set forth in ALM GL c 71, § 37G and prohibiting hazing set forth in ALM GL c 

269, §§ 17-19. City of Boston Sch. Comm. v. Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 (2006) 22 Mass L Rep 15, 2006 Mass 

Super LEXIS 634. 

School committee failed to show that disclosure to union of unredacted student witness statements concerning 

alleged teacher misconduct would violate alleged public policy of protecting students' rights to privacy and safety; even 

assuming that such policy existed, school committee failed to explain interplay (if any) between statutes it relied on to 

support its argument and statements at issue. Boston School Committee and Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 

MFT/AFT/AFL-CIO, 36 MLC 48 (2009).

Page 3 









Chapter 269 Crimes Against Public Peace 


ALM GL ch. 269, § 18 (2012) 

§ 18. Reporting Hazing Offense; Penalty for Failure to Report Violation. 

Whoever knows that another person is the victim of hazing as defined in section seventeen and is at the scene of such 

crime shall, to the extent that such person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, report such crime to an 

appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable. Whoever fails to report such crime shall be 

punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars. 

HISTORY: 1985, 536; 1988, 665. 


The 1987 amendment in the second sentence, increased the maximum fine from $500 to $1000. 

Jurisprudence 

68 Am Jur 2d, Schools § 347. 

Annotations 

Tort liability of college, university, fraternity, or sorority for injury or death of member or prospective member by 

hazing or initiation activity. 68 ALR4th 228. 

Validity, construction, and application of "hazing" statutes. 30 ALR5th 683. 

Law Reviews 

Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue. 84 Tex. L. Rev. 653 (February, 

2006).

ALM GL ch. 269, § 18 

Page 4 

Edelman, How to Prevent High School Hazing: A Legal, Ethical and Social Primer. 81 N. Dak. L. Rev. 309 (2005). 

Edelman, Addressing the High School Hazing Problem: Why Lawmakers Need to Impose a Duty to Act on School 

Personnel. 25 Pace L. Rev. 15 (Fall, 2004). 

CASE NOTES 

School committee failed to show that disclosure to union of unredacted student witness statements concerning 

alleged teacher misconduct would violate alleged public policy of protecting students' rights to privacy and safety; even 

assuming that such policy existed, school committee failed to explain interplay (if any) between statutes it relied on to 

support its argument and statements at issue. Boston School Committee and Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 

MFT/AFT/AFL-CIO, 36 MLC 48 (2009).

Page 1 









Chapter 266 Crimes Against Property 


ALM GL ch. 266, § 126A (2012) 

§ 126A. Real or Personal Property; Penalty for Intentionally Defacing. 

Whoever intentionally, willfully and maliciously or wantonly, paints, marks, scratches, etches or otherwise marks, 

injures, mars, defaces or destroys the real or personal property of another including but not limited to a wall, fence, 

building, sign, rock, monument, gravestone or tablet, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison for a term of 

not more than three years or by imprisonment in a house of correction for not more than two years or by a fine of not 

more than fifteen hundred dollars or not more than three times the value of the property so marked, injured, marred, 

defaced or destroyed, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and fine, and shall also be required to pay for the 

removal or obliteration of such painting, marking, scratching or etching, or to remove or obliterate such painting, 

marking, scratching or etching; provided, however, that when a fine is levied pursuant to the value of the property 

marked, injured, marred, defaced or destroyed or when the cost of removal or obliteration is assessed, the court shall, 

after conviction, conduct an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the value of the property so marked, injured, marred, 

defaced or destroyed or to ascertain the cost of the removal or obliteration; and provided, however, that if the property 

marked, injured, marred, defaced or destroyed is a war or veterans' memorial, monument or gravestone, the fine under 

this section shall be doubled and the person convicted shall be ordered to perform not less than 500 hours of 

court-approved community service. A police officer may arrest any person for commission of the offenses prohibited by 

this section without a warrant if said police officer has probable cause to believe that said person has committed the 

offenses prohibited by this section. 

Upon conviction for said offense the individual's driver's license shall be suspended for one year. If the individual 

convicted of defacing or vandalizing the real or personal property of another is under the age of sixteen then one year 

shall be added to the minimum age eligibility for driving. 

HISTORY: 1994, 60, § 174; 2010, 131, § 101. 

NOTES: Editorial Note

ALM GL ch. 266, § 126A 

Page 2 

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, added "and provided, however, that if the property marked, injured, 

marred, defaced or destroyed is a war or veterans' memorial, monument or gravestone, the fine under this section shall 

be doubled and the person convicted shall be ordered to perform not less than 500 hours of court-approved community 

service" at the end of the first sentence of the first paragraph. Section 202 provides: 

Section 202. Except as otherwise specified, this act shall take effect on July 1, 2010. 


CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 8.260, Wanton Destruction of Property. 

LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations 

Precious Metal & Gem Dealing 

CASE NOTES 

The intent required for wanton defacement of property under ALM GL c 266, § 126A, is general intent. 

Commonwealth v. McDowell (2004) 62 Mass App 15, 814 NE2d 1139, 2004 Mass App LEXIS 1049, review denied 


In order to convict defendant of defacing personal property, the Commonwealth was required to prove that 

defendant's conduct was willful and malicious, or wanton conduct, and that defendant possessed general intent. Insofar 

as the stipulated evidence permitted the inference that defendant intended to drive the car, based on his replacement of 

the car's battery, heedless of the consequences, it was enough to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite 

general intent and defendant's intoxicated state was irrelevant to his ability to form general intent. Commonwealth v. 

McDowell (2004) 62 Mass App 15, 814 NE2d 1139, 2004 Mass App LEXIS 1049, review denied (2004) 442 Mass 1113, 

818 NE2d 1067, 2004 Mass LEXIS 785. 

HIERARCHY NOTES: 

Pt. IV, Tit. I, Ch. 266 Note

Page 3 









Chapter 266 Crimes Against Property 


ALM GL ch. 266, § 126B (2012) 

§ 126B. Public or Personal Property; Penalty for Tagging. 

Whoever sprays or applies paint or places a sticker upon a building, wall, fence, sign, tablet, gravestone, monument or 

other object or thing on a public way or adjoined to it, or in public view, or on private property, such person known or 

commonly known as "taggers" and such conduct or activity known or commonly known as "tagging", or other words or 

phrases associated to such persons, conduct or activity, and either as an individual or in a group, joins together with said 

group, with the intent to deface, mar, damage, mark or destroy such property, shall be punished by imprisonment in a 

house of correction for not more than two years or by a fine of not less than fifteen hundred dollars or not more than 

three times the value of such damage to the property so defaced, marked, marred, damaged or destroyed, whichever is 

greater, or both fine and imprisonment and shall also be required to pay for the removal or obliteration of such "tagging" 

or to obliterate such "tagging"; provided, however that when a fine is levied pursuant to the value of the property 

marred, defaced, marked, damaged or destroyed or where the cost of removal or obliteration is assessed the court shall, 

after conviction, conduct an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the value of the property so defaced, marked, marred, 

damaged or destroyed or to ascertain the cost of the removal or obliteration. A police officer may arrest any person for 

commission of the offenses prohibited by this section without a warrant if said police officer has probable cause to 

believe that said person has committed the offenses prohibited by this section. 

Upon conviction for said offense the individual's drivers license shall be suspended for one year. If the individual 

convicted of defacing or vandalizing the real or personal property of another is under the age of sixteen then one year 

shall be added to the minimum age eligibility for driving. 

HISTORY: 1994, 60, § 174. 


CR Model Jur Instructions for use in the Dis Cts - Mass. Instruction 8.260, Wanton Destruction of Property.

ALM GL ch. 266, § 126B 

Page 4 

Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Offenses Exhibit 1A, Schedule of Suspensions and Revocations. 

LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations 

Precious Metal & Gem Dealing 

CASE NOTES 

Defendant should have been granted a new trial as the recited facts did not allege that defendant sprayed or applied 

paint or placed a sticker upon anything as required for tagging under ALM GL c 266, § 126B, and the colloquy did not 

explain the intent and agreement necessary to convict defendant as a joint venturer. Commonwealth v. Argueta (2009) 

73 Mass App 564, 899 NE2d 896, 2009 Mass. App. LEXIS 59. 

HIERARCHY NOTES: 

Pt. IV, Tit. I, Ch. 266 Note

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