The complexiTy of resource governance in a conTexT of sTaTe ... - Ipis

60 International Alert
Incentives could be introduced to encourage the installation of new comptoirs in the hinterland.
In exchange for reaching certain benchmarks (in terms of transparency, professionalisation and
treatment of minerals) they could benefit, for example, from material and/or technical support.
Such measures require the involvement of many stakeholders, including the DRC government,
international donors, international metal traders and Congolese business federations. Granting
exclusive buying rights to a comptoir is also giving an incentive for comptoirs to move into
the hinterland. It is, however, unlikely that such measures would create a sustainable trading
environment as the comptoir is responsible for generating the support itself (and can do so
without concerning himself much with social or other benchmarks).
Traders from Butembo and Bunia are among the main beneficiaries of the gold trade from Bafwasende
and Mambasa. However, in several areas of Mambasa semi-industrial gold mining operations – and
their political and administrative backers – seem to be making considerable profits too.
Because of recent developments, the situation in Northern Katanga is different. There, a single
comptoir is reaping the profit from locally mined coltan and, to a lesser extent, cassiterite. The
arrival of this comptoir, with the support of Lubumbashi, has sidelined the traders from the Kivus.
The case of the unilateral measures taken by the Katangese government (whether a transgression
of its competence or not) suggests that giving more responsibility to the provinces (including a
greater stake in the taxation of the mineral trade) might incentivise them to better manage the trade
and clamp down on abuse. As this might result in competition with the national government or
other provinces, it would require coordination between these different stakeholders. Additionally,
more information-sharing and data comparison is needed between the state services working on
mining issues in the different provinces and regions. The possibility of creating formal structures
for coordination between provinces (for example, between Katanga and South Kivu on, coltan or
between Maniema and North Kivu on cassiterite) should be explored.
In this light, the next stages of the DRC’s delayed decentralisation process should be borne in
mind. The Congolese constitution stipulates that after decentralisation the provinces will keep
40 percent of the revenues they have generated instead of being “reimbursed” by Kinshasa (it
should be noted, however, that this particular provision might be revised). Moreover, the 11
provinces are to be subdivided in 26 new provinces along the borders of the current districts (this
is particularly important for the Tanganyika district in Northern Katanga). These two measures
would most likely motivate local politicians and civil servants to take control over “their” area of
Congolese mineral production. Naturally it remains to be seen how much of the provincial money
would flow back to the territoires and secteurs.
The local opposition to the drastic measures taken by the Katangese provincial government has
shown that they were taken without consultation. Increasing the responsibility of the provinces
should therefore imply the inclusion of all provincial stakeholders. Examples of such stakeholder
fora already exist, albeit in nascent form, in both the Kivus and Ituri. In South Kivu, a socalled
Tripartite – including the provincial government, civil society and trader representatives
– organised a three-day workshop at the beginning of 2010. In Goma, a round table gathering
organised in March 2010 led to the creation of a think tank/lobby group, in which local community
representatives participate. In Ituri, the Cadre de Concertation de la Société civile de l’Ituri sur les
Industries Extractives has existed since 2007 and has organised a wide range of activities. Similar
mechanisms would have to be created in the Kivu hinterland as they are necessary to ensure
broadly supported policies and reforms.
Officially, industrial mining does not take place in any of the three areas studied. In Maniema,
some of the mining companies who failed to restart industrial exploitation have turned their hand
to commercialising the minerals mined by artisanal miners on their concessions.
Apart from the economic operators, members of armed groups and the Congolese army generate
an income from the widespread mining in the eastern hinterland. This phenomenon exists in all