Journal of Political Inquiry Fall 2014
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<strong>Fall</strong> Issue | <strong>2014</strong>
Nauru: An Experiment<br />
By Hannah Thomas<br />
Nauru is an island country <strong>of</strong> less than 10,000 people, and with a landmass <strong>of</strong> a mere twenty-one<br />
square kilometers, tucked <strong>of</strong>f the shore <strong>of</strong> Sydney, Australia. In October <strong>2014</strong>, the nation found<br />
itself featured in The Economist for its imminent descent into bankruptcy. 1 In many ways Nauru can<br />
be used as a case study to understand the insufficiencies <strong>of</strong> democracy, if democracy is merely<br />
defined by elections and representation. Despite Nauru’s democratic governance structure, which<br />
includes a unicameral parliament, elected representatives, and recognition <strong>of</strong> civil liberties, the<br />
country still faces multifaceted instability. Its democratic institutions fall short <strong>of</strong> helping to protect<br />
liberty and property as seen in Nauru’s impending bankruptcy. Moreover, the entire country is an<br />
interesting case because unlike most failed democracies that can attribute failure to political, ethnic,<br />
or social violence, Nauru has none <strong>of</strong> these conflicts but is still at high risk <strong>of</strong> being a failed state. It<br />
is a democratic country that is confronting myriad social and economic problems that threaten its<br />
sovereignty and the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> its government—not too different from the political and economic<br />
challengers that arose in a nascent United States <strong>of</strong> America. Finally, the potential <strong>of</strong> other countries<br />
(which have more significant involvement in international markets) with such problems could be a<br />
threat to international stability. The following serves as an examination <strong>of</strong> the political, economic,<br />
and social implications <strong>of</strong> a small island state that finds itself confronting exceptional risks to<br />
national stability.<br />
The political condition <strong>of</strong> Nauru can perhaps best be described as paradoxical. Freedom<br />
House accords Nauru the highest rating for being based on representation and free elections 2 as the<br />
country operates under a Westminster system bequeathed by its colonial rulers. 3 Despite this<br />
“freedom,” Nauru is ravaged by government corruption. The system has generated numerous<br />
changing <strong>of</strong> the guards in the past decade alone which has resulted in political instability amidst<br />
allegations <strong>of</strong> political corruption, legislative stalemate, and no-confidence votes. In order to break<br />
1"Closing Down." The Economist. October 04, <strong>2014</strong>. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21621873-dismal-tale-oneremotest-nations-closing-down<br />
2 Freedom In The World <strong>2014</strong>: Nauru. Report. Freedom House. Accessed November 03, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/<strong>2014</strong>/nauru-0#.VDs7xPnF9aQ<br />
3 Australia. Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs and Trade. Nauru's Country Brief. Accessed November 03, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/nauru/nauru_brief.html
the legislative stalemate the government had to introduce legislation to bring the number <strong>of</strong><br />
parliamentary seats to an odd nineteen. 4<br />
Nauru’s unicameral Westminster system <strong>of</strong> government has very little checks and balances.<br />
The only accountability mechanism occurs when the government is pushed out through a noconfidence<br />
vote or popular elections. Moreover, 3 years as a time span for implementing policies is<br />
very short. Therefore, it is no surprise that the government’s policies cater to the whims <strong>of</strong> voters.<br />
When a large sector <strong>of</strong> the economy is public, as in Nauru, political accountability is inextricably<br />
linked to economic decisions, therefore political risk is dependent on economic risk.<br />
Historically, Nauru’s economy was largely reliant on the fossilized droppings <strong>of</strong> seabirds,<br />
industrially known as phosphate deposits. Regrettably, the island’s phosphate reserves were mostly<br />
plundered by colonial rulers. Despite this, when Nauru finally threw <strong>of</strong>f the shackles <strong>of</strong> colonialism<br />
in 1968, the country was still financially sound. 5 The Economist reports that, “After independence in<br />
1968, phosphate exports briefly put Nauruans, per head, among the world’s richest people.” 6 But the<br />
policies <strong>of</strong> successive governments failed at rehabilitating the land, diversifying their economy and<br />
investing wisely in the years <strong>of</strong> abundance. Initially, phosphate revenues contributed to robust<br />
economic growth. Australia and other colonial raiders also paid huge sums in reparations. However,<br />
the country's GDP growth peaked in 1981, and over the following three decades, Nauru's GDP in<br />
fact declined in many instances from the 1980s and through the 2000s. Only recently has moderate<br />
economic growth emerged. 7 According to the Asian Development Bank, this growth is partly<br />
attributable to the regional processing center for people seeking asylum in Australia, referenced at a<br />
later point in this report. 8 Ultimately, unsound investments abroad and at home depleted much <strong>of</strong><br />
Nauru’s phosphate wealth. 9 This includes the purchase <strong>of</strong> an air fleet which was to be a national<br />
carrier and was instead used by presidents for personal reasons at the expense <strong>of</strong> paying customers<br />
who were left stranded at the airport. 10<br />
4 Freedom In The World <strong>2014</strong>: Nauru. Report. Freedom House. Accessed November 03, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/<strong>2014</strong>/nauru-0#.VDs7xPnF9aQ<br />
5 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045<br />
6 "Closing Down." The Economist. October 04, <strong>2014</strong>. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21621873-dismal-tale-oneremotest-nations-closing-down<br />
7 Nauru: Country Pr<strong>of</strong>ile. UN Data. Accessed December 02, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
https://data.un.org/CountryPr<strong>of</strong>ile.aspxcrName=Nauru<br />
8 Nauru: Economy. Asian Development Bank. Accessed December 02, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.adb.org/countries/nauru/economy<br />
9"Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045<br />
10 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045
Many <strong>of</strong> the poor economic policies <strong>of</strong> prior decades are inflicting contemporary<br />
consequences, and this is not strictly limited to depleted resource wealth. Nauruans do not pay taxes.<br />
Instead, they have increasingly become reliant on social welfare with schooling and medical fees paid<br />
for by the government. Housing, electrical and telecommunication services are all subsidized. Since<br />
the phosphate industry is state owned, 95% <strong>of</strong> employment in the country is in the public sector.<br />
When unemployment was at 90% in 2005, 11 the government told the people that the welfare society<br />
they were used to was no longer sustainable. 12 Today, an estimated one-third <strong>of</strong> the population is<br />
thought to be unemployed. 13<br />
Like many other small island states, Nauru is compelled to leverage its resources creatively.<br />
The government has taken to some unusual ways <strong>of</strong> filling their c<strong>of</strong>fers, including serving as a haven<br />
for dubious characters who seek <strong>of</strong>f-shore banking alternatives and selling citizenship. Nauru has<br />
also developed warm relations with Taiwan by recognizing their statehood and allowing them to<br />
have the distinction <strong>of</strong> the only embassy on its paradise in return for fiduciary loans at low interest<br />
rates. 14 Regulations <strong>of</strong> bank start-ups are minimal and this has spun into a roaring business <strong>of</strong><br />
crooks using Nauru as a venue for money laundering. 15 In a highly publicized case, Nauru played an<br />
essential part in a trail left by money laundering crooks from Russia to the United States. Whatever<br />
the verity <strong>of</strong> the story, Nauru’s international image was ultimately tainted due to its lax rules and<br />
refusal to ramp up legislation on <strong>of</strong>fshore banking. 16 These illegal activities might not represent a<br />
problem for other countries who can easily impose sanctions on Nauru; but for Nauru, fiscal ties<br />
with these countries are a necessity. As a small island nation, the country has limited economic<br />
options and the state <strong>of</strong> foreign relations bears significant weight. Now, the country is on the brink<br />
<strong>of</strong> economic collapse and the policies mentioned above are dysfunctional.<br />
11 The World Factbook: Nauru. Report. Accessed November 03, <strong>2014</strong>. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html.<br />
12 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045<br />
13 "Closing Down." The Economist. October 04, <strong>2014</strong>. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21621873-dismal-tale-oneremotest-nations-closing-down<br />
14 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045<br />
15 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045<br />
16 Jason Sharman. "A Study for the Pacific Islands Forum on Offshore Finance Centres in Forum Island Countries:<br />
Assessing the Impact <strong>of</strong> the Proposed US ‘Stop Tax Haven Abuse’ Act."<br />
http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/FEMM%202008%20Offshore%20Finance%20<br />
Centres%20in%20FICs%20-%20Report.pdf
According to the Australian government, the greatest growing source <strong>of</strong> revenue (5%<br />
increase in real GDP in 2011) 17 today is the previously-referenced <strong>of</strong>fshore processing center, used<br />
to house the boat-loads <strong>of</strong> refugees seeking asylum in Australia. In return for money, Nauru houses<br />
the refugees. 18 Former president Marcus Stephen said that “Nauru's parliament would unanimously<br />
support the re-opening <strong>of</strong> the two detention centers on the island, which operated between 2001<br />
and 2008”. 19 Refugees, on the other hand, expressed their displeasure at being housed there instead<br />
<strong>of</strong> in refugee camps in Australia. 20<br />
Aside from political and economic implications affecting the overall stability <strong>of</strong> the country,<br />
there are notable social factors at work. As referenced previously, Nauruans depend on the<br />
government for work and social welfare and they are used to a lifestyle <strong>of</strong> opulence including short<br />
work hours and access to imported goods. In fact, Nauru has been branded the “world’s fattest<br />
country” in an indictment against the lifestyle changes that came with phosphate prosperity— the<br />
shift from a traditional diet to an imported diet <strong>of</strong> soda, beer, spam and fast-food. The body index<br />
for men and women is 33.85 and 35.05 respectively. Obesity was ensued by related diseases: an<br />
estimated 45% <strong>of</strong> Nauruans are plagued by diabetes. 21 This increases the government’s spending on<br />
social welfare and healthcare. It will definitely contribute to a low life expectancy, and undoubtedly<br />
has a damaging effect on the value <strong>of</strong> the country’s labor force. Society will eventually become<br />
riddled with problems that government policies will find hard to address.<br />
Along with ill health, phosphate prosperity also gave way to a population that was less<br />
inclined to work. 22 Education lost its value. In 2001, it was reported that only a third <strong>of</strong> children go<br />
on to secondary school. Education took a hit in 2001-2005, when the system came to a standstill<br />
because teachers were not being paid and schools stopped functioning. It is reported that, “In 2008,<br />
less than 9% <strong>of</strong> teachers in Nauru had a degree qualification. Half had only a basic certificate and<br />
17 "Nauru: Economy." The Commonwealth. November 03, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/nauru<br />
18Australia. Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs and Trade. Nauru's Country Brief. Accessed November 03, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/nauru/nauru_brief.html<br />
19 Alana Rosenbaum. "Nauru's President Quits Amid Corruption Allegations." The Age, November 2011.<br />
http://www.theage.com.au/world/naurus-president-quits-amid-corruption-claims-20111110-1n8qo.html<br />
20 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001 http://www.economist.com/node/884045<br />
21 Joshua E. Keating. "Why Do The World's Fattest People Live On Islands" Foreign Policy, February 08, 2011.<br />
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/08/why_do_the_worlds_fattest_people_live_on_islands<br />
22 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist, December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045
over 30% had effectively no qualifications, being classified as trainees.” 23 Even if the government<br />
enacts policies to address the economic dysfunction, society will not be willing to change.<br />
While Nauru exists under a democratic governance structure, there exist myriad elements<br />
with political, economic, and social dimensions which, coupled with a faulty unicameral<br />
parliamentary system, all contribute to the unstable and vulnerable position in which Nauru finds<br />
itself today.. Economic challenges are particularly intractable through the country’s political system<br />
because individual and social choices are reflected negatively in the political system. Like most<br />
countries endowed with natural resources, Nauru’s reliance on phosphates will not last forever. Most<br />
investors should refrain from investing in this phosphate industry because <strong>of</strong> the economic risks and<br />
the moral issues <strong>of</strong> contributing to the slow death <strong>of</strong> a failing state. Using Nauru as an example <strong>of</strong><br />
the risk that comes with elections as a platitude <strong>of</strong> democracy, when issues like these are present in a<br />
more significant player in the international system, they can present both an economic and security<br />
risk. This begs the question: what should be done with Nauru and states that face similar issues<br />
One option has been illustrated in the case <strong>of</strong> Lanai, a Hawaiian island with 3,200 residents<br />
purchased in 2012 by Larry Ellison, founder <strong>of</strong> Oracle and one <strong>of</strong> the world’s richest people. 24 In<br />
fact, Nauruans are seeking a way out <strong>of</strong> the island entertaining the possibility <strong>of</strong> purchasing another<br />
island. 25 As Nauru runs out <strong>of</strong> money, it is also running out <strong>of</strong> ideas. One mutually beneficial<br />
solution for Nauru and investors (including sovereign funds) could feasibly be for an investor to buy<br />
the island. Nauruans will have the option <strong>of</strong> leaving to another country or seeking employment<br />
under the investor in what would no longer be their country. The investor would own that country<br />
and control much, if not all, <strong>of</strong> the island’s economic productivity. Admittedly, this is controversial;<br />
however, this experiment might lead to better yields than if Nauruans continue with the status quo.<br />
A “good” investor might turn Nauru around in a way that Nauruans were unable to do. This could<br />
lead to similar solutions for vulnerable “microstates” and those who have to suffer living in them.<br />
23 International Council For Open and Distance Education. November 03, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.icde.org/projects/regulatory_frameworks_for_distance_education/country_pr<strong>of</strong>iles/nauru/<br />
24 Jon Mooallem. "Larry Ellison Bought a Island in Hawaii. Now What" The New York Times, Sept. 23, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.nytimes.com/<strong>2014</strong>/09/28/magazine/larry-ellison-island-hawaii.html_r=0<br />
25 "Paradise Well And Truly Lost." The Economist. December 20, 2001. http://www.economist.com/node/884045
Traveling and reading inspired Hannah Thomas to work for her master’s at New York University in political theory,<br />
after graduating with a bachelor’s in political science and economics from Miami University in Ohio. She focuses on<br />
democracy, liberty, and revolutions.
Is Liberal Hypocrisy Causing <strong>Political</strong> Disengagement<br />
By James Lees<br />
In January 1918, ten months before the end <strong>of</strong> the First World War, U.S. President Woodrow<br />
Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points speech. In his remarks, President Wilson outlined<br />
his vision for post-war peace, with order and justice for all states, no matter how small. This<br />
speech laid the foundations for the “idealist” world that many statesmen would fight for in<br />
subsequent years. Tenets <strong>of</strong> liberalism are still foundational in our society today: selfdetermination,<br />
protection <strong>of</strong> civil liberties, free trade, open treaties, and democratic governance.<br />
Yet, its development up to and through the 21 st century has been marred by a lack <strong>of</strong> cohesion<br />
between domestic and international ideology. During the golden age <strong>of</strong> liberalism, while<br />
international relations were <strong>of</strong>ten conducted on a liberal basis, states were largely inadequate in<br />
their protection <strong>of</strong> domestic individual rights. Conversely, following the Second World War,<br />
liberalism ascended in the domestic sphere, while international society became far more realist.<br />
These two seemingly paradoxical trends were witnessed in both the United States and<br />
throughout Western Europe. Through historical review <strong>of</strong> such trends, this paper examines the<br />
contemporary political dissatisfaction that has manifested in the West, and the underlying forces<br />
that have contributed to citizens’ discontent with and distrust in their respective political<br />
systems.<br />
The ideas contained within the Fourteen Points were fundamental in shaping<br />
international society after the end <strong>of</strong> the First World War, and are best exemplified through an<br />
emphasis on self-determination and the creation <strong>of</strong> the League <strong>of</strong> Nations. A precursory<br />
institution to the United Nations, the League was established to provide collective security for<br />
the allied powers and to prevent another world war. It intended to “guarantee […] territorial<br />
integrity to great and small states alike.” 1 Its design, based on “Wilsonian idealism,” stressed<br />
equal rights for all sovereign nations. Yet, a voiced respect for equal rights was not reflected in<br />
the implementation <strong>of</strong> domestic policy <strong>of</strong> any Western powers; and this is especially true for the<br />
United States. The Wilson administration oversaw an expansion <strong>of</strong> blatant institutional<br />
segregation, 2 as well as the passing <strong>of</strong> legislation such as the Oriental Exclusion Act <strong>of</strong> 1924,<br />
which denied rights to many foreign and domestic minority groups. 3 Concurrently, while allied<br />
powers in Europe echoed the sentiments <strong>of</strong> Wilson’s Fourteen Points, these states still held<br />
1 Woodrow Wilson, "Speech on the Fourteen Points," Congressional Record, 65th Congress 2nd Session, 1918, 680681.<br />
2 Ronald Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots <strong>of</strong> Modern Liberalism, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,<br />
2005) 41-45.<br />
3 William Easterly, The Tyranny <strong>of</strong> Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the forgotten rights <strong>of</strong> the poor (New York: Basic Books,<br />
2013), 51.
tightly to their colonies, exploiting local resources and labor to support their domestic<br />
economies.<br />
There is a reasonable explanation to this apparent paradox. The disparity between<br />
international liberalism and domestic oppression in fact benefitted Western powers, both<br />
politically and economically. By declaring and maintaining sovereign rights for all nations, the<br />
most powerful states believed they could maintain stability and peace. By denying domestic<br />
liberalism through suppression <strong>of</strong> individual rights, particularly for minority groups, they could<br />
ensure that their economies remained pr<strong>of</strong>itable and powerful; and retain majority political<br />
support for their respective regimes.<br />
However, even the “idealist” system at the international level was not as it seemed. While<br />
states had supposedly committed to liberalism internationally, they instead continued to put their<br />
national interest first and did not act with “unselfish sympathy,” as Wilson had called for. Even<br />
between the allied powers France, Britain and the U.S., relations in the inter-war years were<br />
described by Robert Boyce as being in “a state <strong>of</strong> virtual war, wherein mutual incomprehension<br />
fuelled a downward spiral” 4 and ensured a breakdown in trust between the three. In fact, the U.S.<br />
had failed to even join the League <strong>of</strong> Nations, despite its formation only taking place due to<br />
Wilsonian idealism. The onset <strong>of</strong> the Second World War ultimately ended the failed experiment<br />
in international liberalism.<br />
The ideas espoused in the interwar years would then migrate into domestic issues. The<br />
Allied powers needed vast resources for the war effort, seeking troops and materials from the<br />
colonies. As William Easterly notes, to ensure they could count on the support <strong>of</strong> their subjects,<br />
the colonial powers needed to convince their colonized that it was better to stay on side. He<br />
quotes one <strong>of</strong>ficial as stating, “Colonial subjects might be tempted to say that they have not<br />
much freedom to defend.” 5 Consequently, this supported a shift, albeit slight, towards the<br />
acceptance <strong>of</strong> racial equality, which would in turn culminate in swift and marked decolonization<br />
in the post-war years. Hendrik Spruyt suggests that after the war there was a shift in the<br />
receptivity <strong>of</strong> elite groups in the West to ideas <strong>of</strong> racial equality,. 6 an idea that has been<br />
significantly explored by Ikenberry and Kupchan. 7 This would not only lead to decolonization,<br />
4 Robert Boyce, "World Depression, World War: Some Economic Origins <strong>of</strong> the Second World War”, in Paths to<br />
War: New Essays on the Origins <strong>of</strong> the Second World War, eds. Robert Boyce and Esmonde Robertson, (St. Martins Press,<br />
1989), 88.<br />
5 William Easterly. The Tyranny <strong>of</strong> Experts, 81.<br />
6 Hendrik Spruyt, “The end <strong>of</strong> empire and the extension <strong>of</strong> the Westphalian system: the normative basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
modern state order”, International Studies Review, (2000): 65-92, 88.<br />
7 John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power", International Organization 44: 03 (1990):<br />
283-315.
ut would also bring about a rise in support for civil rights movements. As domestic liberalism<br />
increased, a movement emerged in the West towards universal equality, which included universal<br />
human rights. This movement was embodied in the end <strong>of</strong> segregation, the rise <strong>of</strong> feminism, the<br />
LGBT movement, and secularization (to name but a few); Wilson’s legacy had accordingly<br />
moved from the international to the domestic sphere.<br />
Yet at the same time, the international environment drifted away from liberalism. The<br />
immediate onset <strong>of</strong> the Cold War and the spread <strong>of</strong> nuclear weapons following the Second<br />
World War, rendered statecraft to be defined by rational choice and game theory. The<br />
commitment problem, that a state can never really know the true intentions <strong>of</strong> another, led to<br />
international relations representing a prisoner’s dilemma, a well-known concept to political<br />
theorists, with gamesmanship becoming a defining characteristic <strong>of</strong> foreign policy, particularly in<br />
the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Now, it seemed the apparent paradox had come full<br />
circle: Liberalism became a domestic phenomenon, while international relations were far more<br />
realist.<br />
We witness a culmination <strong>of</strong> this phenomenon today. There are myriad domestic and<br />
transnational movements calling for individual rights to be respected and enhanced, but the<br />
international order is still far more realist than it is liberal. Perhaps among the most glaring<br />
illustrations <strong>of</strong> this contradiction in its contemporary form lies in the governance and operation<br />
<strong>of</strong> the League’s successor, the United Nations. While the institution and a majority <strong>of</strong> its<br />
members have pr<strong>of</strong>essed and encouraged commitments to various dimensions <strong>of</strong> human rights<br />
and humanitarian norms, there are countless instances <strong>of</strong> the United Nations failing to uphold<br />
these declared principles. Frequently, the inaction can be attributed to the operational workings<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Security Council. The body, by design, inevitably serves the realist aims <strong>of</strong> its permanent<br />
membership. The recent revelation <strong>of</strong> the U.S. spying on Germany, one <strong>of</strong> its closest allies,<br />
demonstrates a distinct lack <strong>of</strong> trust and the absence <strong>of</strong> liberal ideology. Further, the current<br />
airstrikes against the Islamic State <strong>of</strong> Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are motivated more by a fear <strong>of</strong> threat<br />
to Western national security than humanitarian concern for the Syrians caught up in the conflict.<br />
By and large there are few examples <strong>of</strong> genuine liberalism existing as a prevailing force in<br />
international society, despite the system being predicated on liberal democracy. Governments<br />
and their leaders pr<strong>of</strong>ess liberalism, but they do not practice what they preach. I believe that this<br />
disparity is one <strong>of</strong> the root causes <strong>of</strong> the current disillusionment between voters and politicians.<br />
Politics today is marred by extreme disengagement. The <strong>2014</strong> midterm elections in the<br />
US are only one prime example. Not only did the New York Times report that the <strong>2014</strong> midterm
elections produced the lowest voter turnout in more than seven decades, 8 but interest in the<br />
elections actually fell as they approached. 9 The voters are also disenchanted with political actors.<br />
Just recently, in October <strong>2014</strong>, President Obama received his highest disapproval rating <strong>of</strong><br />
57% 10 . Europe faces its own share <strong>of</strong> political cynicism, as noted by Aurelien Mondon. 11 Yet,<br />
while there is clearly deep dissatisfaction in the West with the political process, there remain<br />
political issues in which people express great interest. The recent Scottish referendum on<br />
independence proves that. There was an historic voter turnout, with 84.6% <strong>of</strong> the electorate<br />
using their franchise. 12 How do we explain this seemingly incongruous relationship between<br />
political interest and political dissatisfaction I contend that it is the political hypocrisy, steeped<br />
in historical circumstances and ideology, and demonstrated by inconsistency between what is<br />
said and what is done, which serves as the best explanation. This hypocrisy has historically<br />
been—and remains—heavily influenced by an ultimate non-belief in and apostasy <strong>of</strong> political<br />
liberalism, demonstrated by Western leaders throughout the 20 th Century and into the new<br />
millennium.<br />
The liberalism <strong>of</strong> Wilson emphasizes peace, universal rights and the “understanding <strong>of</strong><br />
[others] needs as distinguished from [our] own interest,” 13 on an international level. Yet, as both<br />
history and contemporary politics demonstrate, it is as if liberalism retains merely a hallucinatory<br />
presence in international affairs. Liberalist ideas attract the support <strong>of</strong> the public, yet they do not<br />
provide leaders with the power and security they <strong>of</strong>ten seek. Thus, liberalism continues to imbue<br />
political rhetoric, yet fails to pervade political action. Perhaps the continued push for liberalist<br />
ideals in the domestic sphere could eventually translate to foreign policy. But until politicians can<br />
align the message with concerted action, it is difficult to perceive how current political<br />
dissatisfaction in the West could be alleviated.<br />
8 “Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years”, The New York Times, Nov 11, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.nytimes.com/<strong>2014</strong>/11/12/opinion/the-worst-voter-turnout-in-72-years.html.<br />
9 Chuck Todd et. al, “The Great American Tune Out”, NBC News, Oct 15, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/great-american-tune-out-interest-midterm-elections-drops-n226251<br />
10 "Presidential Approval Ratings -- Barack Obama", Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obamapresidential-job-approval.aspx.<br />
11 Aurelien Mondon, “Distrust <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Political</strong> System, not the Far Right, is real threat to our European future”, The<br />
Conversation, May 14, <strong>2014</strong>. http://theconversation.com/distrust-<strong>of</strong>-the-political-system-not-the-far-right-is-realthreat-to-our-european-future-26662.<br />
12 “Scottish Independence Referendum”, The Guardian, Sep 18, <strong>2014</strong>. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/nginteractive/<strong>2014</strong>/sep/18/-sp-scottish-independence-referendum-results-in-full.<br />
13 Woodrow Wilson, “Speech on the Fourteen Points.” Full speech can be viewed via the following link:<br />
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~wggray/Teaching/His300/Handouts/Fourteen_Points.pdf
James moved to New York to study for a master’s in international relations at New York University. James has<br />
a background in finance; having completed his bachelor’s in economics at Bristol University, he then spent two<br />
years working for an investment bank in London. His focus is on economic and political development, particularly<br />
in sub-Saharan Africa.
On the 18 th<br />
Scottish Independence: The Thistle in Europe’s Side<br />
By Elia Francesco Nigris and James Lees<br />
<strong>of</strong> September <strong>2014</strong>, the citizens <strong>of</strong> Scotland voted to remain a part <strong>of</strong> the United<br />
Kingdom. Independence was rejected by a margin <strong>of</strong> over 10%, with the ‘No’ campaign taking<br />
55.3% <strong>of</strong> the votes, and winning majorities in all but four <strong>of</strong> the 32 constituencies. Scotland has<br />
been part <strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom since the Acts <strong>of</strong> Union <strong>of</strong> 1707, and while the independence<br />
referendum did not lead to the creation <strong>of</strong> the 197 th country, it does have major implications within<br />
the United Kingdom, and both across and beyond Europe. Domestically, it has sparked a fresh<br />
debate on the devolution <strong>of</strong> powers, which may in fact be a positive outcome. However, the<br />
referendum has set a precedent for independence movements across Europe, which could result in<br />
continental instability. In this paper the authors will outline why the referendum took place, and<br />
consider its potential consequences within both the domestic sphere and the European continent.<br />
The referendum’s outcome, one <strong>of</strong> the first <strong>of</strong> its kind in recent history, is recognized by both<br />
the government <strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom and by the regional government <strong>of</strong> Scotland. The decision<br />
to hold a referendum was agreed upon in October 2012 by David Cameron, the Prime Minister <strong>of</strong><br />
the United Kingdom, and Alex Salmond, the nationalist First Minister <strong>of</strong> Scotland, through the<br />
Edinburgh Agreement.<br />
Many wonder why David Cameron decided to allow this referendum to happen; the most<br />
common answer being that the question <strong>of</strong> Scottish independence had to finally be answered. Mr.<br />
Cameron, a true believer in the right <strong>of</strong> self-determination and democratic and liberal ideals, deemed<br />
a referendum the most noble and definitive way to find a permanent solution to the problem, as<br />
leaving the issue unsettled could have weakened the entire Union. While Cameron’s own political<br />
ideals may have played a part, there are additional arguments that can be made. The most important<br />
factor that needs to be considered is that, at the time <strong>of</strong> the signing <strong>of</strong> the Edinburgh Agreement,<br />
there was little to suggest that a Yes vote in favor <strong>of</strong> independence could actually win. Mr. Cameron,<br />
along with many pundits and British politicians, believed the No vote would easily prevail. Hence,<br />
on the one hand, the risk <strong>of</strong> allowing a vote on the issue seemed minimal and, on the other, the<br />
gains for him, politically speaking, could have been extremely high.<br />
In Mr. Cameron’s thinking, the issue <strong>of</strong> Scottish independence could be addressed once and<br />
for all, while he could be hailed as a truly democratic leader, not afraid to let ‘the People’ decide their<br />
own fate. Furthermore, the vote on Scottish independence could have locked up his re-election
campaign for 2015, suggesting that the decision may have had an internal, political motive. It is no<br />
secret that Scotland is a strongly pro-Labour stronghold, and Ed Miliband would need the region’s<br />
support in order to defeat the incumbent Prime Minister. Mr. Cameron believed that a vote on<br />
Scottish independence could gain him some popularity among nationalist voters and, even more<br />
importantly, undermine the support for Labour in the region. This strategy seems to have partially<br />
worked: even though Tories have not racked up much support in Scotland, Labour seems to be<br />
losing a good deal <strong>of</strong> its own. 1 In an October <strong>2014</strong> poll, support for the Scottish National Party had<br />
reached a historical peak <strong>of</strong> 52%, meaning they could feasibly win 54 seats in the British parliament,<br />
leaving Labour with only 4 in the region—an historical low. 2 With these numbers, it is extremely<br />
hard to imagine that Mr. Miliband could become the next Prime Minister, unless he forms a<br />
coalition government with the SNP.<br />
In addition to the potential changes in Parliamentary composition, the referendum has<br />
inspired shifts in the amount <strong>of</strong> power devolved to regional parliaments. Scotland and Wales were<br />
first given devolved powers in 1998, as the fulfillment <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> Tony Blair’s campaign promises.<br />
Since that time, decentralized power has gradually increased in all the regional parliaments. But in<br />
the final weeks before the referendum, the leaders <strong>of</strong> the three major parties—David Cameron, Nick<br />
Clegg and Ed Miliband—all promised that they would deliver ‘devo-max’, should Scotland remain a<br />
part <strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom 3 . This would give the Scottish government greater power over taxation,<br />
spending and welfare policies. While these vows were heavily attacked by the Yes campaigners as<br />
‘too little too late’, once the results came in both No and Yes activists alike called for their<br />
fulfillment. But it is not just Scotland who now expects greater devolved powers. The Welsh,<br />
Northern Irish and even the English are looking for changes. England is now the only region that<br />
has no devolved powers; any ‘English-only’ laws can still be voted on by MPs in Westminster whose<br />
constituents are not impacted by changes.<br />
1 Indeed, as <strong>of</strong> the writing <strong>of</strong> this report, Mr. Miliband has attempted and largely failed in recouping Labour support<br />
throughout Scotland in the wake <strong>of</strong> the referendum. See Simon Johnson, “Ed Miliband attempts to win back Yes voters<br />
in Scotland.” The Telegraph. November 28 <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ed-miliband/11260800/Ed-<br />
Miliband-attempts-to-win-back-Yes-voters-in-Scotland.html<br />
2 Severin Carrell, “Labour faces massive losses to SNP at UK general election, poll shows,” The Guardian, Oct 30, <strong>2014</strong>,<br />
accessed Nov 24, <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/<strong>2014</strong>/oct/30/scottish-labour-snp-general-election-poll<br />
3 David Clegg, “David Cameron, Ed Miliband and Nick Clegg sign joint historic promise which guarantees more<br />
devolved powers for Scotland and protection <strong>of</strong> NHS if we vote No,” The Daily Record, Sep 15, <strong>2014</strong>, accessed Nov 24,<br />
<strong>2014</strong>, http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-ed-miliband-nick-4265992
While this may be an outcome Mr. Cameron did not expect, it may well prove beneficial him.<br />
By modernizing the unwritten constitution to decentralize certain power, it may be possible to create<br />
policies that are more broadly supported, as policy can be targeted to smaller groups. Many policies<br />
unevenly benefit a certain area, be it a city or a region. By allowing for devolved policy making,<br />
political parties may actually be able to deliver more <strong>of</strong> what people want in specific areas. This<br />
could certainly be the case in regards to different welfare benefits, such as housing, where needs and<br />
costs significantly change from region to region. In an age where disengagement with political<br />
parties is rampant, finding a way to interest people in the political process is vital. Indeed, the high<br />
84.6% voter turnout in the Scottish referendum proved that people still care about high-level<br />
political decisions, especially when they can understand and relate to how these decisions affect<br />
them.<br />
Outside <strong>of</strong> the UK, there have been considerable effects for other independence<br />
movements. It seems Mr. Cameron, when he made his decision, did not take into consideration that<br />
he does not live in a vacuum; the referendum has set a precedent for other independence<br />
movements across Europe, providing them with legitimacy. The better known, <strong>of</strong> course, is the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Catalonia, an eastern region in Spain that has unsuccessfully tried to become an independent<br />
nation for many years. On the 9 th <strong>of</strong> November <strong>2014</strong> they held a straw poll on independence<br />
“defying legal and political objections from Madrid.” 4 The poll returned with 80.7% in favor <strong>of</strong><br />
independence, and with a turnout <strong>of</strong> approximately 50%. It had originally been planned as a nonbinding<br />
referendum, but the Constitutional Court <strong>of</strong> Spain had deemed this illegal. One voter, Maria<br />
Pilar Lahoz, was quoted as saying independence is “unstoppable and the door has now at least been<br />
opened.” 5 The Spanish government, unlike the British one, has no intention <strong>of</strong> recognizing this<br />
result, but it seems those who support independence have been emboldened by the Scottish<br />
referendum.<br />
Of course, Catalonia is not the only region in Spain that would like to free itself from the<br />
government <strong>of</strong> Madrid; the Basques have had a long history <strong>of</strong> deep separatist sentiments. The same<br />
is true for the Flemish region in Belgium, where the Dutch speaking part <strong>of</strong> the country has sought<br />
4 Raphael Minder, “Catalonia Overwhelmingly votes for Independence From Spain in Straw Poll,” The New York Times,<br />
Nov 9. <strong>2014</strong>, accessed Nov 24, <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.nytimes.com/<strong>2014</strong>/11/10/world/europe/catalans-vote-in-straw-pollon-independence-from-spain.html<br />
5 Ibid
to gain independence from the government <strong>of</strong> Brussels 6 , and independence movements can be<br />
found in the Italian regions <strong>of</strong> Veneto and Sardinia, among numerous others. Together, these<br />
independence movements pose larger challenges to the stability <strong>of</strong> Europe. It is clear that allowing<br />
an independence referendum for every single linguistic and cultural minority in Europe would be<br />
impossible, but it would be equally impossible, once Pandora’s box has been opened, to allow some<br />
to vote on the issue and not to allow others. Where is the line drawn Granting independence to<br />
numerous separatist groups would feasibly result in the formation <strong>of</strong> many small nations, <strong>of</strong>fsetting<br />
a balance <strong>of</strong> power that has, even in a period <strong>of</strong> crisis, given Europe welfare and prosperity since the<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the Second World War. This realization helps one understand why Mr. Cameron’s decision<br />
sets such a dangerous precedent: it indirectly legitimized the demands <strong>of</strong> every single independence<br />
movement in Europe, even when most other governments do not intend to grant the same<br />
concession Mr. Cameron has made to the Scottish people. And despite his belief that the<br />
referendum would answer the Scottish question once and for all, it has not. Many expect that talks<br />
on a new referendum will become prominent in the coming years, especially if the UK goes ahead<br />
with a planned referendum on EU membership. Scotland is far more pro-European than England,<br />
but may find they have little power to sway the result <strong>of</strong> the referendum, due to England’s far<br />
greater number <strong>of</strong> voters. 7 Thus, it is reasonable to wonder whether a second referendum may come<br />
around far sooner than was expected.<br />
The consequences for other countries, if or when their governments refuse to follow in the<br />
steps <strong>of</strong> the UK, could be significant: social tensions could arise (indeed, they have emerged under<br />
similar circumstances in the past); independence movements, receiving rebuttals to their referenda<br />
demands, could prove more vocal and the resulting social turmoil could boil over into violence.<br />
After all, there have been multiple incidents <strong>of</strong> terrorist movements in Europe killing innocent<br />
civilians in the name <strong>of</strong> independence—the Basque Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA) in<br />
Spain, for example, as well as the National Liberation Front <strong>of</strong> Corsica, France and the Committee<br />
for the liberation <strong>of</strong> South Tyrol (BAS), in Italy. Moreover, it is feasible that the implications <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Scottish referendum could extend outside Europe, concerning other ethnic or religious minority<br />
groups fighting for autonomy, such as the Uyghur people living in the Xinjiang Uyghur<br />
6 Katrin Bennhold, “Separatists around the world draw inspiration from Scotland”, CNBC, Sep. 10, <strong>2014</strong>, accessed Nov<br />
30, <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101990463#<br />
7 Libby Brooks, “Nicola Sturgeon calls for Scottish veto on EU referendum,” The Guardian, Oct 29, <strong>2014</strong> accessed Nov<br />
24, <strong>2014</strong>, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/<strong>2014</strong>/oct/29/nicola-sturgeon-scottish-veto-eu-referendum
Autonomous Region within the People's Republic <strong>of</strong> China, or the separatist movement in Quebec,<br />
Canada. It is not difficult to perceive how the precedent <strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>ficial referendum in Scotland, which<br />
might be upheld as a shining example <strong>of</strong> democracy in the United Kingdom, may very well cause<br />
tension and tragedy elsewhere.<br />
It is without doubt that the consequences <strong>of</strong> the Scottish referendum lie in contrast to some<br />
initial expectations. While many assumed the referendum would serve as a final answer to the<br />
question <strong>of</strong> independence, it has instead increased the number <strong>of</strong> those in Scotland calling for selfrule<br />
and indirectly legitimized other independence movements, in Europe and beyond. It has also<br />
forced the United Kingdom to examine its constitutional set up and seek ways to modernize its<br />
institutions, while ensuring that the most significant decision-making remains centralized. While<br />
Scotland voted “no” to independence this time, there have already been numerous calls for another<br />
referendum. This is in part because, as suggested above, should the referendum on Britain’s EU<br />
membership move forward, the Scottish may well be virtually powerless to influence the decision.<br />
The Scottish referendum may indeed prove to be an enduring thistle in the side <strong>of</strong> Mr. Cameron and<br />
in Europe.
Elia grew up Milan, Italy and graduated with a bachelor's degree in economics and social sciences from Bocconi<br />
University. He then moved to the New York to pursue a master's degree in political economy analysis at New York<br />
University.<br />
James moved to New York to study for a master’s degree in international relations at New York<br />
University. James has a background in finance; having completed his bachelor’s in economics at Bristol University, he<br />
then spent two years working for an investment bank in London. His focus is on economic and political development,<br />
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
Acquiescence and Consent in Democratic Theory<br />
By Andrew Tripodo<br />
Tenacious men with strong wills, admirable aims, and impressive minds planned and executed the<br />
American Constitutional Convention <strong>of</strong> 1787. These men had neither a legal right nor popular<br />
mandate to forge a new government, overturning the existing Articles <strong>of</strong> Confederation. No<br />
authority granted them permission to draft this constitution, and the majority <strong>of</strong> the population,<br />
mostly farmers, hadn’t an inkling that such a convention was even taking place. What these fifty-five<br />
men did have were keen insights into human nature---most importantly, that the natural human<br />
tendency for selfishness can be channeled to serve the public good. They also possessed strong<br />
understandings <strong>of</strong> the needs and wants <strong>of</strong> Americans and the means to act on these convictions.<br />
They succeeded in an obvious way: the United States exists today as a relatively stable democracy,<br />
with institutionalized electoral processes, term limits, and a system <strong>of</strong> checks and balances on<br />
government. The country is more or less free from abusive authority, and its citizens enjoy<br />
predictable stability and need not worry about the dangerous hand <strong>of</strong> arbitrary power. However, just<br />
because this strategy worked, does that mean it was also legitimate<br />
Questions on the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> government are as old as the study <strong>of</strong> government itself, and<br />
they are prominent elements <strong>of</strong> Russell Hardin’s forthcoming book, Why a Constitution, 1 which shares<br />
its title with a chapter Hardin contributed to the The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism<br />
(1989).<br />
Hardin begins by addressing the theory, prominent in the writings <strong>of</strong> John Locke, which<br />
claims that a government can only be legitimate if it first maintains order and second, protects the<br />
natural rights <strong>of</strong> its citizens. These principles are the foundation <strong>of</strong> Liberalism, a theoretical form <strong>of</strong><br />
government that elevates the rights <strong>of</strong> individuals over the rights <strong>of</strong> rulers, and emphasizes the duty<br />
<strong>of</strong> a ruler over the duty <strong>of</strong> a citizen. Liberal principles underlie nearly all <strong>of</strong> the political dialogue <strong>of</strong><br />
the modern age, whether it be between intellectuals or among the general public. Few will argue that<br />
the American government fails at either <strong>of</strong> these duties—the U.S. citizenry is on the whole<br />
threatened by neither anarchy nor arbitrary government action that jeopardizes people’s life, liberty,<br />
or property rights. This government, then, is legitimate according to the classic liberal criteria.<br />
1 This forthcoming work was provided to the author by Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Hardin in manuscript form. The following citations<br />
apply to the manuscript text as it was presented to the author <strong>of</strong> this report.
However, Hardin directs the reader’s attention to an enormous rift between liberal theory<br />
and reality: at the time <strong>of</strong> the drafting and signing <strong>of</strong> the U.S. Constitution, the vast majority <strong>of</strong><br />
American citizens had never heard <strong>of</strong> such claims to legitimate authority, an thus could not have<br />
consented to be governed in such a way. This is as true <strong>of</strong> the bulk <strong>of</strong> American citizens today as it<br />
was in 1787. But here they are, allowing themselves to be governed, abiding by the rules <strong>of</strong> a regime<br />
they never consented to, resting on a theoretical foundation that they are largely unaware <strong>of</strong>. The<br />
governing philosophy that centers around individual freedom, in the form <strong>of</strong> rights, fails to present<br />
those citizens with perhaps the most fundamental freedom (or right) <strong>of</strong> all: to truly accept or deny<br />
the constitution that will govern them. Here the claim could be made that, though Americans are<br />
not fully aware <strong>of</strong> the basis for their government’s legitimacy, they clearly do not have serious<br />
enough qualms to actively and loudly disagree with the system, and this must imply consent.<br />
Perhaps, but the word consent is far too strong. It denotes active, conscious agreement, and<br />
most American citizens are unaware <strong>of</strong> the possibility for such agreement, nor what they would<br />
agree with. Here, Hardin resurrects a more apt word to replace the concept <strong>of</strong> “consent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
governed”. It was first articulated by David Hume to describe the general behavior <strong>of</strong> citizens under<br />
the U.S. Constitution (and constitutions in general): acquiescence. Citizens do not agree, they just do<br />
not disagree actively or fight back. They abide. Apathy underlies acquiescence, while engagement<br />
underlies consent.<br />
Why do citizens acquiesce Hardin explains that people acquiesce to political and legal<br />
orders (as they are outlined by constitutions) for the same reason that they follow social<br />
conventions: because resisting would be costly and, as long as the imposed sociopolitical<br />
conventions are not excessively <strong>of</strong>fensive (that is, not radically different from prevailing trends),<br />
acquiescence has no real costs. In essence, Hardin concludes, “we acquiesce because it would be<br />
very difficult to organize what would de facto have to be a collective action to topple an ongoing<br />
convention or to organize a new one” 2 . Even the most rigorous study <strong>of</strong> history would be hardpressed<br />
to find an instance when the bulk <strong>of</strong> citizens actively agreed with the constitution they were<br />
about to be subjected to: there was a furious debate in the American states over ratification between<br />
the “Federalists” and the “Anti-Federalists”. North Carolina and Rhode Island did not even formally<br />
ratify the Constitution until after George Washington had been elected as the first President <strong>of</strong> the<br />
United States: by that time, Hardin asserts, they decided to accept the consensus <strong>of</strong> the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />
2 Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution (forthcoming, 2015). p. 12 (manuscript).
states since they realized that holding out cost more than joining in. Many other countries’ political<br />
systems today are governed by such constitutions and do not seek to change the underlying premise<br />
<strong>of</strong> these covenants: their citizens acquiesce. But acquiescence is not inevitable. History presents<br />
occurrences in which citizens do not abide by new rules placed upon them and will, as Locke put it,<br />
“appeal to Heaven” (revolt) in the face <strong>of</strong> requirements they find <strong>of</strong>fensive or unduly burdensome.<br />
So, what will incite citizens past the realm <strong>of</strong> acquiescence and into the realm <strong>of</strong> active<br />
disagreement Here, Hardin cites Hume’s Duel Convention Theory: “government derives its power<br />
(not its right) to rule by some specific form <strong>of</strong> coordination that is a convention and the populace<br />
acquiesces in that rule by its own convention.” 3 Therefore, a Constitution that creates political<br />
conventions that are more or less aligned with the social conventions <strong>of</strong> the populace will be<br />
successful, by which we mean stable, unchallenged. If a political convention moves in direct<br />
opposition to a social convention, however, it will be <strong>of</strong>fensive enough to justify action. Hardin<br />
explains this logic via the economic language <strong>of</strong> opportunity and transaction costs, but we do not<br />
need this language to understand the concept. What is important is that the political order created by<br />
a constitution does not create excessive friction with the traditional social order. A constitution that<br />
pushes people to change can wake them from their acquiescent slumber and jeopardize law and<br />
order.<br />
Communities will not acquiesce on issues they feel passionately about, and here is where<br />
some comments on religion is relevant. Most religious believers consider following their beliefs as<br />
being in their ultimate interest, as it is the only interest that extends beyond death and, in life, defines<br />
whom they associate with and how they do so. A constitution that attempts to control the religious<br />
views <strong>of</strong> its populace can (and <strong>of</strong>ten will) spark impassioned conflict. Societies that are religiously<br />
homogenous are an exception to this observation: they are indeed more tightly bound by their<br />
shared spiritual beliefs, and constitutions that govern such societies are strengthened rather than<br />
compromised by their religiosity because it enshrines the status <strong>of</strong> that religion. But what gives<br />
religion its unifying power also endows it with destructive power. Hardin claims that if there is any<br />
hope <strong>of</strong> uniting people who hold different religious beliefs, the topic must be omitted—the absolute<br />
nature <strong>of</strong> the topic simply defies compromise. Since general acquiescence seems to be a necessary<br />
public condition for successful constitution-making, and religious differences do not lend<br />
themselves to acquiescence, the rational decision is to simply leave religion out <strong>of</strong> the constitution<br />
3Ibid, 11.
and thus out <strong>of</strong> the realm <strong>of</strong> state regulation. Hardin rightly touts the strategy <strong>of</strong> removing religion<br />
from constitutions as “the single greatest achievement <strong>of</strong> political thought and practice in all the<br />
history <strong>of</strong> western political thought.” 4 With religion omitted, acquiescence reigns supreme.<br />
Still, the question remains: is a government that relies on acquiescence legitimate<br />
Acquiescence is the compelling fact in successful governments, but should it be the goal Is it<br />
sufficient<br />
The most widely accepted justification for the claim to constitutional legitimacy in the face<br />
<strong>of</strong> acquiescence lies in the theory <strong>of</strong> implied consent: that by virtue <strong>of</strong> reaping the benefits <strong>of</strong> the<br />
government into which citizens are born, they have implicitly consented to its existence. We have, in<br />
effect, entered into a contract that we never knew existed. This theory exists primarily for<br />
intellectuals, for they are among the few who are conscious <strong>of</strong> this problem. The rest think not <strong>of</strong><br />
legal legitimacy, and, their conventions not being egregiously broken, acquiesce.<br />
If we strip the “implied consent” theory <strong>of</strong> its venerable sheen, its obvious illogic will be<br />
revealed. A story will to pull this theory down from abstraction: In downtown New Orleans,<br />
tourists are apt to come upon “shoe shiners” who run up to their unknowing patrons, apply some<br />
cleaning solution to their shoes, and expect compensation for their efforts. According to the implied<br />
consent theory, tourists should pay them. Just as citizens unknowingly benefit from the order and<br />
security provided by the government into which they are born, and thus are bound to “implicitly<br />
consent” to its rule, so the patrons reap benefits. Thus, they are obliged to compensate their<br />
provider. In the government case, the trade is consent for rights and security. But trade was made<br />
without the knowledge <strong>of</strong> one party. Given a true choice, some will pay, and some will want to walk<br />
away. All are indignant. They know that they have not consented to being governed in a contractual<br />
sense. But this is the concept that underpins democratic legitimacy.<br />
It is crucial to emphasize that in an important way this argument is irrelevant---it misses<br />
reality. The reality is that order exists because a constitution successfully establishes political<br />
conventions that are aligned with previously held social conventions, thus enabling the politically<br />
significant members <strong>of</strong> the population to abide by the new government.<br />
4 Ibid, 9.
Given the dubiousness <strong>of</strong> the “implied consent” theory, the pressing question arises: how<br />
can we legitimize a new constitution In answering this question, Hardin asks that his audience let<br />
go <strong>of</strong> theories and focus on facts. The reality <strong>of</strong> acquiescence, he submits, need not lead to<br />
pessimism. After all, if the government took action that we found upsetting, the spell <strong>of</strong><br />
acquiescence would be broken and citizens would loudly protest. So is the reality <strong>of</strong> acquiescence<br />
evidence that government is generally meeting the people’s needs If people do not want to<br />
participate, does that mean they are content with the way things are<br />
This is where this author and Hardin’s views diverge. Hardin identifies the crucial difference<br />
between consent and acquiescence, and then concludes that acquiescence is good enough. It solves<br />
more problems than it spawns, and is evidence <strong>of</strong> overall governing success. If the government was<br />
failing to ensure stability or to protect private rights, people would surely not react with<br />
acquiescence, they would be moved to actually engage in politics. Governments functioning by<br />
virtue <strong>of</strong> widespread acquiescence are, by the criteria <strong>of</strong> Liberalism, successful. If we simply let go<br />
<strong>of</strong> the implied consent theory, we can easily come to terms with the reality <strong>of</strong> acquiescence. But to<br />
take this view is to give up on the democratic ideal <strong>of</strong> representation. If people are consumed with their<br />
private lives and unengaged with government, how can their views be represented Consent is the<br />
lowest tier <strong>of</strong> representation. It makes no attempt to capture the nuance <strong>of</strong> opinion, but simply asks<br />
for wholesale rejection or acceptance <strong>of</strong> a proposal. If we give up on the possibility <strong>of</strong> widespread<br />
consent in a democracy, we must face a disturbing question: are democracies actually representative<br />
Put even more starkly: are democracies responsive to their people If citizens accept the reality <strong>of</strong><br />
acquiescence, then do they simply regard the idea <strong>of</strong> democratic responsiveness and representation<br />
as a myth crafted to maintain order<br />
Clearly there is much at stake. Setting the precedent <strong>of</strong> consent instead <strong>of</strong> acquiescence will<br />
ensure that the government remains truly representative and responsive to citizen needs. If the<br />
government is founded on acquiescence, then it is very likely that the vast majority <strong>of</strong> the population<br />
will remain ignorant <strong>of</strong> the institutions erected by the constitutions and <strong>of</strong> the political arena<br />
thereafter. And, though the constitution may have been founded on social convention (which<br />
naturally aligns it with the wants and needs <strong>of</strong> the people), the two need not remain linked forever.<br />
That is, incremental political changes could slowly disempower a citizenry that is unaware <strong>of</strong> them.<br />
The acts <strong>of</strong> self-serving politicians could erode the political dynamics that enable citizens to<br />
comfortably acquiescence while remaining confident that order and right security will remain. While
the public slumbers in acquiescence, forces that could undermine the foundation <strong>of</strong> the system that<br />
allows for comfortable acquiescence are free to wreak incremental havoc. Nestled within a culture <strong>of</strong><br />
acquiescence, citizens are unlikely to notice small changes—but small changes accumulate and over<br />
time could transform a population from one that acquiesces to one that is subjugated. Sudden, large,<br />
changes would likely rouse citizens to take action, but a culture <strong>of</strong> acquiescence could make them<br />
blind to small, pernicious shifts over time: new voter requirements, increased thresholds for<br />
parliamentary participation, loosening or tightening <strong>of</strong> controls on free speech, terms limits, and<br />
financial donations. Alternatively, the conventions that are the foundation <strong>of</strong> the constitution could<br />
themselves disempower and ignore large swaths <strong>of</strong> society, systematically depriving them <strong>of</strong><br />
representation. After all, slavery was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and the document<br />
did not even grant voting rights to all American freemen (or women) until amendments were made<br />
over time to expand suffrage, a stark reminder that conventions have no inherent normative valence.<br />
Any institution created by the constitution to guard against abuses <strong>of</strong> power could fail to fulfill their<br />
function, as institutions that are neither respected nor understood by the populace can be ignored,<br />
manipulated, or changed by those in power. In other words, the same apathy that enables<br />
acquiescence has the potential to undermine the representative goals <strong>of</strong> democracy.<br />
“If men were angels,” Madison famously remarks in Federalist #51, “no government would<br />
be necessary.” He goes on to call for a political order in which institutions are pitted against each<br />
other, a system where personal ambition is channeled to serve the general good, a government filled<br />
with selfish men who become the unwitting sentinels over the public health. He gives up on<br />
bettering men, dismisses selfish power-seeking as the natural human state, and resigns himself to<br />
figuring out how to manage that selfishness. He forgets that just because men are no angels does not<br />
mean that they are devils, and it does not mean that they cannot become more angelic with practice.<br />
Cultivating public virtue among the entire population is the only way to craft a democracy that lives<br />
up to its claim to representation. Institutions are not enough to protect an apathetic public. In fact,<br />
without an engaged and informed public, the very institutions meant to protect citizens can become<br />
perverted and distorted by those bent on acquiring personal power.
Andrew has lived in many places in the pursuit <strong>of</strong> myriad, mysteriously connected, interests. He revels in learning and<br />
teaching and is ever charmed by the difficulty in fully disentangling the two from each other. He currently studies<br />
political science, coaches high school debate, and enjoys writing on a wide range <strong>of</strong> subjects.
The Faces <strong>of</strong> D-Company: An Analysis <strong>of</strong> the Terror-Crime Nexus<br />
By Elizabeth Bennett<br />
This paper looks at the transnational criminal organization D-Company out <strong>of</strong> South Asia. The<br />
analysis includes origins, aspects and faces <strong>of</strong> D-Company as it shifts along the terror-crime nexus.<br />
D-Company is looked at as a criminal organization, a terrorist group, and an economic actor in<br />
South Asia.<br />
In today’s world <strong>of</strong> proliferating threats, an organization that engages in both criminal and<br />
terrorist activities can be a significant destabilizer in a region such as South Asia. The following<br />
analysis will examine the origins <strong>of</strong> D-Company, an organized criminal group which formed in India,<br />
and whose influence can now be felt across the region. This organization, while perhaps not as wellknown<br />
as some other criminal or terrorist groups, is a destabilizing force in South Asia, particularly<br />
due to its adaptive, multifaceted role. In tracing the history and development <strong>of</strong> D-Company, this<br />
report will explore how the organization has evolved into such a role. Discussion will turn to two<br />
primary causes for the group’s shift into terrorist activity, and the three different ‘faces’ <strong>of</strong> the<br />
organization as it exists today: a transnational criminal organization, a terrorist group, and an<br />
economic actor. Regardless <strong>of</strong> where D-Company and its leader Dawood Ibrahim fall on the<br />
spectrum between a criminal and terrorist organization, this examination finds that the group<br />
remains both a national and regional security threat for South Asia.<br />
D-Company Origins<br />
Dawood Ibrahim’s criminal syndicate D-Company originated in the late 1970s in the city <strong>of</strong><br />
Mumbai, India. D-Company rose to power following the city’s declared emergency order from 1975<br />
until 1977, which aimed to take down mainstream criminal organizations. 1 India, and particularly<br />
Mumbai as the center <strong>of</strong> India’s criminal underworld, fostered conditions that were conducive to the<br />
rise <strong>of</strong> criminal syndicates. India’s strategic location with port access and drug and illicit good<br />
smuggling in neighboring states, gave D-Company and other criminal syndicates ample opportunity<br />
to rise to international prominence in the late 1970s early 1980s. 2<br />
1 U.S. Library <strong>of</strong> Congress, Congressional Research Service, International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats,<br />
U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress, by John Rollins, Liana Wyler, Seth Rosen, CRS Report R41004 (Washington,<br />
DC: Office <strong>of</strong> Congressional Information and Publishing, 2010).<br />
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/134960.pdf<br />
2 U.S. Library <strong>of</strong> Congress, Congressional Research Service, Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism,<br />
(Washington, DC: Office <strong>of</strong> Congressional Information and Publishing, October 2003).
Taking advantage <strong>of</strong> favorable conditions and the void <strong>of</strong> criminal syndicates left by the<br />
emergency order, D-Company flourished as a top criminal organization in Mumbai. By the mid<br />
1980s Ibrahim fled to Dubai under the growing pressure from Indian authorities. Based out <strong>of</strong> the<br />
port city <strong>of</strong> Dubai, D-Company was involved in drug and arms trafficking, gold smuggling,<br />
extortion, counterfeit currency, real estate, contract killings, gambling, and film piracy. 3<br />
Evolution<br />
1992 Riots & Muslim Marginalization<br />
D-Company’s evolution into a criminal-terrorist organization involved many factors. The<br />
following analysis will discuss the two primary causes for evolution: first, the 1992 riots/violence<br />
against Indian Muslims, and secondly a shift in the market that prompted Ibrahim to expand outside<br />
<strong>of</strong> purely criminal activities to sustain D-Company.<br />
The shift towards ideologically motivated activities took place following the destruction <strong>of</strong><br />
the 16th century Babri mosque in Uttar Pradesh, India in December 1992 and the resulting riots that<br />
killed hundreds <strong>of</strong> Muslims. 4 In 1984 the Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was<br />
elected into power, and at the time, India’s minority population <strong>of</strong> Muslims was around 150 million<br />
people, roughly 12 percent <strong>of</strong> the population. Leading up to the 1992 attacks, a wave <strong>of</strong> Hindu<br />
nationalism swept India that led to Muslim marginalization and violence. 5<br />
In retaliation and seeking to protect the minority Muslims, D-Company smuggled in<br />
explosives and weapons that were ultimately used in the 1993 Mumbai Bombings. In early 1993,<br />
ships departed from Dubai for Karachi carrying explosives and numerous small arms. These arms<br />
and explosives, facilitated through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), were used in<br />
the 13 bombings throughout Mumbai on March 12, 1993 that killed 157 and injured over 700. 6<br />
Following this attack D-Company moved its headquarters to Karachi. This proved to be a pivotal<br />
moment for D-Company: the previously secular organization split along religious lines, with the<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> Hindu members leaving to follow a Hindu Lieutenant, Chota Rajan, and the rest<br />
3 Ryan Clarke, Terror-Crime Nexus in South Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2011).<br />
4 "The 1993 Mumbai Blasts: What Exactly Happened on March 12 that Year," IBN Live, 2013.<br />
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/the-1993-mumbai-blasts-what-exactly-happened-on-march-12-that-year/380222-3.html<br />
5 Kanisk Tharoor, “Divided and Conquered: Indian Muslims and Hindu Nationalism,” Globalist, 2004.<br />
http://www.yale.edu/globalist/archive/issue12/divided-conquered.htm<br />
6 The targets <strong>of</strong> the attack included the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Air India building, headquarters <strong>of</strong> the Hindu party<br />
Shiv Sena, and the Cinema Plaza.
emaining under the control <strong>of</strong> Ibrahim. 7<br />
ideology, and shifted into the terrorism-crime nexus. 8<br />
From here, D-Company adopted a degree <strong>of</strong> radical<br />
Cause: Shift in India’s Markets<br />
With rampant corruption and a closed economy, D-Company flourished as one <strong>of</strong> India’s<br />
top criminal organizations. But in the early 1990s, at the same time as the riots and destruction <strong>of</strong><br />
the Babri mosque, the economic and markets shifted in India, leaving many <strong>of</strong> D-Company’s<br />
activities less pr<strong>of</strong>itable. This was also a primary motivation for D-Company moving towards<br />
terrorist activities. Prior to 1991, the economy <strong>of</strong> India was dominated by the public sector, with<br />
limited international trade and socialist-oriented policies. Such economic policies had helped to<br />
cultivate criminal and black market activities within the country. However, in June <strong>of</strong> 1991 the newly<br />
elected Congress Party changed the fundamental structure <strong>of</strong> the Indian economy, devaluating the<br />
rupee immediately by twenty-five percent to alleviate the current account deficit. 9 By the end <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decade the Indian economy was averaging over 6 percent growth rate and witnessed a declining<br />
market for illicit activities. 10<br />
New business dealings with the Pakistani ISI created opportunities to diversify D-<br />
Company’s portfolio and created a new market for illicit activities. For example, a bond between al-<br />
Qaeda and D-Company was forged that allowed the use <strong>of</strong> smuggling routes by al-Qaeda members<br />
to escape over the Afghanistan border into Pakistan. This al-Qaeda connection gave D-Company<br />
the opportunity to deal in the Afghanistan heroin market. 11 Another major policy change was the<br />
liberalization <strong>of</strong> gold imports. Indian policy makers cut the duty rate in half from Rs 450/10gms to<br />
Rs 220/10gms. 12 The government <strong>of</strong> India seized nearly 5.7 and 5.0 tons <strong>of</strong> gold in 1990 and 1991,<br />
respectively, but by 1992 the amount seized had dropped to nearly 2.9 tons under the newly open<br />
policy. 13 This change in gold import policy marginalized D-Company’s gold smuggling enterprise<br />
7 Ryan Clarke "The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus," Terrorism and <strong>Political</strong> Violence 20, no. 3 (2008):<br />
376–395.<br />
8 International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress.<br />
9Manmohan Agarwal, Whalley, John. “The 1991 Reforms, Indian Economic Growth, and Social Progress.” National<br />
Bureau <strong>of</strong> Economic Research: Working Paper 19024, May 2013. Page<br />
10 U.S. Library <strong>of</strong> Congress, Congressional Research Service. India-U.S. Security Relations: Strategic Issues, by Alan<br />
Kronstady. CRS Report R42948. (Washington, DC: Office <strong>of</strong> Congressional Information and Publishing, 2013).<br />
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42948.pdf<br />
11 Ryan Clarke, Terror-Crime Nexus in South Asia, 85-87.<br />
12 Reserve Bank <strong>of</strong> India history series. Volume 4, 1981-1997, Part A<br />
13 Reserve Bank <strong>of</strong> India history series. Volume 4, 1981-1997, Part A
and drastically reduced its pr<strong>of</strong>it. The more open economic context forced Dawood Ibrahim to<br />
expand business activities, led him into dealings with terrorist groups.<br />
Faces <strong>of</strong> D-Company<br />
To understand the multifaceted, intricate nature <strong>of</strong> the organization, it is important to<br />
examine the different ‘faces’ <strong>of</strong> D-Company, and to assess the groups’ ideological and financial<br />
motivations. These ‘faces’ include roles as a transnational criminal organization, a terrorist group,<br />
and an economic actor. Upon examination, it is clear that D-Company is not solely a terrorist group<br />
or criminal organization, but in fact shifts its role to best suit its own interests.<br />
Transnational Criminal Organization<br />
Residing in Pakistan, Ibrahim is able to manage his criminal network that now spans across<br />
Asia, Africa and the Middle East. As a transnational crime syndicate, D-Company is involved in<br />
arms and human trafficking, gold smuggling, extortion, bribery, contract killing, counterfeit<br />
currency, and drug trade. The command structure <strong>of</strong> D-Company is made up <strong>of</strong> various cells that<br />
are led by top individuals, such as ‘Tiger’ Memon, who report directly to Ibrahim. Regional<br />
commanders lead operations <strong>of</strong> each cell, which focus on varying criminal activities based <strong>of</strong>f <strong>of</strong><br />
their respective locations and expertise. Under the regional commanders are lieutenants that report<br />
orders and commands to foot soldiers carrying out the operations. Buying <strong>of</strong>f corrupt politicians,<br />
referred to as netas, D-Company has been able to exploit the weaknesses and complacency <strong>of</strong> many<br />
governments <strong>of</strong> the countries in which it operates. 14<br />
The Dubai based cell, for example, has specialized in counterfeit currency. Because <strong>of</strong><br />
Dubai’s accessibility to ports, D-Company was able to spread Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN)<br />
to major cities in India by sending notes with laborers returning from Dubai in their backpacks or<br />
suitcases. This counterfeit currency is reported to end up back in the hands <strong>of</strong> the ISI to finance<br />
illicit activities and militant groups in India, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). 15 In August 2013<br />
Indian police arrested a top lieutenant, Abdul Karim Tunda, whom confessed to the FICN<br />
14 Ryan Clarke, "The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus," date<br />
15 Sumita, Sarkar, Arvind Tiwari “Combating Organized Crime: A Case Study <strong>of</strong> Mumbai City,” South Asia Terrorism<br />
Portal. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume12/Article5.htm
operation and an estimation <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> fake notes were coming into India<br />
annually. 16<br />
Additionally, the organization was involved in opium and heroin trade, and human<br />
trafficking that spanned from South East Asia to the Middle East. D-Company is also involved in<br />
smaller activities such as illegal Bollywood production with sales to the U.S. and the U.K. Taking<br />
such activities into consideration, the organization seems financially motivated and is<br />
nondiscriminatory in dealings to increase pr<strong>of</strong>itability and revenue.<br />
Terrorist Organization<br />
Since D-Company’s first terrorist activities in 1993, the organization has been both directly<br />
and indirectly involved in terrorist activity and funding in South Asia. 17 The inability <strong>of</strong> Pakistan to<br />
provide a secure and stable environment has lead to the use <strong>of</strong> groups like D-Company as a resource<br />
for gains against India, and in return Ibrahim and D-Company were given safe haven. 18 While D-<br />
Company and the ISI or LeT have differing ideological goals, Ibrahim and his syndicate as a<br />
facilitator <strong>of</strong> terrorism are one <strong>of</strong> the most dangerous organizations in the region.<br />
The ISI and LeT were given access to vast smuggling routes by D-Company for arms<br />
trafficking, drug trade, and as an escape route from Afghanistan. ISI has benefited from the fake<br />
currency and arms trade through D-Company. The pr<strong>of</strong>its from this trade are used to provide LeT<br />
with supplies and weapons in the proxy fight against India. 19 Ibrahim has been implicated in other<br />
terrorist attacks and was named a Specially Designated Terrorist by the U.S. State Department and<br />
U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Treasury for his connections to al-Qaeda. 20<br />
Ibrahim was also connected with financing, providing safe houses and contacts for various<br />
terrorist groups across South Asia attacking inside India including Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harakat-ul-<br />
Jihad-i-Islami, the Indian Mujahideen. 21 Most recently it was reported D-Company made a deal with<br />
terrorist organization Boko Haram out <strong>of</strong> Nigeria to supply drugs and weapons. 22 Given the<br />
16 Biswas Shrideep, "Currency <strong>of</strong> Terror," South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2011.<br />
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Currency-Of-Terror/277209<br />
17 Ryan Clarke, Terror-Crime Nexus in South Asia, pg. 196-205.<br />
18 Ibid. pg. 196-205.<br />
19 Ryan Clarke, Terror-Crime Nexus in South Asia, pg. 196-205.<br />
20 United States Department <strong>of</strong> Treasury, Office <strong>of</strong> Foreign Asset Control. U.S. Designates Dawood Ibrahim as Terrorist<br />
Supporter. http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/js909.aspx<br />
21 Ryan Clarke, Terror-Crime Nexus in South Asia, pg. 161-166.<br />
22 “Exposed: Boko Haram-Dawood nexus to smuggle drugs in India,” Times <strong>of</strong> India, September 6, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://times<strong>of</strong>india.indiatimes.com/videos/news/Exposed-Boko-Haram-Dawood-nexus-to-smuggle-drugs-in-<br />
India/videoshow/41886330.cms
diffusive nature <strong>of</strong> D-Company, its presence spanning three continents and the diversity <strong>of</strong> its<br />
activities, the alliances with ISI and terrorist financing and related activities comprise only one part<br />
<strong>of</strong> D-Company’s portfolio.<br />
Economic Actor<br />
D-Company’s role as an economic actor is very similar to that <strong>of</strong> any regional or<br />
multinational corporation concerning the level <strong>of</strong> influence and decision-making on a local level.<br />
The group’s economic relationship with the region is also reciprocal: Pakistan benefitting from illicit<br />
revenue and D-Company receiving political protection. D-Company has played a vital role in the<br />
Pakistani economy: lacking foreign investment and internal growth, Pakistan’s economy is<br />
unsustainable without considerable amounts foreign aid. D-Company’s illicit revenue via funding to<br />
the Central Bank and massive deposits <strong>of</strong> foreign currency in local banks has reportedly assisted in<br />
the bail out <strong>of</strong> Pakistan’s economy on many occasions. 23<br />
Operating out <strong>of</strong> multiple countries D-Company took advantage <strong>of</strong> globalization, ease <strong>of</strong><br />
international trade and demand for goods, technology, and ease <strong>of</strong> travel. In the late 1990s D-<br />
Company was able to exploit the growing film industry in India. Vertically integrating operations<br />
with production, distribution, manufacturing through trading companies like Al-Mansoor and<br />
SADAF Trading, Ibrahim was able to exploit new markets in the United States and the UK for<br />
Indian film products. 24 Also, as discussed the fiscal policy change in the early 1990s with reduced<br />
duty rates on gold left the smuggling business for D-Company less pr<strong>of</strong>itable. But a policy change<br />
reverting to high import duties on gold and silver June 2013 has again opened up a market for<br />
precious metal smuggling. 25 An analysis <strong>of</strong> the organization as an economic actor demonstrates that<br />
D-Company has generally acted in an economically adroit, rational manner seeking to increase<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>its but also taking advantage <strong>of</strong> political and economic opportunities across the region to secure<br />
optimal monetary and nonmonetary outcomes.<br />
23 Ryan Clarke, Terror-Crime Nexus in South Asia, date, pg. 288-304.<br />
24 Gregory Treverton; at el. Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009). pg.<br />
91-95.<br />
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG742.pdf<br />
25 “Why Gold Smuggling is on the Rise in India.” BBC News, March 13, <strong>2014</strong>.
Impact and Responses<br />
For India, the impact <strong>of</strong> D-Company on South Asian stability is now greater than ever. The<br />
declarations <strong>of</strong> al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, rise <strong>of</strong> other jihadist activity in the region and<br />
the U.S. preparing to exit Afghanistan, D-Company has numerous opportunities to strike at the<br />
heart <strong>of</strong> the BJP government. Ibrahim has the network and finances to assist in a complex strategic<br />
attack in India that could be devastating and have a proliferating effect on terrorism in South Asia.<br />
India<br />
The Government <strong>of</strong> India has taken a group centric approach in trying to counter the<br />
influence <strong>of</strong> Ibrahim and D-Company. Following the 1993 bombings India sought extradition with<br />
countries like the United States and UAE to bring D-Company members associated with the attack<br />
back to India for trial. While India arrested some <strong>of</strong> D-Company’s key figures, its influences<br />
remained. In 1999 India enacted the Maharashtra Control <strong>of</strong> Organised Crime Act (MCOCA) to<br />
update original framework to deal with the growing organized crime and is currently trying top D-<br />
Company lieutenants Abdul Karim Tunda under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)<br />
Act. India targeted specific assets known to Ibrahim and his associates in India, demolishing homes<br />
and businesses. 26 The newly elected prime minister <strong>of</strong> India, Narendra Modi, prior to the election<br />
promised the extradition <strong>of</strong> Ibrahim from Pakistan. 27 No substantial action has been taken since<br />
Modi’s election to dismantle D-Company’s network <strong>of</strong> influence.<br />
U.S. Efforts<br />
The United States has been involved as secondary support in assisting India to contain and<br />
take down D-Company, including adding Ibrahim and his lieutenants to U.S. Treasury and State<br />
Department sanctions lists. 28 The <strong>2014</strong> joint U.S.-India statement mentioned the goal <strong>of</strong>,<br />
“dismantling <strong>of</strong> safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical<br />
26 “IPL spot-fixing: Court orders property attachment process against Dawood Ibrahim, Chhota Shakeel,” Z News, May<br />
31, <strong>2014</strong>. . http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/ipl-spot-fixing-court-orders-property-attachment-process-againstdawood-ibrahim-chhota-shakeel_936311.html<br />
27 Since election <strong>of</strong> Modi in May <strong>2014</strong> it was widely reported that Dawood Ibrahim asked the ISI for more protection<br />
and to be relocated.<br />
28 United States Department <strong>of</strong> Treasury, Office <strong>of</strong> Foreign Asset Control, Designations Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics<br />
Kingpin Designation Act, 2009.
support for networks” for groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and D-Company. 29 The FBI and India’s<br />
Intelligence Bureau are now sharing intelligence on the location and assets <strong>of</strong> Ibrahim. Lastly it was<br />
speculated that the U.S. was going to provide assistance in extraditing Ibrahim from Pakistan, the<br />
country who denies his existence in the country. 30 This type <strong>of</strong> activity has been reported before but<br />
the U.S. has taken no action. 31<br />
Conclusion<br />
The preceding analysis illustrates an organization that, in spite <strong>of</strong> lacking the global<br />
awareness or media attention experienced by its peer groups, remains a genuine political and<br />
economic force in South Asia and beyond. Because <strong>of</strong> Dawood Ibrahim’s ability to adapt and grow<br />
D-Company through nearly four decades, his organization remains one <strong>of</strong> the most influential<br />
groups in the region. Today, it is important that all <strong>of</strong> D-Company’s “faces” be acknowledged: this<br />
includes the organization’s roles as a transnational criminal organization, a terrorist group, and an<br />
economic actor inside <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. In tracing the group’s historical development and examining the<br />
regional context in which these developments took place, one can better understand how the<br />
organization has acquired the multidimensional role it exhibits today. And in turn, by examining this<br />
we can better understand how each role threatens the stability <strong>of</strong> the South Asia. It remains to be<br />
seen whether, or how, D-Company continues to threaten regional stability if it manages to maintain<br />
its adaptive nature.<br />
29 Office <strong>of</strong> the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint Statement,” The White House, September 30, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-<strong>of</strong>fice/<strong>2014</strong>/09/30/us-india-joint-statement<br />
30 Elizabeth Bennett, “Time for India to Take Down Dawood Ibrahim,” The Diplomat, Nov. 1, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://thediplomat.com/<strong>2014</strong>/11/time-for-india-to-take-down-dawood-ibrahim/<br />
31 “No Request Made to US to Track Down Dawood Ibrahim, Clarifies Government,” Press Trust <strong>of</strong> India, February<br />
19, <strong>2014</strong>.<br />
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/no-request-made-to-us-to-track-down-dawood-ibrahim-clarifiesgovernment/
Elizabeth is a graduate student at New York University’s Department <strong>of</strong> International Relations. In 2013<br />
she received a B.S. in Economics from Bentley University. She specializes in U.S. national security and terrorism<br />
focusing on South Asia.