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For The Defense, November 2012 - DRI Today

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Product Liability<br />

been filed in federal court.” WRS Motion<br />

Picture and Video Lab. v. Post Modern Edit,<br />

Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 876, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1999).<br />

Thus, the U.S. District Court, Central District<br />

of California determined the forum<br />

defendant rule to be jurisdictional consistent<br />

with Grubbs. Id. at 878.<br />

52 ■ <strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> ■ <strong>November</strong> <strong>2012</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> Majority Interpret Violating<br />

the Rule as Procedural Error<br />

Creating a Waivable Defect<br />

<strong>The</strong> majority of circuit courts, including<br />

the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,<br />

Ninth, Tenth, and Elevenths Circuits, hold<br />

that a violation of the forum defendant<br />

rule is procedural and, thus, waivable. See<br />

Farm Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d<br />

18, 22 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a violation<br />

of the forum defendant rule did not<br />

strip the district court of its jurisdiction<br />

because it was a “technical” defect that had<br />

been waived); Woddward v. D.H. Overmyer<br />

Co., 428 F.2d 880, 882–83 (2d Cir. 1970);<br />

Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179<br />

F.3d 81, 90 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing<br />

a §1441(b) violation as a waivable removal<br />

defect); Korea Exchange Bank v. Trackwise<br />

Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 50 (3d Cir. 1995);<br />

In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1523 (5th<br />

Cir. 1991); Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus.<br />

Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding<br />

that the forum defendant rule “is more<br />

a matter of removal procedure, and hence<br />

waivable, than a matter of jurisdiction”);<br />

Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d<br />

933, 940 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing removal<br />

by a forum defendant as a “technical” violation);<br />

Am. Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d<br />

1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1970) (describing a<br />

§1441(b) violation as a waivable defect in<br />

removal proceedings); Pacheco de Perez v.<br />

AT & T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.4 (11th<br />

Cir. 1998); Borg- Warner Leasing v. Doyle<br />

Elec. Co., 733 F.2d 833, 835 n.2 (11th Cir.<br />

1984). Although these circuits agree in<br />

interpreting the forum defendant rule as<br />

raising procedural issues, their procedural<br />

postures and rationales differ.<br />

<strong>For</strong> example, the First Circuit in Fudge<br />

relied on the plaintiff’s actions to determine<br />

“implicit consent” to federal jurisdiction.<br />

See Fudge, 831 F.2d at 22. In Fudge,<br />

the defendants removed the case to a federal<br />

court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,<br />

and the federal district court rendered<br />

a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s<br />

complaint. See id. at 19. <strong>The</strong> removal<br />

was improper under the removal statute<br />

because the defendant was a citizen of the<br />

state where the action was filed. Id. at 22.<br />

<strong>The</strong> plaintiff appealed, arguing that the federal<br />

district court did not have jurisdiction<br />

to enter a judgment against it because “the<br />

parties acted upon a mutual mistake of law<br />

with respect to the propriety of removal to<br />

federal court.” Id. at 21. <strong>The</strong> First Circuit<br />

upheld the federal district court’s judgment,<br />

explaining that the plaintiff’s “prosecution<br />

of the case in federal court for<br />

approximately one year, and its failure<br />

to object to removal until after judgment<br />

had been rendered, constitute[d] implicit<br />

consent to federal court jurisdiction and<br />

waiver of its right to object to removal.”<br />

Id. at 22.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Third Circuit in Korea Exchange<br />

Bank, however, found that whether the case<br />

could have been filed initially in a federal<br />

court would determine the outcome. See<br />

Korea Exchange Bank v. Trackwise Sales<br />

Corp., 66 F.3d at 47. In Korea Exchange<br />

Bank, the plaintiff, a citizen of New York,<br />

filed a complaint in a New Jersey state court<br />

against three defendants, all citizens of<br />

New Jersey. See id. at 47. <strong>The</strong> first defendant<br />

that the plaintiff served, Trackwise Sales<br />

Corp., timely removed the action to a federal<br />

district court on diversity jurisdiction<br />

grounds. Id. Nothing happened in the case<br />

for over seven months after the federal district<br />

court sua sponte remanded the case<br />

due to violation of the forum defendant<br />

rule. Id. <strong>The</strong> defendants appealed the federal<br />

district court’s remand order. Id. <strong>The</strong><br />

Third Circuit reversed, holding that “an<br />

irregularity in removal of a case to federal<br />

court is to be considered ‘jurisdictional’<br />

only if the case could not initially have been<br />

filed in federal court.” Id. at 50 (emphasis<br />

added). <strong>The</strong> Third Circuit recognized in the<br />

holding that unlike in Grubbs, the federal<br />

district court in the Korea Exchange Bank<br />

case had not entered a final judgment. Id.<br />

Similar to Korea Exchange Bank, the<br />

Fifth Circuit in In re Shell Oil Co. based its<br />

holding on the language of the removal<br />

statute and the statute’s underlying policy.<br />

See In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d at 1521–22.<br />

In In re Shell Oil Co., the plaintiffs moved<br />

for a remand 34 days after the filing of the<br />

defendants’ notice of removal, arguing that<br />

two of the defendants were citizens of the<br />

forum state. Id. at 1518. <strong>The</strong> federal district<br />

court granted the remand, and the<br />

defendants appealed. Id. <strong>The</strong> Fifth Circuit<br />

reversed the remand order, holding that<br />

“improper removal under §1441(b) is [] a<br />

waivable removal defect.” Id. at 1522. To<br />

support the holding the court relied on the<br />

text of 28 U.S.C. §1447(c), which states that<br />

“‘a motion to remand the case on basis of<br />

any defect in removal procedure must be<br />

made within 30 days after the filing of the<br />

notice of removal.’” Id. at 1521 (quoting 28<br />

U.S.C. §1447(c)). <strong>The</strong> court explained that<br />

the “policy behind the rule is to prevent a<br />

party who is aware of a defect in removal<br />

procedure from using the defect as insurance<br />

against later unfavorable developments<br />

in federal court.” Id. at 1522.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Minority Interpret Violating<br />

the Rule as a Jurisdictional Issue<br />

Creating a Nonwaivable Defect<br />

<strong>The</strong> Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is the<br />

only circuit court to hold expressly that<br />

failing to comply with the forum defendant<br />

rule is a jurisdictional issue thus creating a<br />

nonwaivable defect. See Hurt v. Dow Chem.<br />

Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir. 1992). In<br />

Hurt, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit in a state<br />

court against the defendants for personal<br />

injuries allegedly resulting from exposure<br />

to pesticide manufactured and applied by<br />

the defendants. Id. at 1143. <strong>The</strong> defendants<br />

filed a petition to remove the case to the<br />

federal court on the basis of federal question<br />

removal jurisdiction. Id. <strong>The</strong> plaintiff<br />

moved to remand the case to the state<br />

court, arguing that the case was improperly<br />

removed on federal question grounds.<br />

Id. at 1143–44. <strong>The</strong> federal district court<br />

denied the plaintiff’s motion, holding that<br />

removal on federal question grounds was<br />

proper at the time of removal, and plaintiff<br />

“waived any non- jurisdictional objection<br />

to the impropriety of removal.” Id. at<br />

1144 (quoting Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., No.<br />

90-0783-C (3), slip op. 3 (E.D. Mo. May 22,<br />

1991)). <strong>The</strong> plaintiff appealed to the Eighth<br />

Circuit. Id.<br />

In the appeal, the sole question presented<br />

was whether removal was proper.<br />

Id. <strong>The</strong> defendants argued that removal<br />

was proper because a preemption defense<br />

arising under federal law gave the federal<br />

district court federal question jurisdiction<br />

and, in the alternative, the federal

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