04 Agroterrorism - Canzler r3.pdf

2007 OSC Readiness Training Program
Then and Now
Disposal Decision Making:
Agroterrorism, the Avian
Flu, and the OSC
Erica Canzler
EPA/OEM
Training by OSCs for OSCs • February 12-16, 2007 • Miami, Florida

Agroterrorism
• Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique
problems:
• Agriculture production is geographically disbursed
• Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined locations,
and then transported and commingled with other herds
• Pest and disease outbreaks can quickly halt economically
important exports
• Many veterinarians lack experience with foreign animal
diseases that are resilient and endemic in foreign countries
• Agents are easy to obtain; anonymous attack
• Events such as FMD, 9/11,anthrax have changed the
response structure of the federal government to include
more coordination and integration

What’s at stake
• $1.2 Trillion in economic
activity (2002)
• 2.8 Million workers (1994)
• Exports are our lifeblood
• $56.2 billion exported in Ag
commodities (2003)
• US Share of global
production (2002)
• 39% of corn
• 38% of soybeans
• 8% of wheat

Response Resources
• Political
• NRP
• CONOPS for Decon/Disposal
• Decon Portfolio
• Tactical
• Support Teams
• Laboratories
• Quick Reference Guides
• National Stockpiles
• SNS and NVS

Potential Livestock BW Agents
• Avian influenza
• Foot and mouth
disease
• Exotic Newcastle
• Bovine spongiform
encephalopathy
• Anthrax
• Classical swine fever
• Rift Valley fever
• Nipah/Hendra virus

Avian flu
• Avian influenza viruses occur naturally in birds
• All avian flu viruses are endemic in waterfowl &
do not harm them
• Among birds these viruses are very contagious
and spread readily to domesticated birds
including chickens, ducks and turkeys, causing
severe illness and death
• Virus is shed in saliva, nasal secretions, and
feces—infection occurs by contact with these

Epidemiology of Avian Flu in
Humans
• Wild birds mix with
domestic chickens in
back yard farms
• Domestic chicken
flocks mix in live
poultry markets
• People mix with sick
or dead chickens
• People catch avian flu

How Spread…
Among People
• Nearly all cases have involved people coming in
direct contact with infected feces or secretions
• One Indonesian family with 7 victims recently got
people worried, but there is no evidence to date that
this represents any change in the usual pattern of
spread
• Among Birds
• Anticipated spread by migratory birds to Alaska from
Asia via the East Asia/Australian flyway has not
materialized

Major AI Outbreaks – Domestic Poultry
Year
Subtype
Location
Impact
Notes
1983
H5
PA, USA
Affected chickens, turkeys,
guinea fowl 1.7 mill. birds culled
Mild virus circulating for 6
mo. in the area – no human
cases
1994-2003
H5N2
Mexico
1 billion birds affected
LPAI mutated HPAI
outbreak ’94-5. Strain has
circulated since. No human
cases.
1995-2003
H7N3
Pakistan
3.2 mill. birds died in initial
outbreak 1995
Vaccination campaign ended
outbreak. No human cases.
1997
H5N1
Hong Kong
Virus isolated from chickens; 1.5
mill. birds culled in 3 days
18 human cases/6 deaths.
First H5N1 human infections
2003
H7N7
Netherlands
30 /100 mill. birds in country
killed; 255 flocks infected.
Spread to Belgium rapidly
contained
80 human cases, 1 vet. died.
Most cases involved conjunctivitis
(“pink eye”)
2003-2006
H5N1
Asia, Europe, Africa
Most severe outbreak to date;
220 mill. birds died or culled – is
ongoing
>250 human cases, >50% fatal
in 10 countries
2004
H7N3
British Columbia
>19 mill. birds culled
2 human cases, both with
conjunctivitis
2005
H7
North Korea
200,000 birds culled as of 4/05
No human cases.

EPA Bird-Brained -or-
EPA—Keep Your Eye on the Birdie!
• So where’s the beef What’s avian flu got to do
with an OSC in the EPA
• Research is showing that H5N1 can persist for
months in the environment under the right
conditions
• The language of HSPD 9 leaves open the possibility
that if a non-agricultural setting were contaminated
in an outbreak that EPA could be asked to perform
disinfection/decontamination for AI

HSPD 9 –Roles and
Responsibilities
• ESF Annex #11 establishes USDA as the
primary Federal agency to respond to animal
disease outbreaks in an agricultural setting
• ESF Annex #8 establishes HHS/FDA as the
primary Federal agency to respond if the
disease agent is identified as a zoonosis
• ESF Annex #10 establishes EPA as the primary
Federal agency to respond if there is chemical
contamination or persistent biological
contamination that poses an imminent and
substantial threat to public health and/or the
environment

HSPD 9 – Roles and
Responsibilities
• Disposal of animal carcasses in animal disease
outbreaks is the responsibility of USDA in
cooperation with local and state authorities
• EPA solid waste, air and water expertise can be
consulted
• If local/state and USDA resources are
overwhelmed, additional resources are
available through the NRP in accordance with
ESF Annex #11
• As the response grows in INS (level 3), EPA OSCs
may be called upon to work in the Disposal Unit

Response Structure
• Unified Command – probably APHIS in
conjunction with State Department of
Agriculture
• Depends on location and actual nature of event
• Pre-determined plans; disposal sites
• In-house composting = preferred (volume &
species)
• State Vet assists in response
• Local resource support to the maximum extent
possible

Avian Flu Carcass Disposal
• Common Methods
• Composting
• Burial
• Incineration
• Rendering
• Isolation
• Disposal of Domestic Birds Infected by Avian Influenza
• EPA530-R-06-009
• USDA prefers on-site management (composting)

Foot and Mouth Disease

Worker Health and Safety

Carcass Handling

Location

Avian Flu –
Disinfection/Decontamination
• Chemical methods
• Most detergents
• Most disinfectants
• Physical methods
• Heating (the higher the temperature, the more rapid
the inactivation)
• Complete drying
• Disinfection of the environment is usually done
by a chemical method

Avian Flu Decontamination
• List of 90 agents registered with EPA with
label claims of being effective against
H5N1
• http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/factsheets/avi
an_flu_products.htm
• None officially approved by EPA for this use
• Decon. of avian flu would therefore require a
FIFRA Section 18 emergency exemption

Avian Flu – Responder Health
and Safety
• Observe basic infection control measures after
• Contact with infected or exposed poultry
• Contact with surfaces contaminated with bird feces
or secretions
• Removing PPE of any kind
• Good hand hygiene includes
• Hand-washing with soap and water for 15-20
seconds
• If hand-washing facilities not available, use
accepted alternative means (e.g. waterless alcoholbased
hand-cleaning gels)

Avian Flu – Responder Health
and Safety
• Antiviral medications
• CDC recommends influenza antiviral medication for
any worker who has direct contact with infected
fowl, their feces or excretions
• Medical monitoring
• Exposed workers should be watched carefully for the
development of typical influenza symptoms:
• Fever, sore throat, cough, muscle aches, diarrhea,
trouble breathing
• If signs of illness develop, worker to notify healthcare
provider, occ. med. and infection control personnel at their
workplace
• Other than visiting healthcare provider, should stay at
home until 24 hours after fever resolves

Conclusion
• Whether animal death occurs naturally, by a
FAD outbreak, or even by a terrorist
attack…proper planning will make all the
difference
• Build the toolbox (methods of decon/disposal)
• Know the PPE needed - safety first
• The quicker the response to eradicate the
disease, dispose of infected carcasses, and
decontaminate…the lower the impact on
agricultural operations