Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark

More documents

Recommendations

Info

PHY-N support in progress or planned • Ubertooth and Ubertooth BTLE – in progress, supported in Git • Kisbee – 802.15.4 capture, supported but hard to classify networks • RFCat / FSK – Planning classification still • SDR – HackRF, etc can in theory talk any protocol 96
Writing for PHY-N • Each device record has a common component • Additional information is attached as tagged blobs of data • Phy-N plugin can define any additional data for any device it needs 97
Page 1:
Wireless Intrusion Detection Mike K
Page 4 and 5:
Why do we care • You need to know
Page 6 and 7:
Security goes both ways • As a us
Page 8 and 9:
Options So what are your options 8
Page 10 and 11:
Independent/Overlay WIDS • Passiv
Page 12 and 13:
Monitoring wireless • Multiple me
Page 14 and 15:
Who is coming after you • Lots of
Page 16 and 17:
General jackasses • Learned how t
Page 18 and 19:
Targetted external attacks • Some
Page 20 and 21:
20 What gets used
Page 22 and 23:
RF Denial of Service • Wi-Fi oper
Page 24 and 25:
24 Wavebubble jammer
Page 26 and 27:
26 Detecting jamming
Page 28 and 29:
Fake saturation • 802.11 uses CSM
Page 30 and 31:
Detecting saturation attacks • Ca
Page 32 and 33:
Detecting deauth/disassoc • Easy
Page 34 and 35:
When is 100m = 11k • Handshake br
Page 36 and 37:
Detecting Reaver attacks • Legiti
Page 38 and 39:
Extremely vulnerable • Roaming ha
Page 40 and 41:
Two main ways to impersonate • Me
Page 42 and 43:
Spoofing the network name • 802.1
Page 44 and 45:
Strengthening the system • WPA-PS
Page 46 and 47: Impersonation impact • Once you c
Page 48 and 49: Stream hijacking • Unencrypted ne
Page 50 and 51: Extremely pernicious ● ● ●
Page 52 and 53: Direct attacks against drivers •
Page 54 and 55: Easy to detect... sort of • Drive
Page 56 and 57: Detecting client spoofing • Diffe
Page 58 and 59: Application attacks • Border IDS
Page 60 and 61: 60 Wi-Fi Pineapple
Page 62 and 63: PwnPlug • Looks like power adapte
Page 64 and 65: How bad is WEP, really • HORRIBLE
Page 66 and 67: Where WIDS falls down • We can pr
Page 68 and 69: Things we can't currently fix • O
Page 70 and 71: Corralling clients • Can attempt
Page 72 and 73: Things you CAN'T do • Run jammers
Page 74 and 75: Kismet • Started as purely a netw
Page 76 and 77: Kismet IDS • Both signature and t
Page 78 and 79: Getting the latest version • Your
Page 80 and 81: Host hardware ● ● ● ● Kisme
Page 82 and 83: WIDS to Syslog • Two ways to get
Page 84 and 85: Expanding Kismet - Distributed Capt
Page 86 and 87: Kismet protocol • Similar to IMAP
Page 88 and 89: Expanding Kismet - Plugins • Plug
Page 90 and 91: Client plugins • Able to interfac
Page 92 and 93: Going beyond Wi-Fi • What about o
Page 94 and 95: 94 Kismet Phy-Neutral
Page 98 and 99: So what else do we care about • O
Page 100 and 101: Heist of the century • When used
Page 102 and 103: Ninja-level problems • Attackers
Page 104 and 105: Different != better • Custom prot
Page 106 and 107: Things you probably send to pagers
Page 108 and 109: Recap • If you don't know to look
show all

Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?