Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark
Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark
Things we can't currently fix • Open networks are insecureable • There is no way to maintain trust – no unique information in an open network • WPA-PSK only provides trust when the PSK is unknown, no good for public networks • WPA-EAP needs cert chain, difficult and dangerous 68
Active defense • Actively defend via injection of packets • Use the same attacks • Difficult to enforce in shared airspace, unless you're the only occupant in a building... • Kismet doesn't, but could with plugins 69
- Page 18 and 19: Targetted external attacks • Some
- Page 20 and 21: 20 What gets used
- Page 22 and 23: RF Denial of Service • Wi-Fi oper
- Page 24 and 25: 24 Wavebubble jammer
- Page 26 and 27: 26 Detecting jamming
- Page 28 and 29: Fake saturation • 802.11 uses CSM
- Page 30 and 31: Detecting saturation attacks • Ca
- Page 32 and 33: Detecting deauth/disassoc • Easy
- Page 34 and 35: When is 100m = 11k • Handshake br
- Page 36 and 37: Detecting Reaver attacks • Legiti
- Page 38 and 39: Extremely vulnerable • Roaming ha
- Page 40 and 41: Two main ways to impersonate • Me
- Page 42 and 43: Spoofing the network name • 802.1
- Page 44 and 45: Strengthening the system • WPA-PS
- Page 46 and 47: Impersonation impact • Once you c
- Page 48 and 49: Stream hijacking • Unencrypted ne
- Page 50 and 51: Extremely pernicious ● ● ●
- Page 52 and 53: Direct attacks against drivers •
- Page 54 and 55: Easy to detect... sort of • Drive
- Page 56 and 57: Detecting client spoofing • Diffe
- Page 58 and 59: Application attacks • Border IDS
- Page 60 and 61: 60 Wi-Fi Pineapple
- Page 62 and 63: PwnPlug • Looks like power adapte
- Page 64 and 65: How bad is WEP, really • HORRIBLE
- Page 66 and 67: Where WIDS falls down • We can pr
- Page 70 and 71: Corralling clients • Can attempt
- Page 72 and 73: Things you CAN'T do • Run jammers
- Page 74 and 75: Kismet • Started as purely a netw
- Page 76 and 77: Kismet IDS • Both signature and t
- Page 78 and 79: Getting the latest version • Your
- Page 80 and 81: Host hardware ● ● ● ● Kisme
- Page 82 and 83: WIDS to Syslog • Two ways to get
- Page 84 and 85: Expanding Kismet - Distributed Capt
- Page 86 and 87: Kismet protocol • Similar to IMAP
- Page 88 and 89: Expanding Kismet - Plugins • Plug
- Page 90 and 91: Client plugins • Able to interfac
- Page 92 and 93: Going beyond Wi-Fi • What about o
- Page 94 and 95: 94 Kismet Phy-Neutral
- Page 96 and 97: PHY-N support in progress or planne
- Page 98 and 99: So what else do we care about • O
- Page 100 and 101: Heist of the century • When used
- Page 102 and 103: Ninja-level problems • Attackers
- Page 104 and 105: Different != better • Custom prot
- Page 106 and 107: Things you probably send to pagers
- Page 108 and 109: Recap • If you don't know to look
Things we can't currently fix<br />
• Open networks are insecureable<br />
• There is no way to maintain trust – no unique<br />
information in an open network<br />
• WPA-PSK only provides trust when the PSK is<br />
unknown, no good for public networks<br />
• WPA-EAP needs cert chain, difficult and dangerous<br />
68
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