Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark
Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark Wireless Intrusion Detection - Sharkfest - Wireshark
Detecting saturation attacks • Can look for absurdly long CTS/RTS durations • Can look for CTS/RTS without corresponding data • Both vulnerable to false positives, especially if your monitoring hardware can't see all data • 11g seeing 11n will see control frames but not data, for example 30
Get off my lawn: Deauth/disassoc • Network tells clients when they're allowed in, and when they're being disconnected • Of course this is unencrypted... • Deauthentiction or disassociation packets both cause the client to leave • All you need is the BSSID and client MAC 31
- Page 1: Wireless Intrusion Detection Mike K
- Page 4 and 5: Why do we care • You need to know
- Page 6 and 7: Security goes both ways • As a us
- Page 8 and 9: Options So what are your options 8
- Page 10 and 11: Independent/Overlay WIDS • Passiv
- Page 12 and 13: Monitoring wireless • Multiple me
- Page 14 and 15: Who is coming after you • Lots of
- Page 16 and 17: General jackasses • Learned how t
- Page 18 and 19: Targetted external attacks • Some
- Page 20 and 21: 20 What gets used
- Page 22 and 23: RF Denial of Service • Wi-Fi oper
- Page 24 and 25: 24 Wavebubble jammer
- Page 26 and 27: 26 Detecting jamming
- Page 28 and 29: Fake saturation • 802.11 uses CSM
- Page 32 and 33: Detecting deauth/disassoc • Easy
- Page 34 and 35: When is 100m = 11k • Handshake br
- Page 36 and 37: Detecting Reaver attacks • Legiti
- Page 38 and 39: Extremely vulnerable • Roaming ha
- Page 40 and 41: Two main ways to impersonate • Me
- Page 42 and 43: Spoofing the network name • 802.1
- Page 44 and 45: Strengthening the system • WPA-PS
- Page 46 and 47: Impersonation impact • Once you c
- Page 48 and 49: Stream hijacking • Unencrypted ne
- Page 50 and 51: Extremely pernicious ● ● ●
- Page 52 and 53: Direct attacks against drivers •
- Page 54 and 55: Easy to detect... sort of • Drive
- Page 56 and 57: Detecting client spoofing • Diffe
- Page 58 and 59: Application attacks • Border IDS
- Page 60 and 61: 60 Wi-Fi Pineapple
- Page 62 and 63: PwnPlug • Looks like power adapte
- Page 64 and 65: How bad is WEP, really • HORRIBLE
- Page 66 and 67: Where WIDS falls down • We can pr
- Page 68 and 69: Things we can't currently fix • O
- Page 70 and 71: Corralling clients • Can attempt
- Page 72 and 73: Things you CAN'T do • Run jammers
- Page 74 and 75: Kismet • Started as purely a netw
- Page 76 and 77: Kismet IDS • Both signature and t
- Page 78 and 79: Getting the latest version • Your
Detecting saturation attacks<br />
• Can look for absurdly long CTS/RTS durations<br />
• Can look for CTS/RTS without corresponding data<br />
• Both vulnerable to false positives, especially if your<br />
monitoring hardware can't see all data<br />
• 11g seeing 11n will see control frames but not data,<br />
for example<br />
30
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