in the united states district court for the - Hoosier Racing Tire

Case 2:07-cv-01294-TFM Document 263 Filed 09/15/2009 Page 19 of 34
sanctioning company, including DMS, is being coerced to select Hoosier. Further, Defendants
argue that the undisputed summary judgment record evidence does not demonstrate that
Hoosier and DMS have entered into an illegal conspiracy in violation of antitrust laws.
STA filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on Defendants’ affirmative
defenses of “unclean hands” and “in pari delicto.”
A. Statutory Framework
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be
illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Although this language may suggest a broad restriction on commercial
restraints, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has made clear that this provision covers
only unreasonable restraints of trade. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 n. 17 (1984) (explaining that “every contract is a restraint of trade,
and as we have repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade”) (collecting cases); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, 156 F.3d 452,
462 (3d Cir. 1998).
In determining whether a defendant’s conduct unreasonably restrains trade in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts generally apply one of two analytical methods,
depending on the nature of the concerted action at issue. Rossi, 156 F.3d at 461. Courts
examine agreements using either (a) the so-called “rule of reason” analysis, “whereby the fact
finder ‘weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
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