Manuel Franzmann The Debate About the Finalité ... - Euroacademia

Paper prepared for the Second Euroacademia International Conference
The European Union and the Politicization of Europe
Budapest, 6 – 8 December 2012
This paper is a draft
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The debate about the “finalité” of EU-reforms. A noteworthy
rejection of a European federal “nation state” among German
intellectuals 1
Manuel Franzmann, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Abstract:
For some months, a vivid intellectual debate has taken place in the German press about the “finalité” of institutional
reforms within the European Union. The majority of its participants outright reject the outlook of a European federal
“nation state”. At first glance, their primary argument seems to be conclusive: A complete “communitisation” (in the
sense of the sociological distinction between “community” and “society”) of the European Union would be an
excessive demand for the centuries old national bonds. (Such a communitisation would imply a fully developed
European federal “nation state”.) Accordingly, it seems reasonable to restrict the EU to a limited form of supranational
cooperation between independent nation-states, which conclude intergovernmental contracts. However, the
story seems to be more complicated. With the crisis of the EU, it has become obvious that with the implementation of
the economic and monetary union, the EU states lost an immense amount of national sovereignty and already crossed
the line of limited contract-based interstate cooperation that follows the logic of “societalization”. They now deeply
depend on each other and are in need of joint action, which thoroughly affects their lives. They increasingly resemble
a “totality” of a common life, of a “community”, but without perceiving themselves as such, i.e. as a developing new
Nation “Europe”.
Keywords: political sociology; finalité of the EU; public debate in Germany; federal state; EU-crisis
Introduction
For some months, German newspapers and magazines have published a series of articles about the “finalité” of EUreforms.
Despite the dominant consensus that the persistent crisis of the European Union calls for more and not less
Europe, the majority of writers, commentators and intellectuals involved in this debate reject outright the perspective
of a European nation-state, even if you label it a “post-national” or “federal” state. The main reason put forward for
this is that a European federal state would be at least unrealistic in the face of the lack of will to European solidarity
and centuries old national bonds. It is no question that this argument makes a lot of sense. It is astounding, however,
how quickly any discussion about a European federal state ends with it. This suggests that we do not really need a
European federal state, neither to overcome the actual crisis of the European Union nor to prepare for a future of
multipolar power spheres. In this paper, I argue that such a perception seems to be illusory. My paper is to be
understood as a step towards a sociological research project, which shall explore the involved “background” of
interpretation patterns regarding the Political, based on documents and in-depth interviews with politicians of the
European Union.
The rejection of a federal state – an example
A prominent example for this rejection of a European federal state that I quote now for the purpose of illustration is
the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. In an interview with Francis Fukuyama about Habermas' new book “The
Crisis of the European Union: A Response” Habermas explains his rejection. He says:
“If we are to cease shirking the question of the ‘finalité’ of the unification process, we must lay down the
correct parameters. A federal state on the model of the United States or the German federal republic is the
wrong model; for that would be to set an unrealistically ambitious goal – one more ambitious than is necessary
or sensible. (…) a Commission that would have been transformed into a government would not have to be
predominantly responsible toward the European Parliament, as required by the pattern of a federal state. For the
purpose of democratic legitimation it would be sufficient that a European government be responsible in equal
measure to the Parliament and the Council in which the national governments are represented.” (Habermas
2012) 2
“Community” vs. “Society”, the European Union as a hybrid
In order to show what seems to be illusory with this argumentation, I have to make use of the old sociological
distinction between “community” and “society” that goes back to the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1887,
1957) and was later adopted by Durkheim, Weber and others. It allows for the outlining of a general structural
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problem of the political institutions of the European Union that has developed gradually and meanwhile takes serious
proportions. In the language of these terms, the European Union is a contradictory hybrid between “community” and
“society”. It has started as “society” on the institutional level and later moved towards “community”, but actually
never reached the point of a political constitution as “community”. This would imply a federal state that represents the
instrument to act as a community.
Before elaborating on this hybrid condition, I have to give some explanatory words about the central analytical
distinction used here. What is the difference between “community” and “society” A community is holistic, a society
specific. Within a community, you are relevant as a whole person, whereas in society you only count as carrier of a
special function or role, i.e. in a limited regard. This implies that in a community usually every topic is permitted for
discussion, whereas in society the allowed topics are limited to the specific roles, functions and forms of cooperation.
Community also implies solidarity, whereas in society the emphasis is on pursuing one’s self-interest–e.g. through
contracting with others. In a community, you often share your life and your emotions, whereas society is marked by
interpersonal distance. Everybody is regarded as replaceable. Community comprises the totality of life, whereas
society appears in this regard only as an abstraction. There is much more to say about the difference between
community and society, but these rather unsystematic remarks should suffice to illustrate it a bit and to evoke a rough
understanding. 3
There are some sociologists who follow the “founder” of this distinction (Tönnies) in thinking that “community” is a
social phenomenon, which is restricted to relationships in social proximity (e.g. family relations) and gets overarched
by society in the historical emergence of modernity. In this perspective, the nation state is seen as “society”. However,
this would be a fundamental “category mistake” with serious consequences for theorizing about the Political. The
nation state has to be seen as a political “community” or more precisely as the instrument for acting as a political
community. It embodies (as legal community) the “non-contractual elements in contracts” Durkheim was interested in
and is the carrier of a shared culture with values that developed from its history. It has an obligation to solidarity
towards its members that has become in some way operationalized in the modern welfare state. The political
community has the right to impose obligations upon its members as well as upon its guests without their contractual
agreement. If you die as a soldier who serves your national community you not only lose a specific role and function,
you lose your whole life. These are only a few examples that should demonstrate the community character of the
nation state. This nation state should be seen primarily as a universalistic model of political community, at least in its
fully developed, democratized shape. In this respect, it represents something abstract, a structure that would be valid
for a European political community as well.
Societal relationships, on the other hand, are to be found within a nation state and out of it. The former constitute a
society that, metaphorical speaking, builds a politically and legally regulated social space “between” state and
communities within the social proximities–such as families and friendships. The latter exist in the rather sparsely
regulated sphere between the states. They dominate the process of globalization. The difference between them is the
presence or absence of a politically communitarized social framework with its regulations and rules.
Now let us look at the history of the European Union and its predecessors. As is well known, political elites started
this European project in the face of two World Wars and of the human catastrophes in the first half of the 20 th century.
This historical context stimulated a strong sense of cooperation and an impulse focusing on the community of
humankind. In this respect, the whole European undertaking appears “communitarized” right from the beginning.
However, as important as it is, this is something informal. On the formal level, the building of European institutions
began dominantly in the mode of societalization, i.e. with limited, specified, contractual relationships to the mutual
benefit between autonomous nation-states. The areas of cooperation grew massively over time and developed a highly
institutionalized shape. This process was accompanied by a growing symbolism of a European community and lead to
the transferring of sovereign rights of the participating nation states to European institutions.
That is the point where the mentioned structural problem emerged and became progressively stronger. It is that the
political communities of the participating nation states are weakened in their sovereignty in favor of a hybrid political
entity, which has not yet constituted itself as a political community and which is tied to the logic of societalization. In
effect, this means an institutional weakening of “community” as a political and social framework for everything else.
It must be compensated with a great deal of effort by the strong informal community impulse among political leaders
in Europe. If the majority of EU citizens could perceive the European Union as a political community in its own right
and not only as an hybrid entity based on limited interstate agreements, there would be no reason any more not to
transfer the universalistic model of the democratized nation state with its historical achievements up to the European
level. Therefore, as it seems, the often-criticized democratic deficit of the EU, its underdeveloped social infrastructure
and other shortcomings in comparison to the standards of the nation state must be explained by the not yet constituted
political community of the EU. I see two major barriers to it: first, the lack of political support among intellectuals,
politicians and citizens, and second, the practical difficulty to find a wise synthesis between the different variations of
the nation state within the member countries of the EU–this is a complex challenge with lots of questions of detail.
However, it should be clear that the leading problem is the lack of political support. In this respect, Habermas
argumentation has a somewhat positivistic touch. Accordingly, he adds in his interview with Francis Fukuyama with
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firm absoluteness: “It is true that the citizens will always have closer ties to their nation state than to the European
Union“. But is this a fact written in some sort of book of nature One thing seems clear: without the support of strong
intellectual voices, the necessary change in the perceptions of citizens and in the European public will not take place.
Therefore, there is a danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy in argumentations like the one of Habermas. However, the
main point seems to be that he does not see any need for a European federal state and for a constitution as political
community, neither now nor in the future. This goes hand in hand with a philosophical cosmopolitism and postnationalism
that prematurely regards the nation state as obsolete and orientates towards a vague “world society”. 4
The current crisis as indecisiveness between “community” and “society”
Let us move on now to the current crisis of the European Union that, of course, has many aspects, causes and
consequences. Here, our focus has to be on the contradictory, hybrid constitution of EU institutions that move between
society and community. In this respect, the turning point in the history of the European Union and in the formation of
the complex crisis seems to be the implementation of the economic and monetary union. With it, the participating EU
member states in some way crossed a line because they now gave up very important aspects of their economic
autonomy. The current crisis illustrates this particularly regarding the monetary policy. In history, states have financed
whole wars with their monetary policy. They have managed their national debt; stimulated economic growth; put their
national economy in an advantageous position in relation to the world market through the devaluation of their
currencies. The current tragedy of Greece is in part due to the lack of its former monetary autonomy. For this reason,
some economists call for a temporary or longer return of Greece to its drachma. The main alternative to such an
approach of turning the clocks back seems to be moving on and completing the political communitisation with a
European federal state. This conclusion is backed by the “optimum currency area theory” that has become an
important intellectual resource to analyse the current crisis of the European Union. According to this theory (Mundell
1961) there are four main characteristics of a currency area that provide stability of the currency: homogeneity,
flexibility, mobility and solidarity. The Eurozone clearly falls short in all four compared to the Dollar zone of the
USA. The Belgian philosopher and economist Philippe Van Parijs has very convincingly argued (Van Parijs 2012)
that the most realistic prospect for advancement in stabilizing the Eurozone is the construction of an effective
infrastructure of solidarity. But how to build such an infrastructure without the constitution of a European political
community
Conclusion
Let me conclude this presentation with a short summary. With the economic and monetary union, the participating
member states put themselves in the same boat on such a large scale that the resulting consequences begin to burst the
limits and rock the entire boat, causing comprehensive problems. For this reason, you can say that all citizens of the
EU already form an actual “community of consequences”. However, they still do not see and constitute themselves as
a “political community” along the standards of the fully developed model of the nation state, which would allow
acting as a community in a democratically legitimized way and with a built in infrastructure of solidarity. To this day,
the political institutions of the EU remain limited or “societal” in their framework to deal with these far-reaching
consequences.
Information about the author see: www.manuelfranzmann.de
References:
Habermas, rgen. 2012. “The European Citizen: Just a Myth” Interview by Francis Fukuyama. Global. The Global
Journal. http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/695/
Mundell, Robert A. 1961. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.” American Economic Review 51 (4): 657–665.
Oevermann, Ulrich. 2000. “The Analytical Difference Between Community and Society and Its Consequences.
Keynote Address.” In Developing Identities in Europe. Citizenship Education and Higher Education, ed.
Alistair Ross, 37–61. London: CiCe.
Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1887. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Leipzig: Fues's Verlag.
Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1957. Community & society, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
Van Parijs, Philippe. 2012. “No Eurozone without Euro-dividend”. Unpublished, provisional manuscript.
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Notes:
1 My presentation of this paper at the Euroacademia conference in Budapest 2012 was made possible by the generous support of the
“Vereinigung von Freunden und Förderern der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main e.V.“. Thanks to Margaret
Griese and Amos Nascimento for proof reading this manuscript.
2 For Habermas’ contribution to the debate in Germany, see: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/europaszukunft/kurswechsel-fuer-europa-einspruch-gegen-die-fassadendemokratie-11842820-l1.html
3 See also Oevermann 2000.
4 „Here we are dealing with the very first instance of an accommodation of sovereign nation states – moreover, the first generation
of particularly self-confident nation states with their own imperial pasts – to the postnational constellation of an emerging world
society.” (Habermas 2012)
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