Corporate governance and earnings management ... - CEREG

Corporate governance and earnings management ... - CEREG Corporate governance and earnings management ... - CEREG

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We also exclude auditors from our list of social forces, since we believe they have been playing the role of facilitators or accompanists during the whole period of our study. Their major mission has been accompanying the dominant forces, so they have been the privileged observer of accounting regulation evolution. As Puxty et al. (1987), we believe that the reproduction/reform of the prevailing structure of politico-economic relations is seen as an (often unintended) consequence of these parties’ efforts to mobilise their stock of material and ideological resources (including institutions) to negotiate policies and practices of regulation that are perceived, within the terms of their own frames of reference, to safeguard or advance their own individualistic career interests as well as the class interests of those on whose behalf they act. 2.1. The lawyers Lawyers were a driving force at the start of the period under examination. In the 1900s, most authors insisted that acquired goodwill was not a true asset. Balance sheet recognition of this “fictitious” asset might be accepted, but only on condition that the goodwill should be amortized rapidly (generally in less than five years) or a similar solution applied. Most of these authors were lawyers following the theory of the famous French lawyer Thaller (1895, p. 251) who believed that “creditors’ interests are decisive”. Many influential lawyers were uncomfortable with rapid expensing of goodwill, and in France for example a less drastic alternative still coherent with the static approach was proposed: establishment of a reserve equivalent to the goodwill value. This “French” solution cannot be considered equivalent to the Anglo-Saxon practice of charging goodwill to equity, as it entails a reduction in distributable dividends for the current year (like expensing). For this reason, we consider it equivalent to expensing soon after acquisition. Several French authors recommend this approach (Decugis, 1906, No. 270; Croizé, 1908; Houpin & Bosvieux, 1927, No. 1384). 10

2.2. The bankers The bankers’ main concern was protection of the corporate assets. They did not therefore approve of recording goodwill as an asset, preferring to have it eliminated as soon as possible. Walker sums up their position very succinctly (1938a, p. 174): “It might be desirable for credit or other purposes to show the financial condition of an enterprise on the basis of tangible assets alone. If so, goodwill or the intangibles might appear on the balance sheet as deductions from the proprietary equity”. The creditors, particularly banks, were sufficiently influential to impose the write-off against equity solution. The opinion of some actors of the time was expressed by Mc Kinsey and Meech (1923, p. 538): “Depreciation of intangibles should be estimated with care and liberally provided for. Bankers and business men generally prefer a balance sheet presenting only tangible assets to one loaded with goodwill and other intangible values … in general, accumulated surplus should bear its share”. This opinion was echoed by one of the period’s best goodwill specialists: “It is undeniable that today’s balance sheet proceeds on the assumption that it is going to be used to obtain bank loans; and as the banker is presumed to loan only on the security of liquid assets, all the efforts of the statement of the financial status are directed towards the proof of that liquidity” (Esquerré, 1927, p. 41). The interests of lawyers and bankers have often been convergent throughout the time. They allied in many circumstances (see below) and can form a broader category referred to as the “creditors”. 2.3. The tax administrations Increasing fiscal income was the major motivation of tax administrations, which explains their preference for recognition of goodwill as an asset, to remain unamortized. Emery (1951, p. 562) illustrates this position: “The last point to be mentioned here in support of not writing off valuable goodwill is essentially the reasoning behind the income tax ruling, which disallows any deduction for goodwill amortization. The rule is generally defended on the 11

2.2. The bankers<br />

The bankers’ main concern was protection of the corporate assets. They did not therefore<br />

approve of recording goodwill as an asset, preferring to have it eliminated as soon as possible.<br />

Walker sums up their position very succinctly (1938a, p. 174): “It might be desirable for<br />

credit or other purposes to show the financial condition of an enterprise on the basis of<br />

tangible assets alone. If so, goodwill or the intangibles might appear on the balance sheet as<br />

deductions from the proprietary equity”.<br />

The creditors, particularly banks, were sufficiently influential to impose the write-off<br />

against equity solution. The opinion of some actors of the time was expressed by Mc Kinsey<br />

<strong>and</strong> Meech (1923, p. 538): “Depreciation of intangibles should be estimated with care <strong>and</strong><br />

liberally provided for. Bankers <strong>and</strong> business men generally prefer a balance sheet presenting<br />

only tangible assets to one loaded with goodwill <strong>and</strong> other intangible values … in general,<br />

accumulated surplus should bear its share”. This opinion was echoed by one of the period’s<br />

best goodwill specialists: “It is undeniable that today’s balance sheet proceeds on the<br />

assumption that it is going to be used to obtain bank loans; <strong>and</strong> as the banker is presumed to<br />

loan only on the security of liquid assets, all the efforts of the statement of the financial status<br />

are directed towards the proof of that liquidity” (Esquerré, 1927, p. 41).<br />

The interests of lawyers <strong>and</strong> bankers have often been convergent throughout the time. They<br />

allied in many circumstances (see below) <strong>and</strong> can form a broader category referred to as the<br />

“creditors”.<br />

2.3. The tax administrations<br />

Increasing fiscal income was the major motivation of tax administrations, which explains<br />

their preference for recognition of goodwill as an asset, to remain unamortized. Emery (1951,<br />

p. 562) illustrates this position: “The last point to be mentioned here in support of not writing<br />

off valuable goodwill is essentially the reasoning behind the income tax ruling, which<br />

disallows any deduction for goodwill amortization. The rule is generally defended on the<br />

11

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