LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW - Brock University

LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW - Brock University LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW - Brock University

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6 LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW IX Mercy killing may be passive or active depending upon whether the physician allows her to die naturally or whether the physician hastens her death by using a procedure which overrides the natural process. Regarding the distinction between passive and active mercy killing, Douglas Walton has observed that “to allow something to happen [to let her die] is to make it possible for it to happen when it does in fact happen. By a double negation, to make it happen [to kill her] is to not allow it [her death] not to happen.” 2 In other words, “to allow her to die” implies that the physician also allows her to live, however unlikely her continuing to live may be, because socalled “spontaneous remissions” do occasionally occur. However, in active mercy killing “to kill her” implies that the physician does not allow her to live, because the physician’s action closes off every avenue of healing, including ones that are unfamiliar to medical science. Unless stated differently, I shall pose the remaining questions only about Voluntary Active Euthanasia (VAE). The patient is “terminally” ill; she freely asks her physician to kill her; the physician accedes to her request by carrying out a procedure which makes it happen that she dies; and the procedure hastens her death by overriding the natural process of dying. For example, the physician injects her with curare, a deadly paralysing drug. 2. IS IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HER ILLNESS TO GO INTO REMISSION Some ethicists think that the answer to this question is certainly “yes” for some terminal cases. James Rachaels, for example, says: it does not follow from the fact that doctors have sometimes been mistaken that they can never know for sure that any patient is hopeless. That would be like saying that since some people have sometimes confused a Rolls Royce with a Mercedes, no one can ever be certain which is which. In fact, doctors do sometimes know for sure that a patient cannot recover. 3 It needs to be said straightaway that this is an odd way of speaking. Physicians with whom I have spoken, one being the director of a palliative care unit, generally do not talk this way about terminal cases. In my experience they do not say that a case is “hopeless”, because a meaningful life can still be lived even if the patient and her physician both believe that she has no hope of recovery, and they do not claim to know for certain that a 2 Douglas Walton, “Splitting the Difference: Killing and Letting Die”, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 20.1 (1981): 76. 3 Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death, 2 nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1986) 59.

COLWELL: TO BE IN PAIN, OR NOT TO BE 7 physical recovery could not occur. However, for the sake of continuity I shall use the word “hopeless” to mean what I hope Rachaels means by it, namely, “physically hopeless” or “having no possibility of physical recovery”. Still, does the car analogy quite establish Rachaels’ point The problem of uncertainty in the case of the two cars is not one of establishing their identities, that is, not one of deciding what to call the cars once you know all the facts about them. Rather, it is the problem of confusing the cars whose identities have already been established. In Rachaels’ case the problem is one of misidentification, not one of identification. 4 However, the problem of uncertainty in many cases of apparently terminal illness is one of identification. Whether an illness can with certainty be identified as “hopeless” is often the first problem with which we should grapple in making an ethical judgement. The Rolls Royce will not transform into a Mercedes while we are examining it closely; but a so-called “hopeless” case might transform into a “hopeful” case, or at least a “less hopeless” case, as we continue to look at it closely, however rare such an occurrence has been in the past. It is notoriously difficult to establish the truth of such negative universal statements as: “there is no possibility that any terminally ill patient of this type will ever get well.” One would have to know about all the terminal cases of this type ever to have occurred, and then be able to say that none of them went into remission. Moreover, one would have to know for certain that no first-time remissions of this type could occur in the future. This calls for an omniscience rarely found in physicians. Furthermore, remarkable cases of so-called “spontaneous remission” have been documented. 5 But let us grant that physicians do know for certain that some types of cases are hopeless; for example, cases of anencephaly. We are still left with the question of whether the numerous other types of “terminal” cases, most of which are not so bleak, can safely be subsumed under the same category of “hopeless”. Since there are degrees of hopelessness among terminal cases, we should not want to use the certainty about the most hopeless of them to establish warrant for VAE in all hopeless cases. We have been thinking only about the prognosis of the physical state of the patient. If we consider the prognosis of her psychological state as well, our uncertainty is compounded. To be certain not only that someone will die 4 Neither the act of mismatching a name and an object nor the act of misapplying a name to a vaguely perceived object is the same as the act of trying to determine the category in which to place an unusual object which is clearly perceived. 5 For example, H. R. Casdorph, M.D., Ph.D., The Miracles (Plainfield, NJ: Logos International, 1976).

6 <strong>LUTHERAN</strong> <strong>THEOLOGICAL</strong> <strong>REVIEW</strong> IX<br />

Mercy killing may be passive or active depending upon whether the<br />

physician allows her to die naturally or whether the physician hastens her<br />

death by using a procedure which overrides the natural process. Regarding<br />

the distinction between passive and active mercy killing, Douglas Walton<br />

has observed that “to allow something to happen [to let her die] is to make it<br />

possible for it to happen when it does in fact happen. By a double negation,<br />

to make it happen [to kill her] is to not allow it [her death] not to happen.” 2<br />

In other words, “to allow her to die” implies that the physician also allows<br />

her to live, however unlikely her continuing to live may be, because socalled<br />

“spontaneous remissions” do occasionally occur. However, in active<br />

mercy killing “to kill her” implies that the physician does not allow her to<br />

live, because the physician’s action closes off every avenue of healing,<br />

including ones that are unfamiliar to medical science.<br />

Unless stated differently, I shall pose the remaining questions only<br />

about Voluntary Active Euthanasia (VAE). The patient is “terminally” ill;<br />

she freely asks her physician to kill her; the physician accedes to her request<br />

by carrying out a procedure which makes it happen that she dies; and the<br />

procedure hastens her death by overriding the natural process of dying. For<br />

example, the physician injects her with curare, a deadly paralysing drug.<br />

2. IS IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HER ILLNESS TO GO INTO REMISSION<br />

Some ethicists think that the answer to this question is certainly “yes”<br />

for some terminal cases. James Rachaels, for example, says:<br />

it does not follow from the fact that doctors have sometimes been<br />

mistaken that they can never know for sure that any patient is hopeless.<br />

That would be like saying that since some people have sometimes<br />

confused a Rolls Royce with a Mercedes, no one can ever be certain<br />

which is which. In fact, doctors do sometimes know for sure that a<br />

patient cannot recover. 3<br />

It needs to be said straightaway that this is an odd way of speaking.<br />

Physicians with whom I have spoken, one being the director of a palliative<br />

care unit, generally do not talk this way about terminal cases. In my<br />

experience they do not say that a case is “hopeless”, because a meaningful<br />

life can still be lived even if the patient and her physician both believe that<br />

she has no hope of recovery, and they do not claim to know for certain that a<br />

2 Douglas Walton, “Splitting the Difference: Killing and Letting Die”, Dialogue:<br />

Canadian Philosophical Review 20.1 (1981): 76.<br />

3 Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death, 2 nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1986)<br />

59.

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