Gospels of Thomas and Philip and Truth - Syriac Christian Church

Gospels of Thomas and Philip and Truth - Syriac Christian Church Gospels of Thomas and Philip and Truth - Syriac Christian Church

11.11.2012 Views

composed of God’s imagination. VI. (Jn 5:19, Th 75, Ph 6 32 40 93 130 143) To know oneself as essentially a reflection of imagery in the mind of God, is then to know that one is ‘eternally born in the Bridal-Chamber’ of the mystical union of the Two into One: the Spirit with the Light, the Father with the Mother, the Bridegroom with the Bride¹, and Christ with the Totality. (¹recalling the Song of Songs) VII. (Th 83, Ph 78, Tr 8 17) But a (visual) mirror is itself a type of image, not somehow separate from the visual field. Just so are the two, the angel and the image, united: each individual is a unitary reflection within the divine imagery. And the incarnate Christ is proposed as the perfect mirror-image (‘face-form’) of the Father, in which God beholds himself ideally reflected. We ourselves, on the other hand, are intended by God as imperfect— though perfectible (Mt 5:48, Lk 1:6, Tr 53) — mirror-images in his imagination. VIII. (Jn 1:1-3, Ph 10 11 13 25 72 136, Tr 43) Remaining to be considered would be the entire topic of semantics, which is to say of the logos or meaning itself; what is it precisely that characterizes those images— sounds, pictures, gestures, inscriptions, etc., or thoughts thereof— which serve as specifically linguistic icons or ‘symbolic images’? And in what sense is an incarnate person a logos (and Christ the perfect Logos)? A sentence is, after all, itself a complex of images (whether physical or mental) which is being put to a communicative use; so we would presumably be saying that each incarnation is a divine communication (and Christ the perfect communication). Are then propositions and their components perhaps, like the persons who use them, essentially reflectional? This would imply that the descriptive meaning of language consists in a polydimensional ‘mirroring’ of its possible denotations— just as the identity of a person consists in his reflecting his own imagery and in his being a reflection (incarnation) of God. Here we would have to analyze the various interrelations of at least six parallel binaries: ego/imagery, substance/attribute, subject/object, subject/predicate, active/passive and variable/ function— both among individuals and regarding the Godhead. IX. Regarding only the syntactical structure which is required e.g. in order to format noun-phrases and verb-phrases, we might well think that a person's being essentially a subjective mirroring of objective images could in itself enable him inherently to understand the subject-predicate as well as the active-passive (Jn 5:19) grammatical forms. This would perhaps help to explain the necessarily innate 122

linguistic capacity of children (thus Noam Chomsky) to understand, generate and transform new sentences in the language. X. Children, however, assuredly learn single words before they learn sentences; so individual words are indeed primitive in language. Now, since a word is an image (sound, inscription, etc.), we might raise the question whether there is a significant logical parallel between such ordinary linguistic icons and computer icons. For the latter— far from being mere pictures— represent files of programs as well as of data; so we might hypothesize that a word is a type of image which designates a file either of data (including images) or of a program. Thus men will, quite naturally, have made computers as simplified models of their own rationality. (Cf. Alan Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Mind 1950: ‘In the process of trying to imitate an adult human mind, we are bound to think a good deal about the process which has brought it to the state that it is in’; NB: ordinary language and life are generally analog, i.e. have continuous rather than digital truth-functions, whereas modern computers function in a binary calculus.) XI. Such a unique and extraordinary metaphysic, which might be called Spiritual Idealism, has significant parallels with (1) the Neoplatonism of Plotinus in his Enneads; (2) George Berkeley's philosophy of Subjective Idealism, according to which ‘sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit; whence ... there must be some other Mind wherein they exist’ [Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous]; (3) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz' schema of ourselves as monads ‘mirroring’ the Universe, with God as the Supreme Monad [Monadology 56]; (4) the ego/phenomena analysis of Immanuel Kant, where the ‘unity of consciousness preceding all empirical data,... the transcendental unity of apperception’ is in essential polarity with ‘the [sensory] manifold of all our intuitions’ [Critique of Pure Reason A1067]— see especially his eloquent ‘transcendental hypothesis’ [A779/ B807]; (5) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.64, Notebooks 1914-1916 [7.VIII.16 2.IX.16], and Philosophical Investigations [#373, ‘Theology as grammar’]; (6) Martin Buber's I and Thou— see also William James's prior The Will to Believe: ‘The universe is no longer a mere It to us, but a Thou, if we are religious’; (7) Hans Reichenbach's The Philosophy of Space & Time [Dover Books, New York, n/d]; (8) Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception; and (9) much traditional Oriental epistemology: Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist [recall Th 30!]— thus e.g. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism [2nd Series]: ‘The entire 123

composed <strong>of</strong> God’s imagination.<br />

VI. (Jn 5:19, Th 75, Ph 6 32 40 93 130 143) To know oneself as essentially a<br />

reflection <strong>of</strong> imagery in the mind <strong>of</strong> God, is then to know that one is ‘eternally born in<br />

the Bridal-Chamber’ <strong>of</strong> the mystical union <strong>of</strong> the Two into One: the Spirit with the<br />

Light, the Father with the Mother, the Bridegroom with the Bride¹, <strong>and</strong> Christ with the<br />

Totality. (¹recalling the Song <strong>of</strong> Songs)<br />

VII. (Th 83, Ph 78, Tr 8 17) But a (visual) mirror is itself a type <strong>of</strong> image, not<br />

somehow separate from the visual field. Just so are the two, the angel <strong>and</strong> the<br />

image, united: each individual is a unitary reflection within the divine imagery. And<br />

the incarnate Christ is proposed as the perfect mirror-image (‘face-form’) <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Father, in which God beholds himself ideally reflected. We ourselves, on the other<br />

h<strong>and</strong>, are intended by God as imperfect— though perfectible (Mt 5:48, Lk 1:6, Tr 53)<br />

— mirror-images in his imagination.<br />

VIII. (Jn 1:1-3, Ph 10 11 13 25 72 136, Tr 43) Remaining to be considered<br />

would be the entire topic <strong>of</strong> semantics, which is to say <strong>of</strong> the logos or meaning itself;<br />

what is it precisely that characterizes those images— sounds, pictures, gestures,<br />

inscriptions, etc., or thoughts there<strong>of</strong>— which serve as specifically linguistic icons or<br />

‘symbolic images’? And in what sense is an incarnate person a logos (<strong>and</strong> Christ the<br />

perfect Logos)? A sentence is, after all, itself a complex <strong>of</strong> images (whether physical<br />

or mental) which is being put to a communicative use; so we would presumably be<br />

saying that each incarnation is a divine communication (<strong>and</strong> Christ the perfect<br />

communication). Are then propositions <strong>and</strong> their components perhaps, like the<br />

persons who use them, essentially reflectional? This would imply that the descriptive<br />

meaning <strong>of</strong> language consists in a polydimensional ‘mirroring’ <strong>of</strong> its possible<br />

denotations— just as the identity <strong>of</strong> a person consists in his reflecting his own<br />

imagery <strong>and</strong> in his being a reflection (incarnation) <strong>of</strong> God. Here we would have to<br />

analyze the various interrelations <strong>of</strong> at least six parallel binaries: ego/imagery,<br />

substance/attribute, subject/object, subject/predicate, active/passive <strong>and</strong> variable/<br />

function— both among individuals <strong>and</strong> regarding the Godhead.<br />

IX. Regarding only the syntactical structure which is required e.g. in order to<br />

format noun-phrases <strong>and</strong> verb-phrases, we might well think that a person's being<br />

essentially a subjective mirroring <strong>of</strong> objective images could in itself enable him<br />

inherently to underst<strong>and</strong> the subject-predicate as well as the active-passive (Jn 5:19)<br />

grammatical forms. This would perhaps help to explain the necessarily innate<br />

122

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