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UTGB Vol 5.pdf - Robson Hall Faculty of Law

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duration without infringing on the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the Lieutenant Governor, surely it<br />

can also reduce its duration without <strong>of</strong>fending s. 41(a) <strong>of</strong> the Constitution Act,<br />

1982.<br />

Critics <strong>of</strong> fixed date election legislation also refer to Ontario Public Service<br />

Employees' Union v. Ontario (Attorney General), where the Supreme Court <strong>of</strong><br />

Canada held that government cannot remove the Lieutenant Governor's power<br />

to dissolve Parliament:<br />

The fact that a province can validly give legislative effect to a prerequisite condition <strong>of</strong><br />

responsible government does not necessarily mean it can do anything it pleases with<br />

the principle <strong>of</strong> responsible government itself. Thus, it is uncertain, to say the least,<br />

that a province could touch upon the power <strong>of</strong> the Lieutenant Governor to dissolve<br />

the legislature ... without unconstitutionally touching his <strong>of</strong>fice itself.5 2<br />

Those who extend this case to support an attack on the constitutionality <strong>of</strong><br />

fixed date election legislation fall into the same trap as Forsey. Again, such an<br />

attack takes the breadth <strong>of</strong> this statement outside its scope-OPSEU stands for<br />

the proposition that the Lieutenant Governor always retains the power to<br />

dissolve the House before the statutorily prescribed maximum duration has been<br />

exceeded. Fixed date election legislation respects his power. However, the<br />

Lieutenant Governor does not have the power to refuse to dissolve parliament<br />

when its maximum duration-as determined by the law-has been met. To do<br />

so would be to act outside the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the Lieutenant Governor. Thus OPSEUJ<br />

like Re The Initiative and Referendum Act before it, simply cannot be used to<br />

support the proposition that ftxed date election legislation infringes on the<br />

<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the Lieutenant Governor and is therefore unconstitutionaL<br />

V. CONCLUSION<br />

Manitoba's unfixed election dates allow the incumbent to use its ability to set<br />

an election date for purely partisan purposes. History has shown repeated abuse<br />

<strong>of</strong> this power to the detriment <strong>of</strong> the electoral process, governance, and in the<br />

end, the electorate itself. Other provinces and the federal government have<br />

already established their own fixed date election legislation-it can be done,<br />

and it should be done. There are no compelling reasons why Manitoba's<br />

government should resist a move to set election dates.<br />

52<br />

[1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at para. 101 [OPSEU].

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