Joel A Lewis Youth Against Fascism.pdf

DEMOCRACY
aggression against democracy. 252 In an article on foreign policy and Spain, Joe Cohen
argued that "in supporting the Spanish people and giving material and diplomatic aid to
the cause of democracy and peace" the Soviet Union served "not only to its own welfare,
but also the interests of labor and progress throughout the world." 253
The British and American YCLs contrasted the foreign policies of their own respective
governments. The British YCL posited a complete opposition to the policies of
Chamberlain's National Government. The YCL blamed the defeat of democracy in Spain
upon Chamberlain's "treacherous" foreign policies. The YCL asserted that Chamberlain
was consciously instituting pro-fascist policies; his support of non-intervention and
"policy of appeasement expressed in honest terms, is the policy of assistance to fascist
aggression and the destruction of democracy." 254 The YCL insisted it was the duty of all
democratic forces to remove the National Government to save democracy in Britain and
Spain:
Spain's people have fought and will continue to fight. There is no question of that. They
will go down fighting, rather than live as slaves. They are fighting fascism, which is our
enemy as much as it is theirs. They can fight Hitler's and Mussolini's men; but they cannot
fight Chamberlain's ban on arms. That is our job. 255
The YCLUSA also denounced Chamberlain for his betrayal of Spain and democracy in
very similar terms. John Gates, the former YCLUSA Battalion Commissar for the
Lincoln Brigade, reflected upon the defeatist role of Chamberlain's Spanish policy:
How, then, can we explain the defeat of Republican Spain The answer is to be found in
the policy laid down at Munich. This infamous pact decided the fate of the Spanish
people. The Munich pact was the logical development and culmination of the policy of
non-intervention and so-called neutrality. Ostensibly a means of saving peace, it was, in
fact, a policy of saving fascism. Today the facts are plain for all to see. Nonintervention
was a mask for intervention in Spain and has resulted in the victory of Mussolini....
Munich made possible the invasion of Spain on an unparalleled scale by Mussolini,
while at the same time it tightened the arms embargo against Spain.... We have good
reason not to place too much faith and trust in the actions of the British and French governments.
256
Santiago Carrillo, the head of the Spanish JSU, stated that without Chamberlain's recognition
of Franco at the end of February, 1939 that "Germany and Italy would never have
been able to defeat the Spanish army and the Spanish people." 257 Communists argued that
Chamberlain's rejection of collective security and Republican Spain was a conscious
manoeuvre, reflecting how "he admires fascism and wants to see Hitler and Mussolini
destroy democracy in Europe." 258
In contrast to the British experience, the American YCL perceived Roosevelt as a potential
close ally of Spanish democracy. While the YCL supported Roosevelt, they
insisted that the President's lack of initiatives to defend peace and democracy needed to
be "contrasted with the constant attempt of the Soviet Union" to check "the fascists in
Spain." 259 Further articles on Spain in the early part of 1937 continued this comparison,
exalting the "brilliant example of Soviet solidarity" and lamenting that "Roosevelt's
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