Retail and Hospitality Slip and Fall in Aisle Four By Renee W. Dwyer and Russell N. Jarem Modern Premises Liability Challenges to Retail Operations “Self-service” operations in particular should note the growing number of states that are adopting the heightened “mode of operation” standard of care. In 2007, in Kelly v. Stop & Shop, 281 Conn. 768 (Conn. 2007), the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that certain retail enterprises should bear the burden of rebutting a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant was negligent, and a plaintiff can satisfy a prima facie negligence standard by presenting evidence that the defendant’s mode of business operation leads “to a foreseeable risk of injury” and “the plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by an accident within the zone of risk.” Id. at 791. <strong>The</strong> court’s decision abrogated the traditional premises liability standard under which a plaintiff was required to establish that a defendant had actual or constructive notice of a specific hazard. In adopting the mode of operation standard, Connecticut joined a growing number of states that have held certain retail establishments to a greater standard of care than in the past under traditional premises liability law. <strong>The</strong> Approaches Retailers face liability everyday from slips and falls that people experience in their establishments. “Self- service” operations need to insulate themselves more vigilantly from liability exposure than other retail establishments due to the “mode of operation” rule adopted by many states across the country. As the Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Kelley, “[t]here is… a distinct modern trend favoring the rule, and it appears that most courts that have considered the rule have adopted it.” Kelly, 281 Conn. at 783. Under traditional premises liability law, a retail store owner has a duty to keep a premises in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of store customers. In situations involving falls, most courts require a plaintiff to show that the condition causing him or her to slip and fall existed long enough so that the defendant should have discovered it and should have remedied it. In other words, the plaintiff is generally required to plead and prove that the retailer had actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard. In these cases, a third party such as a customer usually creates the hazard that a plaintiff blames for his or her injury. 46 ■ <strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> ■ <strong>February</strong> <strong>2012</strong> ■ Renee W. Dwyer and Russell N. Jarem are partners of Gordon Muir & Foley in Hartford, Connecticut. Ms. Dwyer, a member of <strong>DRI</strong>’s Retail and Hospitality Committee, routinely represents major retailers in the defense of serious premises liability actions, as well as retail store false arrest claims, malicious prosecution claims, and pharmacy liability claims. Mr. Jarem’s practice includes premises liability defense of landowners and leaseholders for premises defects and retail operations. He is a member of the <strong>DRI</strong> Employment and Labor Law Committee.
<strong>The</strong> growing trend in most jurisdictions relieves a plaintiff of this burden, particularly in self- service situations. Courts that dispense with the traditional requirements of notice recognize either a “mode of operation” or a “recurring condition” basis for liability under which a plaintiff bases the defendant’s liability on the methods used by the defendant to run the defendant’s business. <strong>The</strong> “mode of operation” rule differs from the standard premises liability rule in that with the “mode of operation rule” courts “allow a customer injured due to a condition inherent in the way [a] store is operated to recover without establishing that the proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.” Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 251 Kan. 700, 702, 840 P.2d 463 (Kan. 1992). Some states, namely Arkansas, New York, and Maine, apply the “recurring condition” rule, which may result in greater potential liability than a “mode of operation” rule. While a retail establishment may avoid liability by showing that it took “precautions reasonably necessary to protect its customers,” an owner that knows of recurring conditions “that pose[ ] a potential danger to invitees may not ignore that knowledge and fail reasonably to respond to the foreseeable danger of the likelihood of a recurrence of the condition.” Dumont v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, 664 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1995). See also Brookshires Grocery Co. v. Pierce, 71 Ark. App. 203, 205 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000); Simoni v. 2095 Cruger Associates, 285 A.D. 2d 431, 729 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). In these cases, any potential recurring hazard, as opposed to one arising from a selfservice mode of operation, may expose a retail establishment to liability. <strong>The</strong> following jurisdictions have adopted the mode of operation approach: Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Chiara v. Fry’s Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 152 Ariz. 398, 401, 733 P.2d 283 (Ariz. 1987); Kelly, 281 Conn. 768 (Conn. 2007); Gump v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 93 Hawai’i 428, 441–444, 5 P.3d 418 (Haw. Ct. App.1999), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 93 Hawai’i 417, 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000); McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 308, 707 P.2d 416 (Idaho 1985); Donoho v. O’Connell’s, Inc., 13 Ill. 2d 113, 118, 124–125, 148 N.E.2d 434 (Ill. 1958); Golba v. Kohl’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Jackson v. K- Mart Corp., 251 Kan. 700, 710, 840 P.2d 463 (Kan. 1992); Sheehan v. Roche Brothers Supermarket, Inc., 440 Mass. 780, 863 N.E.2d 1276 (Mass. 2007); Waller v. Dixieland Food Stores, Inc., 492 So. 2d 283 (Miss. 1986); Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 781 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Mo. 1989); Richardson v. Corvallis Public School District, 286 Mont. 309, 950 P.2d 748 (Mont. 1997); Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 429, 221 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1966); Mahoney v. J.C. Penney Co., 71 N.M. 244, 259–260, 377 P.2d 663 (N.M. 1962); Lingerfelt v. Winn- Dixie Tex., Inc., 645 P.2d 485, 489 (Okla. 1982); Worsham v. Pilot Oil Corp., 728 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 298 (Tex. 1983); Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Debus v. Grand Union Stores of Vt., 159 Vt. 537, 545–546, 621 A.2d 1288 (Vt. 1993); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash. 2d 39, 47, 49, 666 P.2d 888 (Wash. 1983); Steinhorst v. H.C. Prange Co., 48 Wis. 2d 679, 683–684, 180 N.W.2d 525 (Wis. 1970); Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 1980). <strong>The</strong> following jurisdictions follow a burden- shifting approach, in which the defendant must establish that it exercised reasonable care under the circumstances of the self- service operation: Colorado, Georgia, and Kentucky. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 258 (Colo. 1983); Davis v. Bruno’s Supermarkets, Inc., 263 Ga. App. 147, 148–149, 587 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Lanier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Ky. 2003). Although New Jersey and Oklahoma follow the “mode of operation” approach, both jurisdictions also incorporate burdenshifting principles. See Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. at 429–30, 221 A.2d at 513; Lingerfelt v. Winn-Dixie Tex., Inc., 645 P.2d at 485, 489. Other states that follow a hybrid approach are Illinois, combining the traditional and the “mode of operation” approaches, and New Mexico, combining the “mode of operation” and the “recurring condition” approaches. See Donoho v. O’Connell’s, Inc., 13 Ill. 2d 113, 118, 124– Courts that dispense with the traditional requirements of notice recognize either a “mode of operation” or a “recurring condition” basis for liability. 125, 148 N.E.2d 434 (Ill. 1958); Mahoney v. J.C. Penney Co., 71 N.M. 244, 259–260, 377 P.2d 663 (N.M. 1962). <strong>The</strong> following jurisdictions currently follow the traditional premises liability approach, in some cases rejecting the “mode of operation” standard outright: Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. See S.H. Kress & Co. v. Thompson, 267 Ala. 566, 569, 103 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1957); Kremer v. Carr’s Food Ctr., Inc., 462 P.2d 747, 749 (Alaska 1969); Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 36 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2001); Howard v. Food Fair Stores, New Castle, 57 Del. 471, 480, 201 A.2d 638 (Del. 1964); Richardson v. Commodore, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 693, 696 (Iowa 1999), abrogated on other grounds, Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 2009); Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975), superseded by statute, La. Rev. Stat. §9:2800.6 (1997); Maans v. Giant of Md., LLC, 161 Md. App. 620, 639, 871 A.2d 627 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); Whitmore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 89 Mich. App. 3, 8, 279 N.W.2d 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Norman v. Tradehome Shoe Stores, Inc., 270 Minn. 101, 106, 132 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. 1965); Herrera v. Fleming Cos., 265 Neb. 118, 122, 655 N.W.2d 378 (Neb. 2003); Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 109 Nev. 247, 849 P.2d 320 (Nev. 1993); Simpson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 N.H. 571, 574, 744 A.2d 625 (N.H. 1999); Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836, 837, 501 N.Y.S.2d 646, 492 <strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> ■ <strong>February</strong> <strong>2012</strong> ■ 47