Navigation guide Refugee populations in the UK: Algerians - ICAR

state of emergency was introduced on 9 February 1992 that remains in force. The FIS was declared illegal
in March 1992. Mohammed Boudiaf, a respected veteran of the 1954-62 war was appointed by the army to
lead the new Council of State. Under Boudiaf’s orders, as many as 10,000 Islamist supporters were
detained in huge camps in the desert. Boudiaf’s assassination in June 1992 confirmed the severity of the
situation and destroyed many people’s hopes that the crisis would be over quickly. Liamine Zeroual was
immediately appointed to replace Boudiaf. Detainees from the camps were progressively released from the
summer of 1992 onwards.
The camps had actually provided an opportunity for networks to become established between Islamist
activists and many left the camps to join existing armed groups or found others. These armed groups were
not well directed or organised 13 but the government was neither prepared, nor the army trained, for dealing
with this kind of enemy. From 1993 onwards certain armed groups began a policy of individual
assassination, frequently targeting prominent intellectuals, journalists, artists or doctors; during May 1993
alone 200 individuals were assassinated. 14 During 1994, large areas of the country were under the de facto
control of the armed groups and there were suggestions that the government could lose control entirely. 15
In 1994 France stepped in to help the government and arranged or provided more than US$6 billion of
assistance, much of it in the form of military hardware. 16 New presidential elections were held in 1995
confirming Liamine Zeroual as the new president. The elections were welcomed and Zeroual’s policies,
backed up with substantial French support, were greeted as the beginning of the end of the conflict. He
introduced a policy of clemency, involving partial pardons for members of armed groups, and initially there
were signs that this was successful. By 1997, hopes that the end of the conflict was near were again
destroyed as killings of individuals gradually escalated to a series of terrible massacres of tens and later
hundreds of people.
In August and September 1997, hundreds of civilians were killed in the villages of Bentalha, Rais and Beni
Messous, near Algiers and by the end of the year, the remote mountainous area of Relizane was targeted.
These events terrified the local population and provoked huge internal population movements; some spoke
of an ‘exodus’ from the area near Algiers, the Mitidja. 17 The Groupe Islamique Armeé (Armed Islamic Group,
GIA) later claimed responsibility for these massacres, though a series of high profile accounts in the press,
and later in books, questioned the role of the army. Few serious commentators support the notion that the
army actually committed these massacres, though this is the essence of some of the accusations, but the
published accounts at least raise the question of why the government did so little to prevent them occurring.
In 1999, the election of President Bouteflika was again seen as heralding a real change in the war as he
outlined a number of bold initiatives to bring an end to the violence. Over time it became clear that these
ideas were being blocked due to conflict within the administration, and the hopes incited by his election have
faded. By 2001 violent attacks were again increasing, and from April onwards a series of protests to mark
the 21 st anniversary of the Berber Spring were again violently repressed by the police, resulting in the death
of at least 60 people and exacerbating the alienation felt by the Berber minority. These events provoked a
series of innovative political mobilisations in Kabylia, known as the ‘archs’ or ‘citizens’ movement’. Initially
this coalition of organisations, based on traditional political structures, appeared to offer a potential solution
13 Some commentators have identified as many as seven separate strands of organisation, each with different methods
and goals, Khelassi, N. (1998) ‘La Violence’ Pouvoirs 86, pp. 107-116. The most notorious of these is undoubtedly the
Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) which has claimed responsibility for the majority of attacks on civilians.
14 Reporteurs Sans Frontiers (1994) Le Drame Algerien: un peuple en otage. La Decouverte, Paris.
15 Le Monde 16.9.94.
16 Leveau, R. (1994) ‘Algerie: les pièges de l’aide internationale’ Politique internationale 65 automne, pp. 171-192.
17 Stora, B. (2001) La Guerre Invisible Algérie, années 90. Presses de Science Po, Paris.
Navigation guide to refugee populations: Algerians
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