U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
Chapter 2: Command and Organization 2-2.4 Politics Elected officials from local county and state organizations attempted to obtain and control resources. These local organizations served as “response managers” for their jurisdiction. They were ostensibly part of the ICS but exhibited considerable influence and independence in the allocation and control of OSR teams and equipment, including those of SUPSALV. Examples of this competition for assets and independent resource assignments were the “Skunkworks”, the self-named State-operated pollution response team answerable to the State of Alabama only. This organization requested and received SUPSALV booming teams to protect the entrance to Mobile Bay. In their enthusiasm to protect the bay, they deployed the boom in a fashion that did not account for the significant tidal currents, the boom was ultimately damaged beyond repair as a result. Another example of an independent response manager influencing the system was the response team from St. Tammany Parish which requested, obtained, and kept SUPSALV MARCO skimming assets in the Slidell, LA area for the duration of the spill even though oil never made it to the Parish waters. 2-2.5 Obtaining Critical Resources SUPSALV was dependent on the Area Command (OSVs) and Incident Commanders (smaller VOOs and barges) for obtaining assets to support their assigned mission. SUPSALV’s OSR equipment is highly specialized but dependent on vessels of opportunity for supporting their deployment. The vessels of opportunity included capable OSVs for offshore high speed skimming, OSVs for laying oil containment boom, and an OSV for assisting in maintenance of the MARCO Class V Skimmers. Smaller boats were needed to work with the near-shore MARCO Class V skimmers. Shore and barge-based cranes were used for management of the boats in port, and jack-up and spud barges were used to facilitate off-shore use of the MARCO Class V skimmers. Generally, when resources were required, they were identified and made available. There was a vetting / learning process associated with the provisioning process though. For example, for smaller boats to support MARCO Class V skimmers, initially outboard powered runabouts were provided, then cabin cruiser type vessels, then, eventually, commercial shrimpers that were suitable for the task were assigned. Because there were conflicting and competing requests for these same resources, SUPSALV requests were subject to ICS prioritizations. 2-2.6 Requests for Information Numerous (often 3 or 4 times daily) requests for information within the Navy left some staff working a greater portion of their time providing tailored responses and less time managing their tasks. An example was a 4 May request for information to be used in to prepare Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Whelan in his testimony before Congress. Three simple questions were asked, but the questions, as they were processed and forwarded through the OSD Policy Crisis Center and OPNAV Navy Crisis Action Team THREE Resource Situation Awareness Center (RSAC) Pentagon, to 00C Deputy, Michael Dean, to 00C Admiralty Attorney, 2-6
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response Richard Buckingham, and finally to the Command Center in Gulfport became a high priority, stop everything drill requiring immediate, high level attention. After staffing ad hoc responses to numerous “good ideas” coming from both the public and private sector, the National Incident Commander established an Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Panel (IATAP) to provide an established process to fairly evaluate the merits of plausible improvements to the oil cleanup process. The establishment of this assessment program took a significant load off the Navy staff, reducing the number of distractions and demands on their time for issues relating to suggested process improvements. Examples of the IATAP evaluations SUPSALV personnel took part in are included in Para 5-3.3. 2-2.7 Access to Fresh Oil Crude oil bubbling to the surface has a different consistency than oil that has been floating for a couple of days. The aged oil turns into a thick, slimy mess and becomes contaminated with floating ocean debris. Clean fresh oil is more easily handled and can be separated from the water efficiently by SUPSALV’s skimmer systems. For these reasons, the SUPSALV VOSS teams always desired assignment to the Gulf waters in the vicinity of the flowing oil. Conflicting priorities at the well site didn’t always allow that access. Because multiple strategies were being employed; In-situ burn, mechanical recovery (large volume skimmers), and dispersal, SUPSALV’s VOSS teams were not always given access to the fresh oil. The decision makers were balancing multiple priorities but from SUPSALV’s perspective, their VOSS OSVs which were manned and ready to collect oil were not always placed where the fresh oil was. 2-2.8 Timely Aerial Reconnaissance. Offshore Support Vessels (OSV) with NOFI VOSS skimmers deployed are limited to traveling at about 3 knots. Other VOSS skimmers are slower, at about 0.8 kts. MARCO Class V skimmers move at 1.0 kts unless rigged for towing where they are capable of 5 – 6 kts. Retrieving gear and redeploying it is time consuming. Because of this slow pace of advance, sending VOSS or MARCO belt skimmers off in search of oil spotted the day before was ineffective and wasteful. The delay between sighting oil and getting assigned to a patrol / skimming area meant that the skimmers were often looking for the spotted pockets of oil from the height of eye of the wheel house rather than having a timely aerial reconnaissance locate the oil. In an attempt to improve timeliness of oil spotting reports, the Navy activated its airship, MZ-3A which arrived in the Gulf Region on 6 July to assist in spotting and monitoring oil and support command and control of skimming operations. The Airship began operating from a mooring three miles Southeast of Mobile Bay but was later based at Jack Edwards Airport AL, just east of Mobile Bay. It typically flew six-hour sorties and would report surface oil sightings to the task force. Communications with the afloat task force and ICP leadership proved difficult and the airship did not make the contribution that was hoped for. 2-7
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Chapter 2: Command and Organization<br />
2-2.4 Politics<br />
Elected officials from local county and state organizations attempted to obtain and control<br />
resources. These local organizations served as “response managers” for their jurisdiction. They<br />
were ostensibly part of the ICS but exhibited considerable influence and independence in the<br />
allocation and control of OSR teams and equipment, including those of SUPSALV. Examples of<br />
this competition for assets and independent resource assignments were the “Skunkworks”, the<br />
self-named State-operated pollution response team answerable to the State of Alabama only.<br />
This organization requested and received SUPSALV booming teams to protect the entrance to<br />
Mobile Bay. In their enthusiasm to protect the bay, they deployed the boom in a fashion that did<br />
not account for the significant tidal currents, the boom was ultimately damaged beyond repair as<br />
a result. Another example of an independent response manager influencing the system was the<br />
response team from St. Tammany Parish which requested, obtained, and kept SUPSALV<br />
MARCO skimming assets in the Slidell, LA area for the duration of the spill even though oil never<br />
made it to the Parish waters.<br />
2-2.5 Obtaining Critical Resources<br />
SUPSALV was dependent on the Area Command (OSVs) and Incident Commanders (smaller<br />
VOOs and barges) for obtaining assets to support their assigned mission. SUPSALV’s OSR<br />
equipment is highly specialized but dependent on vessels of opportunity for supporting their<br />
deployment. The vessels of opportunity included capable OSVs for offshore high speed<br />
skimming, OSVs for laying oil containment boom, and an OSV for assisting in maintenance of<br />
the MARCO Class V Skimmers. Smaller boats were needed to work with the near-shore<br />
MARCO Class V skimmers. Shore and barge-based cranes were used for management of the<br />
boats in port, and jack-up and spud barges were used to facilitate off-shore use of the MARCO<br />
Class V skimmers. Generally, when resources were required, they were identified and made<br />
available. There was a vetting / learning process associated with the provisioning process<br />
though. For example, for smaller boats to support MARCO Class V skimmers, initially outboard<br />
powered runabouts were provided, then cabin cruiser type vessels, then, eventually, commercial<br />
shrimpers that were suitable for the task were assigned. Because there were conflicting and<br />
competing requests for these same resources, SUPSALV requests were subject to ICS<br />
prioritizations.<br />
2-2.6 Requests for Information<br />
Numerous (often 3 or 4 times daily) requests for information within the Navy left some staff<br />
working a greater portion of their time providing tailored responses and less time managing their<br />
tasks. An example was a 4 May request for information to be used in to prepare Deputy<br />
Assistant Secretary of Defense Whelan in his testimony before Congress. Three simple<br />
questions were asked, but the questions, as they were processed and forwarded through the<br />
OSD Policy Crisis Center and OPNAV Navy Crisis Action Team THREE Resource Situation<br />
Awareness Center (RSAC) Pentagon, to 00C Deputy, Michael Dean, to 00C Admiralty Attorney,<br />
2-6