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U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response<br />

2-2.1 Multiple Lines of Authority.<br />

Because ICP Houma and ICP Mobile each had lines of authority, both independently issued<br />

direction to SUPSALV. SUPSALV was unable to adjudicate Mobile and Houma’s conflicting<br />

requests and requested relief from the Area Commander in Roberts, LA. On 6 May the Federal<br />

Reserve Asset Staging Unit in Gulfport, MS began reporting to the Area/Unified Command<br />

(Roberts, LA) vice ICP Houma. ICP Houma and ICP Mobile then had to submit requests through<br />

Area/Unified Command for SUPSALV oil spill response (OSR) equipment and assets. Once the<br />

assets were allocated, the ICPs had the authority to deploy operationally. Items that were<br />

staged but not deployed were occasionally transferred from one ICP to another without<br />

SUPSALV knowledge. This led to <strong>ESSM</strong> personnel “discovering” the gear they were intending to<br />

utilize was not present or available. Early on SUPSALV learned to periodically send personnel to<br />

visually check on equipment in staging areas without assigned SUPSALV personnel.<br />

2-2.2 Turnover of Key Contacts<br />

SUPSALV manned each of their key positions, Houston Source Control ICP and Gulfport, MS<br />

State Pier Command Van, with two fully committed senior staff members who each spent<br />

approximately 50% of their time on-site and the remaining 50% of their time back at NAVSEA<br />

HQ but still engaged on a daily basis in the conduct of the operation. In contrast, key Task Force<br />

Leaders and ICP management team members invariably rotated off the job after around 2<br />

weeks. It became apparent that the turnover process was not comprehensive and issues and<br />

routines worked out with the past holder of that post had to be resolved anew with the current<br />

holder of the post. During the operation, a call to the ICP switchboard rarely found an operator<br />

who knew who was occupying what position within their own organization. In an attempt to work<br />

with this deficiency, the SUPSALV team had their reservist or visiting ED Diver trainee make<br />

almost daily contact with each Task Force and ICP POC to see who was occupying the key<br />

positions and if they had a copy of the Skimming and Booming Ops CONOPS and knew who<br />

and what SUPSALV was, where our equipment and personnel were, and what they were doing.<br />

2-2.3 Responsible Party Coordination<br />

BP played a significant role in coordinating the oil spill response. They were willing funders of<br />

the mission and assigned people who were knowledgeable and productive to the coordination<br />

task. BP’s specific impact on SUPSALV’s operation was the contracting of vessels of<br />

opportunity to support off shore skimming, boom handling boats for MARCO Class V skimming,<br />

and the OSVs used for boom laying and MARCO Class V tending. BP also demonstrated their<br />

responsiveness after SUPSALV identified the requirement for knuckle boom cranes for the<br />

VOSS boats.<br />

2-5

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