U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response<br />
2-2.1 Multiple Lines of Authority.<br />
Because ICP Houma and ICP Mobile each had lines of authority, both independently issued<br />
direction to SUPSALV. SUPSALV was unable to adjudicate Mobile and Houma’s conflicting<br />
requests and requested relief from the Area Commander in Roberts, LA. On 6 May the Federal<br />
Reserve Asset Staging Unit in Gulfport, MS began reporting to the Area/Unified Command<br />
(Roberts, LA) vice ICP Houma. ICP Houma and ICP Mobile then had to submit requests through<br />
Area/Unified Command for SUPSALV oil spill response (OSR) equipment and assets. Once the<br />
assets were allocated, the ICPs had the authority to deploy operationally. Items that were<br />
staged but not deployed were occasionally transferred from one ICP to another without<br />
SUPSALV knowledge. This led to <strong>ESSM</strong> personnel “discovering” the gear they were intending to<br />
utilize was not present or available. Early on SUPSALV learned to periodically send personnel to<br />
visually check on equipment in staging areas without assigned SUPSALV personnel.<br />
2-2.2 Turnover of Key Contacts<br />
SUPSALV manned each of their key positions, Houston Source Control ICP and Gulfport, MS<br />
State Pier Command Van, with two fully committed senior staff members who each spent<br />
approximately 50% of their time on-site and the remaining 50% of their time back at NAVSEA<br />
HQ but still engaged on a daily basis in the conduct of the operation. In contrast, key Task Force<br />
Leaders and ICP management team members invariably rotated off the job after around 2<br />
weeks. It became apparent that the turnover process was not comprehensive and issues and<br />
routines worked out with the past holder of that post had to be resolved anew with the current<br />
holder of the post. During the operation, a call to the ICP switchboard rarely found an operator<br />
who knew who was occupying what position within their own organization. In an attempt to work<br />
with this deficiency, the SUPSALV team had their reservist or visiting ED Diver trainee make<br />
almost daily contact with each Task Force and ICP POC to see who was occupying the key<br />
positions and if they had a copy of the Skimming and Booming Ops CONOPS and knew who<br />
and what SUPSALV was, where our equipment and personnel were, and what they were doing.<br />
2-2.3 Responsible Party Coordination<br />
BP played a significant role in coordinating the oil spill response. They were willing funders of<br />
the mission and assigned people who were knowledgeable and productive to the coordination<br />
task. BP’s specific impact on SUPSALV’s operation was the contracting of vessels of<br />
opportunity to support off shore skimming, boom handling boats for MARCO Class V skimming,<br />
and the OSVs used for boom laying and MARCO Class V tending. BP also demonstrated their<br />
responsiveness after SUPSALV identified the requirement for knuckle boom cranes for the<br />
VOSS boats.<br />
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