U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM
Chapter 2: Command and Organization of them provided Navy - Coast Guard Liaison support at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Engineering Duty Officers, who were available provided was on-site supervision and tracking. This was important because of the extensive geographic dispersal of SUPSALV equipment and contractor personnel. Gulfport management team not only needed to keep tabs on the ESSM operation and operators but also needed a report on any Task Force or ICP issues affecting their teams. Serving as a part of the SUPSALV team also provided the Reservist and ED Officers excellent training and experience in working in the ICS. 2-1.4 CNIC A Coast Guard Request for Assistance (RFA) was approved by U.S. Navy for equipment belonging to Navy shore installations. That equipment belongs to the Commander, Naval Installations Command (CNIC). The plan was to ship their equipment to Gulfport where the CNIC management team would assign it as directed. On 22 June, the CNIC Management Team arrived at State Pier, Gulfport and was briefed by SUPSALV and a USCG Representative on site. A second ESSM Command Van was made available and CNIC began to organize their systems as they arrived in Gulfport. CNIC provided the following equipment: • 8 Kvichak belt skimmers • 3 NOFI Harbor Buster • Associated personnel and support boats Because CNIC oil spill response equipment is assigned to specific facilities, it was not obtained or configured to be easily transportable or sustainable in the field. It was also generally designed for use in calm waters, harbors or ports, and not very suitable for use in open-ocean or exposed bodies of water. Given the CNIC system capabilities and lack of mobile logistics support, the CNIC equipment was initially co-located with SUPSALV, so the Navy (SUPSALV) could provide logistics support and simplify deployment, system operations, and crew support before follow-on deployment. CNIC distributed a concept of operations (CONOPS) with stability tables to ensure the ICP task force leaders understood the capabilities and limitations of CNIC’s smaller Kvichak skimmer systems. CNIC equipment and operators fell under ICS Houma or Mobile if it was not deployed to a Navy Base (Pensacola Naval Air Station for example). However, CNIC exercised oversight remotely similar to how SUPSALV did with SUPSALV assets. 2-2 Issues Operating in Incident Command Structure (ICS) SUPSALV has operated as a member of a federalized incident command system in the past including the federalized response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This DWH incident resulted in creation of multiple ICPs and SUPSALV’s role required interaction at multiple levels within the organization. As can be expected, there were challenges associated with operating in such a expansive organization. They included: 2-4
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response 2-2.1 Multiple Lines of Authority. Because ICP Houma and ICP Mobile each had lines of authority, both independently issued direction to SUPSALV. SUPSALV was unable to adjudicate Mobile and Houma’s conflicting requests and requested relief from the Area Commander in Roberts, LA. On 6 May the Federal Reserve Asset Staging Unit in Gulfport, MS began reporting to the Area/Unified Command (Roberts, LA) vice ICP Houma. ICP Houma and ICP Mobile then had to submit requests through Area/Unified Command for SUPSALV oil spill response (OSR) equipment and assets. Once the assets were allocated, the ICPs had the authority to deploy operationally. Items that were staged but not deployed were occasionally transferred from one ICP to another without SUPSALV knowledge. This led to ESSM personnel “discovering” the gear they were intending to utilize was not present or available. Early on SUPSALV learned to periodically send personnel to visually check on equipment in staging areas without assigned SUPSALV personnel. 2-2.2 Turnover of Key Contacts SUPSALV manned each of their key positions, Houston Source Control ICP and Gulfport, MS State Pier Command Van, with two fully committed senior staff members who each spent approximately 50% of their time on-site and the remaining 50% of their time back at NAVSEA HQ but still engaged on a daily basis in the conduct of the operation. In contrast, key Task Force Leaders and ICP management team members invariably rotated off the job after around 2 weeks. It became apparent that the turnover process was not comprehensive and issues and routines worked out with the past holder of that post had to be resolved anew with the current holder of the post. During the operation, a call to the ICP switchboard rarely found an operator who knew who was occupying what position within their own organization. In an attempt to work with this deficiency, the SUPSALV team had their reservist or visiting ED Diver trainee make almost daily contact with each Task Force and ICP POC to see who was occupying the key positions and if they had a copy of the Skimming and Booming Ops CONOPS and knew who and what SUPSALV was, where our equipment and personnel were, and what they were doing. 2-2.3 Responsible Party Coordination BP played a significant role in coordinating the oil spill response. They were willing funders of the mission and assigned people who were knowledgeable and productive to the coordination task. BP’s specific impact on SUPSALV’s operation was the contracting of vessels of opportunity to support off shore skimming, boom handling boats for MARCO Class V skimming, and the OSVs used for boom laying and MARCO Class V tending. BP also demonstrated their responsiveness after SUPSALV identified the requirement for knuckle boom cranes for the VOSS boats. 2-5
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Chapter 2: Command and Organization<br />
of them provided Navy - Coast Guard Liaison support at Coast Guard Headquarters in<br />
Washington, D.C. Engineering Duty Officers, who were available provided was on-site<br />
supervision and tracking. This was important because of the extensive geographic dispersal of<br />
SUPSALV equipment and contractor personnel. Gulfport management team not only needed to<br />
keep tabs on the <strong>ESSM</strong> operation and operators but also needed a report on any Task Force or<br />
ICP issues affecting their teams. Serving as a part of the SUPSALV team also provided the<br />
Reservist and ED Officers excellent training and experience in working in the ICS.<br />
2-1.4 CNIC<br />
A Coast Guard Request for Assistance (RFA) was approved by U.S. Navy for equipment<br />
belonging to Navy shore installations. That equipment belongs to the Commander, Naval<br />
Installations Command (CNIC). The plan was to ship their equipment to Gulfport where the CNIC<br />
management team would assign it as directed. On 22 June, the CNIC Management Team<br />
arrived at State Pier, Gulfport and was briefed by SUPSALV and a USCG Representative on<br />
site. A second <strong>ESSM</strong> Command Van was made available and CNIC began to organize their<br />
systems as they arrived in Gulfport.<br />
CNIC provided the following equipment:<br />
• 8 Kvichak belt skimmers<br />
• 3 NOFI Harbor Buster<br />
• Associated personnel and support boats<br />
Because CNIC oil spill response equipment is assigned to specific facilities, it was not obtained<br />
or configured to be easily transportable or sustainable in the field. It was also generally designed<br />
for use in calm waters, harbors or ports, and not very suitable for use in open-ocean or exposed<br />
bodies of water. Given the CNIC system capabilities and lack of mobile logistics support, the<br />
CNIC equipment was initially co-located with SUPSALV, so the Navy (SUPSALV) could provide<br />
logistics support and simplify deployment, system operations, and crew support before follow-on<br />
deployment. CNIC distributed a concept of operations (CONOPS) with stability tables to ensure<br />
the ICP task force leaders understood the capabilities and limitations of CNIC’s smaller Kvichak<br />
skimmer systems. CNIC equipment and operators fell under ICS Houma or Mobile if it was not<br />
deployed to a Navy Base (Pensacola Naval Air Station for example). However, CNIC exercised<br />
oversight remotely similar to how SUPSALV did with SUPSALV assets.<br />
2-2 Issues Operating in Incident Command Structure (ICS)<br />
SUPSALV has operated as a member of a federalized incident command system in the past<br />
including the federalized response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This DWH incident resulted in<br />
creation of multiple ICPs and SUPSALV’s role required interaction at multiple levels within the<br />
organization. As can be expected, there were challenges associated with operating in such a<br />
expansive organization. They included:<br />
2-4