U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

Final Report, SONS Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico, 27 April — 24 September 2010
Lesson:
Command centers requested, on short notice, to have Class V Skimmers
skim at night or 24 hours a day as well as skimming too far off shore.
Recommendation: During this operation, none of the Class V skimmers had been in heavy
concentrations of oil during daylight hours. Also they should not be more
than 10 n.m. offshore. SUPSALV did not see a real need to have skimmers
skimming in the dark hoping to run into oil unless they were in a heavy
concentration of oil at all times. It would be unproductive since the oil is
not visible at night. Distribution of Appendix F was an attempt to address
this issue that was partially successful.
Lesson:
Since SUPSALV was not allowed to set up its own cleaning stations, it was
difficult and time consuming to get the equipment through the approved
cleaning and decontamination stations throughout the region.
Recommendation: In an attempt to ensure that the equipment was being cleaning adequately,
SUPSALV stationed personnel at each location to shepherd the equipment
through the process. In the future, SUPSALV needs to get the approval to
complete some of this decontamination work since they are set up with the
appropriate decontaminating systems designed for their equipment.
Lesson:
Need more direct SUPSALV involvement in the Unified Command Plans
(UCP) & ICP’s to liaison with someone who knows and understands how
SUPSALV equipment is used and deployed.
Recommendation: Assign USCG person to the SUPSALV Command and Control Center.
Lesson:
Using OSV MV Renee, the size and weight of the Class XI Skimmer made
offshore operations tenuous.
Recommendation: The Class XI Skimmer should be tasked near-shore versus offshore
skimming.
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