U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

Final Report, SONS Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico, 27 April — 24 September 2010
Lesson:
Difficulty in making the various command centers understand what the
capabilities of the SUPSALV equipment systems were. This was made
more difficult because of the numerous changes in personnel at the
command centers who were unfamiliar with the operational design of the
equipment.
Recommendation: A SUPSALV representative should have a direct line of communication
with the operations and planning sector to ensure personnel are provided
with the operating capability of all equipment and are involved in the
planning on how they were to be utilized. This was partially accomplished
later in the operation by producing a Class V Vessel Skimmer System
CONOPS (see Appendix F) and presenting it to the centers.
Lesson:
Command centers continually tried using Oil Containment Boom in
locations where the currents were too high causing boom to drag anchors
and cause damage.
Recommendation: SUPSALV should provide a review of boom capabilities to all command
centers. See Appendix E.
Lesson:
Command centers were constantly providing VOO boats for the Class V
Skimmers that were inadequate for towing the systems even after
SUPSALV provided tow boat requirements.
Recommendation: SUPSALV must ensure that the personnel in command centers understand
the equipment requirements.
Lesson:
Skimmer servicing and Oil Bladder offloading at the many different
skimmer locations proved inadequate.
Recommendation: SUPSALV requested and received an offshore supply vessel with large mud
tanks to allow it to be set up as a Skimmer System Maintenance Vessel
along with bladder offloading capability. This vessel was then dispatched to
the various system locations throughout the Gulf and acted as a roving
service station, repairing and servicing Skimmer Systems as well as
offloading its Oil Recovery Bladders.
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