U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

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Final Report, SONS Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico, 27 April — 24 September 2010 SECTION C – PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED Problem: Solution: Problem: Solution: Problem: Direction to GPC personnel by USCG teams varied widely at the SUPSALV Command Post in Gulfport. GPC field personnel should take operational direction on a task only when directed by the Program Manager or his assigned assistant. Direction given by team leaders of other agencies or organizations was often misleading and/or inaccurate. The Class V Skimmer cabs heated up and remained hot throughout the day. Installation of air conditioning units in the cabs of the Class V Skimmers worked well. The Fortress anchors used in 26″ boom mooring were stolen and had to be replaced. Recommendation: None. 108
Final Report, SONS Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico, 27 April — 24 September 2010 SECTION D – LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS Lesson: Staging support for Venice was excellent. Support from the command group was undesirable. It took 2 months to get weight handling equipment. Recommendation: None. Lesson: Command centers moved SUPSALV equipment without notifying SUPSALV. Recommendation: SUPSALV personnel need an aggressive follow-up plan with the command centers to personally verify the location of the material not accompanied by SUPSALV personnel. This became especially apparent in Amelia, Grand Isle, Resolve Yard (Theodore, AL), Port Fourchon, and BOH Brothers Shipyard, LA. Lesson: A time delay occurred for the approval of ICS-213 RR USCG Resource Request for Services or Material. Recommendation: No real solution. SUPSALV personnel attempted to walk them through the process of trying to replace the damaged equipment. Lesson: A disaster of this magnitude is often considered to be “organized chaos” in the early phases of the response mode. For the most part, GPC management did an excellent job organizing the response. Minor shortfalls existed with the logistical aspect concerning food and accommodations for GPC employees. Recommendation: The establishment of a central command and control at the command trailer in Gulfport during the initial response was essential to the tracking of equipment, logistics, finance issues, coordination with ICS/UAC, etc. Lesson: In the early stages of the response, efforts receiving equipment in Gulfport as the trucks arrived proved to be time consuming and tedious work. Documenting <strong>ESSM</strong> gear and label information was a full time job for at least one GPC employee. Recommendation: The establishment of Enterprise, and one IT department employee in Gulfport, would have been beneficial in the documentation and tracking of all response gear arriving in Gulfport, specifically the establishment of the use of barcode scanners. 109
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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Respons
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U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

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