U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response
1-4.3 National Level Risk Management Decisions
Pulling SUPSALV equipment from the CONUS ESSM bases was a calculated risk management
decision. OPA-90 (33CFR154) requires that facilities be equipped and trained to respond to any
potential scenario at their own facilities which included SUPSALV assets in the case of Tier II
and III worst case discharges and defined in 33CRF154. While responding to USCG requests,
SUPSALV was still obligated to meet that OPA-90 requirement. Navy (OPNAV N45) decision to
empty the Cheatham and Port Hueneme warehouses was based on the conclusion that because
the Gulf of Mexico was centrally located, it was estimated that ESSM equipment could be
deployed to the Gulf and if an emergency arose on the east or west coast, equipment could be
redeployed to that location within specified timelines for worst case discharges. Due to the
increased transport timelines, pollution response equipment was not deployed from Pearl Harbor
or Bahrain. Some equipment was eventually deployed from the Alaska ESSM site. This
significantly increased the time needed to fully respond to a potential Alaska incident.
The decision to deploy Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) equipment (from
individual Navy facilities) was more complicated. Both federal and state and local regulations
had to be met. Coast Guard HQ, USCG Sector Commanders, and State/local approval was
needed at each port to decrease local capacity below prescribed levels. Initially, CNIC scrubbed
their inventory to identify any equipment in excess of prescribed response requirements. This
equipment was the first of the CNIC OSR gear ordered to the Gulf of Mexico operating area.
Then CNIC began the process of requesting waivers for each specific facility. After all parties
granted waivers, additional equipment was deployed. By the time this was accomplished, and
due to the inshore nature of the equipment, the CNIC equipment saw little actual use.
1-4.4 Organizational Structure
Due to the size of the spill and the widespread impact in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Gulf’s
shore, the response organization was equally extensive. SUPSALV worked within the Incident
Command System (ICS) structure, reporting to the Unified Area Commander and serving the
Mobile and Houma Incident Command Posts. Working alongside the Coast Guard was BP, the
Responsible Party, and the state and local authorities. The overall organization was large and
coordination among all was challenging and often cumbersome. The uncertain and evolving
nature of the spill made the allocation and deployment of resources contentious. It was a good
opportunity for SUPSALV to work with the ICS as mandated when a Spill of National Significance
(SONS) event is declared.
1-4.5 Significant Local and National Press
This event generated a significant amount national interest and press coverage. The Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President were
routinely briefed on the progress of events taking place in the Gulf. While SUPSALV’s role was
small compared to the overall effort and exposure to the national press was limited, it did exist.
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