U.S. NAVY SALVAGE REPORT DEEPWATER HORIZON ... - ESSM

Chapter 1: Introduction
OPNAV Instruction 4740.2G, tasks NAVSEA 00C, SUPSALV, to execute the responsibilities of
the Salvage Facilities Act, to procure, maintain, and distribute salvage and related pollution
abatement material to the Emergency Ship Salvage Material (ESSM) bases, and to provide
capability for response to Oily Hazardous Substances (OHS) releases on the open ocean or
incident to salvage operations.
OPNAV Instruction 5090.1C is the Navy’s Environmental Readiness Program which ensures that
the Navy operates worldwide in an environmentally responsible manner. The Program identifies
spill preparedness and response guidance in Chapter 12. Specifically, it directs that facilities
comply with 33CFR154 and vessels with the planning requirements of OPA-90 and 33CFR155
despite legal exemption as a “public vessel”. Many Navy vessel and Navy facility plans cite
SUPSALV as an Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) for Worst Case Discharge spills.
OPNAVINST 5090.1C requires that SUPSALV:
• Ensures that the Navy’s equipment inventory for major and offshore spill events is
drilled/exercised in accordance with USCG implementing regulations of OPA-90
• Assist NOSCs in major OHS pollution response issues as they arise and in decisionmaking
for major or offshore/salvage related response operations
• Provide expertise and equipment for spills exceeding local capability
• Provide advice, personnel, and equipment, as appropriate for joint/pollution operations.
1-4.2 Differences Between Planned Capability and this Operation
The Navy sizes its oil response capability to respond to its largest vulnerability as defined by
33CFR164/155. That vulnerability is the Fleet Oiler Champion Class which has a length on deck
of 615 feet and a displacement of 40,000 tons. The fuel oil bunker capacity is 237,000 barrels.
ESSM equipment is ordered and maintained to respond to a spill from a single one of these
ships in either a harbor/river or in the ocean. With Naval bases focused on their own
responsibility at the base, (in-shore capability), SUPSALV has emphasized preparations for an
ocean event. The DWH oil spill was several orders of magnitude larger than this “Navy worst
case” scenario. As a result, while SUPSALV could bring significant resources to the scene, the
actions of SUPSALV alone could not come close to containing the estimated 40,000 bbls per
day 1 (4.9 million bbls total) that spilled into the Gulf.
1 The amount of oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico was a matter of public speculation for a number of
months. BP’s initial estimate of 1,000 bbls was thought to be lower than the actual flow but independent
estimates were not available until a 12 May video gave the public a first look at oil flowing from a recently
cut drill riser. News outlets attempts to estimate the volume prompted the Coast Guard, on 19 May, to
commission a Flow Rate Technical Group allowing for an informed independent estimate of the flow rate.
On 11 June, based on the committee’s analysis, the flow rate was estimated to be between 20,000 and
40,000 bbls per day. That week, Admiral Thad Allen was quoted estimating the oil flow rate between
12,000 and 25,000 bbls per day with a production (capture at the well head) between 6,000 and 10,000
bbls per day. On 4 August, the Flow Rate Technical Committee revised their estimates and reported that
the well was initially dumping 62,000 bbs per day into the gulf and that rate had diminished to 53,000 bbls
per day by the time the well was capped.
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