Nuclear Proliferation TechnologyTrends Analysis - International ...

PNNL -14480
Although a number have countries have expressed an interest, only China has openly
purchased centrifuge enrichment technology. It took three years from the time the
agreement was signed until the facility (200,000 swu/yr) went into operation. Several
factors were involved in this rapid development: 1) The Russian (Soviet) centrifuges
were reportedly early models taken out of service that were immediately available and
were known to be functional, 2) the Russians were very familiar with the technology and
had proven ways of setting up the cascades and other parts of the facility, 3) the facility
was constructed on a site where other enrichment technology existed, so proven UF 6
infrastructure was available as were technicians trained in handling it.
Brazil’s decision to construct a commercial facility could in some ways be considered a
purchase, because the technology was developed by the Brazilian navy and was sold to a
commercial entity. It took Brazil about 18 months to put their facility (20,000 swu/yr)
into initial operation. This is about 1/10 th the size of the Russian/Chinese enrichment
facility. As with the Chinese facility, the Brazilian commercial plant was located on a
site where enrichment technology (an aerodynamic enrichment facility, see section 3.5)
existed, so the infrastructure and trained personnel were available.
From this, it can be inferred the minimum time to put a centrifuge enrichment facility into
operation in a location with existing UF 6 technology infrastructure is between eighteen
months and three years.
3.2.4.1.3 Overt/covert acquisition
At least five countries, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya, have acquired or
attempted to acquire technology through covert means. The most successful of the five,
Pakistan, may have been responsible for providing the means for the other four countries
to develop their programs, especially Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Pakistan is a classic example of a country attempting to acquire technology through
covert means. In order to bypass existing international controls, Pakistan was forced to
develop an illicit international procurement network. The key technology holders and
several of its leaders were in Pakistan. But many other leaders were spread throughout
the world and located in Europe, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South
Africa, and Malaysia. The network also depended on a variety of unwitting
manufacturing companies and suppliers on many continents. Buying components and
assembling them in-country allowed Pakistan to develop an enrichment capability in nine
years.
In the mid 1980’s, when the Pakistani program was mature, the process changed, and
some key members of the network decided to make the technology available to whoever
would buy it 66,67 . While operational and producing HEU, the early Pakistani facilities
suffered from severe quality problems. It may be inferred that this is because the
66 Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction, David Albright, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, June 23, 2004
67 How Pakistani's network offered the whole kit; Nuclear proliferator/Scientist and black marketer, William J. Broad, David E.
Sanger and Raymond Bonner, The International Herald Tribune, February 13, 2004
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