Nuclear Proliferation TechnologyTrends Analysis - International ...

PNNL -14480
In the second phase (1997-2002), efforts focused on centrifuge construction, assembly,
and mechanical testing. The third phase (since 2002), has involved research, assembly,
installation, and completion of pilot centrifuge cascades.
Iran explored the use of both P1 and P2 centrifuge technology from Pakistan (see section
3.2.3.6). In the mid-1990s, Pakistan supplied about 500 P1 centrifuges to Iran. These
were probably scrapped machines that Pakistan had retired from its main centrifuge
program 52 . By 2003, Iran reported it had 920 P1 centrifuges of which some were
indigenously manufactured or assembled. Iran also received blueprints and information
from Pakistan for constructing P2 machines, but lacked the capability to manufacture
maraging steel rotors, and attempted to make them from carbon composites. This attempt
reportedly failed and the decision was made in 2003 to abandon the P2 approach and
scrap the P2 equipment. 53
Although Iran has reportedly not yet actually enriched any significant quantities of
uranium, it has apparently continued to work to advance its indigenous aluminum
centrifuge technology. It has been reported that Iran may have developed an advanced
supercritical gas centrifuge, with a potential of producing as much as 10 SWU/yr 54 . An
aluminum centrifuge with a throughput of 6 SWU/yr or 7 SWU/yr would be of
supercritical design, connecting two or more segments with a bellows, allowing it to
survive the first critical speed. An aluminum machine with a throughput of 14 SWU/yr
would have three or more segments. This higher throughput would reflect a very
advanced aluminum machine design and a production capability nearly three times that of
first-generation supercritical centrifuges such as the G2 or P2 design 55 .
Iran’s centrifuge development program took over twenty years to produce what is
apparently an indigenous, advanced design for a supercritical aluminum centrifuge based
on early Urenco or Pakistani designs.
3.2.3.11 Libya
In 1995 Libya began to acquire the capability to perform gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment. In 1997, after failing to develop centrifuge technology indigenously, Libya
decided to purchase the technology surreptiously and contacted the international
underground procurement network based in Pakistan that had already supplied Iran
(Section 3.2.3.10) and North Korea (Section 3.2.3.12) with centrifuge components and
designs.
52 Smuggling Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction, David Albright, Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, June 23, 2004
53 The spread of nuclear know-how, Peter Grier, Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 2004
54 Iran Has Developed An Advanced Supercritical Aluminum Centrifuge, Nucleonics Week Special Report, Volume 44.Special, March
7. 2003.
55 Estimates of Natanz Centrifuge Power by Iran, IAEA Differed by Factor of Two, Mark Hibbs, Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 28, No. 10; Pg. 3,
May 12, 2003
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