Metropolitan Arrangements - Philippine Institute for Development ...

ManagingUrbanization 

Undera Decentralized 

GovernanceFramework 

Volume1

ManagingUrbanization 

Undera Decentralized 

GovernanceFramework 

Volume 1 

Edited by Rosario G. Manasan 

Raul S. Anlocotan 

Casimira V, Balandra 

Jazmin D. Berido 

Rosemarie O. Buan 

Carmel P, Chammag 

Clark Y. Clarete 

Aurora M. Joson 

Johnny T. Lira . 

Ma. Lourdes D. Lira 

Rosario G. Manasan 

Ruben G. Mercado 

Virginia S. Pineda 

Ross Q. Quisao 

Anicia C. Sayos 

Victor B. Ubaldo 

Demographic Researchand Development Foundation, Inc. 

pAs 

Philippine Institute for Development Studies

Copyright 2002 

• by Demographic Research and Development 

Foundation (DRDF), Inc. 

c/o Population Institute, University of the Philippines 

2/F Palma Hall, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 

Philippines 

and 

Philippine Institute for Development Studies 

4/F NEDA sa Makati Building 

106 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village 

1229 Makati City 


Printed in the Philippines. All rights reserved. 

The findings, interpretations and conclusions in this volume are 

those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of DRDF 

and PIDS. 

Please address all inquiries 

to: 

PHILIPPINEINSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENTSTUDIES 

NEDA sa Makati Building 

106 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village 

1229 Makati City 


Telephone: (63-2) 8924059, 8935705 

Fax: (63-2) 8939589, 8161091 

E-maih publications@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph 

Website: http://www.pids.gov.ph 

ISBN 971-564-047-8 

RP06-02-500

TableofContents 

Foreword .......................................................................... xix 

Part I 

ANALYSES 

Chapter I Financing and Delivery of Urban Services 

in the Philippines: An Overview ............................................. 3 

by Rosario G. Manasan 

Urbanization vis-_t-visExpenditures and Revenues ..................... 5 

Revenues and Expenditure Structures of Cities .......................... 7 

The Urban Fiscal Problem ............................................................ 11 

Closing the Urban Fiscal Gap ....................................................... 24 

Issues for Further Research .......................................................... 30 

References ...................................................................................... 31 

Chapter 2 Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines: 

Passing Fancy or the Future Megatrend ..................................... 33 

by Ruben G. Mercado and Rosario G. Manasan 

Context of Inquiry. ......................................................................... 34 

Purpose and Scope of Study. ......................................................... 38 

Demographic and Geographic Features of Current 

and Emerging Metropolitan Arrangements ......................... 39 

Genesis of Metropolitan Arrangements ....................................... 40 

Organization, Financing and Activities of 

Metropolitan Arrangements: Variations 

and Commonalities ................................................................... 45 

Policy Issues and Implications ...................................................... 52 

Sustaining and Enhancing the Metropolitan 

Arrangements ............................................................................ 58 

Alternative Metropolitan Structures ............................................. 61 

Conclusions and Agenda for National Policy Action .................. 68 

References ....................................................................................... 72 

Chapter 3 Environment and Natural Resources Management: 

Lessons from City Program Innovations ............................................. 75 

bynen 

Mer,ao 

Selected City Environmental Programs ........................................ 76 

Lessons Learned: Key Elements for Program Success ................ 97 

V

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 102 

References ....................................................................................... 103 

Chapter 4 Health Management: Strategies 

from Selected Cities ............................................................................. 105 

by Virginia S. Pineda 

Health Services Provided by Cities 

and DOH Under the Devolution ............................................ 107 

Comparison of Population, Health Expenditures 

and Health Performance of Selected Cities .......................... 108 

Health Concerns and Strategies ............................ . ...................... 109 

Strategies Related to Systems Administration ............................. 119 

Applicabili W and Suggested Improvements ................................ 123 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 124 

References ...................................................................................... 126 

Chapter 5 Local Efforts in Housing Provision ............................... 127 

by Anicia C. Sayos, Ross Q. Quisao and Rosario G. Manasan 

Introduction ............................................... :................................... 127 

Objectives ............................................. ........................................... 128 

Urbanization and Housing Needs ................................................ 129 

Local Efforts in Housing Provision ............................................... 131 

Cost Recovery. ..................................................................... ............ 140 

Key Concerns .................................................................................. 146 

References ...................................................................................... 149 

Appendix ........................................................................................ 150 

PART II 

CASE STUDIES 

Chapter 1 Closing the Urban Fiscal Gap: An Overview ................. 155 

by Rosario G. Manasan 

Introduction ................................................................................... 155 

The Heart of the Problem ............................................................. 155 

Dissecting the Urban Fiscal Problem ........................................... 157 

The Unfortunate Consequence .................................................... 158 

Recommendations: Interventions to Close 

the Urban Fiscal Gap ................................................................ 158 

Reference ........................................................................................ 161 

vi

Chapter 2 Metropolitan Arrangements 

in the Philippines: An Overview ........................................................... 163 

by Ruben G. Mercado and Rosario G. Manasan 

Metropolitan Arrangements vs. Decentralization ....................... 163 

Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines .......................... 164 

Activities That Metro Arrangements Do Best .............................. 164 

Policy Issues ..................................................................................... 165 

Sustaining Metropolitan Arrangements ....................................... 166 

Agenda for National Policy. ........................................................... 167 

Choosing the Appropriate Metro Structure ................................ 168 

C . mdie of_Metropo 

Owning the Metropolitan Vision: The Case of BLIST ...................... 173 

by Ruben G. Mercado and Carmel P. Chammag 

Development Trends in Metro BLIST.......................................... 174 

The BLIST Master (Structure) Plan ............................................. 174 

Potentials for Cooperation ............................................................ 176 

Managing Metro BLIST. ................................................................. 180 

Existing BLIST Structure ............................................................... 181 

Points for Consideration in Handling Metro BLIST ................... 184 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 190 

References ....................................................................................... 191 

Setting an Institutional Framework for Metropolitan 

Management: Metro Cebu ................................................................... 193 

byRuben G. Mercado 

Composition and Management of Metro Cebu .......................... 193 

Metro Cebu Population and Land Characteristics ..................... 194 

Current Activities in Metro Cebu ................................................. 195 

Potentials for Cooperation ........................................................... 196 

Institutional Structure for Managing Metro Cebu ..................... 199 

Conclusion ..................................................................................... 201 

References ...................................................................................... 202 

Providing a Metropolitan Perspective to Development 

Planning: Cagayan de Oro .................................................................. 203 

by Ruben G. Merrado and Casimira V. Balandra 

Metro CDO Current Development and Prospects ...................... 204 

Approaches to Metro CDO Development ................................... 211 

vii

Metropolitan Concerns in the CDO Area .................................... 214 

Metro CDO Planning and Governance ........................................ 215 

LGU Preferences on the Sharing Pattern of 

Urban-Related Activities and Service Delivery. ...................... 216 

Conclusion ....................................................................................... 219 

References ....................................................................................... 220 

Metro Naga: A Continuing Challenge of Local 

Autonomy and Sustainability ............................................................... 221 

by Ruben G. Mercado and V/ctor B. Uba/do 

Management of the Metropolis .................................................... 221 

Demographic andLand Characteristics ....................................... 222 

Historical Antecedents/The Metro Naga Development 

Program (MNDP) ..................................................................... 223 

Programs/Accomplishments ......................................................... 226 

Future Plans .................................................................................... 231 

Key Features of Success .................................................................. 232 

Furore Challenges .......................................................................... 233 

References ...................................................................................... 234 

Melro Iloilo: A Struggle for Acceptance and Organization .............. 235 

by Ruben G. Men:ado and Rau/S. An/ocotan 

\. 

Demographic and Land Characteristics ............................ i......... 237 

Identified Areas for Cooperation ................................................. 238 

Possible Next Steps ............. ,.......................................................... 244 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 245 

References ...................................................................................... 245 

Metro Davao: In Search of Metropolitan Def'mitions ....................... 247 

by Ruben G. Mercado 

The Three Definitional Models of Metro Davao ......................... 248 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 253 

References ....................................................................................... 254 

Governance and Urban Development: Case Study 

of Metro Manila ..................................................................................... 255 

by Ruben G. Mercado 

Introduction .................................................................................... 255 

Metropolitan Governace ................................................................ 263 

Major Metropolitan Governance Challenges ....................... ........ 281 

ell 

VIII

Future Challenges and Directions ................................................ 293 

References ....................................................................................... 295 

Chapter 3 Health Management Strategies of Selected Cities .......... 299 

by Virginia S. Pineda 

Pros and Cons ................................................................................. 299 

Passing the Buck to Local Governments ...................................... 300 

Eight Who Made the Grade ........................................................... 300 

Coping with Insufficient Health Stations ..................................... 301 

When Health Workers Are Scarce ................................................. 302 

Meeting Medical Emergencies ...................................................... 304 

Augmenting Finances .................................................................... 305 

Identifying Health Needs: Knowing the Problems 

Gets You Half the Way There ................................................. 306 

Integrated Approach: The Sum Is Greater Than Its Parts .......... 307 

Clustering of Barangays: A New Meaning for Hamletting .......... 307 

Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation: 

Don't Expect WhatYou Don't Inspect .................................. 307 

The Best and the Worst: Appealing to the Filipino Ego ............. 308 

More Improvements in the Current Setup .................................. 309 

Health in the Hands of the People: In Conclusion ..................... 310 

C_e Studies_of Health Management Strate_es 

Reaching Out: Gingoog City's Total Integrated 

Development Approach (G-TIDA) ...................................................... 315 

by Virginia S. Pineda and Clark Y. Clarete 

Health Facilities and Expenditure/Budget ................................. 315 

Health Performance ........ ;............................................................. 316 

The G-TIDA Approach .................................................................. 316 

Key Elements for Success .............................................................. 322 

Areas for Improvement ................................................................. 323 

Applicability and Replication ........................................................ 324 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 325 

References ...................................................................................... 326 

Puerto Princesa City's Satellite Clinics: 

A Curative Rural Network .................................................................... 327 

byvirginias. Pinega 


Health Performance ...................................................................... 328 

The Satellite Clinic Projects .......................................................... 329 

ix

Impact of the Project ............................................. ........................ 331 

Key Elements for Success ............................................................. : 332 

Strategies That Can Be Replicated ............................................... 332 

Other Recommendations .............................................................. 334 

Conclusion ..................................................................................... 335 

Emergency Rescue Naga: An LGU-Managed Emergency 

Rescue Project ....................................................................................... 337 

by Virginia S. Pineda and Rosemarie O. Buan 

Health Facilities, Welfare and Expenditures ................................ 337 

Emergency Rescue Naga (ERN) ............................ :...................... 338 

ERN Structure, Functions and Responsibilities ............................ 339 

Key Elements for Success ............................................................... 342 

Applicability and Replication ......................................................... 343 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 345 

People Power at Work: The Case of Surigao City's Primary 

Health Care (PHC) Federated Women's Club ................................... 347 

by Virginia S. Pineda and Johnny T. Lira 

Health Facilities and Expenditures ............................................... 347 

Health Performance ....................................................................... 348 

The PHC-City Government Partnership ...................................... 349 

PHC Health Activities ..................................................................... 351 

PHC Health Initiatives .................................................................... 353 

Key Elements for PHC Success ...................................................... 354 

How to Replicate ............................................................................. 359 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 361 

References ....................................................................................... 362 

Financing and Delivery of Health and Sanitation Services: 

A Case Study of Cotabato City............................................................. 363 

by Virginia S. Pineda and Ma. Lourdes D. Lira 

Vital Facts and Figures .................................................................... 363 

Problems/Constraints to Effective Health Service Delivery. ...... 364 

The Special Project on Health and Sanitation ............................ 366 

Key Contributors to the Project's Success .................................... 372 

Strategies That Can Be Replicated by Other Cities ..................... 374 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 376 

X

Lapu-lapu City's Partnership for Health ............................................ 377 

by VirgniaS. Pineda 

Health Facilities .............................................................................. 377 

Health Expenditures/Budget ....................................................... 377 


Strategies to Promote Health ........................................................ 379 

Key Elements for Success .............................................................. 382 


Conclusion ...................................................................................... 384 

Olongapo: A Health City...................................................................... 387 

by Virginia S. Pineda and Aurora M.Joson 


Health Performance ....................................................................... 388 

Strategies to Promote Health ........................................................ 388 



Conclusion ...................................................................................... 392 

Butuan City: A Consistent Regional W_nner in Nutrition ................. 393 

by Virginia S. Pineda anJazmin D. Berido 



Nutrition Activities ......................................................................... 395 

Strategies to Overcome Malnutrition ........................................... 397 



Conclusion ...................................................................................... 402 

About the Authors .............................................................................. 403 

xi

ListofFigures 

PART I 

Chapter 1 

Figure I Share of CLGUs in Total General Government 

Revenue ............................................................................. 7 

Figure 2 Share of Externally Sourced Income in 

Total Receipts of LGUs .................................................... 8 

Figure 3 Revenue Performance of CLGUs ................................... 8 

Figure 4 Share of CLGUs in Total General Expenditure ............ 9 

Figure 5 Importance of CLGUs in Total Expenditure, 

Total Population and Total Land Area ........................... 10 

Figure 6 Growth Rate of Real Per Capita Expenditure 

and Real Capita Local Source Revenue ......................... 10 

Figure 7 Distribution of CLGU Expenditures by 

Service Category. .............................................................. 11 

Chapter 2 

Figure 1 City, Non-city and Total Metropolitan Land Area ......... 40 

Figure 2 Comparative Structure of Local Government 

System With and Without a Metropolitan Body. ........... 56 

Figure 3 Metropolitan Governance Framework ........................... 59 

Chapter 3 

Figure 1 Structure of the Clean Effort ............................... :........... 85 

Figure 2 Structure of the Green Effort .......................................... 86 

Figure 3 Eco-Walk Program Essentials ........................................... 87 

Chapter 5 

Figure 1 Organizational Chart of the Lote Para sa 

Mahirap Program .............................................................. 145 

xii

PART lI 

Case Studies of Melropolitan Arrangements 

BLIST 

Figure 1 Proposed Organization for Metro BLIST 

Under the Structure Plan ....................... ......................... 182 

Figure 2 BLIST Area Task Force Under the NWLGQ. ................. 185 

Metro Manila 

Figure 1 Major Road Network of Metro Manila ........................... 262 

Figure 2 Organizational Structure: Metropolitan Manila 

Development Authority .................................................. 278 

Case Studies of Health Management Su'atet_ies 

Emergency 

Rescue Naga 

Figure ] Organizational Structure of the Emergency 

Rescue Naga ...................................................................... 340 

Surigao City's PHC Federated 

Women's Club 

Figure ] The Community Dam Board ....................................... ....356 

PARTI 

ListofTables 

Chapter 1 

Table ] Linear Regression of Per Capita Tax Revenue 

of CLGUs ............................................................................. 14 

Table 2 Ratio of Revenue to Expenditure from LGU Business 

Enterprises, 1991-1995 ...................................................... 17 

Table 3 Ratio of Revenue to Expenditure from LGU Business 

Enterprises of Selected CLGUs, 1995 ..................... ;..._.... 18 

Table 4 Total Cost Recovery of Hospitals, 1995 ............................ 19 

Table 5 Linear Regression of Per Capita Expenditure 

of CLGUs ............................................................................ 23 

t0* 

xnl

Chapter 2 

Table 1 Urbanization in Selected Asian Countries, 1990 ............... 33 

Table 2 Metropolitan Arrangements: Composition, Land Area 

and Population .................................................................... 39 

Table g Metropolitan Composition, Geographic and 

Demographic Characteristics, by Metropolitan 

Arrangement ........................................................ _............... 42 

Table 4 Organizational Types and Financing of Metropolitan 

Arrangements ..... _................................................................ 46 

Table 5 Development Activities Under the Metropolitan 

Arrangements ........................................... :.......................... 48 

Table 6 Past and Future Traffic Demand in Metro Cebu, 

1979-2010 .............................................................................. 50 

Table 7 Urban BLIST: Water Demand, 1994-2020 .......................... 51 

Table 8 CAMADA: Landfill Site Requirements ............................... 51 

Chapter 3 

Table 1 Basic Features ofOplan Linis Program .............................. 77 

Table 2 General Information on Bantay Puerto Program 

Components .......................................................................... 79 

Table 3 Baguio City Clean and Green Program Components ....... 82 

Table 4 Clean and Green Program Budget and Sources, 1996..._. 85 

Table 5 Olongapo City Solid Waste Management Program, 

1989-present .......................................................................... 89 

Table 6 Environmental Sanitation and Management Office 

Income and Expenditure, 1990-1996 

(in thousands of pesos) ........................................................ 91 

Chapter 4 

Table 1 Population of Selected Cities .............................................. 108 

Table 2 Population Density and Land Area of Selected Cities ...... 110 

Table 3 Infant Mortality Rates ........................................................... 110 

Table 4 Child Mortality Rates ............................................................ 110 

Table 5 Maternal Mortality Rates ...................................................... 111 

Table 6 Health Expenditures and Ratio to Total City 

Expenditures ......................................................................... 111 

Table 7 Rado of Basic Health and Hospital Expenditures 

to Total Health Expenditures .............................................. 111 

Table 8 Health Expenditures Per Capita, 1991 and 1994 .............. 112 

Table 9 Basic Health Expenditures Per Capita, 1991 and 1994 .... 112 

Table 10 Hospital Expenditures Per Capita, 1991 and 1994 ........... 112 

xlv

Chapter 5 

Tablc._"'Stat_ of Urbanization ......................................................... 131 

Table 2 Income of Local Government Units .................................. 139 

Table 3 Participants and Their Respective Roles in the 

Kaantabay sa Kauswagan Program ...................................... 143 

Appendix 

Table 1 Cities' State of Urbanization ............................................... 150 

PART II 

Case_Studies of Metmp_olitanArrangements 

Metro BLIST 

Table 1 Metro BLIST: Demographic and Land Characteristics .....174 

Table 2 Metro BLIST: Land Use (in percent) ................................. 175 

Table 3 Metro BLIST: Water Demand, 1994-2020 .......................... 177 

Table 4 Expected Benefits From and Share in the BLIST 

Cooperation .......................................................................... 187 

Metro Cebu 

Table 1 Metro Cebu: Demographic Characteristics ........................ 195 

Table 2 Urbanization Projections for Metro Cebu ......................... 195 

Table 3 QuantityofSolidWaste in Cebu City.................................. 197 

Table 4 Past and Future Traffic Demand in Metro Cebu, 

1979-2010 ............................................................................... 198 

Table 5 Water Balance in Metro Cebu (in cu.m/day) .................... 199 

Metro Cagayan de Oro 

Table 1 Metro Cagayan de Oro: Demographic Characteristics ..... 205 

Table 2 Existing Land Uses ............................................................... 207 

Table 3 Passenger and CargoTraffic at the CDO-PMO 

and Airport ........................................................................... .207 

Table 4 Types of Business Establishments ....................................... .208 

Table 5 Telephone Situation in Metro Cagayan de Oro .......... ...... 212 

Table 6 Water Supply Facilities, 1996 ............................................... 216 

Metro Naga 

Table 1 Metro Naga: Demographic and Land Characteristics ...... 223 

XV

Table 2 Area-Specific Roles in Metro Naga ........ ...................... :..._i. 2_i-i 

Table 3 Financial Sources of the MNDC .............. :..,_z...._x: .......... 226 

Metro lloilo 

Table 1 Metro Iloilo: Population and Land Characteristics .......... 237 

Metro Davao 

Table 1 Davao City: Basic Demographic and Land 

Characteristics ...................................................................... 248 

Table 2 General Land Use, 1994 ..................................................... 249 

Table 3 Population Distribution, Land Area and Density, 1990... 249 

Table 4 General Information on Davao City, Sta. Cruz 

and Panabo ........................................................................... 250 

Table 5 General Information on Davao Integrated 

Development Program ........................................................ 253 

Metro Manila 

Table 1 Demographic Facts About Metro Manila ........................... 257 

Table 2 Gross Domestic Production Structure ............................... 258 

Table 3 Regional GDP Per Capita .................................................... 260 

Table 4 Poverty Incidence of Families, by Region 

and Urbanity, 1985-1997 ...................................................... 261 

Table 5 Comparative Overview of Metro Manila 

Commission (PD 824), Metro Manila Authority 

(EO 392) and Metro Manila Development Authority 

(RA 7924) ...................................................................... . ....... 265 

Table 6 Comparative Revenue Structure of Metropolitan 

Organization .......................................................................... 268 

Table 7 Expenditure Pattern of Metropolitan Body. ...................... 274 

Table 8 Total General Government Expenditures in 

Metro Manila, 1989-1997 ..................................................... 276 

Table 9 Traffic Volume on Major Roads, 1980 and 1995 

(vehicles/day) ................. ,.................................................... 283 

Table 10 Number of Registered Vehicles in Metro Manila, 

1980, 1990 and 1995 ............................................................ 283 

Table 11 Car Ownership Structure, 1980 and 1996 ......................... 284 

Table 12 Public Transportation Supply, Estimated No. 

of Operating Units, 1983 and 1996 .................................... 285 

Table 13 Transport and Traffic Management in Metro Manila ....... 286 

Table 14 Land Use Classification in Metro Manila ........................... 290 

xvi

.Case Studies._of_Health 

ManagemenLS1rategies 

Gingoog City's Total Integrated Development Approach (G-TIDA) 

Table 1 Mortality and Nutdfion Indicators, 1990 and 1995 .......... 317 

Puerto Princesa City's Satellite Clinics 

Table 1 Budget for the CHO and Satellite Clinics, 

1995-1997 (P million) .......................................................... 328 

Table 2 Mortality and Nutrition Indicators, 1990 and 1995 .......... 329 

Table 3 Satellite Clinics and Catchment Areas ............................... .330 

Table 4 Satellite Clinics' Services and Number of Patients ........... 2,31 

Emergency 

Rescue Naga 


Surigao City's PHC Federated Women's Club 

Table 1 Mortality and Nmrition Indicators, 1990 and 1995 .......... 348 

lVmancing and Delivery of Health 

and Sanitation Services in Cotabato City 

Table 1 Comparative Mortality Rates, 1990 and 1995 .................... 372 

Lapu-lapu City's Partnership for Health 

Table 1 Catchment Areas of Hospitals and Barangay 

Health Stations in I_apu-lapu City. ..................................... =.378 

Table 2 Mortality and Nutrition Indicators, 1990 and 199.5......... 1380 

Olongapo: A Health City 


Butuan City: A Consistent Regional Outstanding Winner 

in Nutrition 

Table 1 M0rtalityand Nutrition Indicators, 1990 and 1995 .......... 394 

Table 2 Composition of the Butuan City Nutrition Committee....395 

Table 3 Malnutrition in Butuan City and in the Philippines ......... 397 

xvii

Foreword 

ing of the Local Government Code in 1991. This single Act of 

ne granting of the landmark more autonomy legislations and responsibilities in Philippine history our islocal the pass- 

government 

units has had tremendous impacts on the way governance takes 

place at the local level. Perhaps the most significant has been in the 

challenge that the Code had incited among local officials and citizens in 

coming up with innovative ways to address issues and shortcomings in 

their respective spheres. 

Of course, the Code--and the accompanying decentralization process 

as a whole--is not without problems, to say the least. The decentralization 

process was rendered even more complicated by the rapidly 

growing urbanization phenomenon that has taken place in the past few 

decades and which has impinged heavily on the fiscal condition of the 

various localities. 

This first volume of a 2-volume publication documents these phenomena-urbanization 

taking place against the framework of a decentralized 

environment for governance. The overall picture is a bit bleak 

and shows the urgency of resolving the fiscal situation first and foremost. 

But the accompanying snapshots to the bigger picture are encouraging. 

They show that in coping with such situation, the innovativeness 

and determination to succeed of a number of local communities shine 

through. 

This book is about them. In coming up with this volume, therefore, 

I sincerely hope that the winning case illustrations will serve as an 

inspiration to more local government units and communities to put their 

acts together and aspire to be among the best in their endeavors. 

Finally, I wish to thank the Demographic Research and Development 

Foundation (DRDF) through its director, Dr. Corazon P. Raymundo, 

for its support of the research project as well as of this two-volume publication. 

The writing of the case studies for this volume would also not 

have been possible without the assistance provided by the following individuals 

and offices in the regions: Ms. Madelyn Escandor of NEDA 

Region VII (Central Visayas); the Primary Health Care and Barangay 

Environmental and Sanitation Implementation Group (BESIG) members 

of Surigao City; the staff of NEDA Region IV (Southern Tagalog) 

and Puerto Princesa City Planning and Development Office and satelxix

lite clinic; the staff of the Olongapo City Health Office; Dr. Victor Borja 

and the Emergency Rescue Naga/Naga City Hospital staff; the Macro 

Division of NEDA Region V (Bicol Region); Dr. Berame, health officer• 

• of Lapu-lapu City; and the Cotabato City Office of Health Services. 

MARIO B_LAMBERTE, Ph. D. 

President, PIDS 

xx

Part I. Analyses

Chapter 

Fin'lancingand Deliveryof Urban 

Services in the Philippines: 

An Overview 


rbanization has certain advantages. Agglomeration economies 

esult inhigher productivity than in the rest of the economy. 

urbanization proceeds, cities are better able to capture 

the benefits from economies of scale, which may bring about 

reductions in unit cost of delivering certain types of services. Scale 

economies are more likely in public utilities such as sewerage 

treatment plants, public transportation, and the like. Urbanization 

also induces increases in the taxable capacity of cities such that more 

revenues can be mobilized from the same jurisdiction. 

However, urbanization also tends to be associated with a good 

number of problems. Congestion, which tends to increase with city 

size, leads to agglomeration diseconomies that may offset the positive 

effects of technological economies of scale on input costs. These 

diseconomies may take the form of air and water pollution, increased 

need for disease control and fire/police protection, and slum 

settlements. Moreover, one observes that basic services such as potable 

water supply, solid waste collection, telephones, health and education 

facilities are critically inadequate in many large cides. 

Worldwide, there have been two types of responses to these 

problems. One way is to impose controls on rural-urban migration 

and rapid population growth. The other way is to find efficient ways 

to manage and finance the urban sector. 

This paper takes the accomodationist view and focuses on the 

question of how to finance and deliver adequate public services in 

urban areas. This question then becomes, in large part, a fiscal 

question. However, it cannot be denied that improvements in resource 

allocation and in service delivery mechanisms/arrangements at the 

local government level are also extremely important.

4 Managing UrbanizationUnder a DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

The immediate cause of the shortage and, sometimes near 

absence, of basic public services in large cities is the inability of 

governments to fund the delivery of the right quantity and quality of 

these services. At the national level, central governments may be so 

preoccupied with stabilization issues and the need to deal with the 

problem of large central government fiscal deficits to have enough 

time and resources to address unmet needs in the urban sector. 

Moreover, central governments may not be in the best position to 

levy and/or collect taxes and user charges that are suitable at 

mobilizing public resources from the growth in urban fiscal capacity. 

At the local level, the growth of local government revenues may be 

dampened by centrally imposed constraints on their revenue-raising 

powers, and limited by low revenue effort and inappropriate 

intergovernmental fiscal relations. 

How can cities and other urban areas capture the fiscal benefits 

of urbanization so that they can then increase supply of public services 

in their respective jurisdiction For this to happen, cities should be 

empowered to levy and collect taxes and fees that can better exploit 

thei r gains from urbanization. There should be no disincentives arising 

from the grant system against improvements of local government 

revenue effort. Also, there should be appropriate credit institutions 

and mechanisms that will enable subnational governments to finance 

investments of a relatively large scale. 

In the conduct of any study on urban management, one is always 

confronted with the difficulties of delineating which are "urban areas." 

This study tried to resolve this issue by defining its coverage to include 

all cities plus non-city regional growth centers This decision was borne 

more out of convenience than out of rigorous analysis. Admittedly, 

some cities will not qualify as "urban" under most definitions. However, 

this option is a a convenient way of categorizing most urban areas 

without getting bogged down by the definition problem. Also, the 

focus on city local government units (CLGUs) is motivated by a desire 

to study urbanization in the context of the more decentralized 

governance framework that is engendered with the passage of the 

Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. Note that the fiscal gap (the 

di_rence between expenditure requirements/needs and revenues) 

of urban LGUs tend to be magnified by the recent devolution of 

fianctions from national government agencies. 

1The municipal regional g_ovcth centers included in this study ate Santiago in Isabela, San Feriaando 

in La Un_-on, _ad S',m P'e_nando in Pampanga,

Financingand Deliveryof Urban Services 

S 

In the next section, the conceptual framework that defines the 

urban fiscal gap problem is presented. Meanwhile, the section 

"Revenue Structure of Cities" presents an overview of the expenditure 

and revenue structure of CLGUs in the Philippines. It provides some 

overall perspective on the size of the urban sector. The section "The 

Urban Fiscal Problem" looks at the determinants of CLGU revenue 

performance and expenditure behavior in an attempt to validate the 

existence of the urban fiscal gap in the Philippines while "Closing the 

Urban Fiscal Gap" presents some ways to close the said gap. 

Urbanization vi_-vis Expenditures and Revenues 2 

Local government units (LGUs) in urban areas typically tace a 

financing problem. The problem may be defined by the existence of 

a "fiscal gap," a gap between perceived service needs and available 

financial resources. It should be notedthat the fiscal gap is different 

from the actual fiscal deficit that reflects the shortfall of actual revenue 

collections relative to actual LGU expenditure. This distinction is very 

important in the Philippine context where LGUs are not allowed to 

engage in deficit financing of recurrent expenditures. 

To gain some understanding of how urbanization impacts on 

the fiscal gap, it helps to look at how urbanization and population 

growth affect the expenditure requirements as well as the revenue 

collections of urban LGUs. On the one hand, the growth in the 

demand for public services is most often driven by the growth in 

population. The growth in population may arise from its natural 

growth and from migration. Some would argue that LGU expenditures 

have to increase at a rate that is at least proportional to the rate of 

population growth so as to sustain a given level of service. In cases 

where service provision entails increasing marginal cost, the response 

of expenditure needs to population growth is even more pronounced. 

This may be relevant, for instance, when rapid rural-urban migration 

tends to lead migrants to settle in hard-to-service (and, therefore, 

cosily-to-service) areas like shorelines, mountainsides and floodplains. 

The strong and positive correlation between urbanization and 

per capita personal income in developing countries is well 

documented. At the same time, higher per capita income tends to be 

associated with higher per capita demand for public services (which 

implies that most types of public services are normal goods). The 

2This section draws heavily from the work of Bahl and Lima (1992).

6 ManagingUrbanizationUnder a DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

increment in service requirements would be larger as the income 

elasticity of demand for public services goes up. Positive income 

elasticities have been observed for water/power supply, telephone 

services, and for solid waste disposal and also urban highway 

infrastructure (because the demand for motor vehicles is highly 

income-elastic). Similarly, the demands for educational services and 

health care are positively linked with rising incomes. 

While it is clear that urbanization exerts an upward pressure on 

local government budgets, it is unclear ifLGU revenues will respond 

as quickly and as strongly to rapid population growth. Undoubtedly, 

population growth, urbanization and the associated growth in per 

capita income all tend to expand the revenue capacity of urban 

governments. However, the growth in LGU revenue is held back by 

the fimited taxing authority of LGUs and their lagging revenue efforts. 

For instance, while property values tend to rise with urbanization, 

this is not immediately reflected in the statutory tax base unless 

assessment values are automatically indexed. 

Also, inflation is usually higher in larger cities. However, 

government expenditures are more automatically responsive to 

inflation than government revenues. Inflation will drive up 

government spending requirements almost instantaneously because 

of a hike inthe cost of materials and supplies and of the pressure to" 

increase government employees' salaries following the associated 

escalation in the cost of living. The LGU revenues are not as responsive 

to inflation. This is because in many places, there is no automatic 

indexation of the assessed values of real property for real property 

tax purposes. Moreover, many local taxes are imposed on a specific 

rather than on an ad valorem basis. 

The evidence on the relation between city size and cost recovery 

is mixed. On the one hand, some large cities (especially those which 

operate public business enterprises) are able to fully recover the cost 

of service delivery and they may sometimes even generate a surplus. 

Some countries like South Korea and Colombia impose betterment 

levies (or special assessment) in order to charge alt_cted landowners 

for the benefits they get from certain improvements in infrastructure. 

On the other hand, it may be difficult to genei_tte enough revenue 

from user charges to cover full costs from services like transportation, 

housing, health and education, which have a large social component. 

Lastly, the relationship between intergovernmental grants and 

urbanization can either be inverse or direct. "If grants are distributed 

on a straight per capita basis then urbanization may generate an

Financingand Deliveryof Urban Services 7 

increased inflow of"external resources. The same will hold if grants 

are made on a cost reimbursement basis. External resource flows may 

increase or decrease in responseto increases in per capita personal 

income in the city depending on the structure of the grant system. A 

tax-sharing scheme will channel more funds to local governments as 

urbanization proceeds, whereas formula-equalizing grants may have 

just the opposite effect" (Bahl and Linn 1992). 

Revenue and Expenditure Structures of Cities 

Revenue 

structure 

All LGUs, in the aggregate, accounted for 4.9 percent of total 

general government revenue in 1985-1991 and 5.7 percent in 1992- 

1996 (Figure 1). Thus, the degree of fiscal decentralization when 

measured in terms of revenue decentralization has not been altered 

significantly by the passage of the LGC. 

In comparison, the share of CLGUs in the country's total general 

government revenue rose significantly from 2.1 percent in 1985-1991 

to 2.9 percent in 1992-1996. In a sense, the increment in the share of 

all LGUs in total general government revenues is due solely to the 

increase in the share of CLGUs. Moreover, CLGUs' share in the total 

local source revenue of all subnational governments has expanded 

from 43.0 percent to 50.2 percent during the period under study. 

Nonetheless, there appears to be a trend toward increasing 

reliance on external sources of finance among CLGUs. The 

contribution of externally Sourced income to the total receipts of 

CLGUs was magnified, reaching 52.0 percent in 1992-1996 from 38.6 

Figure 1. Share of CLGUs in Total General Government Revenue 

ALL LGUs CLGUs ALL LGUs CLGUs 

4.9% 2.1% 5.7% 2.9% 

1985;_1991 1992-1996

8 ManagingUrbanization Under a DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

Figure 2. Share of Externally Sourced Income in Total Receipts of LGUs 

externally 

sourced 

externally 

income 

sourced 

38.6% income 

52% 

1985-1991 1992-1996 

externally 

sourced 

62% 

ALL LGUs 

externally 

Sourced 

64,7% 

1985-I 991 I gg2-1996 

Figure 3. Revenue Performance of CLGUs 

TOTA,,oc._ sou_l. P_ o_ 0.25................................. 

GNP 

0.2 

0.16 

_ 0,1 

I 1935-1991 1992-1996 1985-1991 1992.1996 

0 

percent in 1985-1991. However, CLGUs continue to be less reliant 

on external sources of finance relative to the average LGU, where 

the share of externally sourced income to total receipts rose from 

52.0 percent to 64.7 percent (Figure 2). 

Despite these developments, the overall revenue performance 

of CLGUs was noteworthy during the period under study. Total local 

source revenue rose from 0.34 percent of gross national product 

(GNP) in 1985-1991 to 0.55 percent of GNP in 1992-1996 (Figure 3). 

Thus, per capita local source revenue of CLGUs grew at a decent 

pace of 11.4 percent in 1991-1996 compared with the 8.9 percent

Financingand Delivery of UrbanServices 9 

growth of local source revenues of the average LGU during the same 

period and the 2.4 percent growth in CLGU local source revenue in 

1985-1991. 

The biggest increase was posted by local business taxes, which 

doubled from 0.11 percent of GNP to 0.22 percent of GNE This was 

followed by real property taxes, which increased from 0.14 percent 

of GNP to 0.21 percent of GNE However, operating income of CLGUs 

remained steady at about 0.1 percent of GNE Consequently, the local 

business tax came to dominate the real property tax after the 

implementation 

of the LGC. 

F__enditure structure 

In the Philippines, the LGUs as a whole contributed 7.0 percent 

of total general government expenditure in 1985-1991 and 14.0 

percent in 1992-1996 (Figure 4). This implies that the degree of fiscal 

decentralization, when measured in terms of expenditure 

decentralization, has doubled in the post-LGC era. The latter figure 

is roughly equal to the 15 percent share of subnational governments 

in general government expenditure in a sample of less developed 

countries (Bahl and Nath 1986). 

Figure 4. Share of CLGUs in Total General Expenditure 

ALl. LGU 

CLGU 

N.I. _ 7,0 3.5CLGU 14,01 7.4 

19_5-1SSl 

lSg2-1_6 

In like manner, 

the share of CLGUs in total general government 

expenditures in the country doubled from 3.5 percent in 1985-1991 

to 7.4 percent in 1992-1996 (Figure 4). Thus, CLGUs' share in the 

total expenditure of all subnational governments has remained fairly 

stable at approximately 50 percent throughout the period under study 

even as their jurisdictions include 25.5 percent of total population 

and 6.0 percent of total land area (Figure 5).


growth and/or urbanization, the urban fiscal gap still exists (find is 

manifested in reduced levels of public service delivery). This may have 

arisen because other sources of CLGU finance (which account for 

some 75 percent of total CLGU receipts) do not exhibit a similar 

relationship with either population growth or degree of urbanization. 

It is also worrisome that the present IRA distribution formula 

tends to have a disincentive effect on local business tax effort. Also, 

CLGUs have an apparent disregard for cost recovery practices. 

Ironically, the experience elsewhere in the world suggests that this is 

in fact one area where urban governments are better able to generate 

additional revenue as urbanization proceeds. 

On the expenditure side, we found that relative gainers in the 

devolution process allocated higher IRA at the margin on education 

and economic services but not on health services. This implies that 

the provision of health services is not a priority sector for most CLGUs. 

Determinants of revenue performance of CLGUs 

This study assessed the determinants of CLGUs revenue 

performance in 1991-1995. The LGUs' revcnuc performance was 

measured in terms of per capita total LGU income and two 

components of per capita locally generated revenues: per capita local 

business tax revenue (PCLBT) and per capita real property tax 

revenue (PCRPT). Per capita LGU revenue is then regressed against 

the variables listed below for each of the years 1991, 1993, 1994 and 

1995. 

1. Per capita personal income (PCPY) is used as a proxy for the 

taxable base of the CLGU. 

2. Per capita IRA (PCIRA) is included as one of the major 

determinants of CLGU tax effort to assess whether central 

government transfers to CLGUs suhstitute for locally 

generated taxes. On the one hand, there is concern among 

some policy analysts that intergovernmental grants may 

provide a disincentive to local resource mobilization efforts. 

On the other hand, others argue that central government 

transfers may stimulate LGUs to increase local revenue 

generation because such grants allow LGUs to breach the 

threshold income associated with the provision of more and 

higher quafity services, in this case, higher allotments from 

the central government may encourage LGUs to generate

Financingand Delivery of UrbanServices ] 3 

more revenues locally to complement what they receive from 

the center. 

3. Degree of urbanization (URB). Earlier studies have shown that 

LGU revenue performance is determined by the economic 

base as well as other economic variables that indicate the 

overall level of development like the degree of urbanization 

(Bahl and Schroeder 1983). In these studies, a high degree 

of urbanization is hypothesized to allow LGUs to derive more 

revenue from agiven economic base because tax collection is 

less difficult when the informal sector is relatively smaller in 

more urbanized areas. Relatedly, urbanization is associated 

with the expansion of market-based activities that are easier 

to reach tax-wise. 

4. Population growth rate.(POPGR) is yet another proxy for changes 

in the economic base. 

Two alternative functional specifications were tried: linear and 

double logarithmic. The results of the double logarithmic equations 

are largely consistent with those of the linear equations in terms of 

the signs of coefficients and their statistical significance but the linear 

form was found to have a better fit. 

White's (1980) test was used to detect heteroscedasticity. This 

test is deemed to be important considering that the regressions were 

run using cross-section data. The test is based on the regression of 

the squared residuals from the original regression on the original set 

of explanatory variables plus the squares of said variables. Where 

heteroscedasticity was present, the procedure suggested by White was 

used to correct the standard errors and t-statistics. 

Per capita local business tax revenue 

The results presented in Table 1 show that per capita local 

business tax revenue is, as expected, positively related with per capita 

personal income. The relationship is not statistically significant for 

all years under study except in 1995. Moreover, the relationship is 

weak because the increase in PCLBT is estimated to be P0.26 at the 

maximum for every P100 increase in PCPZ. This may be indicative of 

the LGCs' inability to fully capture the revenue potential of their 

economic base. 

At the same time, PCLBT is found to be negatively related with 

PCIRA. Unlike in 1991 and 1993, the relationship was found to be

14 Managing Urbanization Under a Decentralized Governance Framework 

Table 1. Linear Regression of Per Capita Tax ]Revenue of CLGUs 

INDEPENDENT 

VARIABLE 

DEPENDENT Constant PCPY PCIRA URB POPGR R2 White 

VARIABLE 

Chi-Square 

PCLBT 

1991 -4.143 0.001 -0.040 0.620 0.619 0.522 2.483" 

(-0.293) (1.004) (-1.449) (4.162)" (0.310) 

1993 q.030 0.001 -0.148 0.760 2.339 0.441 2.394" 

(-0.059) (1.013) (-1.532) (2.896)- (0.657) 

1994 14.898 0.002 -0.030 0.609 5.833 0.459 1.986" 

(0.604) (1.610) (-3.055) °" (2.271)" (1.446) 

1995 15.172 0.003 -0.034 0,748 7.418 0.477 2.596" 

(0.515) (1_664)* (-2.765)'" (2.343)'" (1,552) 

PCRPT 

1991 -1.480 0.006 _).039 0.032 7.269 0.247 2.147" 

(-0,048) (2.123)* (-0.742) (0.068) (1.108) 

1993 7.606 0.005 0.020 0.078 0.876 0.098 0.257 

(0.149) (1.952)* (0.794) (0.170) (0.106) 

1994 -23.915 0.005 0.045 -0.111 18.830 0.120 2.646" 

(-0.326) (1.332) (1.198) (-0.140) (1.709)" 

1995 -17,000 0.005 0.007 0.076 21.458 0.142 2.740"" 

(-0.200) (1.741)" (0.163) (0.089) (1,936)" 

PCLGUY 

1991 1802.223 0.003 1.172 1.465 -1740.106 0.429 1.575 

(1.330) (1.220) (6.549) "" (1.796)" (-1.295) 

1993 630.444 0.009 1.134 2.987 -731.572 0.851 3.406"" 

(0.461) (1.633)* (20.288)" (2.954)*" (-0.539) 

1,994 20.638 0.026 0.859 1.197 88.274 0.625 8.082'* 

(0.008) (2.112)' (8.765)'" (0.077) (0.035) 

1995-2241.926 0.021 0.935 2.583 2320.627 0.432 8.068" 

"Statistically significant at 5%. 

*"Statistically significant at 1%, 

(-0.667) (1.068) (7.185)" (0.866) (0.695) 

Note: Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-values. When the White ehi-square is significant, the 

t-values are derived from White chi-square heteroskedastieity-consistent covarianee matrix.

Financingand Deliveryof UrbanServices | 5 

statistically significant for 1994 and 1995. The coefficients for PCIRA 

indicate that an increase of PI00 in PCIRA results in a P3.01-P3.36 

reduction in PCLBT, other things being equal. These suggest that 

while intergovernmental transfers had a neutral effect on local 

business tax effort prior to the implementation of the LGC, CLGUs 

tended to substitute central government grants for local business taxes 

with the LGC's implementation. 

Lastly, the PCLBT of CLGUs exhibits a positive and significant 

relationship with the degree of urbanization in all years under study. 

In contrast, the coefficients for population growth rate yield negadve 

signs but are not statistically significant. These suggest that CLGUs 

are able to capture part of the fiscal benefits of urbanizadon and 

population growth. 

Per capita real proper_ tax revenue 

In contrast, PCIRA appears to have a neutral effect on per capita 

real property tax revenue in all years under study. While the 

coefficients for PCIRA are positive, they are not statistically significant. 

Again, PCPY has a positive and significant link with PCRPT (except 

in 1994). The relationship is slightly stronger than that of the PCLBT. 

A P100 increase in PCPY results in a P0.48-P0.55 increase in PCRPT. 

The coefficients for population growth rate have positive signs 

and they are significant in 1994 and 1995. However, while the 

coefficients for degree of urbanization are also positive, they are not 

significant. Apparendy, CLGUs' real property tax systems have not 

been able to fully capture the positive effects on land values that 

urbanization usually entail. 

Per capita CLGU total income 

Per capita LGU total income (PCLGUY) is found to be largely 

driven by increases in per capita IRA. This is expected given that the 

IRA accounts for approximately half of the total CLGU income during 

the period. The regression results also confirm expectations that 

PCLGUY is positively and significantly associated with per capita 

personal income. This was the case in 1993 and 1994. However, on 

the whole, both the urbanization and the population growth rate 

variables are not found to be statistically significant explanatory 

variables for PCLGUY (with the exception of the 1991 and 1993 

equations, where the coefficient for degree of urbanization is found 

to be positive and statisticaUy significant).


This study also assessed the performance of CLGUs in 

recovering the costs of provision of certain types of service through 

user charges. Specifically, cost recovery in the provision of public 

utilities (like waterworks, power supply, and telephone services) and 

of general urban services like markets and slaughterhouses was 

studied. 

Table 2 indicates that, in the aggregate, CLGUs' cost recovery 

ratios (i.e., revenue-to-expenditure ratio) in the activities enumerated 

above were consistently below unity in 1991-1995.3 Moreover, contrary 

to the experience in other countries, the cost recovery ratios of 

CLGUs are even lower than those of the average LGU. 

For instance, the 1995 data showed that none of the 20 CLGUs 

providing water supply services had a cost recovery ratio greater than 

unity. Moreover, it appears that only four of these CLGUs were 

charging for water (Table 3). 

The CLGU cost recovery performance in markets and slaughterhouses 

was relatively better but still problematic. Only nine out of 

42 CLGUs were able to fully recover the recurrent operating cost of 

their public markets while only five out of 24 CLGUs (or 21 percent) 

were similarly situated with regard to slaughterhouses (Table 3). 

Lastly, the hospital revenue-to-hospital expenditure ratio of 

CLGUs in 1995 varies from a low of 0 to a high of 36 percent (for 

Olongapo City). Moreover, seven out of 17 CLGUs in the sample 

posted ratios higher than the 11 percent average for all CLGUs. This 

result is not quite expected because many LGUs regard hospital care 

services as a public good that should be given free of charge (Table 

4). 

Determinants of CLGU expenditures 

To study the determinants of the expenditures of CLGUs, total 

per capita I,GU expenditures (PCTLGUEXP) and per capita 

expenditures on economic services (PCECON), health services 

(PCHE) and education (PCED) were regressed against the variables 

listed below. 

1. LGU Income. Obviously, LGU expenditure will be limited by 

LGU income because of the budget constraint. By tradition, 

sI-Iere, we limited our analysis to recovery of recurrent costs only because of data 

inaccessibility for capital costs.

FinancinganODeliveryof UrbanServices ! 7 

Table 2. Ratio of Revenue to Expenditure from LGU Business 

Enterprises, 1991-1995 

All LGUs 

CITIES 

1991 |992 1993 1994 1995 1991 1992 1995 1994 1995 

Total Pubfic 53,66 97.33 90.55 78.61 68.02 49,71 90.01 78,86 77,00 68.06 

Enterprise 

Waterworks System 72.95 48.18 55.69 54.72 72.06 83.00 42.59 36.f_ 

Electric Light 69,28 84.56 78.27 86.76 18.42 92.59 93,75 94,01 

& Power 

Telephone System 94,72 98,55 227.04 151.84 37.78 0.27 

Transportation 16.02 10,70 59.77 $.66 6.87 0,84 3.06 1.48 

system 

Operation of Market 119.09 109.23 106.71 75150 66.12 118.12 92.19 97.07 76.94 71.73 

Opelation of 

Slaughterhous_ 197.61 165.69111A2 83.97 227.39 156.28 85,31 77._ 

Operations of Toll 

Roads,Bridges& 

Ferries 1.76 14.25 _9._ 38,02 32.47 2.52 11_,83 3,380.90 425,02 534.59 

Operation of 184.10 94.75 177.00 126.12 90._ 453,26 299.79 263.40 404.87 180.37 

Cemeteries 

Source of data: AFR 1991-1996, 

Philippine LGUs do not finance recurrent expenditures by 

issuing debt. In the analysis that was done for this study, two 

major components of LGU income (per capita IRA [PCIRA] 

and per capita local source revenue [PCLSR]) were considered 

as distinct explanatory variables. Itis important to distinguish 

between these two variables so as to evaluate the impact of 

intergovernmental transfers on CLGU spending. 

2. Net Resource Transfer as a Result of the LGC While the increase 

in the IRA (as a result of the implementation of the 1991 Local 

Government Code) is sufficient to cover the cost of devolved 

functions in the aggregate, it cannot be denied that there is a 

mismatch, between the financial resources and the 

expenditure responsibilities that were transferred to LGUs. 

Thus, the increase in the IRA share of some LGUs is not 

enough to finance the functions devolved to them. 4 Although 

only a few CLGUs had negative per capita net resource transfer 

in 1993 and 1994, there is considerable variation in said 

erhc IRA increment in 1991 is defined as the difference between the 1993 IRA and the 

1992 IRA. The IRA increment in 1994 is analogously computed.

18 Managing Urbanization Under a Decentralized Governance Framework -. - 

Table 3.Ratio of Revenue to Expenditure from LGU'Business Enterprises 

of Selected CLGUs, 1995 

RATIOOF INCOMETO EXPENDITUI_(%) 

N_a_ae of Cities Water Markets Slaughterhouse Transport 

Laoag, Ilocos Norte 93,31 116.42 

Dagupan, Pangasinan 96.26 336.68 

San Carlos, Pangasinan 

Baguio, Benguit 

Santiago, Isabela 99.32 12.75 

Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija 65.70 46.69 0.00 

Palayan, Nueva Ecija 

San Jose, Ecija 150.38 

Angeles, Pampanga 54.68 120.77 0.0O 

Olongapo, Zambales 14.68 

Batangas, Batangas 106.98 0.00 

Lipa, Batangas 114,03 

Gavite, Cavite 201.82 

Tagaytay, Cavite 99.92 216.71 

San Pablo, Laguna 149.96 38.05 

Lucena, Quezon 270.25 81.17 0.00 

Legazpi, Albay 59.96 

Iriga, Camarines Sur 98.27 84.22 

Nag'a, Camarines Sur 0.00 100.66 84.10 

Roxas, Capiz 77.94 30.46 

Uoilo, Iloilo 0.00 96.29 

Baeolod, Negros 0.00 40A7 

Bago, Negros Oct. 8.55 

Cadiz, Negros Oct. 0.00 77.06 

La Carlota, Negros 58_35 

San Carlos, Negros Oce. 

Silay, Negros Occ. 0.00 18.41 

Tagbilaran, Bohol 

Danao, Cebu 27.60 69.41 97.41 

Lapulapu, Cebu 0.00 44.65 

Mandaue, Cebu 0.00 63.01 72.90 155.42 

Toledo, Cebu 21.54 37.04 3._.46 

Bais, Negros Oriental 

Dumaguete, Negros Oriental 

Ormoe, Leyte 38,24 65.66 

Tacloban, Leyte 0.00 19.43 0.00 0.00 

Calbayog, Western Samar 0.00 21.95 

Dapitan, _amb_Del Norte 0.00 17.96 30.26 0.00 

Dipolog, Zamb. Del Norte O.00 0.00 O.00 0.00 

Pagadian, Zamb. Del Sur 

Zamboanga, Zam. Del Sur 0.00 55.88 53.27 

Ozamis, Misamis Occ. 

Tangub, Misamis Occ. 214.10 

Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Or. 0.00 38.44 

Surigao, Surigao Del Norte 0.00 68.66 98.81 0.00 

Davao, Davao Del Sur 29.26 15.17 0.00 

General Santos, S. Cotabato 0.00 93.51 136.73 384.13 

Iligan, Lanao Del Notre 30.97 63.48 2.03 

Marawi, North Cotabato 28.16 

Cotabato, N. Cotabato 0.00 34.49 15.89 0.0O 

C_oocar_ 

Pasay 131.83 

Q_ezon 2.42 

No. of dries w/ratio > 100 0 out of 20 9 out of 42 5 out of 24 2 out of 12 

Percentage to Total No. 0 21.43 20.83 16.67

Financingand Deliveryof UrbanServices 19 

Table 4. Total Cost Recovery of Hospitals, 1995 

..... Hospitals 

Name dCilies Income Ex/_ndit_..,. Ratio(%) 

ul ir ulli 

Laoag, Ilocos Norm 156,828.00 2,6'29,419.25 5.96 

Cahanatuan,Nueva Ecija 1,332,862.00 17,023,515.28 7.83 

Angeles,Pampanga 5,19'2,2_8.95 21,294,692.23 24.38 

Olongapo'/am_cs 6,650,576.88 18,439,639.32 36.07 

Cavite,C__ite 0.00 904,259.40 0.00 

San Patio, Laguna 0.00 3,000,000.00 0.00 

Naga, CamarinesSur 1,554,701.98 7,828,976._2 19.86 

Bag_ NeglOSOct. 994,943.60 5,262,267.73 18.91 

Toledo, Cebu 626,989.21 9,700,013.91 6.46 

Onnoc, Leyte 0.00 989,567.05 0.00 

Tadohan, Leyte 1,425,510.81 6,507,776.27 21.90 

Pagadian, 7_rnK Del Sur 46,380.27 1,581,451.01 2.55 

Ommis, Misamis Occ. 1,165,910.83 7,868,676.15 14.82 

Cagayande Oro"Misanfis Or. 2,805,178.40 26,728,446.48 10.50 

lligan, Lanao DelNorm 2,865,949.62 21,650,876.09 13.24 

Caio(rm_ 652,647.16 12,298,011.2'2 5.31 

Pasay 1,915,413.85 18,103,726.19 10.58 

All Oties 71,219,000.00 623,173,000.00 11.43 

All LGUs L_31,986,000.00 2,783,245,000.00 10.46 

i 

variable across individual CLGUs. s A dummy variable, D1, 

(which takes on the value of 1 when the per capita net resource 

transfer to the CLGU is above the median and 0 otherwise) 

was thus includedas one of the explanatory variables in the 

regression analysis. This variable was induded to verify whether 

the budget allocation behavior of the relative gainers from 

the devolution program differ significantly from that of the 

relative losers. 

3. Human Development Index. The analysis also tested whether or 

not lagged (or contemporaneous) values of the composite 

human development index (HDI) and its various components 

(life expectancy [LE] and functional literacy rate [FLR]) 

influence the budget allocation of CLGUs for the social sectors 

in the current year. This is an attempt to determine if CLGUs' 

5The net resource transfer is defined as the difference between, the IRA increment and 

the cost of devol_d functions.

20 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

spending on the social sectors is responsive to objective 

indicators of need. In the 1993 equations, 1990 HDI values 

were used while 1994 HDI values were used in the 1994 and 

1995 regressions. 

4. Population Growth Bate (POPGR). The growth in the demand 

for public services is most often associated with population 

growth. A prior/, it is expected that LGU expenditures grow 

more or less proportionately with respect to population so as 

to maintain a constant level of service. 

5. Degree of Urbanization (URB). A strong and positive relation 

between urbanization and per capita personal income is well 

established (Bahl and Linn 1992). At the same time, rising 

per capita personal income would tend to lead to an increase 

in the demand for public services if such demand is incomeelastic. 

6. Dummy Variables for the Presence of City Provincial Regional 

Hospital Within CLGU Jurisdicfion. Three additional dummy 

variables were introduced. D2 takes on the value of 1 if the 

CLGU operates its own hospital and is set at zero otherwise. 

On the other hand, D3 is given a value of 1 if there is a 

provincial government-operated hospital while D4 takes on 

the value of 1 if there is a Department of Health (DOH)- 

operated hospital within the city. 

Given the high cost of operating hospitals, the presence 

of city-operated hospitals is expected to impact significantly 

on per capita CLGU health expenditures. On the other hand, 

since most of the patients of province-operated and DOHoperated 

hospitals located within a given city are typically 

residents of the said city, their presence usually implies an 

effective subsidy to the city in the form of lower health 

spending requirements (Capuno and Solon 1996). 

Again, two alternative functions specifications were tried: linear 

and double logarithmic. The results of double logarithmic equations 

are largely consistent with those of the linear equations in terms of 

signs and significance of the coefficients. Generally, the linear 

specifications werefound to have better fit. White's (1980) test was 

again used to detect heteroscedasticity and White's correction was 

implemented where needed.


Per capita total LGU expenditure 

In all years, a strong,positive and significant link is established 

between per capita LGU total expenditure and per Capita IRA. 

However, while there appears to be some evidence that relative net 

•gainers from the devolution process tend to have different marginal 

propensities to spend out of the IRA comparedwith relative net losers, 

the coefficient of the Dl*PCIRAvariable switches sign from negative 

in 1994 to positive in 1995. 8 

The results of the expenditure regressions presented in Table 

5 show that the degree of urbanization and PCLGUEXP are negatively 

and significantly related in 1995. In the other years, the sign of the 

coefficient of the urbanization variable is positive but not significant 

(except in 1994). These results tend to show that while CLGUs were 

able to adjust their aggregate expenditure level in line with the 

increasing demands of urbanization in 1991-1994 (when the IRA share 

of LGUs increased substandaUy following the implementation of the 

Local Government Code, they were largely unable to do the same in 

1995 (when the increase in IRA share of LGUs have started to taper). 

In contrast, the population growth rate variable did not turn 

out to be a good explanatory variable for all years under the study. 

Per capita health expenditures 

The analysis reveals that the population growth rate is negatively 

and significantly associated with per capita health expenditures 

(PCHE) for all years except 1991. Similarly, the coefficients of the 

urbanization variable are also negative and statistically significant in 

1994 and 1995. 

The negative sign of the POPGR and URB variables is contrary 

to initial expectations. However, it is possible that actual CLGU per 

capita health expenditures (as opposed to required level) will decline 

with higher population growth rates and higher degree of 

urbanization as their revenues do not increase accordingly. This is so 

because Philippine LGUs are generally unable to go into deficit 

finance. Consequently, these results might be an indication of the 

urban fiscal gap problem. 

However, CLGUs that operate their own hospitals tend, as 

expected, to spend more on health on a per capita basis compared 

with other CLGUs. This is manifested by the positive and highly 

°Note that IRA share of LGUs of BIR revenues rose from 11 percent in 1991 to 20 percent in 

1992, 25 percent in 1993 and 40 percent from 1994 onward.


significant relationship between D2 and PCHE. However, our results 

do not suggest that the presence of province-operated or DOHoperated 

hospitals within city premises leads to a reduction in per 

capita health expenditures of the host cities. 

The coefficients for PCIRA have the expected signs but are not 

significant in 1994 and 1995. Moreover, while the coefficients of the 

DI*PCIRA variable are negative in the PCHE regressions 7, they are 

not significant except in 1993. This is in sharp contrast with the results 

of similar regressions made for provincial governments. The 

difference may be because only one of the CLGUs was a net loser in 

the devolution process in an absolute sense. 

Similarly, there is no strong link between per capita local source 

revenue and PCHE. While the coeffÉcients of the PCLSR variable are 

positive, they are not significant except in 1995. 

It is noted that while CLGU allocations on the health sector are 

consistent with health need indicators like life expectancy (i.e., with 

high life expectancy-CLGUs budgeting less for health services), the 

relationship between these variables is not statistically significant 

except in 1994. 

The coefficients of POPGRin the PCED equations have negative 

signs as in the PCHE equations. However, these coefficients are not 

statistically significant. The same result holds for the URB variable. 

All these lend some support to the existence of an urban fiscal gap. 

The DI*PCIRA and the PCIRA are the only statistically 

significant explanatory variable in the PCED regressions, s The sign 

of the coefficient of the Dl*PCIRAvariable is positive indicating that 

relative net gainers in the devolution process tend to allocate their 

windfall resources to the education sector. However, the negative sign 

of the coefficient of the PCIRA variable suggests that on the whole, 

per capita education expenditure of CLGUs tend to fall with higher 

per capita IRA. 

Per capita local source revenue does not appear to be a good 

explanatory variable for PCED; Its coefficients in the PCED regressions 

are not significant except in 1991. 

_'he negative relationship between D I*PCIRA and PCHE indicates that relative net gainers in 

the devolution process tend to spend less on health at the margin compared with the relative 

net losers. 

SThe D I*PCIRA is significant in 1993 and 1995 while the PCIRA is significant in 1991 and 1994,

Table 5. l.lnear Regression of Per Capita Expenditure of ClaUs 

D_ C__mnm¢ Per Cq_a DI*Per Per Capita POPGR URB FLR LE D2 D3 D4 R2 W_te 5' 

vARiam _. IRA C_mA _ Sam_me " _ m=I 

_re O. 

Tolal Eeenemic 

1991 -730.049 .0.0_5 4).o80 277.4_ 006.139 .0,039 i_ =_ 

(.o.8c_) (.0.._1) (.1.2os) (o.sso) (.0.8oa)" Q- 

199,$ -1184,642 (0.0131 0,254 0.014 1454.827 .0.018 0.269 0.620 

19o_ 

(-o.421) 

1007.693 

-0.105 

-0.0a4 

(2.7a0)"" 

0.188 

(o.o66) 

-0.1,,8 

(.529) 

-`513.475 

(-2.100) 

.0.005 0.270 0.4s4 -- 

(0.,1401 (-0.._0) 0.1591 "" (-1._531 (-0.2251 (.o.cm) _" 

1995 1250.176 .0.028 0.170 -0.020 -789A13 .0.005 0,256 0.523 ,_ 

(0.5311 (-0.474) (3.082) "" (-0.259) (-0.:_t8} (.0.fi34} 

1991 188.804 0.941 0.075 -169.439 0.096 .0.196 25.707" -8.072 -2A06 0.573 0.815 Q_ 

(1.073) (1.7111" (3.,................._0)" (-1.0751 (1.0801 (.0.2121 (4.6101 (-1.374) (-.0.580) _. 

1993 858.$92 0.052 -0.040 0.030 -779.080 .0.257 -0.320 21.113" 3.188 s.3880,300 0.514 m 

(i.84_) (1.900)" (-2.310)" (1._51 (-2.2¢81" (-l._Jo) (-0.1_) (2.sos) (o._

24 Managing UrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

" " on economic services 

The DI*PCIRA variable is the only variable that is consistently 

significant in the PCECON regressions. Similar to the PCED equations, 

the sign of the DI*PCIRA coefficients is positive, suggesting that 

relative net gainers in the devolution process tend to allocate a larger 

portion of their IRA on economic services compared with relative 

losers. 

The coefficients of the POPGR and the URB variables are both 

negative tending to support the urban fiscal gap hypothesis. However, 

they are not statistically significant. 

At the same time, both the PCIRA and the PCLSR do not register 

statistically significant relationships with PCECON. 

Closing the Urban Fiscal Gap 

The problem of the urban fiscal gap can, in principle, be 

addressed in four different ways: (1) increased local revenue effort 

with unchanged revenue authority; (2) increased LGU revenue 

authority; (3) increased transfers from central government; and (4) 

more efficient use of existing financial resources in service delivery. 

Increa_ng _ revenue effort 

One of the more important findings of this Study is the 

substitutive effect of the IRA distribution formula on local source 

revenue. To counteract this tendency, tax effort may be taken into 

account explicitly in the IRA allocation formula. Alternatively, the 

IRA distribution formula may also be allocated to the different LGUs 

so as to equalize net fiscal capacitieis, i.e., revenue capacity net of 

expenditure needs (Shah 1994). 

At the same time, the results outlined in the subsection "Per 

Capita Real Property Tax" indicate that CLGUs' real property tax 

systems have apparently not been able to fully capture the positive 

effects on land values that urbanization usually entails. In this regard, 

the amendment of the Local Government Code in favor of an 

automatic indexation of the schedule of fair market value in between 

general revisions will greatly help to compensate for this weakness in 

the system. Such a move will protect the real property tax base from 

being eroded by inflation during the years when no general revision 

is undertaken. By avoiding the need to make substantial adjustments 

in the schedule, it will also be easier to narrow the gap between the 

"official" fair market values and the true marketvalues of real property


in the medium term. Moreover, to counter local assessors' tendency 

to value real property below its true market value, the use of the zonal 

values of real property (on which the BIR bases its assessment of 

transfer taxes) should be considered. Tan (1993) found from a sample 

of areas in Metro Manila that the local assessors' estimate of the fair 

market value was at best 30 percent of the true fair market value of 

real properties. 

On the collection side of RPT, Fisher (1996) recommends that 

current collecdbles should be monitored separately from delinquent 

accounts. He further recommends that a more aggressive collection/ 

enforcement stance be taken such that at the close of each quarter, 

each account is issued notices of delinquencies; at the end of the 

second quarter when an account becomes delinquent, warrants of 

levy should be issued; and at the end of the third quarter when an 

account becomes delinquent, auction notice should be issued. 

In comparison, the biggest problem with regard to the local 

business tax is the underreporting of gross receipts of establishments. 

Requiring taxpayers to submit income tax returns (ITRs) filed with 

the Bureau of Internal Revenue is perhaps the most direct way of 

obtaining information. Given the present tax calendar, this implies 

that local business tax is initially assessed on the basis of previous 

year's ITRwhich is subject to final adjustment later in the year as the 

current ITR becomes available. In addition to the ITRs, local treasurers 

may require large establishments to submit supplementary accounting 

records. In large/urban areas, local treasurers should be trained in 

the conduct of field examination to check veracity of reported gross 

receipts. The use of presumptive income levels, particularly for small 

establishments, should be explored. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 

this worked very well in Naga in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

To improve collection/enforcement of the non-RPT, ARD 

(1992) noted that the requirements are simple. They only need 

consistency in practice. It includes: (1) the establishment of a tax roll 

for each type of tax (the conduct of a tax census and the development 

of a revenue data bank are key steps in this regard); (2) maintenance 

of systematic and organized records where payments of all taxpayers 

are automatically entered as they occur;, (3) the sending of tax bills; 

(4) conscientious monitoring of payments of taxpayers and 

identification and collection of tax delinquencies; and (5) strict 

implementation of sanctions and penalties on erring taxpayers.


A number of LGUs, particularly provincialgovernments, have 

•adopted cost-based pricing of hospital services. Moreover, a good 

number ofdties are already sourcing a substantial part of their hospital 

expenditures from user charges. In addition to this innovation on 

the technical side, local sanggunians (councils) need to pass legislation 

that will remove restrictions on the retention of income generated 

by these hospitals. It has been found that said restrictions discourage 

hospital personnel from collecting user fees. 

In contrast, the poor financial performance of CLGU business 

enterprises is worrisome. Again, a move to cost-based pricing is one 

way of addressing this problem. Still another wayis through the award 

of management contracts to the private sector. 

Lastly, a good number of CLGUs have large cash balances. 

However, the Commission on Audit has put in place certain 

regulations that limit the CLGUs' ability to maximize the returns on 

these funds. Some LGU officials (e.g., Bacolod officials) were 

questioned when they invested in Treasury bills. 

increasing LGU taxing authority 

in the medium term, the assignment of taxing powers to various 

levels of government must be reviewed. Existing theoretical guidance 

on tax assignments suggests that residence-based taxes and taxes on 

immobile factors like the RPT are appropriate for local taxation. At 

the same time, motor vehicle ownership and use is also a suitable tax 

base for CLGUs. "The number of vehiclesAn any given city usually 

grows faster than its population. The growing number of vehicles 

requires more expenditures to maintain roads and imposes the cost 

of congestion and pollution on the urban environmenC (Bahl and 

Linn 1992). 

The imposition of betterment levies (or a tax aimed at recouping 

from beneficiaries the public costs of providing urban infrastructure 

from the beneficiaries) should also be explored. Such charges have 

been tried with positive effects in Korea and Colombia. 

,, ng and inse,- e li,y 

Case studies of best practices in LGU service delivery suggest 

that upgrading of LGU planning and fiscal management capacity, 

greater emphasis on participatory process, more effective 

coordination with other government agencies including other LGUs, 

ability to catalyze private sector and NGOs, use of appropriate lowcost 

technologies, contracting with the private sector, and elimination

Financingand Deliveryof Urban Services 27 

of corruption will all contribute to improving the efficiency of public 

service provision. These highlight the need to disseminate and 

encourage replication of such practices. 

In this project, eight case studies ill health service delivery 

(Butuan, Cotabato, Gingoog, Lapu-lapu, Naga, Olongapo, Puerto 

Princesa, Surigao), five in environmental and natural resource 

management (Baguio, General Santos, Olongapo, Puerto Princesa, 

Las Pifias), and three in housing (Naga, Puerto Princesa, San Carlos) 

were reviewed. The objective of this exercise is to document innovative 

programs and highlight the key elements that have made them 

successful and sustainable. Many of these programs have already 

received awards from various bodies like the Galing Pook Awards, 

HAMIS (Health Management Information System), and Clean and 

Green Program. The added benefit of this project is not so much the 

identification of previously unrecognized innovations but the 

decomposition of so-called best practices into their principal 

components which, in turn, enhances their replication in other cities. 

These case studies share several features that cut across sectors. 

First, greater participation of various stakeholders (local institutions 

and people) in the financing as well as in the implementation process 

ensures efficient and effective program results and helps sustain the 

program itself. This is best exemplified by the mobilization of women's 

groups in the delivery of health services (as in Surigao City's Primary 

Health Care Federated Women's Club, Lapu-lapu City's mothers 

support groups); Naga City's reliance on the community organizations 

in identifying the beneficiaries of the housing program and in putting 

together the share of the beneficiaries in the financial requirements 

of the project; and the widespread participation in Puerto Princesa's 

Oplan Linis and reforestation program. 

Second, the LGUs involved in these best practice cases have 

somehow been able to break free from the financial constraints that 

most urban LGUs face. The concerned LGUs took different routes 

in addressing the fiscal gap. Some have introduced user fees (as in 

Olongapo City's Solid Waste Management Program) while others have 

spent time and effort in designing a well-thought-out cost recovery 

Scheme (as in San Carlos City's LoteParasa Mahirap). Still other LGUs 

have focused on mechanisms/techniques that reduce the cost of 

service production/delivery. This is true of Cotabato City's use of 

barangay halls and even private homes in the absence of barangay 

health stations (BHSs) and the mobilization of health volunteers in 

Cotabato City, Olongapo City and Naga City. Some LGUs have also

28 ManagingUrbanizationUnder a DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

mobilized additional funds from other levels of goyernment as well 

as from the private sector. For instance, Olongapo City requires its 

barangays to allocate 5 percent of their IRA to health and welfare. 

Surigao City obtained P1.5 million for the construction of a training 

center for its PHC Women's Club from the Countrywide Development 

Fund (CDF) of a senator. In Lapu-lapu City, partnerships with the 

private sector were established, wherein 10 private companies and 

five educational institutions support eight barangays in the conduct 

ofamonthlyfree clinic and donated facilities and supplies. Similarly, 

in General Santos City's Adopt-an-Island Program, business 

establishments, academic institutions and NGOs develop and maintain 

parks and road islands in the city. Other LGUs have maximized the 

use of their own resources to finance development expenditures. San 

Carlos City, for example, set aside 30 percent of its IRA (instead of 

the mandated 20 percent) for their Local Development Fund. 

Third, the better programs are those that are integrated, 

intersectoral and undertaken within a development strategy that 

attempts to capture the synergy from program interdependencies. 

For example, Puerto Princesa's Low-Cost Housing Project is in reality 

just one component of the city's Bantay Dagat Program. In like 

manner, Olongapo City strengthened the link between health and 

sanitation by integrating its environment program with health 

activities. 

On the other hand, the case studies also highlight a number of 

sector-specific concerns. In the housing sector, both Naga's Kaantabay 

sa Kauswagan Housing Program and San Carlos' Lore Para sa Mahirap 

focus on the provision of lot and settlement upgrading in contrast to 

Puerto Princesa's Low-Cost Housing Project, which involves the 

provision of a house and lot package. Experiences elsewhere in the 

world tend to indicate that the role of government in the housing 

supply is best limited to land development and investment in on- and 

off-site infrastructure. "Given the heterogeneity of people's 

preferences for a kind of shelter and the speed at which they can or 

want to improve its quality, it is not surprising that public housing 

projects often do notfit the housing preferences of the poor." In this 

case, public resources alloted for housing construction are better 

placed in complementary inputs into housing like tenure and services 

(Bahl and Linn 1992).

FinancingandDeliveryof UrbanServices 29 

The experience in all three housing cases is consistent with the 

experience in many countries that subsidize housing consumption 

either through the underpricing of land or the implicit subsidy on 

interest. Often, land is valued at its acquisition cost to government. 

_While a first project may be able to draw on financially cheap public 

land, follow-up projects may have to purchase land at commercial 

prices from private owners. In that case, the replicability of the first 

project--if it relies on subsidized land costs--is in doubt." At the same 

time, experience in other countries suggests that subsidies on housing 

tend to result in the overconsumption of housing relative to other 

goods and services and in overly ambitious expectations for housing 

standards because full cost is not borne by beneficiaries (Bahl and 

Linn 1992). This lesson is most relevant in the case of Puerto Princess 

where the project did not Charge an interest and which provides 

homelots of 99 square meters (almost double the size of lots in 

commercial low-cost housing projects) but beneficiaries still complain 

about the smallness of the lot. Although San Carlos and Naga provide 

some implicit subsidies in their programs, these subsidies are not as 

substantial. 

In all three cases, the success of the programs was helped by the 

LGUs' ability to play a catalytic role in terms of coordinating with 

national shelter and shelter-financing agencies. Moreover, in Nags, 

the City Council passed ordinances pertaining to land conversion and 

gave the mayor authority to negotiate the purchase of land. Aside 

from the traditional way of acquiring land which is through direct 

purchase, the LGU negotiated for land sharing and land swapping 

schemes. 

All three cities used census listing of the claimants in monitoring 

the legality of the latter's claims as future beneficiaries. But most 

noteworthy is the local initiative in strictly implementing the ban on 

illegal construction in Puerto Princesa. 

Environment and natural resource management 

The types of environmental programs that cities can undertake 

may vary depending on the overall development goals of the city as 

well as the features and priorities of the city environment that is to be 

managed. For natm_ resources-rich cities like Puerto Princesa and 

Baguio, environment and natural resource management activities 

(such as the Bantay Gubat and Bantay Dagat in Puerto Princesa and 

Eco-Walk Program in Baguio) serve as the city's main programs. For

30 ManagingUrbanizationUnder a DecentralizedGovernanceFramewOrk 

highly urbanized cities where environment problems are associated 

with growth in economic activities such as in Olongapo City, solid 

waste management program deserves greater emphasis. 

Environmental programs can also be nonconventional as in the case 

of Las Pifias and General Santos where the focus is more on the 

aesthetics and tourism aspects and goals of the program. 

In environmental and natural resource management where 

there is a need to change people's behavior and attitudes, a good 

information, education and communication program is essential. 

While each LGU may craft its own program for the environment, 

inter-LGU cooperation has to be made in many instances in view of 

the economies of scale and externalities involved (e.g., sanitary landfill 

site management and maintenance). Lastly, when market-based 

instruments are used in tandem with regulatory instruments, LGUs 

may be able to raise revenues while minimizing further environmental 

damage. 

Health 

Puerta Princesa's Satellite Clinic Project and Naga's Emergency 

Rescue Naga are aimed at providing emergency medical assistance. 

Naga's scheme makes use of an extensive radio network and the 

availability of ambulances to improve the access of residents in rural 

barangays to medical care in emergency situations. Making the 

program available metro-wide enabled the sharing of limited facilities 

and magnified benefits. 

In contrast, Puerta Princesa (by staffing the satellite clinic with 

trained medical personnel on a part-time basis) not only provided 

emergency medical care but also improved the access of rural 

barangays to basic health care. The satellite clinics enabled early 

treatment of diseases before they go t worse and decreased the number 

of patients going to hospitals. Thus, the projects highlights the 

importance of looking at curative and preventive health care in a 

more integrated manner. 

Issues for Further Research 

This study also attempted to collect some input/output 

indicators of the service delivery levels of CLGUs. The results are 

rather disappointing. Input/output indicators were not available (or 

at the very least, not easily accessible even if they are available) at the 

local level for most services with the exception of education and health 

care services. The absence of this information may indicate that

Financingand Delivery of Urban Services 31 

CLGUs do not make use of this kind of data in planning and 

budgeting. Moreover, simple correlation analysis between input/ 

output indicators (when they are available), on the one hand, and 

per capita CLGU expenditure, on the other, suggest there is a weak 

relationship between them. 

References 

ARD (Associates in Rural Development). 1992. Essential Actions for 

LGU Revenue Mobilization. Local Develoment Assistance 

Program (LDAP) Project Document. 

Bahl, R. andJ. Linn. 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. 

New York: Oxford University Press. 

Bahl, R. and L. Schroeder. 1983. The Business License Tax. In Local 

Government Finance in the Third World: The Case of the Philippines, 

edited by Roy Bahl and Barbara Miller. NewYork: Praeger. 

Bahl, R. and S. Nath 1986. Public Expenditure Decentralization in 

Developing Countries. Government and Policy 4:405-418. 

Capuno,J.J. and O. Solon. 1996. The Impact of Devolution on Local 

Health Expenditures: Anecdotes and Preliminary Estimates 

from the Philippines. Unpublished. 

Fisher, R. 1996. Assessment of Real Property Tax System in the 

Philippines. Report submitted to ARD-Gold Project. 

Shah, A. 1994. The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in 

Developing and Emerging Market Economies. Policy and 

Research Series No. 23. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 

Tan, E. 1993. Real Property Taxation and Its Potential as a Major 

Source of Local Revenue. In Poverty Growth and the Fiscal Crisis, 

edited by Emmanuel de Dios and Associates. Makati City: 

Philippine Institute for Development Studies and Ottawa: 

International Development Research Centre. 

White, H. 1980. A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Esdrnator 

and A Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48:817- 

838.

Chapter 

2 

Metropolitan Arrangements 

in the Philippines: Passing 

Fancy or the Future.Megatrend 

Ruben G. Mewado, and Rosario G. Manasan 

In the next century, human progress will hinge on the 

metropolitanization of the majority of the world's population, 

transformation of the old models of metropolitan development and 

planning, and the elimination of urban inequality... What is needed 

is a new wa_ of thinking about the metropolis and urban planning 

based on the idea that the metropolis is progressive and desirable and 

not aplague tothe humanity... The new way of thinking should pmject 

the current trends of metropolitan development into the twent_frrst 

century, not as fantastical futuristic visions but as sane scientific 

assessments of the laws that govern metropolitan development, and 

that permit us to consciously guide that development. 

- Thomas Angotti (1993) in Metropolis 2000 

economy and the continued pursuit of the national dispersion 

he policy country's through drive regional towardconcentration becoming a have globally revitalized competitive and 

eventually stirred large cities to expand their physical area for planning 

as well as their service area for urban service delivery. Noteworthy in 

recent years is the emergence of new "metropolises" in almost every 

region of the country. A local traveler may be surprised to hear that a 

city he has always known now has the word "metro" preceding its 

name. A tour in these new metropolises will reveal, however, that they 

do not show yet the metropolitan complexion, i.e., population and 

built structures, that the term "metro" usually connotes. 

Angotti (1993), in writing a modern day perspective on metropolitanization 

in the world, has suggested a general rule-of-thumb in 

defining a metropolis by referring to it as a large urban settlement


with at least. 1 million population, t.A city is different from a metropolis 

as the former is only a medium-sized settlement with a population 

between 100,000 and 1 million. Also a unique feature of a metropolis 

is that its geographical area usually extends across several local 

government boundaries. 

If the above definition is to be used, only Metro Manila, Metro 

Cebu and Metro Davao will qualify. Metropolitan arrangement in this 

paper defines or classifies other metropolises that do not pass the 

theoretical standards of population nor the urban criteria of a 

metropolis but functionally behave as such. Operationally defined, a 

metropolitan arrangement is where a highly urbanized city and the 

local government units (LGUs) contiguous with it enter into a 

cooperative venture in planning and implementing urban 

development activities. 

The formation of metropolitan arrangements emerged mostly 

in the 1990s. But is this just a fleeting phenomenon considering the 

recent emphasis placed worldwide on mega-cities Or, is this a prelude 

to future trend in the management of the urban environment in the 

21'_century Philippines If there are significant benefits to this form 

of geopolitical cooperation, how can these be strengthened and 

enhanced as an alternative mechanism for effective and efficient urban 

service delivery 

Context of Inquiry 

Interwoven in this study is an examination of the issues 

surrounding the evolution, appropriateness, effectiveness and 

sustainability of these metropolitan arrangements. It may be 

worthwhile to consider these issues in the light of current 

socioeconomic and political development in the national and global 

scene. 

There is no strict universal definition of a metropolitan area such that metropolises in the 

world vary in terms of population and area size. Neither is there a formal definition in the 

Philippines. More recently, however, with the emergence of relatively big metropolis worldwide, 

the United Nations has defined some metropofis as megalopolises, which pertain to big cities or 

metropolises having a population of 8 million and over (UN Unive_gsity 1994).

MetropolitanArrangementsinthe Philippines 35 

Table 1. Urbanization in Selected Asian Countries, 1990 

Urban, Population 

Ave. Annual 

Population Area 

Country (in millions) (sq. km) Density GrowthRate 

1980-1990 

As%of 

Total 

Growth 

Rate 

1980-1990 

Philippines 61 300 203 2.4 49 5.1 

Thailand 56 513 109 1.8 23 4.6 

Indonesia 178 1905 93 1.8 31 5.1 

Malaysia 18 330 54 2.6 43 4.9 

Vietnam 66 330 200 2.1 "_2 3.4 

South Korea 43 99 434 1.1 72 3.5 

Japan 124 378 328 0.6 77 0.7 

Source of basic data: WorMDe_/opment Report 1992. 

Rap/d urban/zat/on 

The rate of urban growth in the Philippines, which posted 5.1 

percent for the intercensal years 1980 to 1990, is considered one of 

the highest in the developing economies of Asia (Table 1). As it is 

true for its ASEAN neighbors, its urbanization rate is more than double 

the national population growth rates. The source of this growth has 

been recognized to be influenced by a mixture of factors, including 

history, geography, sectoral, macroeconomic and explicit spatial 

policies (NEDA 1996). 

The 1990 Census of Population and Housing revealed that the 

Philippines is 48.4 percent urban. Projection for 1995 showed the 

share of population in the urban areas to be 54.1 percent or about 38 

million out of the 69 million total population (Gonzales 1997). This 

represents a high growth rate of 4.6 percent--almost double the 

national growth rate of 2.45 for the period 1990-1995. The proportion 

of urban population over the national population is expected to 

increase its share as the country's economic production will be 

generated mostly in the urban areas following the anticipated 

increasing shares of the industry and services sectors. 

Ttw advent of metropolises and meg_bolises 

The rise of metropolises and the emergence of megalopolises 

are contemporary urbanization phenomena taking place in many 

countries. The former refers to the process whereby a city expands 

its influence to surrounding cities and towns, forming an urban region


or conurbation 2 more commonly known as a metropolis or 

metropolitan area. The latter phenomenon is when a metropolis grows 

further in terms of population and creates an expanded metropolis 

forming a megalopolis, a term first used byJean Gottman for a spatial 

system consisting of several metropolitan areas (Serote 1994). 

In the Philippines, the occurrence of these phenomena is very 

much pronounced in recent years. Metro Manila is now part of the 

world map of current megalopolises or mega-cities (ADB 1994). 

Having reached more than 8 million population in 1990, it has 

graduated from a metropolitan status. Lately, some of the highly 

urbanized cities have been gradually taking on a metropolitan 

character in terms of increasing population and the presence of 

relatively complex urban systems, including modern transport and 

communication infrastructure, expanding residential areas resulting 

in an intricate daily commuting pattern and sophisticated commercial 

and trading activities. Other cities, while still far from being considered 

a metropolis, are gradually following suit by shaping either a formal 

or an informal metropolitan arrangement among the concerned 

LGUs. The transformation of these cities into metropolises finds basis 

in the expectation of their likely metropolitan destiny aside from the 

perceived benefits that can be derived from such aggrupation. 

Metropolitan arrangements: decentraliza6on or 

re-centralizaaon 

Article X Section 13 of the 1986 Constitution provides the prime 

basis for any inter-governmental or metropolitan arrangement. It 

states: 

Local government units may group themselves, 

consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and 

resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in 

accordance with law. 

=Serote (1.994) quotes the Dictionary of Social Sciences in defining "conurbation" as a 

"large geographical area, extending across several local government boundaries, forming 

in socioeconomic terms a single continuous urban region." He further explains that 

the term metropolis comes from two Greek words: metro meaning "mother" and polls 

meaning "city." It is descriptive of a "mother city giving birth as it were to daughter cities 

and together forming a large city that is several times bigger than the original one in 

terms of land area and population."


The 1991 Local Government Code further strengthened the 

concept of metropolitan arrangements under Chapter 3, Section 33: 

Local government units may, through appropriate 

ordinances, group themselves, consolidate or coordinate 

their efforts, services, and resources for purposes 

commonly beneficial to them. In support of such 

undertakings, the local government units involved may, 

upon approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public 

hearing conducted for the purpose, contribute funds, real 

estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and 

appoint or assign personnel under such terms and 

conditions as may be agreed upon by the participating 

local units through Memoranda of Agreement. 

While these provisions form the legal basis for some 

intergovernmental structures that can then be applied to a 

metropolitan arrangement, the creation of such a structure is feared 

by some as a form of re-centralization or, at the very least, a threat to 

the autonomy of LGUs. Metropolitanization would, in effect, make 

LGUs give up some of the greater and broader powers and functions 

they have been accorded under the new Local Government Code. In 

addition, smaller LGUs might consider such metropolis formation as 

a form of annexation and fear that they will lose their identity as a 

distinct local entity. 

Still, some believe that metropolitan arrangements strengthen 

decentralization rather than encourage re-centralization when its 

formation is caused primarily by the LGUs themselves. Such 

metropolitan formation allows for a subnational-level government (as 

oppose to a central government) provision of services characterized 

by economies of scale and externalities. Thus, metropolitan 

arrangements can be viewed not as a re-centralization movement but 

rather, a refinement of the decentralization thrust. 

Me_llam arrm_me_ _ poetical preferences 

From the standpoint of a more integrative development 

planning, the support behind metropolitan arrangements emanates 

from the benefits that could be derived from scale economies and 

the spillovers of service between administrative or political 

jurisdictions. This is true particularly of urban services such as traffic 

management, water supply, treatment and storage, solid waste


management and land use planning that can be provided more 

effectively and efficiently if they are jointly planned and delivered by 

moreJ than one LGU. While this is arguably a justifiable option, the 

choice of the type of organizational structure may be difficult to 

determine considering that LGUs have equal political legitimacy. 

Thus, competition and antagonism may sometimes hinder a workable 

and sustainable working relationship or moreso, a more formal 

metropofitan arrangement. 

Purpose and Scope of Study 

This study provides a broad inquiry into the evolution and 

dynamics of metropolitan arrangements in the Philippines. 

Specifically, the objectives are: 

1)To document the evolution of the various metropolitan 

arrangements in the country and evaluate their future 

prospects; 

2) To determine the various functional areas where metropolitan 

arrangements have been or can be effective and efficient in 

the delivery of urban services; 

3) To identify and analyze problems confronting these groupings 

in the area of institutional strengthening and coordination, 

finance, management operations and local autonomy; and 

4) To propose policy reforms regarding these arrangements, both 

metropolis-specific and metropolises in general. 

Eight metropolitan arrangements are considered in this study: 

Metro Manila, Metro Naga, Metro BLIST (formerly Metro Baguio), 

CAMADA (formerly Metro Dagupan), Metro Cebu, Metro Iloilo, 

Metro Cagayan de Oro (CDO) and Metro Davao. While there are 

other metropolitan arrangements that are known to be emerging 

(e.g., Metro Urdaneta, Metro General Santos, Metro Iligan), the study 

limits itself only on those that already have a formal institutional 

arrangement or are in an advanced stage of evolving one. The insights 

and perspectives put forward in this study benefited very much from 

formal and informal discussions with regional government officials 

and local executives in these areas.


Table 2. Metropolitan Arrangements: Composition, Land Area and 

Population 

Population 

Composition Land Area 1995 

blvb-o City Municil_dity Province (_l. kin) I_wel Growth 

(Total) 

Rate 

1990-95 

Manila 10 7 17 633.21 9,454,040 3.52 

CAMADA 1 2 3 147.50 269,093 1.38 

BLIST 1 4 5 973.34 386,512 2.49 

Naga 1 14 15 1257.67 560,322 2.19 

Cebu 3 7 10 922,98 1,435,903 2.39 

Iloilo 1 3 4 207,80 437,351 1.59 

CDO 1 15 16 3841 _71 861,588 3.63 

Davao 1" 1 1 2211.30 1,006,840 3.39 

2** 1 2 3 2724.61 1,039,721 2.66 

3*** 1 4 20817.86 4,480,267 2.29 

* Davao City only, 

** Total of Davao City, Panabo and Sta. Cruz. 

*** Total of Davao City, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. 

Sources: 1990 Population and Landarea Data from National Statistics Office; 1995 Census of 

Population and Housing. 

Demographic and Geographic Features of Current 

and Emerging Metropolitan Arrangements 

Table 2 provides a general picture of the eight metropolitan 

arrangements as to their demography and geography. 

Expectedly, a metro arrangement is generally composed of a 

city plus the neighboring municipalities. Variations, however, exist in 

the number of geopolitical units involved in the arrangement (Table 

2). The number of cooperating LGUs ranges from 3 to 17. Metro 

Davao is a special case where there are at least three definitions that 

have evolved: (1) a Metro Davao that is synonymous to Davao City; 

(2) a Metro Davao that encompasses Davao City and the neighboring 

municipalities of Panabo and Sta. Cruz; and (3) a Metro Davao 

referring to Davao City and the three surrounding provinces, namely, 

Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. 

There is a close association between the largeness of the 

metropolitan areas under study and the area contributed by the noncity 

LGUs in the metropolitan composition. These non-city LGUs 

account for a sizeable share (i.e., about more than half) of the total 

metropolitan area in this study (Figure 1). Conversely, the same graph 

shows that the share of the city area to the overall size of the 

metropolitan area is relatively small. Except for Metro Manila, Metro 

Cebu, Metro Davao 1 and Metro Davao 2, the share of the mother 

city comprises only less than a third of the total metropolitan area.


Figure 1. City, Non-city and Total Metropolitan Land Area 

25000-- 

z_oo, 

I 

I=N°_Y I 

, 

NXlO. 

_- MANILA BUST _M_ *CO,' ,L01LO CES0 C_- 1 OAVAO3 

Source: Basic data from Table 2_ 

The demographic and geographic differentiation between city 

and non-city areas can be seen as creating a development balance. 

For instance, the geographically large non-city area can be a potential 

expansion area for the geographically limited capital city while the 

demographically large city can be seen as a big potential market for 

non-city products and services. Such symbiosis and development 

complementarities would, of course, prove workable, depending 

largely on how well the metropolitan arrangements are effected. 

Genesis of Metropolitan Arrangements 

With the exception of Metro Manila, the formation of 

metropolitan arrangements are events of the 1990s. One can glean 

from their unique experiences a variety of factors that cause their 

formation. These arrangements can be generalized based on four 

major precursors, 

Common pressing local concern 

The formation of Metro BLIST, CAMADA and Metro Naga was 

preceded by pressing concerns. The damage left by the strong quake 

that hit the regions of Northern Luzon in 1990 has paved the way for 

LGUs to interact more closely and view future developments in a more 

integrated fashion. The disaster has facilitated the development plan

MetropolitanArrangementsin the Philippines 41 

of Metro Baguio, which eventually, upon consultation with the 

surrounding municipalities of Benguet Province, became the 

foundation of the Metro BLIST (Baguio, La Trinidadl Itogon, Sablan 

and Tuba) area. The same experience holds true for Dagupan City, 

Calasiao and Mangaldan in the province of Pangasinan. Originally 

called Metro Dagupan, the new name CAMADA was eventually agreed 

on by the mayors of the area. In the case of Metro Naga, the shortage 

of oil products during the Gulf War led Naga City and surrounding 

municipalities to work together in resolving gas sourcing and 

allocation issue. 

Metro Cebu, Metro CDO and Metro Davao find their origin 

from regional or area development strategies and spatial studies. 

Initially, the Regional Cities Development Project targeted Cebu, 

Davao and Cagayan de Oro. In view of the important infrastructure 

projects undertaken in these major cities, strategies for regional 

development gave them key roles for the growth and development 

of their respective regions. The influence of these cities have 

expanded beyond their boundaries and development planning has 

led these cities to take on a new status as metropolitan centers 

integrating themselves with the nearby cities and provinces. The 

Central Visayas Regional Program (CVRP) first defined Metro Cebu 

as a planning area. Under the CVRP, the Metro Cebu Development 

Project (MCDP) is the CVRP's infrastructure component, 

implementing road projects in the areas defined as Metro Cebu by 

CVRP. Metro Cagayan de Oro, on the other hand, was a product of 

the integrated area development (IAD) approach, which was a 

development planning strategy fashionable during the Aquino 

Administration. While the National Council on Integrated Area 

Development (NACIAD) was abolished during this period, IAD as a 

planning tool has been carried over and reinvented through the 

Special Development Programs (SDPs). The Metro CDO was 

packaged as an SDP, of which the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Corridor 

(CIC) Project is a major component. Efforts in the implementation 

of the SDP were focused more on the development of infrastructure 

links between Metro CDO and Iligan. Such realization has given 

impetus recendy in considering the needs of the defined metropolitan 

area hand in hand with the development of the CIC region. While 

originally a Davao City initiative, the Metro Davao now has 

metamorphosed into a subregional growth area as defined by the


Table 3. Metropolitan Composition, Geographic and Demographic 

Characteristics, by Metropolitan Arrangement 

Population 

Metro Level Growth Rate Land Area 

1990 1995 1990-1995 (sq. kin) 

Metro Manila 7,928,867 9,454,040 3.52 633.21 

Manila 1,598,918 1,654,761 0.62 24.98 

Mandaluyong 244,538 286,870 2.75 9.29 

Marikina 310,010 357,231 2.68 21.52 

Pasig 397,309 471,075 3.22 48.46 

Quezon City 1,666,766 1,989,419 3.34 171.71 

Sat*Juan 126,708 124,187 -0.40 5.95 

Kalookan 761,011 1,023,159 5.64 55.80 

Malabon 278,380 947,484 4.13 32.64 

Navotas 186,799 229,039 3.82 8.94 

Valenzuela 340,050 437,165 4.81 47.02 

La_ Pinas 296,851 413,086 6.37 32.69 

Makati 452,734 484,176 1.25 18.31 

Muntinlupa 276,972 399,846 7.02 39.75 

Parafiaque 307,717 391,296 4,57 46.57 

Pasay 366,623 408,610 1.96 13.97 

Pat;eros 51,401 55,286 1.37 10.40 

Taguig 266,080 381,350 6.93 45.21 

Metro BLIST 341,202 386,512 2.49 973.34 

Buguio City 183,102 226,883 4.09 57.51 

La Trinidad 48,252 63,089 5.04 80.78 

Itogon 61,773 47,781 4.70 423_70 

Sablan 8,440 9,170 1.57 96_95 

Tuba 39,635 39,589 -0.02 314.40 

CAMADA 251,160 269,093 1.38 147.50 

Calasiao 62,966 69,528 1.87 53.40 

Mangaldan 65,947 73,351 2.01 56.87 

Dagupan City 122,247 126,214 0.60 37.23 

Metro Naga 502,299 560,322 2.19 1,257.67 

Naga City 115,329 126,972 1.82 84.48 

Bombon 10,874 11,739 1.44 44.20 

Calabanga 54,261 59,164 1.63 163.80 

Camaligan 15,436 17,411 2.28 4.68 

Canaman 20,298 22,732 2.14 43.27 

Gainza 7,095 7,743 1.65 14.75 

Magarao 16,623 18,264 1.78 44.97 

Milaor 18,199 21,213 2.91 33.64 

Minalabac 35,922 37,574 0.85 126.10 

Pamplona 24,097 26,176 1,56 80.60 

Pasacao 31,960 36,070 2.29 149.54 

Pill 52,481 61,520 3.02 126.25 

San Fernando 20,608 24,196 3.05 71.76 

Bula 48,240 54,650 2.37 151.30 

Ocampo 30,876 34,898 2.32 118.33 

Metro l]oil0 403,949 437,351 1.59 207.80 

Iloilo City 309,505 334,539 1.47 56.00 

Leganes 18,505 19,235 0.73 32.20 

Pavia 23,814 26,756 2.21 35.00 

Oton 52,125 .56,821 _. 1.63 84.60


Table 3 (continued) 

Population 

MeU'o Level Growth Rate Land Area 

1990 1995 1990-1995 (sq. km) 

Metro Cebu 1,274,345 1,435,903 2.39 922.98 

Cebu City 610,417 662,299 1.54 315.00 

Lapu-Lapu City 146,194 173,744 3.29 58.06 

Mandaue City 180,285 194,745 "1.46 25.18 

Cordova 22,331 26,613 3.34 17.15 

Concolacion 41,270 49,205 3.35 147.20 

Lfloasl 42,587 50,973 3.43 52.10 

Compostela 22,006 26,499 3.54 53.90 

Tali_ay 97,955 120,292 3.92 86.45 

MinglaniUa 50,875 62,523 3.94 65.60 

Naga 60,425 69,010 2.52 102.34 

Metro C,DO 718,699 861,588 3.63 3,841.71 

CDO City 339,598 428,314 4.44 412.80 

Jasaan 29,146 33,598 2.70 77.02 

Villanueva 17,122 21,310 4.19 48.80 

Tagoloan 33,919 40,929 3.58 117.73 

Claveria 31,130 39,020 4.32 894.90 

Opol 20,473 23,958 2.99 80.85 

El Salvador 26,721 31,500 3.13 87.13 

Alubijid 19,531 21,765 2.05 103.45 

Laguindingan 15,503 16,521 1.20 16.74 

Gitagum 10,994 11,327 0.56 43.40 

Libona 29,652 31,897 1.38 343.20 

Manolo Fortich 61,329 67,400 1.78 405.19 

Talakag 35,379 39,378 2.03 186.40 

Baungon 19,774 22,617 2.55 245.30 

Malitbog 14,934 16,414 1.79 581.85 

Sumilao 13,494 15,640 2_80 196.95 

Metro Davao 849,947 1,006,840 3.39 2,211.30 

Davao City 849,947 1,006,840 3.39 2,211.30 

Metro Davao2 1,016,070 1,196,564 2.66 2,724.61 

Davao City 849,947 1,006,840 3.39 2,211.30 

Sta. Cruz 55,951 59,139 1.11 319.91 

Panabo 110,172 130,585 3.40 193.40 

Metro Dav'ao3 2,932,361 3,288,824 2.29 20,817.86 

Davao City 849,947 1,006,840 2.28 2,211.30 

Davao del Sur 632,701 677,069 2.41 4,541.05 

Davao Oriental 394,697 413,472 0.87 5,700.61 

Davao del Norte 1,055,016 1,191,443 2.28 8,364.90 

Sources: Basic data from National Statistics Office 1990; 1995 Census of Population and 

Housing. 

Davao Integrated Development Program (DIDP). Metro Davao is a 

product of the joint undertakings by the city and the three provinces 

whose aim was to develop the whole of Davao as a tourist and 

investment area. Such undertakings includes big tourism projects as 

well as the area's major role in the East ASEAN Growth Polygon.


The beginnings of Metro BLIST and CAMADA (though actual 

development was facilitated more by the effects of the 1990 

earthquake) can also be traced to its being first identified as major 

components of the North West Luzon Growth Quadrangle (NWLGQ). 

The NWLGQ is an interregional development strategy envisioned 

for Region I and CAR. Metro BLIST and CAMADA constitute the 

East Quad and South Quad (CAMADA-Sual-Bolinao Growth 

Corridor), respectively. 

Deliberate national policy and constituency approval 

Metro Manila is the only metropolis that came about as a result 

of a conscious policy decision at the national level. Metro Manila is 

not only a metropolis but is also the National Capital Region (NCR). 

Such title carries with it a distinction of being the economic, social, 

cultural, educational and political center of the nation. The needs of 

metropolitan Manila is a priority concern of the national leadership 

because of two major considerations. First is how to improve public 

services in the areas geographically embracing the center of 

government. Problems of inefficient and uncoordinated services as 

well as future challenges in the face of rapid urbanization have caught 

the attention of the national leadership. The second consideration is 

the need to develop a region that will serve as the showcase for the 

country's drive for modernization consistent with its exp0rt-oriented 

national development strategy. These concerns brought the Marcos 

leadership to issue Memorandum Order No. 314 dated November 

10, 1972, creating an Inter-Agency Committee on Metro Manila to 

"study the systems of municipal/city government in metropolitan 

Manila and to recommend whatever measures of coordination and 

integration are deemed appropriate" and to "study the functions and 

responsibilities of the National Government in the metropolitan area, 

and to recommend whatever changes in structure and interrelation 

with municipal governments are deemed appropriate." The 

committee proposed for the creation of a Metropolitan Manila 

Authority under the Office of the President through a presidential 

decree. A referendum was called for to get the people's support to 

legalize the compositional definition of Metro Manila and to give the 

President the authority to create a new administrative structure for 

the NCR. Eventually, with the positive response by the people, a 

presidential decree (PD 824) was issued in 1975, which defined the 

composition of Metro Manila and created the Metro Manila

Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines 45 

Commission (MMC). Executive Order 392 was issued by President 

Corazon Aquino in 1990, replacing MMC with the Metropolitan 

Manila Authority (MMA). Then in March 1995, Congress enacted a 

law creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority 

(MMDA), replacing MMA and clothed with more powers and 

authorities than the previous metro body. 

Lozalmittazi_ 

Metro Iloilo and Metro Naga are examples of local or 

subregional initiatives. The germ for the creation of Metro Iloilo came 

from influential city locales and was eventually supported by some 

local officials of Iloilo City and the three surrounding municipalities 

that have a stake in a metropolitan arrangement. 

In the case of Metro Naga, the establishment of the metro 

arrangement was principally bolstered by the leadership of the mayor 

of Naga City. Under Naga City's leadership, the initial discussion on 

the gas shortage as a result of the Gulf War eventually led to broader 

concerns and identified the potentials for future cooperation, which 

paved the way for the creation of the Metro Naga Development 

Council. 

Organization, Financing and Activities of Metropolitan 

Arrangements: Variations and Commonalities 

Table 4 outlines the various organizational structures and 

sources of financing of the eight metropolitan arrangements in the 

country. Only three of the eight metropolitan areas under 

investigation already have their respective policy and management 

structures in place. These include Manila, Naga and Davao. Metro 

Manila and Metro Naga are supported by a congressional law and 

presidential decree, respectively, while Metro Davao was established 

through a memorandum of agreement by and among local 

government officials. Majority are still in the process of forming their 

metro bodies and are biased for an authority type of management 

leadership although local leadership is emphasized particularly in the 

chairmanship and composition of the executing council. The Metro 

Cebu Development Council is one of the most recent organizations 

formed. A lot still have to be done to internally organize as well as 

clarify linkages with the regional and local structures, and institutions. 

Except for Metro Manila, all metropolitan arrangements are 

largely locally led. The provincial governors and mayors of the cities


and municipalities of the cooperating area comprise the highest 

decisionmaking group in the organizational hierarchy. Although it 

has been shown in the preceding discussions that while many of the 

existing metropolitan arrangements were not mostly local initiatives, 

the management and sustainability of the arrangement depend largely 

on the zeal and full cooperation of the LGUs. This does not only 

pertain to their crucial role in steering the development of their area 

but similarly important is their commitment to sustain the established 

arrangement through their agreed financial contribution. All 

metropolitan arrangements have fixed local contribution, which is 

Table 4. Organizational Types and F'mancingof Metropolitan Arrangements 

Existing Proposed Source(s) 

Metro Organization Organization Basis / Support Participants of Financing 

Manila Metro Manila Republic Act National / National Allocation/ 

Development Local Local Fixed 

Authority 

Contribution/ 

Fees/Fines Collection 

CAMADA Under Study CAMADA Master Under Under Study 

(Structure) Plan Study 

BLIST Short Term: BLIST Master Local Under Study 

Consultative (Structure) Plan 

Forum 

Long Term: 

a "Metro" 

Authority 

Naga Metro Naga Executive Order Local National Allocation/ 

Development 

Local Fixed 

Council 

Contribution 

Cebu Metro Cebu RDC Resolution Regional MCDP Proiect Funds/ 


To be determined 

Council 

Iloilo Metro lloilo Memorandum of Local Local Fixed 

Development Agreement Contribution 

Council 

CDO Under Study Metro CDO Under Under Study 

Master Plan (on- Study 

going) 

Davao DIDP Board/ Memorandum of Local Local Fixed 

Committee/ Agreement Contribution 

Management 

Office

MetropolitanArrangements in the Philippines 47 

usually a certain percentage of the LGU's internal revenue allotment. 

For Metro Davao3, LGUs provide an equal share of P300,000 as initial 

funding for the program and the operation of the management 

structure. However, Metro Manila and Metro Naga are provided 

annual appropriations from the national government budget, on top 

of the fixed local contribution. 

Table 5 lists the areas of concern considered or proposed to be 

undertaken by the established and the soon-to-be-instituted 

metropolitan arrangements. There are some disparities in the activities 

undertaken by each metropolitan arrangement. This is expected 

considering the diversity in the conditions and priority for coordinated 

effort of each area. For ins "tance, only Metro Davao and Metro Baguio 

have included tourism as part of their major concern because of its 

significant role in these areas' development goals. Interestingly, the 

concerns of Metro Manila and Metro Cebu are exactly the same 

because Cebu views its present and future needs for integrated 

planning and service delivery as one that is or would be similar to 

those of Manila [at least t_om the point of view of the proponent of 

the congressional bill creating the Metro Cebu Development Council 

(MCDA)]. 

In general, however, there are concerns that seem to be common 

to all metropolises. These are in the areas of development planning, 

solid waste management, and transport and traffic management. 

MMDA considers these areas as its biggest challenge at present. It is 

worthy to note that the other emerging metropolises have included 

these concerns either because they are confronted with these issues 

at present or because they want to be more prepared for these 

challenges in the future. 

In Metro Cebu, transport and traffic management is one of the 

priority concerns. Although the traffic situation may not be as severe 

as in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu is confronted with traffic congestion 

in some of its major sections. If existing road situations are not 

improved (i.e., unless new road constructions and/or road expansions 

are undertaken in the future), all of these road sections will be totally 

clogged with increasing traffic demand by the year 2000. Table 6 shows 

past and future traffic demand and how this translates in selected 

road sections of Metro Cebu. The tmttic demand will continually grow 

at over 3 percent toward the next century. By then, its major road 

sections have reached beyond their full capacity as revealed by the 

computed congestion ratios.


Table 5. Development Activities Under the Metropolitan Arrangements 

Metro 

Concern Activity Program 

Manila Development Planning 

Transport and Traffic Management 

Solid Waste Disposal and Management 

Flood Control and Sewerage Management 

Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services 

Health and Sanitation, Urban Protection and Pollution Control 

Public 

Safety 

CAMADA Development Planning (socioeconomic, land use and environment) 


Flood Control and Drainage Improvement 

Solid Waste Management 

City/Town Centers Upgrading 

Housing/Resettlement 

Education 

Health 

Telecommunications 

Water 

Supply 

BLIST Solid Waste Management 


Tourism 

Water 

Supply 

Naga Development Planning 

Equipment Pool Program 

Elderly Service 

Emergency Rescue 

Enterprise Development 

Manpower Development and Employment 

Water Supply 

Health Services Support 

Cebu Development Planning 

Transport and Tr'_c Management 

Solid Waste Disposal and Management 

Flood Control and Sewerage Management 

Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services 

Health and Sanitation, Urban Protection and Pollution Control 

Public 

Safety 

Iloilo Development Planning 

Transport, Traffic Engineering and Management 

Environmental Sanitation, Waste Management and Disposal System 

Flood Control and Sewerage Mmlagement 

Urban Renewal, Land Use and Zoning and Shelter Services 

Networking of"Economic Support Infrastructure 

Public Safety, Maintenance of Peace and Order, Disaster Management 

Trade and Investment Promotion 

CDO Traffic Management 

Water Supply 

Solid Waste Disposal and Management


Table 6. Past and Future Traffic Demand in Metro Cebu, 1979-2010 

1979 1992 2000 2010 

Person Trips (000) 

Private 111 347 583 901 

Public 1029 1846 1728 2309 

Total 1139 1093 2311 3210 

Annual Growth Rate 8.05 g_89 $.29 

Selected Sections 

(person t.rips, in 000) 

Talisay-Ce bu 35 61 85 

Cebu-Mandaue 51 110 159 

Mandaue-Consolacion 25 55 82 

Mactart-MaJ.nla_d 17 36 58 

Road Congestion Ratio 

Talisay-Gebu 1.18 2.03 2.83 

Cebu-Mandaue 0.64 1.38 1.99 

Mandau e-Consolation 1.25 2.75 4.10 

Macta_,-Mainland 0.86 1.80 2.90 

ASSUMPTIONS 

Population (000) 1,274 1,712 2,301 

Trip Maker (000) 956 1,284 1,726 

Trip Rate per Trip Maker 1.68 1.8 1.86 

Private Vehicles (000) 65 110 170 

Basic source: Cebu Integrated Area Development Master Plan Study (1994). 

well-operated landfill or composting site. Dagupan, Calasiao and 

Mangaldan have dump sites that are generally below international 

health standards. Land area estimates for landfill sites ior the 

CAMADA are shown in Table 8 based on the indicated assumptions. 

Potential areas have been proposed in the Master Plan for CAMADA 

and are still awaiting actual implementation. 

The above cases of metropolitan arrangements underline the 

difference of tackling local concerns toward a more integrative 

planning and program implementation and the need to clefine the 

roles of each involved LGU. The basis for such arrangements vary in 

legal forms such as laws, executive orders or memoranda of 

agreement, depending on the political culture of these areas. 

Generally, such legal forms delineate each locality's functions and 

roles in the given arrangement, in practice, however, formal 

arrangements and systems are not yet installed for many of the metros 

under study despite their awareness of their respective urban 

problems. 

Note that the functions commonly identified for metropolitan 

cooperation are largely consistent with those one might expect a prior/


Table 7. Urban BLIST: WaterDemand, 1994-2020 

Year Population % Served Average 

LPCD 

Water Production Requirements 

Ave. (cu. m/day) Peak (cu. in/day) 

1994 312,000 58 190 34,400 48,135 

2000 358,000 70 210 54,600 73,700 

2010 421,000 80 220 74,100 103,700 

2020 473,000 90 220 93,700 131,100 

Source: BDUPP (1994a). 

Table 8. CAMADA:Landf'dlSite Requirements 

LandAreaRequired 

Period Initial Population Final Population (ha) 

1996-2000 301,000 334,000 9.2 

2000-2010 334,000 417,000 27.3 

20102020 417,000 500,000 33.4 

TOTAL 69.9 

Assumptions: 

Average daily waste generation: 0.75 kg/capita/day 

Percent of population serviced by collection system: 95% 

Average solid waste density (as collected): 375 kg/cu.m 

Final landfill volume: 50% of collected volume 

Average landfill depth: 5 m 

Additional site area required for services: 5% 

Basic source: BDUPP 

(1994b). 

on the basis of the theory on expenditure assignment under fiscal 

decentralization. That is, functions that are characterized by 

economies of scale and externalities are generally deemed to be more 

appropriate for higher level governments. Thus, services that require 

areas larger than a local jurisdiction for cost-effective provisioning 

like water supply, sewage disposal and solid waste management are 

generally assigned to metropolitan governments worldwide. Similarly, 

the same is true for services like public health whose benefits and 

costs accrue to nonresidents of a Iocaljurisdiction (i.e., services that 

give rise to spadal externalities). 

On the other hand, Metro Naga's identification of "elderly 

service" as a metropolitan service appears to be surprising at first 

considering that it is largely a quasi-private good with minimal 

economies of scale and benefit/cost spillout. However, if one 

considers that this service is likely to have a large redistributive 

component, then one sees why the proponents of Metro Naga would 

rather assign this to the metropolitan unit rather than to the individual 

LGUs.

Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines ,53 

the formation of a stronger and more coordinated structure to 

implement the Plan. 

Metros Cebu and CDO have yet to show any concrete evidence 

that their cities and municipalities concurs with the need for a formal 

metropolitan arrangement. One may argue that in the case of the 

former, the problem of acceptability may not be so alarming 

considering that the area has already experienced many metro 

projects in the past. However, one must consider that the dynamics 

of a policy and the management structure differ a lot between a project 

office and a metro body. Metro CDO, which is currently formulating 

a master plan for itself, may have to find out how the LGUs envisioned 

to comprise it would like to view the plan's institutional management 

structure. The failure of Metro BLIST and CAMADA to instill among 

the LGUs involved a deep appreciation of the arrangement and their 

inability to work outan acceptable structure for the master plan should 

serve as a lesson to others. 

Leadership is crucial to the adoption of an acceptable 

metropolitan structure. There are two points in this leadership issue. 

The first concerns the question of who should initiate to get everyone 

to agree on a structure. The second is the determination of an 

agreeable mode of metro leadership. 

The first facet of the issue is a serious reality. Generally, the 

initiative is expected to come from the dominant city. There are at 

least three reasons for this. First, most often than not, the dominant 

city has the greatest stake in the arrangement. Second, the city is 

usually recognized as a "big brother" to the other LGUs. Third, the 

component cities and municipalities are constrained ethically to make 

the first move considering thz, t they are structurally under the 

provincial government. 

While these reasons may be valid, the dominant city still hesitates 

to initiate. There are two reasons. First, dominant city fears that some 

LGUs may misconstrue the former's initiative as a move to expand its 

political power and authority. Second, the dominant city encounters 

some difficulty over the provincial government's sensitivities. The 

result is a political stalemate. This whole initiative issue is very real in 

the case of Metro BLIST and C_IKDA. Higher authorities (i.e., 

regional or national leaders) are opined by the local officials to be 

more effective arbiters in such a case.


The second facet of the leadership issue is equally challenging, 

i.e., the choice of leadership type for the adopted structure. Metro 

Manila provides a good example of experiments !n metropolitan 

leadership. The MMC had a powerful governor at its helm. The MMA 

shared the powers by adopting a rotating leadership among the 

members of its council. The MMDA has a presidential appointee as 

chairperson with a Cabinet rank while giving the council a big 

decisionmaking authority. Given Metro Manila's rich experience on 

various modes of leadership, it is not surprising that many of the 

emerging metropolises refer back to these tried structures in 

formulating their own. Reaching a decision on an acceptable formula 

is still in process for a lot of these emerging metropolises• 

• " ed_body 

An effective structure is where roles and functions are clearly 

delineated and understood. In the experience of the MMDA, this 

factor is lacking. One of the criticisms on the functions and 

responsibilities OfMMDA under Republic Act 7295 is the use of the 

word "coordinate," which finds weakness in practice. For instance, 

MMDA's function in coordinating land use classification and zoning 

means almost nothing because it is the LGUs that have the authority 

anyway to reclassify land by virtue of the Local Government Code. 

Coordination in this case has often reduced the MMDA into a mere 

center of information on any changes in land classification by the 

LGU. An integrated physical planning for Metro Manila, which is the 

whole rationale for such task, becomes difficult for MMDA to 

effectively carry out because the function as written in the law does 

not warrant full responsibility and authority. 

e an " • 

When a metropolitan arrangement graduates into a formal 

metropolitan structure, it inevitably requires a full-time organization 

to handle its growing technical and administrative needs. Metro Naga, 

which has gradually evolved from an informal metropolitan setup to 

an established institution, now finds itself needing to build up its 

secretariat support to the Metro Naga Development Council (MNDC) 

as development challenges and activities in the area mount. At present, 

such support is lodged with a Project Officer of Naga City. While this 

one-man support setup is still workable, an expansion of management 

support may eventually become a big necessity.


Finandal mstainabillty 

One of the key factors for a metropolitan body to be sustainable 

is a stable financial source. Different modes of financing and various 

strategies have been employed by existing metropolitan organizations. 

It can be said that the different convictions and perspectives on 

metropolitan structures are reflected in their choice of financing. 

Metro Davao believes on local self-reliance and, therefore, deliberately 

ruled out their dependence on national support to finance its 

organizational machinery. Thus, each member-LGU commits 

P300,000 as its annual contribution. Metro Naga, on the other hand, 

is more practical in its approach. While it too believes in local selfreliance, 

it takes into account the financial condition of the LGUs in 

the arrangement. The uniform 2 percent of the 20 percent 

development fund set aside by the municipality from their annual 

budget as contribution to MNDC addresses the varying financial ability 

of its members. In view of the limitation of the total local contribution, 

the MNDC has to source funds from other sources. The issuance of 

Executive Order (EO) 102 creating the MNDC was a means employed 

by Metro Naga to entitle itself funds from the national budget. The 

original proposal was to get funding from such institutions as the 

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The 

executive order, however, provided for funds under the Office of the 

President. While the NMDA receives an appropriation of P1 million 

annually, the appropriated item has changed its funding source. 

Currently, the budget is part of that of the National Economic and 

Development Authority (NEDA)under its Integrated Area 

Development activities, the item where the fund of the Regional 

Development Council (RDC) is also sourced. 

Metro Manila is a special case. Being a nationally initiated 

metropolis backed by a congressional law, it gets a regular 

appropriation, on top of fixed local contribution, from member-cities 

and municipalities sufficient enough to manage its day-to-day 

operations. 

laenaCyand "toyatty"erise,of 

and munidpalities 

The introduction of a metropolitan structure--be it 

metropolitan arrangement or a formal metropolitan body--chang. 

significantly the relationships of political units in the local governme 

system. Figure 2 shows graphically these changes. Prominent in t"


Figure 2. Comparative Structures of Local Government System With 

and Without a Metropolitan Body 

Philippine Local •Government 

System 

WithoutMetro Structure 

WithMetro Structure 

Metropolit_ ] [ Provinoe 

comparison is the way component cities and municipalities of the 

arrangement can be cross-related with the province and the 

metropolitan body. Quite many believe, though, that the identity and 

loyalty issue may not necessarily present problems in the legaladministrative 

perspective but may do so in the political realm. The 

issue becomes sensitive especially when the historical evolution of 

Metro Manila is brought to the fore. It may be recalled that the original 

composition of Metro Manila prior to the establishment of the MMC 

includes the cities of Manila, Quezon City, Pasay and Caloocan--all 

units that are not under any provincial jurisdiction. When the MMC 

was installed after a pleb!scite was undertaken, the 12 municipalities 

that were under the province of Rizal and one municipality under 

the province of Bulacan formed part of a special province now called 

Metropolitan Manila Area or the National Capital Region (NCR). 

Many believe that the eventual late of many municipalities and 

component cities upon joining any metropolitan arrangement is to 

be detached from the province and become part of a new political 

jurisdiction. The experience of Metro Naga, however, shows that it is 

possible for municipalities to maintain their identity as a political unit 

under the province and still be an active member of the metropolitan 

arrangement as well as contribute religiously in all its endeavors while 

• doing its responsibilities as part of the larger i_rovince. It should be 

mentioned, though, that the MNDC leadership particularly of Naga


City consulted the province regarding the formation of the council 

and sought its support and cooperation. 

The existence of a municipal identity and loyalty despite its 

metropolitan arrangement in the traditional local government system 

may, thus, depend on the political dynamics in the regional area. Such 

dynamics will determine the destiny of subprovincial units involved 

in the arrangements. 

Resolution of conflicts: compromise and sacrifice 

Taking heed of tradeoffs between metropolitan and local 

concerns is one of the more difficult issues in metropolitan 

governance. The basic problem arises when local executives give 

priority to the interest of their respective constituents over that of 

the whole metropolis. The problem of solid waste management best 

illustrates this dilemma. 

Many LGUs have improved garbage collection system by 

adopting more systematic methods and have successfully rallied the 

cooperation of their constituencies in promoting a clean environment. 

However, the reality remains that the final disposal of collected 

garbage has not reached a level of modernity and strict environmental 

acceptability. Open dumping is still the standard practice. The two 

major technologies available in this regard are incineration and the 

establishment of a sanitary landfill. The former is regarded by the 

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as an 

expensive option considering the quality of waste generated, which 

is largely putrescible materials. The use of landfills is what the agency 

is encouraging local governments to adopt instead (Ganapin 1997). 

There are two big constraints to the establishment of sanitary 

landfills, which is why these cannot gain much support from local 

governments. First and foremost is the huge cost of developing the 

facility and the similarly expensive maintenance requirement. This 

problem could be mitigated through inter-LGU cooperation as 

economies of scale are achieved. Metropolitan arrangements show a 

lot of promise in this regard. In case financing can be handled jointly 

by the LGUs concerned, a second hindrance comes to the fore--the 

NIMB (short for Not In My Backyard) attitude. The problem of site 

identification is such a perplexing issue and no amount of technical 

exegesis can convince a local government of the economic, geological 

and environmental feasibility of an area under its jurisdiction as the 

best place to build the sanitary landfill.


For a lot of the emerging metropolises under study, the garbage 

issue is one of the sources of nonsupport for a metropolitan 

arrangement. Often, municipalities, especially those that have large 

tracts of land with big potential as a landfill site, perceive such 

arrangement as a means for them to be co-opted to be the site of 

refuse of the dominant city or the other municipalities in the 

metropolitan area. 

Metro Manila's experience in this issue was one that required 

presidential intervention. What complicated the problem is that the 

identified landfill sites are in Carmona and San Mateo---both in Rizal 

and municipalities outside of Metro Manila's jurisdiction. The issue 

could not have reached a fast resolution had Malacafiang not 

intervened for the MMDA. 

For many cities, especially those having limited land for final 

disposal, the garbage problem pose both a serious and an urgent 

issue. For instance, Baguio City projects that its current dump site 

will reach full capacity in a year's time. Negotiations are being tried 

for a possible site in La Trinidad, among others, but with much 

difficulty. 

If metropolitan arrangements will not prove workable for cities 

beset with metropolitan-wide problems, how can these be resolved 

Should Metro Manila's experience of Presidential mediation be always 

used or should a national policy be formulated in cases of conflicts 

requiring compromise or sacrifice 

Sustaining and Enhancing the Metropolitan Arrangements 

Addressing the issues just described necessitates a clear 

understanding of the elements essential for the successful planning 

and management of the metropolis. An understanding of these basic 

prerequisites would help identify the necessary policy intervention 

instruments that will solve the issues confronting the existing and 

emerging metropolises in the country. 

The identification of the key elements of metropolitan planning 

and management finds basis on the documented experiences of other 

countries and from the unique lessons derived from the existing 

metropolitan arrangements in the Philippines under study. 

There are three key elements or conditions necessary for an 

effective and efficient metropolitan planning and development. First, 

a common vision of preservation and development of the region is 

crucial. Second, there ought to be a unified ecooomic and political 

base to implement the vision. Third, an appropriate metropolitan

MetropolitanArrangements inthe Philippines 59 

structure that will provide an institutional framework for successful 

planning and implementation is inevitable. These three conditions 

essentially constitute what we shall refer hereon as the metropolitan 

governance framework (Figure 3). 

At the apex of the triad is the adoption of a vision to preserve 

and develop the region or the constituted metropolitan area. The 

vision may either be an elaborately framed goal or a simple recognition 

of the benefits that the members of the constituted metropolis 

may derive from the arrangement or cooperation. Similarly important 

is the process of framing and adopting the vision or the identified 

benefits. The ownership of the vision can be better accepted as 

well as produce an impact if the vision itself is derived through a process 

of community debate and decisionmaking. 

A universal experience in metropolitan planning is that many 

of the formal master plans that embodied the vision for the metropolis 

suffer from non-implementation to mere uselessness (Angotti 1993). 

This is one of the biggest frustrations of metropolitan arrangements 

such as in the cases of Metro BLIST and CAMADA. 

There is no question on the technical merits of these master 

plans. What is lacking perhaps is the fuller involvement and cooperation 

of member-municipalities in promoting a metropolitan-wide vision 

that reflects the collective interests of the major stakeholders in 

the area. Cooperation is better assured and the organizational mechanism 

for implementing the vision will be less difficult to install if local 

ownership of the metropolitan arrangement is secured early on. 

A contrasting example is Metro Naga, which took its root from 

a desire of the leaders of the city and member-municipalities to pursue 

development via the principle of resource sharing, role identification 

and integrated area development. A number of achievements 

Figure 3. Metropolitan Governance Framework 

Common Vis/onfor the Reg/on 

and Po//t/m/Base 

M_erope//ta_


have been made so far without the existence of a formal master plan. 

Only recently did the leaders realize the need for one. 

Metro Davao3 is also treading toward a more sustainable arrangement. 

Its vision of nine key result areas for socioeconomic cooperation 

and development under its Davao Integrated Development Program 

shall form the basis for the soon-to-be-completed master plan. 

The Memorandum of Agreement adopting the strategy and the commitment 

to financially assist indicates a commitment to a unified purpose 

and vision for the region. 

At the base of a triad is a unified political and economic mechanism 

to implement the vision. Ideally, to be effective and efficient, 

the metropolitan area should have a unified political jurisdiction and 

a well-coordinated and well-managed economic agencies and authorities. 

Metropolitan planning and management differ from city or 

municipal planning in that the former has to contend with disjointed 

political jurisdictions. Unified planning is thwarted especially when 

these political jurisdictions retain and exercise substantial functions 

and powers under existing laws. A similarly formidable challenge is 

how to harmonize or rationalize the various sectoral and specialized 

agencies providing urban development services. These agencies and 

authorities often develop independently of elected government and 

may resist participation in metropolitan-wide planning if not handled 

carefully and systematically. 

Metropolitan Tokyo is a distinct political unit with 23 special 

wards, 26 cities, 7 towns and 8 villages. The development of the whole 

area is contained in a single plan, which is backed up by a national 

legislation and has the national agencies providing for its regional 

infrastructure needs. In Calcutta, effective delivery of services and 

infrastructure needs of the metropolitan area was carried out only by 

rationalizing the existence of about 570 public institutions, "a veritable 

maze of jurisdictions and authorities that were often in conflict 

andin noway coordinated regionwide" (Sivaramakrishnan and Green 

1986). In Metropolitan Toronto, a division for urban services was 

devised so that the six area municipal governments and the regional 

agencies, boards and commissions have clearly defined responsibilities 

and accountabilities. 

On the other hand, the case of Metro Manila best illustrates the 

presence of multiple government agencies operating, in most cases, 

independendy of the metropolitan authority. Almost all the metropolitan 

services are handled outside of the MMDA without a clear


line of authority between these agencies and the metropolitan sixucture. 

For instance, in the transport sector, the Light Rail Transit Authority 

(LRTA) is under the Department of Transportation and Communication 

(DOTC), Traffic Engineering and Management Team is 

under the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), road 

construction and operations are under DPWH and local governments, 

vehicle registration and licensing are with the Land Transportation 

Office (LTO) and the Land Transport Franchising Regulatory Board 

(LTFRB), flood control and drainage is with DPWH, environmental 

management and services are with the Department of Environment 

and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Laguna Lake Development 

Authority (LLDA). 

The problem of coordination especially in urban iniiastructure 

was not evident during the MMC regime as it was during the MMA 

establishment, when it suffered not only financial and manpower 

constraints but also powerlessness in coordinating metro-wide services. 

While greater powers have been given to the present MMDA, 

problems still exist in the area of vertical and horizontal coordination 

among national sectoral agencies as well as local governments. 

The last element of the triad is the choice of metropolitan structure. 

Existing and emerging metropolises in the country may choose 

one or a combination of the following models of governance structure 

acceptable to its members: (1) a metropolitan city, under which 

a single LGU has responsibility for all local functions; (2) jurisdictional 

fragmentation, under which the responsibility for the same 

local functions lies with the various LGUs operating in the metropolitan 

area; and (3) functional fragmentation, under which the provision 

of services is area-wide but divided along functional lines among 

the LGUs and one or more autonomous agencies or corporations 

(Bahl and Linn 1992). However, each of these metropolises will have 

to craft its own structure considering the multiplicity and variety of 

political and socioeconomic challenges. 

Alternative Metropolitan Structures 

Given the issues raised in the preceding section, the task of 

choosing from among the variety of metropolitan structures would 

definitely not be easy. This section now discusses some of these alternative 

structures for metropolitan management and how they can 

address the particular needs of the present and rising metropolitan 

arrangements.


New city or metropolitan city 

The metropolitan area may be structured as a metropolitan city 

where the provision of most basic services is provided by a Single LGU 

and where no other LGU operates in the area. A metropolitan city 

may occur naturally by virtue of the prior existence of a political jurisdiction 

whose land area is large enough to contain its urban sprawl 

within its boundaries. Alternatively, a metropolitan city may result from 

the annexation or amalgamation of a number of existing political 

jurisdictions or LGUs into a single political administrative unit. Metropolitan 

Bangkok is actually a merger of former municipalities of 

Bangkok and Thonburi. The result was the creation of the Bangkok 

Metropolitan Administration (BMA), an autonomous metropolitan 

city government. The BMA charter provided for a metropolitan assembly 

consisting of both elected and appointed members, each representing 

a constituency of about 100,000 people, the equivalent of a 

district. Aside from Bangkok, metropolitan cities in other countries 

include Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Surabaya and Jakarta. 

The metropolitan city structure provides some ease in coordinating 

activities and implementing plans. The duplication of services 

is less likely and the new city tends to be large enough to enjoy economies 

of scale (Bahl and Linn 1992). The formation of a new citycan 

provide a resolution to the legal administrative ties between the province 

and the municipality/ies that are involved in the metropolitan 

arrangement. Their legal identity in the local government system is, 

thus, clearer and more defined. However, the weakness of the metro 

city's structure lies in its general inability to account for intra-city or 

neighborhood differences in the demand for the services. 

For metropolitan arrangements that involve only a relatively few 

local entities and where political and cultural forces are less problematic, 

a plebiscite can be held for a new city charter. The CAMADA 

may be an eligible candidate. Interviews conducted with high officials 

of Dagupan City and the municipalities of Calasiao and 

Mangaldan indicated no strong opposition to this option. However, 

since the two municipalities thought that because Dagupan City has 

twice their population, they may have to field one candidate for mayorship 

or governorship for the newly formed political unit to compete 

with Dagupan City. 

Jurisd'wtional frabomentation with a second-tier government 

The second approach to metropolitan governance is to allow 

for jurisdictional fragmentation, i.e., the existence of several LGUs

Metropolitan Arrangements inthe Philippines 63 

side by side with a second-tier governance structure within the metropolitan 

area. This structure is very common in the United States 

but examples in developing countries do exist, notably Metro Manila, 

Sao Paulo, Lima, Rio deJaneiro and metropolitan areas in South 

Asia. 

Geographic or jurisdictional fragmentation is usually a spontaneous 

phenomenon stemming from the expansion of the metropolis 

beyond the primate or core city. This model promotes economic 

efficiency by bringing the government closer to the people and, consequendy, 

making it more responsive to local preferences. However, 

it has the disadvantage of being less able to capture the benefits from 

economies of scale and to address problems associated with spillover 

effects of certain types of services. The creation of the second-tier 

governance structure in this model is precisely aimed at counteracting 

this inherent weakness in jurisdictional fragmentation. 

The upper-tier structure takes various forms in different places 

around the globe. One may have a metropolitan development council, 

metropolitan development authority or a metropolitan government. 

The difference among these three options lies in how power is 

shared among the LGUs in the metropolitan area and the leadership 

structure in the second-tier. 

Metropolitan development council (MZK2) 

A common and less complex form of metropolitan structure is 

a metropolitan development council (MDC). In this structure, the 

powers of LGUs composing the council are maintained. Metropolitan 

leadership rests on the council composed of mayors representing 

the cities and municipalities and whose chairmanship is appointed 

from among the members. 

A similar model can be found in most large U.S. metropolises 

such as the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 

(WASHCOG), which is an association of federal, state and local governments 

concerned with the Washington metropolitan area. The 

metropolis covers a land area of 4,000 square miles located in three 

states (Maryland, Virginia and District of Columbia) with a population 

of about 4 million people. 

The MMA is a form of MDC. Metro Naga's adopted structure is 

one vari_/nt that follows the RDC type of organization, minus the 

agency representations. Instead, it has purely local government composition. 

The Metro Davao3 model also has semblance to this structure. 

The difference between these existing models is their respec-


tive technical and administrative support. Metro Naga relies on 

secondment of technical personnel from the member LGUs to serve 

in the MNDC Secretariat. Metro Davao3, on the other hand, established 

a full-time Project Management Office to manage the affairs 

of the regional program. Meanwhile, the MMA has full-time personnel 

with plantilla positions, owing to its being an interim metropolitan 

structure after the abolition of the MMC. 

One advantage of this metropolitan structure is its relative ease 

in obtaining national support mainly because it is backed by constitutional 

provisions. An executive order from the president will suffice 

to sustain its legal identity and financial backing. However, because 

of the limited budget of the executive, financial sustainability of the 

MDC is always at risk. In the case of Metro Naga, its appropriation is 

taken from an agency budget. However, such could prove disadvantageous 

to the agency Local self-reliance in financing the council can 

hold some promise, as in the case of Metro Davao3--that is, if LGUs 

sustain their commitment to the arrangement. The MMA's regime 

suffered because the LGUs refused to contribute their Internal Revenue 

Allotment (IRA) shares to maintain the authority. 

Metropolitan development authority 

An attractive form of metropolitan structure is the metropolitan 

development authority (MDA). This is in view of its relative institutional 

permanence, greater corporate powers and functions and 

fiscal advantage. Also, since it is more of a technocratic organization 

than a political body, it de-politicizes decisionmaking especially on 

issues that are controversial or difficult to be raised by an elected 

leader as they involve political risks. 

In the Philippines, the creation of an MDA lies with the legislative 

branch by virtue of a congressional law enacted for that purpose. 

The metropolitan authority is typically headed by a chief executive 

officer who is appointed by either the central government or the state 

government. 

What easily comes to mind when referring to this model is the 

MMD& Based on interviews conducted in the regions, Metros Cebu, 

* The NEDA, from which the MNDC's appropriation is lodged, had to defend its 

recommendation to increase its budget ceiling following the addition of MNDC as a 

new item in the agency budgeL


BLIST, lloilo and CDO tend to prefer the MMDA structure but it is 

difficult to determine whether such structure would fit in the socioeconomic 

and political milieu of these emerging metropolises. Issues 

on political jurisdiction would have to be resolved and may require a 

regional plebiscite to determine the people's willingness to conform 

to a new administrative unit. Also, their coordinative relationships 

with the regional institutions (e.g., RDC) should be clearly spelled 

out. 

Metro Manila is unique because it is a region in itself but functioning 

as the RDC of the national capital region. Therefore, when 

adopting its model on other regions, adjustments may have to be 

made, especially on those that compose a significant geographic and 

political part of a region. Moreover, these are questions raised with 

respect to the strength of the authority because it displayed weak 

leadership and ineffective coordination of activities with local governments 

and national agencies. Caution, therefore, must be taken 

so that the faulty features of the model are avoided if it is to be adopted. 

A lot of cities or metropofises in South Asia, including New Delhi, 

Bombay, and Colombo, have adopted this model. Experience has also 

shown that, as has been the case in Karachi, metropolitan-wide authorities 

have not been able to resolve conflicts in project implementation 

and that central and provincial governments have to intervene 

(Cheema, in ADB 1987). Moreover, Bahl and Linn (1992) noted that: 

MDAs need to have executive functions and fiscal autonomy 

(resources) if they are able to coordinate the delivery of services 

within metropolitan areas and provide certain services 

with area-wide benefits. A planning agency with only advisory 

powers cannot effectively play this integrative role. Typically, 

MDAs have not been given such powers and as a consequence 

their effectiveness has suffered .... MDAs often fail to combine 

development (investment) and operating responsibility 

and thus create the typical turnkey problem: the agency responsible 

for capital ouday and planning does not allow sufficiently 

for the preferences and the technical, managerial, and 

financial capacity of the operating agency. The result is that 

local facilities deteriorate for lack of adequate maintenance. 4 

These weaknesses are shared by the two other models ofjurisdicational fragmentation 

discussed in this section.


Meixo4_lilaJa government 

The establishment of a me tropolitan government is one of the 

more controversial options. Metropolitan government differs from 

authorities or development councils in that the LGUs composing the 

metropolitan area are subjected to a higher jurisdictional authority 

or government whose leadership is usually elected. The metropolises 

of Tokyo and Toronto adopt this model. 

In a metropolitan government setup, the body is usually headed 

by an elected governor. There is a single-tier council and the city and 

municipal mayors also act as area managers. The governor coordinates 

the sectoral departments of the national government. In the 

Philippines, the establishment of this kind of metropolitan setup will 

only be possible with the amendment of the present Constitution. As 

discussed in the earlier section, LGUs have been safeguarded by the 

Constitution against any form of disempowerment that may result 

from the establishment of metropolitan authorities or similar bodies. 

It should be recalled that the new charter was framed in preparation 

for the abolition of centrist governance (under the Marcos administration) 

in favor of a more democratic regime and local autonomy. 

A compromise metropolitan government can be set up whereby 

the local governments retain their powers and function but surrender 

to the metropolitan government those functions and activities 

that are metropolitan in character or those that transcend political 

boundaries. The leadership shall be through an elected governor, 

who shall therefore command the respect of both the people and 

the local executives in the metropolitan area. 

Functlonal_ 

With functional fragmentation, LGUs in the metropolitan area 

have limited responsibilities for service delivery, but autonomous local 

bodies with corporate powers are given the authority to undertake 

specific functions and services on a metro-wide basis. Special 

metropolitan corporations can be established to perform services such 

as water supply and sewerage, electricity, transportation and solidwaste 

management. The metropolitan corporation model is suitable in addressing 

economies of scale in capital-intensive services like public 

utilities and transportationmareas where smaller LGUs would norreally 

have difficulty financing. The "corporatization" of service delivery 

has the advantage of energizing the management of service delivery 

activities by professionals (vs. politicians) whQse decisions tend to 

be shielded from political interventions. Moreover, this mode pro-


motes greater cost recovery; thus, assures the availability of funds for 

the expansion and maintenance of a particular service. However, this 

model makes cross-sectoral coordination more difficult and may lead 

to either over or underinvestment in certain sectors because of the 

earmarking of user charges to the activities. In Metro Manila, the 

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and the Light 

Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are examples of the functional fragmentation2 

There are other laudable models of these metropolitan corporations 

outside the country. For instance, the Metropolitan Toronto 

Corporation, with its agencies, boards and commissions, provides 

specialized urban service functions such as licensing, zoo maintenance, 

performing arts center administration, police services, transportadon, 

family and child service. The Karachi Metropolitan Corporation in 

Pakistan takes care of development projects through its subsidiaries, 

the Karachi Development Authority dealing with land and infrastructure 

projects and the Karachi Water Supply and Sewerage Board. In 

Metropolitan Madras, development projects and operation of urban 

services are executed by governmental, parastatal and municipal organizations, 

one of which is the Madras Corporation that is governed 

by a council of 120 elected members and administered with a stateappointed 

special officer. The commissioner, who is the executive 

head of the corporation, is also appointed by the state government. 

In Cartagena, Colombia, the Municipal Public Service Company 

(EPM) provides the majority with local public services including water 

supply, sewerage, fire protection, administration of public markets 

and slaughterhouses. 

Public corporations have been tried in the Philippines with some 

degree of failure and success but the experience has been largely 

limited at the national level. Metropolitan organizations may, however, 

adopt this model based on the success features in other metropolitan 

bodies abroad. However, a more basic issue has to be resolved. 

That is, whether the metropolitan body has the legal or corporate 

personality to undertake this form of service provision. In the case of 

Metro Manila, Presidential Decree 824 issued in 1975 created Metropolitan 

Manila as a public corporation but Republic Act 7924, which 

created MMDA in 1995, redefined the metropolis as a special devel- 

5Operationally, however, these are government-owned and controlled corporations 

(GOCCs) and, therefore, outside the coverage of the metropolitan unit.


opment and administrative region. Meanwhile, RA 7924, which is the 

existing legal framework for Metro Manila, no longer recognizes its 

corporate personality (unlike PD 824) nor allows for MMDA to create 

corporations. 

There are three notable reasons why it is advantageous for a 

m_tropolis to have a corporate personality. First, it will be able to 

advance economic interest should it require resources that are beyond 

what it can immediately provide; for instance, via capital market 

or through other financial arrangements with private institutions. 

Second, a metropolitan corporation may address the issue of decentralization 

versus re-centralization. For instance, acting as stockholders, 

LGUs can more forcibly advance their own interests as well as 

determine the functions of the organization and the manner by which 

these capacities will be carried out. Third, a corporate structure gives 

continuity to programs despite the limited tenure of local government 

leaders. 

Conclusions and Agenda for National Policy Action 

The metropolitan area is the ultimate form of urban transformation. 

Once an area reaches this stage, it becomes imperative that 

the area should not be constrained to evolve an identity as a new 

political and administrative unit. This will facilitate the formation of 

an organizational machinery that is appropriate, effective and efficient. 

This paper has shown concrete examples of this urban transformation 

and how the emergence of this phenomenon in many urban 

areas of the Philippines has necessitated new forms of administrative 

structures. The metropolis is not a province, municipality or city. It is 

rather a collection of all these and therefore requires unique planning 

models and distinct legal laws. 

Metropolitan planning and development is fast becoming a new 

feature of local governance in the Philippines. While most of the 

groundwork is undertaken largely by local governments themselves, 

the national government plays a critical role, especially in providing 

the legal framework and environment conducive to such undertakings. 

The following is a list of some of the short-term and long-term 

agenda for action in support of metropolitan development. 

Review of basic laws supporting metropolitan devekrpnwnt 

While the present Constitution has authorized the creation of 

special metropolitan political subdivisions," it has delimited the ex-

MetropolitanArrangements in the Philippines 69 

tent to which metropolitan management will proceed. This is because 

of the provision that says higher jurisdictional body such as metropolitan 

authorities can only be established through a congressional 

act and that "cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy 

and shall be entided to their own local executives and legislative assemblies." 

Thus, there are no laws that allow a desirable metropolitan 

mechanism with sufficient powers and authority when the situation 

calls for its establishment. One of the immediate tasks of 

policyrnakers, therefore, is to make appropriate amendments to the 

Philippine Charter that will strengthen the metropolitan structure 

and promote the objectives of metropolitanization. Some of the promising 

provisions can be the inclusion of metropolitan areas as a recognized 

territorial and political subdivision of" the country. With such 

recognition, it would be easier to accord the structure with enough 

powers and functions inherent in such political subdivision. This can 

provide [br a stronger constitutional authority and flexibility for any 

legislation pertaining to metropolitan organizations. 

Rad, ao/inelnde provisions in the Philippine Local Government 

Code 

The Local Government Code has overlooked local governance 

relative to the current and future dynamics of urbanization. Rapid 

urbanization as a result of greater industrialization and agricultural 

modernization, however, has compelled local government units to 

expand their political and administrative linkages with neighboring 

cities and municipalities. 

Should changes be made in the Local Government Code, its 

amendments should be in line with the proposed changes in the 

Constitution. This will allow for the eventual changes in the way sharing 

of powers and functions between LGUs and the constituted metropolitan 

organizations are to be effected. The current Local Government 

Code has further strengthened LGUs' powers and responsibilities 

while overlooking the fact that a number of them are attaining 

the metropolitan character. No provision, however, has been made 

to vest appropriate powers and responsibilities best suited to deal 

with the unique requirements of metropolitan management and development. 

In fact, serious problems still exist in so far as sharing of 

powers and responsibilities between the capital city and the surrounding 

municipalities is concerned as well as in the lack of appreciation 

to give up some of their powers and functions to a higher jurisdictional 

body.


There are at least two areas where amendments can be explored. 

First, the assignment of urban functions or services to a metropolitan 

unit ought to be consistent with and complement that of other 

LGUs or other government agencies. At the very least, the functions 

can take into account those that are metropolitan in character. Potential 

services for metropolitan units to assume include land use planning, 

traffic management, solid waste management, water and sewerage 

services, transport services, flood control and management. Second, 

the functional relationship of the metropolitan unit with other 

government entities must be clear and well-thought for better coordination 

and maximized benefits. For instance, in the area of budget 

review, the absence of an institutionalized development planning for 

Metro Manila was weakened when the Code passed on the review of 

the LGU budget to the DBM rather than to the MMDA (then MMA). 

This has institutionalized the disjointedand uncoordinated programming 

and budgeting process in the metropolis and prevented maximum 

use of Metro Manila's resources. Had the line of responsibility 

between the metropolitan unit or organization and the LGUs regarding 

plailning, programming and budgeting faanctions been recognized 

and made clear, then key problems and needs arising from the growing 

urban service and infrastructure requirements in the metropolis 

could have been strategically formulated. The same lack of institutional 

linkage with the sectoral line agencies makes it difficult for the 

MMDA to influence these agencies' priority thrusts. 

Recognize roles of _litan planning and institutions in the 

present and future urban managenwnt 

Urbanization and the rise of new metropolises are inevitable 

and the challenge of sustainable development in the next century 

lies in their effective and efficient management. National and regional 

planners' perspectives must seriously recognize the implications of 

metropolitanization in their medium- and long-term development 

planning efforts. 

The RDC as a nonpolitical entity can be a catalyst for interlocal 

or metropolitan undertakings in the region. As the development 

planning and policymaking body in the region, it can support and 

provide impetus to efforts where local governments are politically 

constrained to initiate.


Promote researchand deve/opm_ on metwpol/tan p/ann/rig 

and management modds 

Literature relating to city or metropolitan planning and 

management are not that many. In the Philippines, rigorous policy 

studies are rare and if there are any, most are focused on Metro Manila 

only. Given the myriad and increasing number of issues and problems 

of the city and metropolises, studies should be made on a more 

sustained basis to ably assist leaders in making appropriate policy 

interventions. 

Offhand, there are at least three related issues that have to be 

tackled in the short term. One is the need to look at what a metropolis 

or a metropolitan unit can or cannot do under the existing legal 

framework. A clear understanding of this aspect will reveal important 

issues for intervention by the legislature. Two is the need for a deeper 

study on the issues brought about by the changes in the institutional 

dynamics between regional and subregional governments following 

the emergence of a metropolitan arrangement. The policy study can 

identify how a metropolitan cooperation can enhance rather than 

obstruct regional development coordination. Third, financial 

mobilization under a metropolitan setup or similar inter-LGU 

arrangement is an important area for research since financial 

sustainability is the lifeblood of any metropolitan arrangement. 

Long-term issues can be identified in the areas of financial 

structure and management, improvement in the administrative 

capacity to meet the increasing demand for shelter and basic services, 

improvement of urban information systems, development of urban 

institutional capacities and issues pertaining to urban environmental 

management. 

Finally, the study has also explained that metropolitan planning 

goes beyond technical development planning, it is often political 

planning, a relational and prudent approach that sets it into reality 

and fruition. Sivaramakrishnan and Green (1986) has an interesting 

description of this: 

"In reality, metropolitan management is an unglamorous 

interagency process; its accent is on consensus rather than on 

command; its quality is a product of perseverance and team


effort; and its success in the long-run is directly dependent 

on the degree to which that effort can continue to be 

maintained in the rapidly changing kaleidoscope of 

metropolitan life," 

A metropolitan arrangement is a crucial beginning of 

metropolitan development. It can be a passing fancy if the members 

of the arrangement who hold the key to its full development lose 

their enthusiasm and zeal to make it work and if the national 

government fails to open its mind to new avenues and ways of thinking 

about decentralization and local governance. 

References 

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 1987. Urban Policy Issues. 

Proceedings of the Regional Seminar on Major National 

Urban Policy Issues, February 3-7. Manila. 

_. 

1994. MegacityManagement in the Asian and Pacifw Region, edited 

byJeffrey Stubbs and Giles Clarke. Vols. 1 and 2. Mandaluyong 

City, Philippines: ADB. 

Angotti, T. 1993. Metropolis 2000: Planning, Poverty and Politics. New 

York. 

Bahl, R.W. and J,E Linn. 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing 

Countries New York: Oxford University Press. 

BDUPP (Baguio and Dagupan Urban Planning Project). 1994a. 

BLIST. Manila. 

_. 1994b. CAMADA. Manila. 

Ganapin, D.J. 1997. Prospects for Greater Public-Private Sector 

Partnerships. Paper presented at the Conference on Solid 

Waste Management Capability Building, Cebu City, June 26. 

Gonzales, E. 1997. Settlements, Growth Zones and Urbanization. 

Paper presented at the Technical Workshop on Population 

and Urbanization, PIDS, Makati City, 22 September.


Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council / Local 

Government Development Foundation, Inc. 1998. 

Metropolitan Manila Management Study. Manila. 

Japan International Cooperation Agency. 1994. The Study on the 

Cebu Integrated Area Development Master Plan. Final Report, 

Vol. 2. Cebu. 

National Land Use Committee NEDA. 1992. National Physical 

Framework Plan. 

NEDA (National Economic and Development Authority). 1996. 

National Urban Policy Agenda. 

NEDA Regional Office XI. n.d. Profile of the Davao Integrated 

Development Program. 

Republic of the Philippines. 1991. The Local Government Code of 1991. 

Congress of the Republic of the Philippines of 1987-1992, 

Manila. 

Serote, E. 1994. Toward a Nadonal Urban Development Policy: A 

Conceptual Framework. Pasig: National Land Use Committee. 

Sivaramakrishnan, K.C. and Leslie Green. 1986. Metropolitan 

Managcnumt: The Asian Expoqence. NewYork: Oxford University 

Press. 

United Nations University. 1994. Mega-City Growth and theFuture. Tokyo: 

UNU Press.

Chapter 

3 

Environmentand Natural 

ResourcesManagement: 

Lessonsfrom City Program 

Innovations 

he enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code brought 

local government units (LGUs) greater responsibilities to 

manage their natural resources and the environment. In 

particular, the following environment-related mandates have been 

given to the city: 

Solid waste disposal system or environmental management 

system and services or facilities related to general hygiene 

and sanitation (Sec. 17.b.2.vl). 

Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, 

control and review of the Department of Environment and 

Natural Resources (DENR), enforcement of forestry laws 

limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution 

control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the 

protection of the environment; and mini-hydroelectric 

projects for local purposes (Sec. 17.b.3.iii). 

Tourism development and promotion (Sec. 17.b.3.xii); 

tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the 

acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of 

business concessions and security services for such facilities 

(Sec. 17.b.2.xi). 

For some Philippine cities, the enormous responsibilities placed 

on them have brought more opportunities for greater dynamism and 

innovation. Strategies employed and programs undertaken vary in


focus and form depending on the city's stage of development and, 

relatedly, on the features of the city environmenL For instance, natural 

resource-rich cities have made the environment the focus of their 

overall development strategy, particularly in relation to resource 

conservation and tourism development. Within the same focus, 

variations are evident in both program content and the institutional 

dynamics that were involved. Fo r largely urban cities, environmental 

problems are associated with growth of economic activity and for most 

of these cities, special attention is given to the maintenance of air 

quality, cleanliness and managing solid waste. Although strategies 

adopted differ, all the cities achieved a relatively similar degree of 

success. A number of these successful programs have features and 

implementation process that can be considered unique or innovative. 

While these programs were crafted under the socioeconomic and 

political milieu of their respective areas, they nevertheless provide 

valuable insights to other LGUs wanting to better their program design 

and execution. 

This paper aims to draw lessons from some selected cities that 

have undertaken innovative environment programs and to highlight 

the key elements that have made their programs successful and 

sustainable. It concludes with a brief account of other environmental 

management concerns that have not been given significant emphasis 

and attention or where performance has been short of expectations, 

and suggests measures to address the same. 

Selected City Environmental Programs 

Puerto Princesa City: Oplan Linis and Bantay Puerto Programs 

There are two major environment programs that Puerto 

Princesa City has undertaken: Oplan Linis and Bantay Puerto. These 

have been successfully implemented, bringing national and 

international recognition to the city. The city has become a source of 

inspiration to many local governments not only in the area of 

environmental management but also in the area of local governance. 

Puerto Princesa's secret for being the cleanest and greenest 

city in the Philippines-is the sustained implementation of the Oplan 

Linis Program. The program has significantly remade the image of 

the city from the haven of prisoners and malaria-causing mosquitoes 

that it was to what is now the most envied city for its estimable 

cleanliness and for its reputation as one of the major tourist 

destinations in the country.

Environment and Natural Resources Management 77 

Table 1. Basic Features of Oplan _ 

Program 

Component Obiectives Activities 

Cleanliness Maintain - Street sweeping 

cleanliness in all - Cleanliness contest in barangays and schools 

public places (local version of Clean and Green Award) 

- Award for Cleanest and Dirtiest Barangay 

-_Monthly general cleanin G 

Sagip-Dagat;, Maintain coastal - Operation of redemption centers in coastal 

Operation areas clean barangays for wastes dumped in coastal areas 

Basura - Low-cost housing program for _luatters 

living near the coastal area 

Beautification Beautify the city - Painting of sidewalks 

- Planting of ornamental plants and trees 

- Nursery for continuous supply of planting 

materials (Program buys from children 5 tetra 

packs for P1.00. They are used to grow 

seedlings/cutting of plants_) 

Sanitation Promote sanitary - Installation of garbage receptacles (donated by 

practices the business community) along main streets and 

other conspicuous places" 

- Putting-up of comfort rooms in coastal and rural 

barangays 

Information Disseminate - Organization of information team composed of 

and Education information about representatives from city government and civic 

the program 

organizations 

- Tapping government and private entities to assist 

ill all information-related activities 

- Airing of a rive-minute local TV program to tackle 

issues on cleanliness 

- Formation of Oplan Linis Families (OLF) in each 

school composed of a minimum of 50 students 

providing cleanliness awareness in their 

immediate neighborhood. Each OLF is required 

to submit a regular accomplishment report. 

Operation Improve air - Strict enforcement of the following ordinances: 

Sagip-Hangin quality in the city Anti-Littering, No-Smoking and Anti Pollution. 

- Violators are imposed fines and their names are 

flashed on TV and aired over the radio_ 

Solid Waste Improve garbage -Daily collection of garbage in the marketplaces 

Management collection and and scheduled zone collection in residential areas 

disposal - Program introduced to produce organic 

Iertilizex_ fi'om wastes disposed through IRREN 

Foundation (an NGO). Fox"this purpose, 

classification of garbage at the household level is 

slowly being introduced. Target collection in 

residential areas is once a week. 

Source: Oplan Linis Story: The Puerto Prineesa City F_, Puerto Princesa City Government, 

1996.


Puerto Princesa City now claims to be larger than Davao City in 

terms of land area (253,982 hectares) and, therefore, boasts of being 

the largest city in the world. Despite its huge size, the city has 

successfully managed to make the task of cleaning, greening and 

beautifying itself a not-so-difficult undertaking. 

The Oplan Linis Program aims to sustain cleanliness and beauty 

in the city through program institutionalization and community 

participation. Table 1 presents a summary of the basic features of the 

program. 

The program is being managed by a full-time staff headed by a 

project manager (who, incidentally, is the wife of the mayor), two 

assistant project managers and a program supervisor for each of the 

program components, i.e., Cleanliness, Sanitation, SagipDagat (Save 

the Seas), Beautification, Sagip Hangin (Air Improvement Program), 

Dog Pound and Information and Edfication. At the lower level of the 

organization are 50 grass cutters, 70 street sweepers and gardeners, 

50 garbage collectors and various workers and volunteers. 

Program cost at the start of the program in 1993 was P2.1 million. 

This increased to P6.1 million in 1995, representing amere 1.3 percent 

of the total budget. Initial program cost was spent on information 

and education campaign (e.g., media hour, printed materials, 

consultations, etc.), which were considered essential to make the 

program effective and successful. In later years, cost for personnel 

services, mainly for street sweepers, exceeded the cost for operations 

following the expansion of the program's coverage area. 

Palawan is considered the Philippines' "Last Frontier." As the 

capital, Puerto Princesa City considers its critical role as a "steward of 

(its) biodiverse resources and as the active promoter of the balance 

of its total ecology" (Puerto Princesa City Government 1997). Faced 

with illegal activities existing both in the forests and in the seas [e.g., 

illegal logging, kaingin (slash-and-burn) method of farming, 

destructive forms of fishing such as use of dynamite and cyanide, muroami], 

the city has responded to the call of conserving, preserving, 

rehabilitating and sustaining the development of"its forest and water 

ecosystem through the Bantay Puerto Program. 

The Bantay Puerto Program originally had four components: 

City Forest Protection Project or the Bantay C-4zbat,City Coastal Areas 

Protection Project or the Ba,ntay Dagat (Bay-watch), Special Task Force 

Unit and the Special Monitoring Unit. Lately, another component 

was added, i.e., the operation of the Cyanide Detection Laboratory.

Environmentand Natural ResourcesManagement 79 

Table 2 provides a general description of the Bantay Gubat and Bantay 

Dagat projects and their accomplishments. 

The Special Task Force Unit (STFU) and the Special Monitoring 

Unit (SMU) lend support to both the Bantay Gubat and Bantay Dagat 

projects. The STFU evaluates and disseminates intelligence 

information, prepares plan of action relative to illegal activities and 

performs apprehension or arrest of violators. The unit is a 21-person 

body headed by a task force leader from the PNP, a civilian task force 

Table 2. General Information on Bantay Puerto Program Components 

Program Objectives Strategies / Activities Highlights of Major 

component 

Accoml_sh_ems 

Bantny To address the Intensify information During the first 100 days of the 

Gubat alarming dissemination campaign program, confiscated 

(City Forest reduction of regarding preservation and 33,302.17 board feet of 

Protection forest cover in conservation of the city's illegally cut logs, 2,749 pieces 

Project) Palawan that forests_ of round poles, 3 chain saws 

reportedly and 50 illegally caught wildlife. 

decreased from Strengthen partnership and 

75 percent in cooperation of the city with Instilled in the community that 

1976 to 50 DENR, DA, DILG-PNP, NGOs the government is serious in 

percent in 1992. and PVOs in the enforcement enforcing and carrying out 

of forest-related laws_ forest protection laws. 

To conserve, 

preserve and Organize and train 24 Increased awareness and 

rehabilitate the community-based forest importance of forest 

forest areas of protectors serving as project conservation and 

the city, managers in the identified rehabilitation by instituting 

particularly in critical areas, the "Pista Y ang Cageban" 

the identified 24 (Feast of the Forest) held every 

environmentally Establish four checkpoints (2 June 7 to reforest the denuded 

critical rural in the north and 2 in the watershed of Irawan. 

barangays, south) equipped with radio 

communication system and DENR devolved to the city the 

motorcycles, management of the Irawan 

Watershed and the St. Paul 

Plan and conduct operations/ Subterranean National Park 

raids against illegal activities. (Nagkan Tribe of Palawan, 

Haribon Foundation and 

Seize illegally caught marine Ulugan Bay Foundation sit as 

products and equipment used Board Members). 

in the commission of the 

crime and apprehends its 

violator/s. 

Endorse 

to authorities 

concerned any confiscated 

property for proper custody. 

Organize/create a foot patrol 

group in most critical areas.



Bantay To lessen, if not Daily (average of S hours) In the initial months of the 

D_at eliminate, the patrolling of the fbur strategic program, the city government 

(Baywatch) depletion of bays of the City. passed an ordinance banning 

marine resources the shipment of all live fish 

due to illegal Intensify information and lobster out of the city_ 

fishing activities dissemination campaign 

regarding preservation and Daily patrolling of the bays 

conservation of the city's resulted in the confiscation of 

coastal areas, a total of 482 seacrafts as of 

end of 1994_ 

Strengthen partnership and 

cooperation of the city with Seized 13 pump boats engaged 

government agencies in illegal fishing activities; 184 

especially the Philippine pump boats without 

Coast Guard and NGOs. license/permit from 

Philippine Coast Guard and 

Maintain six outposts placed BFAR; collection of P309,000 

strategically in the different from one fishing vessel for 

bays of the city. muro-ami fishing within 7-kin 

boundary of the city and for 

Plan and conduct vessel overload; and from one 

operations/raids against fishing vessel loaded with live 

illegal activities, fish without permit and 

manned by British nationals 

Seize illegally caught marine without passport or working 

products and equipment used permit_ 

in the commission of the 

crime and apprehends its 

violator(s). 

Endorse 

to authorities 

concerned any confiscated 

property for proper custody. 

Source: Puerto Princesa City Government Documents (4th City Sharing Workshop paper and 

Galing Pook Award application materials). 

Note: The Gaiing Pook Program is a national program that aims to recognize local governance 

or best practices in the areas of health services, environmental management, public 

finance, peace initiatives, integrated approach to development, sociocultural 

development, employment generation/livelihood and productivity improvement. 

leader, 10 PNP personnel and nine civilians. The SMU is composed 

of 10 monitoring officers tasked to monitor problems in the 

implementation of the program and gather information on specific 

areas of concern as directed by the program manager. The added 

feature in the program is the establishment of the Cyanide Detection 

Laboratory, which has been accredited by the NBI to assist in legal 

cases involving cyanide fishing. 

The whole Bantay Puerto Program is being managed by the city 

mayor with the assistance of the project managers of each of the major


program components. The Bantay Gubat project manager is assisted 

by two project assistants, 24 community forest patrol officers, 24 

checkpoint sentries and a project recording secretary. The Bantay 

Dagat project manager is assisted by two project assistants, seven banca 

(boat) operators , seven deputy marine guards and a project recording 

secretary. 

Bagnio City: Clean and Green, and Eco-Walk Programs 

The active and substantial involvement of Baguio City's 

community and the civil society in the affairs of the city government 

are more than exemplified in many of the cleanliness programs and 

forest preservation projects of the city. While Baguio City is known by 

various rifles such as "The Summer Capital of the Philippines," "The 

City of Pines," "The Garden City," "The Education Center of the 

North," and "The Regional Center of the Cordillera," the successful 

implementation of its cleanliness and preservation programs has also 

given it the title of "The Cleanest and the Greenest City." 

Maintaining the city clean and green has been a great challenge 

considering the multiple roles of Baguio City. The city serves as the 

regional administrative center of the Cordillera region, the 

commercial and retail trade center for agricultural products of 

Benguet province, the center for higher learning in the north, and 

one of the favorite tourist destinations in the country. These roles 

carry with them a wide array of development activities that invariably 

put a strain on the city's environment. To lessen the difficulty in 

carrying out its task, the city government forged strong partnerships 

with active nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the media, 

business sector and the community residents themselves. The Clean 

and Green Program of the city of Baguio has seven components. Table 

3 lists these components and their respective activities and 

accomplishments. 

The entire program would not be possible if not for the 

partnership of the city government, the NGOs (particularly the Baguio 

Re-greening Movement and the Alay sa Kalinisan) and the national 

government agencies operating in the city. The organizational 

structure of the Clean and Green Program shows graphically the 

extent to which it has involved everyone. Separate structures were 

established for the Clean effort and for the Green effort (Figures 1 

and 2). Barangay/Baguio residents' inclusion in the organizational 

structure is a recognition of their important role in the success of the 

.program and its sustainability.


Table 3, Baguio 

City Clean and Green Program Components 

lh-ogram 

component 

Activities -- Major accomplishments 

Sofid Waste Dally garbage collection 117 out of 129 barangays are served with 

Management the city's collection system (90 percent) 

Orgmaization of Quick 

Response Team on call for 

emergency garbage 

collection especially during 

peak seasons of summer 

and Christmas 

Advocacy campaign 20 barangays have attended as of 1996 

through training of 

barangay residents on the 

3Rs of Solid Waste 

Management (Re-use, 

Reduce and Recycle) 

Local Clean and Green Contests held every year in schools, public 

Contest buildings, barangays, local departments of 

the city govemmeaat, includingjeepney 

Annual purchase of one terminals. 

g-,u'bage ffuck 

Liquid Waste Installation of more latex_ 10 sewerage projects completed in 1995 

Management and secondary sewer lines (e.g., installation of 2422.1 lineal meters 

of sewer pipes, 25 manholes and one 

communal septic tank, repair and 

rehabilitation of 70 linear meters of old 

sewer lines and 256 manholes in various 

parts 

of the city). 

Intensified monitoring of City Ordinance provides for mandatory 

pollution levels in creeks connection to the public sewer system. 

and natural and man-made City government undertakes regular 

waterways within the city sampling and testing to determine the 

bio-oxygen demand and carbon oxygen 

demand levels of different tributaries in 

Environmental Conduct of regular Organized a special task force that 

Sanitation and inspections of food centers, conducts on-the-spot checks on 

Management recreational facilities, night compliance. 

spots and u_,msient housing 

facilities, including Conducted regular mad compulsory 

dormitories and boarding health testing and training of food 

houses in terms of handlers. 

compliance to health and 

sanitation standards 

the 

city_ 

Abattoir Establishment and strict New/acility established, which is 

Operations maintenance of a cleml and provided with rails where animals are 

sanitary environment of the hanged and slaughtered. This way, floor 

new abattoir facility_ dressing and carc'asses are avoided, thus



ensuring utmost sanitation in the area 

and fresh and disease-free meat. 

Liquid wastes and other effluents 

generated by the abattoir are disposed 

of through the Sewerage Treatment 

Plant while solid wastes are collected 

regularly by garbage trucks for disposal 

in the city dumpsite-. Part of solid waste 

is composted for use as fertilizer. 

Perimeter fencing of the City Abattoir to 

discourage further squatting in its 

vicinity. 

Anti-Smoke Intensified compulsory Acquired new smoke-testing machine. 

Belching testing of all motored Intensified testing generated P796,:190 

vehicles especially diesel- worth of income from fees and fines and 

fed vehicles more importantly, raised awareness of 

the city's serious drive against smoke 

belching and proper maintenance of 

vehicles. 

City's inter-agency Traffic and 

Transportation Management Committee 

conducted an "Anti-Smoke Belching 

Contest," a search tot model driver and 

model uansport association with big 

cash prizes donated by the private 

sector, 

Pat'ks Regular maintenance of Collection and propagation of seeds of 

Maintenance city parks and street islands ornamental plants and tree seedlings as 

and a continuing activity. 

Reforestation 

Reforestation Evaluated success of the city's 57 

reforested areas (10 reforested by the 

city government and 47 by various 

private organizations). Results showed 

about 70 percent survival rate 

representing 27,698 total surviving trees- 

Apprehension of 55 persons violating 

forestry laws and effecting the 

confiscation of various tools and 

equipment as well as forest products 

valued at P46, 322.28 in 1995.



Program Activities Major 

cmnimmmt 

Advocacy Tri-media advocacy Public Information Office of the City 

campaign to generate Government spearheaded the campaign 

people participation and, that also led to the implementation of 

enthusiasm the Eco-Walk Program. 

DECS launched in the different 

elementary and secondary schools in the 

city the "War Against Waste" project- 

Office of City Social Welihrc and 

Development and Public Employment 

Services Offices incorporate clean and 

green agenda in their respective 

prosa-ams. 

Source: Office of City Planning and Development Coordinator (OCPDC), Baguio City, 1997, 

"Always Clean, Ever Green_" 

Financing the program is not solely the responsibility of the 

city government. Although mainly funded by the city government 

(17 percent of its annual budget in 1996), barangays and NGOs share 

a relatively large amount to sustain the program. Table 4 shows a 

summary of contributions to the program from the various groups in 

1996. 

Baguio City was a Galing Pook Awardee in 1995 for its program 

called "Eco-Walk: An Environmental Awareness Program for 

Children." This program is actually a revival of a similar program in 

1992. The 1992 project was started by the Baguio Regreening 

Movement but not sustained due to lack of volunteer tour/hiking 

guides. In 1993, an NGO called Timpuyog Ti Iit, whose members were 

mainly barangay captains, pledged support to the program and 

assigned its members as lifetime volunteers. They complement the 

existing volunteers from other NGOs and government agencies that 

believe in the program's rationale and objectives. Figure 3 shows 

graphically the process involved and the activities undertaken as part 

of the Eco-Walk Program. 

The basic objective of the program is value-formation, which is 

considered the foundation for the protection, conservation and 

rehabilitation of the city's environment. In particular, the program


Table 4. Clean and Green Program Budget and Sources, 1996 

Sources Amount (P) 

City Government 45,000,000 

Office of City Mayor 2,000,000 

General Servii:es 16,000,000 

Public Utilities and Services 5,000,000 

City Architect and Parks Superintendent 12,000,000 

City Veterinarian 2,000,000 

City Health Officer 4,000,000 

Other Departments* 4,000,000 

Barangays ** 645,000 

.Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) *** 12,080 

Baguio Regreening Movement 1,680,000 

* All other departments share at least 1 percent of their respective budget to the program, 

which is then used at least once a month for the massive cleanup of creeks and main 

thoroughfares. 

** The 129 barangays allocate at least P5,000 of their respective budget for the beautification 

and cleanliness campaign 

*** The ABC launched "Piso-Piso para sa Kalirlisan," which they turned over to the Alay sa 

Kalinisan, an NGO leading the clean effort. 

Source of basic data: OCPDC (1997). 

F'_gure 1. Structure of the Clean Effort 

Scctore [ NGA 

LGU [ NGO/erivate 5 

day saKalikasan 

(ASK) 

[ 

ASKThrusts 

I I 1 

Qeanliness Drive Propagation of Medicinal Plants 

I


Figure 2. Structure of the Green Effort 

[ LGU ] [ NGO ] _ NG-A ] 

I ] 

t _ [ 

] Baguio Re-_gr¢_ningMovement (BRM) I 

I 

I Executive Committee ] 

'AJ ] 

Technical [ Re=greening [ I_oxma.tion 

Committee [ I Committ¢_ 

I ,1 

[ 

/ 

C_c_tW_u, °n:- 

umcauon 

I Ways&Memls [ ] [ Community [ [ 

[ Committee [Service Com_nitteeJ 

[ -/ 

I Barmlgay / B_ttio Re;idents _]" 

Source: OCPDC (1997). 

hopes to make children aware of the importance of trees and forest 

and learn how they contribute to the supply of water in the city. Busol 

watershed was chosen as the site of the eco-tour walk since it is the 

city's major source of water. However, due to denudation, it barely 

produces 250 to 300 gallons per minute (gpm) from its original 

generating capacity of 4,000 gpm. 

The seven-member staff of the Public Information Office of the 

City Mayor's Office serves as the coordinator and overseer of the Eco- 

Walk Program. Volunteers who serve as guides of the children in their 

hikes come from the Timpuyog Ti lit, the Baguio Re-greening 

Movement (BRM), media practitioners, the Department of 

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Baguio Water 

District. 

The program started with very minimal funding but as it 

progressed, there were activities and projects that required bigger 

funding. A fund drive was launched fbr the construction of a picnic 

shed, wherein about P50,O00 was raised. 

The city government now ha_sa regular budget of"P20,000 for 

the purchase of reforestation tools. The BRM and the Timpuyog Ti lit 

shelled out PIO,O00 and P30,O00 for the program, respectively. In 

the future, more funds would be needed for the establishment of a 

tree nursery, audiovisual equipment for lectures, documentation 

requirements, office and salaries for a regular staff, and regular forest 

guards to help protect the children's seedlings and the watershed as 

a whole.

Environmentand Natural ResourcesManagement 87 

Figure 3. Eco-WalkProgram Essentials 

urrl u Dr 

Source: Various Galing Pook documents (1995). 

The active participation of school children (about 15,000 grade 

schoolers as of 1995) has reforestated the Busol watershed with about 

25,000 tree seedlings. It has reaped socioeconomic benefits. It 

minimized squatting, logging and forest fires. Because the children 

initiated the maintenance of the watershed, there were no forest 

guards needed. This spelt considerable savings to the government in 

terms of maintenance and security expenses. Most important is the 

unquantifiable benefits of the eco-walk experience to the children, 

especially on their present and future regard for the environment. 

Olongapo City: Solid Waste Management 

Olongapo City is one of the pioneer innovators in local 

governance, particularly with regard to solid waste management 

(SWM). As in most cities, Olongapo has faced garbage management 

problems--i.e., irresponsible disposal of waste and a disorganized 

collection system. Part of the problem was the lack of financial 

resources to put up an efficient system since the cost of available 

technology and system was beyond the city's financial capacity. 

Given its meager resources, the city government introduced an 

innovative program on garbage management. Tile program rests on


the principle that solid waste management is not the sole responsibility 

of the local government but is rather a shared obligation with the 

community. This involved user fees and was therefore initially met 

strong opposition. However, because the city government showed its 

sincerity in pushing forth this program, the people were convinced 

and themselves took the program seriously. In the removal of the US 

bases in 1991 and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, the city took on an 

even greater challenge of maintaining and improving the city's 

environmental condition as a major strategy in attracting investors. 

Table 5 summarizes the innovative features of the program. 

The city's solid waste management program has been financially 

serf-sustaining in the first two years of the program through income 

derived from garbage fees. As shown in Table 6, the city has a net 

income of about P1.4 million during the first year of the program 

and more than P500,000 during the second year. From 1992 until 

1996, the city incurred more expen-ses than income derived from 

garbage fees, reaching about P5.7 million in net loss in 1996. The 

expenditure increase over these years was due to the provision of 

benefits under the Salary Standardization Law and the hiring of more 

SWM personnel as demand for services grew with increased 

population. One will note that garbage fee collection dwindled in 

1991 to 1993 because of population loss brought by outmigration 

from the city following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo and the removal 

of the US bases. Thereafter, population grew again (attributed to 

returning residents and migration from areas displaced by the 

calamity) side by side with the flurry of development activities and 

projects in the city with the installation under the Subic Bay 

Metropolitan Authority. 

The increasing expenditure of the city for solid waste 

management and the relatively small hike in the income derived from 

garbage fees gave the SWM program budget a deficit since 1.992 and 

contributed to the total city budget deficit since 1995. To raise 

revenues, new ordinances to amend the 1989 program of fees for 

garbage collection and use of landfill site were issued in 1997. The 

mayor consulted the people with these new rates: from P10-20 to 

P30-40 for households and from P30-P300 to P50-P500 for business 

establishments.


Table 5. Olongapo City Solid Waste Management Program, 1989-present 

Component 

Activities/Innovations 

Collection and Residents required to put garbage in plastic bags or else they will not be 

Monitoring collected. They are encouraged to use the prescribed plastic bags as 

follows: 

Yellow plastic bags (dry recyclable wastes) to be collected on the 

following schedule: 

Zone 1 - Mondays 

Zone 2 - Tuesdays 

Zone 3 - Wednesdays 

Green plastic bags (wet biodegradable wastes) 

Zone 1 - Thursdays 

Zone 2 - Fridays 

Zone 3 - Saturdays 

Orange plastic bags (hazardous wastes such as hospital and clinical 

wastes) to be collected on a designated day and to be disposed of 

through incineration 

Collection schedule is strictly followed (twice a week in residential area_s 

and daily in commercial zones and markets). 

Garbage collectors (called Garbage Teehniciam) and truck drivers wear 

uniforms and IDs (to mark professionalism in the service). 

Sanitary inspectors from City Health Office regularly inspect the 

assigned areas. Citation tickets are issued to residents as_d establishment 

owners violating the sanitation ordinances. 

Junk dealers, scavengers, pushcart boys, ambulant and sidewalk vendors 

organized and integrated in the program; children stAcfly kept out of 

the dumpsites. 

Information and Garbage trucks have public address system broadcasting jingles and 

Value Education reminders for people to guard their health, keep surrom_dings clean 

and dispose of garbage properly. 

Garbage trucks are emblazoned with slogans like "Keep Olongapo 

Clean" and YBawal ang Tamad sa Olongapo." 

Essay-writing and poster-making contests conducted though the 

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). 

City Tourism Council organized cleanliness competitions among 17 

barangays that facilitated the adoption of the program by the 

barangays. 

Organization Environmental Sanitation axld Management Office (ESMO) headed by 

the Public Service Officer oversees the entire program. The ESMO is 

divided into three sections: garbage collection, street cleaning and 

raotorpool. 

City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) provides technical 

assistance through program documentation, interagency negotiation 

and sharing of the city's experience with visitors and researchers_



Component 

Acfivifie_/Innovafiom 

City Health Department provides support through its sanitary 

inspectors, who issue citation tickets to violators_ 

Financing Garbage fees collected. 

To make collection easier and efficient, garbage fees are included in 

the electricity bill: 

- P10 to P20 for households depending on floor area of 

housing structure; and 

- P30 to P300 for business estabhshments depending on the 

type of business 

Garbage trucks finzaaced through donations. 

Legal Orders Ordinance No. 31, Series of 1988 (Use of the Material Recovery Plant at 

New Cabalan) amended by Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1997. 

Ordinance No. 34, Series of 1988 (Schedule of Fees t_or the Use of 

Sanitary Landfill Area at New Cabalan) amended by Ordinance No. 7, 

Series of 1997. 

Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1989 (Schedule of Garbage Fees and Other 

Requirements for Proper Waste Disposal) amended by Ordinance Nos. 

6, 8, and 33, SeiSes of 1997. 

Ordinance No- 56 Series of 1995 (An Ordinance Adopting an 

Environment and Sanitation Code of Olongapo City), embodying the 

city residents' goals, aspirations, efforts and discipline with respect fo 

environment and sanitation management. 

Source: Various Olongapo Citygovemment documents asld personal interviews with city officials 

Marikina City: River Park Managtmwnt 

The success of the Marikina River Development Program, or 

what has been more popularly known as the Save the Marikina River 

Project, provides fresh perspective and valuable lessons on river 

rehabilitation and river park management in the metropolis. The 

program, which started in 1992, has received numerous citations and 

awards from regional and national bodies and has been an inspiration 

to the current efforts to rehabilitate the Pasig River, of which the 

Marikina River is a tributary. The city's project increased in popularity 

when the Philippine Earth Day Festival in April 1996 and the World 

Earth Day Festival in April 1997 where held at the river park. 

The current features of the river park are far better than what 

were originally conceived. The initial objective of the city leadership


Table 6. Environmental Sanitation and Management Office Income and 

Expenditure, 19901996 (in thousands of pesos) 

Pmtkadam 1990 1991 1992 199S 1994 1995 1996 

(C,arbagcFees) S,755.621 5,713.556 5239.960 4_12.435 5,126.496 5,590.840 5,721.217 

Espemilmm 4,384.815 5,0725.625 6,031.195 6,050.045 6,992.013 10,193.57811,377.07S 

Salaries and 

Other Personal 2,976.495 3,737.870 4,149.577 4,283.927 5,572.468 8,327.621 9,345.924 

Services 

Gasoline/ 1,408.320 1,335.755 1,881.618 1,766.717 1,419.544 1,865.956 2,031.749 

Maintenance 

and Other 

ExpenSes 

Net I_ome/ 1,570.805 659.930 (69,234) (1,2$8.210) (1,865.516) (4,8@2.737) (5,656,455) 

Source: City of Olongapo, comparative income statement (1997). 

was just to revive the river and its traditional use as a people's park 

the way it had been prior to the 1970s--before the squatters settled 

along the river banks. The task was to simply relocate the squatters 

and to clean the 22-kilometer stretch, plant shade trees, carve out 

jogging, biking and walking paths along both banks, set up park 

benches and install park lights. Today, however, the 12-kilometer 

stretch has been installed with the following features: a skating rink, 

picnic and tamping grounds, water fountains, a Roman garden, 

gazebos, a floadng restaurant (a small ship turned into a restaurant) 

and a floating stage (used for public performances). The fountains 

and the ship are lighted to enhance the view at nighttime. 

The river park project is one of the city's major programs meant 

to address a broader concern--to improve the living environment 

and conditions of the Marikina residents. It should be mentioned 

that about a third of the people are living in depressed areas, many of 

them settling in disaster-prone places such as those along the 

riverbanks. Flooding is one of its biggest problems because it is situated 

on a valley. The overflow from the Marikina river is not only caused 

by heavy rains. It is exacerbated by the garbage dumped mainly by 

factories and squatter shandes along the river. 

A successful resettlement program would be a prerequisite to a 

more focused river rehabilitation and park development. While incity 

resettlement was favored by officials over relocation of people 

outside the city, resetdement efforts were not as easy as it was thought 

it would be. After a yea r of discussion that necessitated the help of


community development experts and sociologists, the squatterfamilies 

were finally convinced to resettle in the Malanday and Tumana 

areas. Because the land is privately owned, the city government helped 

the families organize themselves and facilitated their enrollment in 

the Community Mortgage Program so that they could eventually own 

the land and house they occupy. One of the major factors that led 

people to cooperate was the city government's effort to ensure that 

the resettlement 

and sewerage. 

sites have the basic facilities such as water, electricity 

After the successful resettlement of families, the city government 

issued an ordinance that penalized garbage dumping into the river. 

A fine of P2,000 was set for violators. The ordinance was strictly 

enforced and those who could not pay the fine had the option to pay 

the equivalent amount in the form of community service. 

The construction of the five-kilometer biking, jogging and 

walking lanes passing through 11 of the town's 14 barangays was 

henceforth pursued. Electric lights were installed and park benches 

placed along the river stretch. In cooperation with the Department 

of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), 800 ornamental trees 

were initially planted along the riverbanks. Fish seeding (carp, plapla 

and tilapia) was also undertaken. Marikina river prides itseff as the, 

only biologically living river in the whole Metro Manila. The rise of 

numerous structures along the river followed. Included here are the 

playgrounds, picnic groves, camping grounds, basketball courts, 

skating rink, floating restaurant and water fountains. From 1993 to 

1997, the city government spent about P34.7 million or an average of 

P6.9 million per year on this project. Among its financial sources are 

national government entities and about P1.6 million from the 

Countryside Development Fund of two senators. Donations in kind 

were given by the city's private sector. For instance, the Chinese 

Chamber of Commerce built a Chinese pagoda while the Marikina 

Zonta Club (a people's organization) designed a Roman garden. 

The Marikina River Park Authority (MRPA) under the Office 

of the Mayor was created to oversee the whole river park program. It 

is presently an attached agency of the city government and manned 

by about 50 personnel. The MRPA coordinates with the City 

Engineering Office, City Settlements Office, City Health Office and 

City Public Safety and Security Office and the barangays. The city's 

radio broadcast facility, DZBE also supports the project through its 

public service programs aired daily from 6:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.


Marikina City is the only LGU in Metro Manila adopting this form of 

communication service to reach its constituents. The whole program 

has achieved more than its basic objective. It caused the recovery of 

valuable land for public use. It helped restore the people's confidence 

in the local government. Dredging activities currently being 

undertaken to alleviate the effects ofLa Nifia can now be undertaken 

with less difficulty as big equipment can easily navigate around the 

river park. Lastly, Marikina City's experience provided hope and a 

tested model for rehabilitating waterways in the other parts of the 

metropolis. 

General Santos City: "Adopt, an-Island" Program 

There are numerous creative ways to beautify the city aside from 

effective garbage management and the conventional activity of 

maintaining ornamental plants and trees around the city. General 

Santos City's simple but creative project provides such example. 

Historically, General Santos City experienced the same fate as 

Central Luzon with the eruption of a volcano 90 years ago. Although 

years have passed, the sight of lahar ashes is still evident especially 

along the uncemented roads of the city, making the place dusty. 

Planting and maintaining trees around the city help screen dust from 

the air. Thus, as early as 1959, tree planting has been part of the major 

programs of the city. 

Given the city's economic boom following the implementation 

of major infrastructure projects and its vision to attract more 

investments as well as make a mark in the international trade scene, 

the task of cleaning and greening the city has gone beyond the level 

of aesthetics. With the support of the city mayor, the City Environment 

and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) embarked on a program that 

called for the development and maintenance of parks and road islands 

in the city. The city has two major parks and seven road islands needing 

to be developed and maintained. Because of the meager resources 

of the city and the need for the people to accept the responsibility of 

managing the environment, a program was launched based on a 

concept called "Adopt-an-Island." 

The program enjoins business establishments, academic 

institutions and NGOs to adopt (i.e., develop and maintain) a park 

or a road island. The city government formulated a landscape design 

of the parks and road islands. Then it forged an agreement with any 

of these said groups wherein the latter would be required to execute


the plan and sustain the project. The city's only role is to provide 

planting materials/seedlings and to assist in daily watering activities. 

To date, agreements with the following groups have been forged: 

Cutflower Vendors Association, Plaza Photographers Association, 

Coca-Cola Bottling Philippines, Inc., Rotary Club of Dadiangas, RFM 

Corporation, Notre Dame Dadiangas College, Mindanao State 

University-CETD, and the General Santos City Garden Club, among 

others. A mark bearing the name of a group or association is placed 

in each island for people to know the original developer and the one 

responsible for maintaining the island. The city government has also 

solicited the cooperation of the media, particularly Bombo Radio, to 

either publicly praise or air the people's complaints regarding this 

groups' performance. Recendy, Bombo Radio has also ,joined the 

program and adopted its own road island to develop and continuously 

maintain. 

The city government spent at least about P25,000 for each road 

island as initial funding for landscape design and purchase of planting 

materials. Thereafter, the government spends only a small amount 

for watering assistance as the major maintenance cost is shouldered 

by the adopter or partner group. Other maintenance activities include 

weeding of the island's peripheries, pruning or trimming, insect 

spraying and painting of island fences. 

The presence of road islands in the inner core of the city and 

the city parks has not only improved the city but has also provided 

the people with an opportunity to substantially contribute to the city 

government's program. 

Las Pifias City: Historical Corridor Project 

Another creative way to improve the city's environment is to 

introduce changes in the built structures of the city so as to project a 

unified architectural theme. This strategy, which is aligned with the 

city's tourism master plan, is exemplified by the Las Pifias City's 

Historical Corridor project. 

Las Pifias is one of the cleanest and greenest places in Metro 

Manila. It is home to the Las Pifias (St.Joseph's Parish) Church and 

Bamboo Organ, which gained worldwide fame and regularly draw 

local and foreign tourists in the area. This led the city to realize its 

need to further develop its tourism potential by restoring its historical 

and cultural sites and artifacts.


importantly to its quality based on clearly defined roles in the entire 

program framework. The case studies have amply illustrated the tact 

that local government programs relating to the environment extend 

beyond normal bureaucratic responsibility, as they demand greater 

coordination and collaboration of various institutions. The setting 

up of a framework and organization to effect a properly planned 

participation and some kind of a machinery to resolve conflicts are 

therefore important. As have been shown by the city experiences 

presented, bringing together the various actors and stakeholders in 

an organized fashion has lessened the cost of implementing the 

program, helped sustain its implementation (even with change in 

political leaderships) and impressed on the people that environmental 

management is a shared responsibility with the city government. 

Surely, "better participation" is more important than "more 

participation." 

Communication: improving knowledge and understanding 

Effective communication is necessary in soliciting meaningful 

participation in a program. The cases presented have recognized the 

crucial role of a well-informed citizenry. A change in the behavior of 

people through information and greater understanding of the general 

intents of the program can bring about unfettered acceptance of the 

responsibilities, costs and inconveniences of any environmental policy 

or program. 

The identification of target beneficiaries and communicators 

of the program was important in designing the communication 

strategy of Puerto Princesa's Oplan Linis Program and Olongapo's 

SWM Program. Oplan Linis targets the children as both beneficiaries 

and disseminators of program information in their respective 

households and communities. Thus, the Project Team covered all 

elementary and high schools to discuss the value of cleanliness and 

oriented them on the program. In each orientation, the team then 

measured how successful they were able to communicate the 

program's concept. To do this, children were given biscuits and juice 

drinks and were then observed if they would find a trashcan for their 

garbage. If they do so, then the orientation was considered to have 

achieved its objective. For Oplan Linis, every resident knew about 

tile program. School children and tricycle drivers were in fact the 

most active program campaigners and overseers. In Oiongapo, since 

the major component of the program required some instilled


discipline and financial sharing by households, the city mayor, along 

with the city officials, held meetings in each barangay to discuss and 

elicit suggestions and/or confirmation on the program. Regular 

barangay meetings allowed discussions and resolution of conflicts. 

The importance of including information, education and 

advocacy as an integrated component of an environmental program 

cannot be overemphasized. In the case studies presented, programs 

extensively used government and private entities, and especially the 

media, both in program dissemination and monitoring. For instance, 

local media was tapped to report violators of the program, as in the 

case of Puerto Princesa and General Santos. This illustrates that 

program advocacy and program awareness can be done in more 

creative ways than one. 

Leadership: vision, popular support, clout and managerial 

_nlsl 

From the five city program innovations presented, four 

leadership themes are underscored: vision, popular support, clout 

and managerial acumen. The leader referred to here is not necessarily 

only the city mayor. These leadership themes may be present among 

other leaders or groups in the city. 

Visionary leadership refers to the ability to see the big picture of 

what to achieve and how to get there. "Without vision, people perish" 

may be a trite expression but the articulation of a vision for the city 

has propelled the five program innovations to move and get things 

done. For instance, Puerto Princesa's Oplan Linis and Bantay Puerto 

programs were formulated based on the city's vision of "Kalinisan, 

Katahimikan and Kaunlaran" (Cleanliness, Peace and Order and 

Development). Baguio City's Clean and Green Program and how it is 

implemented anchor on the city's vision of a "...progressive, peaceful, 

clean and green Baguit>---a center for education, trade and familyoriented 

tourism--managed by God-loving and strong-willed leaders 

in partnership with self-reliant and disciplined citizenry." Olongapo's 

simple vision--to clean the city and create a better image of itself as a 

city and people---drove the organization and sustainability of the 

program. Improving the external environment of General Santos City 

as a means to attract people and investors and contribute toward 

becoming a competitive city in the international trade market 

illustrates than an environmental program can be linked to the city's 

overall development framework. The shared visirn of the city of Las


Pifias and the Congressional Office "to bring back the old charms of 

Las Pifias while at the same time raise the quality of life of its people 

in a way they can be truly proud of" has led the city to implement its 

Historical Corridor project. Meanwhile, Marikina City's vision of 

letting people "touch and smell the water" has driven efforts to 

rehabilitate a dying and unsightly river. 

Popular support derives itself from the leader's ability to 

communicate the vision to the people and rally them behind that 

vision. Credibility and trust on the leader is more important than the 

leader's personal charisma and proficiency in public speaking. 

Credibility is gained through consistency in public utterances and 

actions, in the case programs presented, all of the local leaders in 

their respective cities have established some form of credibility and 

trust among its people. While people's belief on the program per se 

and the benefits that may be derived are important, the leader's 

credibility is critical in ensuring that the people fully embrace the 

program and take on a positive attitude toward its success. This is 

exemplified, for instance, in Puerto Princesa's Oplan Linis Program. 

Although this was a mere remake of past programs, local leaders 

showed more political will to see through its implementation by 

organizing better, issuing ordinances and strictly enforcing them, and 

appropriating sufficient funds. 

Clout refers to the leader's capacity to influence critical 

institutions and individuals to support a program. The ability to 

influence the City Council is important so that critical legislations or 

ordinances are passed and budget appropriations are approved. Clout 

also includes the skill to encourage government agencies, business 

groups, NGOs and the media to take part in the program in terms of 

funding and technical services. In this study's cases, city leaders 

displayed political and administrative clout in undertaking their 

respective programs. Such allowed the timely passage of needed laws 

or ordinances, sufficient funding for the program operations as well 

as enabled the active participation of various groups both in implementing 

the programs' activities and in providing grants and 

donations. 

Managerial acumen refers to corporate and administrative 

capacity to lead or to intelligenfly choose people who will oversee the 

program's implementation. From among the case studies presented, 

Puerto Princesa's mayor personally steered the Bantay Puerto 

Program. On the other hand, the other programs in this study relied

Environmentand Natural Resources Management 101 

upon the leadership of mayoral appointees. It is interesting to point 

out that program managers do not necessarily come from the city 

environment office. Puerto Princesa's Oplan Linis program had the 

First Lady at the helm; Baguio City has the Public Information Officer 

as coordinator of the Eco-Walk Program; and Das Pinas has the Office 

of Tourism and Cultural Affairs playing a major role. General Santos, 

though, had the City Environmental and Natural Resources Officer 

as program overseer. In O!ongapo, the program overseer was the 

Environmental Sanitation and Management Office, a unit especially 

created for the program in coordination with the City Planning and 

Development Office and the City Health Office. In Marikina City, a 

parks authority was created to oversee the fiver park program. 

In general, the management of the programs proceeded under 

a formal organizational setup within the city government and clear 

organizational lines with other agencies and institutions. 

Program design: creative adoption of local culture, values 

and beliefs 

The adoption of local values, beliefs and practices can become 

a creative tool in designing effective and culture-based programs. In 

Puerto Princesa, for instance, the transformation of the yearly Irawan 

Town Fiesta into a Pista Y Ang Cageban (Feast of the Forest) 

incorporated environmental awareness and concern on the need to 

reforest Irawan into this annual religious festival. In Baguio City, the 

Eco-walk program has adopted the concept of muyong, an Ifugao term 

for manmade forests that serve as sources of water for the Banawe 

Rice Terraces. The term was adopted fbr the planting area in the 

Busol Watershed designated for the reforestation project of a group 

of children. As part of the tradition, no one could enter any muyong 

without the permission of its "owners." Because of the sacredness of 

this concept, the reforested area gained respect from outsiders and 

led to the high survival rates of tree seedlings planted. 

Fund _" funding sources not limited to city govermnent 

One of the big lessons that can be derived from the five programs 

presented is that the limited financial resources of the local 

government should never pose a constraint to environmental 

programs. No matter how costly the program, there are creative means 

.of fund sourcing and there are alternative programs that can still


achieve the same ends. If the people realize the worthiness of the 

program, then they can share resources, even voluntarily. The 

programs presented have shown the creative use of Countrywide 

Development Fund (CDF), user fees, and donations in kind, and fund 

drives initiated by various groups and NGOs. 

Program regularity and institutionalization 

Successful programs usually stand the test of time. Except that 

of Las Pifias, the other programs have more than three years of 

sustained implementation. The secret lies not only in leadership but, 

more importantly, in undertaking regular activities that can 

institutionalize the program in the city. For example, Oplan Linis has 

a regular Saturday cleanup in a designated area, Eco-walk is a 

continuous program, Olongapo's garbage services follow a regular 

schedule according to zones, and the General Santos Road Island 

Program is regularly checked and maintained by the city and the 

partner institution. 

National support 

The support and involvement of the national government in 

the city programs, though admittely limited, come in various forms. 

For one, the devolved powers and increased internal revenue 

allotment (IRA) give cities more clout and resources to undertake 

the program. This is especially true for those whose annual budget 

relies mosdv on the IRA. Other forms of support by the national 

government are the awards and recognition given to program 

innovators. 

Conclusion 

This study identified the elements and the preconditions that 

make programs successful in terms of goal achievement as well as 

program sustainability. Also underscored here is the collective or the 

participative nature of environmental management programs as all 

sectors of the society can play a dual role: as implementors and as 

beneficiaries of the program. 

Managing the environment is a huge task that local governments 

have to deal with not only because they are mandated by the Local 

Government Code to do so but more importantly, because failure to 

address environmental concerns would undermine the entire city's 

development efforts and affect people's welfare. While each city or


any LGU is expected to craft its own program for the environment, 

there are instances that interlocal programs have to be made because 

of the resulting program interdependencies and economies of scale. 

This is MOSt especially true in solid waste disposal managemenL While 

many cities have been successful in cleaning their surroundings, the 

final disposal of wastes has not achieved the same degree of 

sophistication _swaste collection. Huge costs required in establishing 

a sanitary landfill and the similarly expensive maintenance 

requirement pose a constraint on the LGUs to undertake the more 

environmentally sound waste disposal activities as an alternative to 

providing areas as dumpsites. Interlocal arrangements show some 

promise in this regard in terms of joint financing and maintenance. 

On a long-term view, the management of environment and 

natural resources would entail the scientific accounting of 

environmental damages and use of natural resources. It will not only 

ensure sustainable management of resources and the environment 

but will also provide revenues for the LGUs when it is used as basis 

for the implementation of regulatory instruments or other more 

effective instruments meant to minimize further environmental 

damage and natural resource depletion. At present, a number of LGUs 

are already adopting regulatory schemes (e.g., anti-smoke belching, 

etc.) to avert activities damaging the environment and are also 

imposing fines and penalties for violators. However, these fines do 

not reflect the full cost of the environmental damage because these 

were not based on sound scientific costing. In some developed 

countries, full cost accounting of environment and natural resources 

is being used as basis for managing forest resources, minimizing 

vehicular emissions, reducing industrial effluents, and installing waste 

treatment plants and facilities, among others. In the Philippines, a 

number of efforts are being undertaken (e.g., Environment and 

Natural Resources Accounting Project [ENRAP], Metropolitan 

Environmental Improvement Program [MEIP] ) which, in the future, 

can help LGUs improve the management of their respective 

environment and natural resources in a sustainable fashion. 

References 

Baguio City Government. 1997. Baguio City: Always Clean, Ever Green. 

Office of City Planning and Development Coordinator, Baguio 

City.


. n.d. Baguio City Profile• Office of the City Planning and 

Development Coordinator, Baguio City. 

Campbell, T.EJ. 1997. Innovations and Risk Taking: The Engine of 

Reform in Local Government in Latin America and the 

Carribean. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 357. Washington, 

D.C. 

General Santos City Government. 1997. City Environment and Natural 

Resources Office Operational Framework• CENRO, General 

Santos City. 

Local Government Academy 1996. Eco-Walk: Environmental 

Awareness for Children. In renovations. LGA-AIM, Manila. 

Marikina City Government. 1992. Program of Government, 1992-1997, 

Major Thrusts/Programs. 

Office of Congressional Representative (Las Pifias). n.d. Las Pifias 

Historical Corridor• Briefing Materials• 

Olongapo City Government. 1997. Oiongapo City Solid Waste 

Management Program. 

World Bank Conference 

Paper presented during the DENRon 

Local Governance and Private Sector 

Participation in Solid Waste Management. Asian Institute of 

Management, Makati City. 

Puerto Princesa City Government• 1996. Oplan Linis Story. Puerto 

Princesa City, Province of Palawan. 

• 1997. City of Puerto Princesa: Profile, Development Vision 

And Strategies. Puerto Princesa City, Province of Palawan. 

• n.d. Bantay Puerto Documentation Enhancement Project. A 

project proposal submitted to Gantimpalang Pang-Lingkod 

Pook, Puerto Princesa City, Province of Palawan. 

n.d. City of Puerto Princesa Ecological Environmental Program: 

A Case Study. Paper presented during the 4d_City Sharing 

Workshop. League of Philippine Cities, Puerto Princesa City. 

Republic of the Philippines. 1991. Local Government Code of 1991. 

World Bank. 1992. World Development Report 1992: Development 

and the Environment. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 

4 

Health Management: 

Strategiesfrom SelectedCities 


ities are facing the challenges of urbanization and devolution. 

Urbanization increases the demand for basic services and 

sanitation facilities. Devolution, on the other hand, gives cities 

and other local government units (LGUs) autonomy in the 

mobilization, allocation and utilization of resources. It involves the 

transfer of power, functions, responsibilities, programs and projects, 

personnel and assets as well as their corresponding appropriations, 

from the national government to the LGUs. If LGUs fail to mobilize, 

allocate, and utilize resources wisely to meet the increasing demand 

tor health services, the health of the population would deteriorate. 

Devolution has been met with perhaps the strongest resistance 

in the health sector. There were fears concerning the health workers' 

security of tenure, the financial and management capability of the 

LGUs to sustain the devolved facilities and functions, and the 

politicization of health services. Consequently, there have been moves 

for recentralization or suspension of devolution. 

On the positive side, devolution can facilitate and improve health 

service delivery. With health workers under the jurisdiction of the 

LGUs, decisionmaking is faster, which allows immediate action on 

health needs and problems. Greater accountability to and closer 

association of local officials with the people put them in the best 

position to underake health programs that are locally responsive, 

relevant and innovative (Borlagdan et al. 1993). 

As devolution proceeded, many local officials complained that 

the internal revenue allotment (IRA) had been inadequate to cover 

for the devolved functions and responsibilities. The net transfer of 

resources (incremental IRA less cost of devolved functions) was 

negative in 26 out of 76 provinces and in some 20 percent of the 

1,500 municipalities in 1993. Although provinces and cities received 

the same IRA, provinces shoulder 60 percent of the total cost of 

devolution of health services while cities shoulder only 2.5 percent


(Manasan 1995). Insufficiency and delay in releases of funds adversely 

affected the implementation of health programs and benefits of health 

personnel as well as the maintenance and operation of hospitals and 

other health facilities. Demoralization among devolved personnel, 

lack of medicines and supplies, and deterioration of services in many 

of the hospitals turned over to provinces have been reported. Budget 

allocation for health was also eroded in LGUs where health was not a 

priority of the chief executives. While there are unmet needs in the 

health sector, total local government expenditures on health, on the 

aggregate, have been lower than what the government used to spend 

before the devolution. 

On the other hand, the Department of Health's Local Government 

Assistance and Monitoring Service (LGAMS) reported that in 

each of the many places where the health sector and the LGU have 

succeeded in forging a working relationship, there has been a marked 

improvement in community participation, closer coordination among 

the various agencies involved in health and health-related programs, 

more flexibility in program implementation, and better primary health 

care management. The LGAMS was able to document I.GU success 

stories under the devolution, specifically, selected municipalities and 

provinces with innovative responses to devolution's transition problems. 

This study focuses on model cities--those that have exemplary 

health strategies that could help other cities cope with the demands 

of devolution and urbanization. Based on the recommendations of 

the NEDA Regional Offices, eight cities were selected for the case 

studies on the health sector. The cities have been winners in competitions 

for best-practice, such as the GalingPook and Health and Management 

Information System (HAMIS) Awards (see Asis 1994 and 

Queta 1994). 

The next section specifies the type of health services devolved 

to cities and those retained by the Department of Health (DOH). 

This is followed by a comparison of population, health expenditures 

and health performance of the selected cities before and after 

devolution. The study then presents the cities' various approaches in 

overcoming common constraints to health financing and service 

delivery as well as their strategies related to systems/administration. 

Finally, it provides an evaluation of the applicability of the strategies 

and suggested improvements.

Health Management: Strategies from Selected Cities 107 

-Iealth Services Provided by Cities and DOH 

Ynder the Devolution 

With decentralization, city governments will be responsible for 

the implementation of primary health care and other field health 

services, aid to puericulture centers, and provision of medical, hospital 

and other support services (which include primary, secondary and 

terdary health care services) in the following health facilities: 

• Barangay (village) health stations; 

* Rural health units; 

• City health offices; and 

• City hospitals in highly urbanized cities (excluding those in 

the National Capital Region). 

Primary health care includes health education; control oflocaUy 

endemic diseases (such as malaria, dengue, and schistosomiasis); 

expanded program of immunization (against tuberculosis, polio, 

measles, diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus); maternal and 

child health and family planning; environmental sanitation and 

provision of safe water supply; nutrition; treatment of common 

diseases; and supply of essential drugs. It is usually provided by 

midwives and barangay health workers in barangay health stations 

(BHS) or rural health units. Secondary health care is given by 

physicians with basic health training. It is usually done in infirmaries, 

clinics or hospitals. Secondary level facilities can perform minor 

surgery and some simple laboratory examinations. Tertiary care is 

rendered by specialists in hospitals. Tertiary hospitals have staff and 

facilities to handle complicated cases, intensive and rehabilitative care, 

diagnosis, treatment, research and training activities. 

The DOH retains the following functions, services, facilities, 

programs, personnel and assets: 

• components of national programs that are funded from 

foreign sources; 

• nationally funded programs that are in the process of being 

pilot-tested or are in the process of being developed; 

• health services and disease control programs covered by 

international agreements such as disease eradication programs 

and quarantinable diseases;


° regtflatory, licensing and accreditation functions in accordance 

with existing laws such as Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Law and 

hospital licensing; and 

* regional hospitals, medical centers and specialized health 

facilities. 

Comparison of Population, Health Expenditures and Health 

Performance of Selected Cities 

Poputat/on 

The population of the cities ranged from about 88,000 persons 

to 247,000 persons in 1995, with Gingoog having the lowest and 

Butuan having the highest population (Table 1). 

Table 1. Population of Selected Cities 

Population 

City 1990 1995 % Change 

Puerto Princesa 92,147 129,577 40.62 

Lapu-lapu 146,194 173,744 18.84 

Cotabato 127,065 146,779 15.51 

Naga 115,329 126,972 10.10 

Butuan 227,829 247,074 8_45 

Gingoog 82,582 87,530 5.99 

Surigao 100,379 104,909 4.51 

Olongapo 193,327 179,754 -7.02 

Philippines 60,703,206 68,616,536 13.04 

Source: 1997Phili1_ine Statistical Yearbook, National Statistical Coordination Board. 

Puerto Princesa City had the highest increase in population 

between 1990 and 1995 at 41 percent. In contrast, Olongapo City's 

population declined by 7 percent for the same period. This may be 

due to out-migration after the withdrawal of the US Navy from Subic 

and the eruption of Mr. Pinatubo. For the rest of the cities, the rise in 

population ranged from 5 to 19 percent between 1990 and 1995. 

Lapu-lapu City was the most densely populated among the cities 

under study, with almost 3,000 persons per square kilometer in 1995 

(Table 2): It is followed by Olongapo and Naga, each with over 1,500 

persons per square kilometer. Puerto Princesa and Gingoog had the 

lowest density, with population per square kilometer of 62 persons 

and 216 persons, respectively, in 1995.


Health expenditures and mortality rates 

All the eight cities have lower infant and children mortality 

rates than the average for the Philippines in 1990 and 1995 (Tables 3 

and 4). However, Surigao, Butuan and Puerto Princesa have higher 

maternal mortality rates than the national average for the same years. 

Nevertheless, they showed a greater decline in maternal mortality 

rates than the national average from 1990 to 1995 (Table 5). 

The data on health expenditures and mortality rates (Tables 3- 

10) indicate a positive relationship between these two variables. The 

magnitude of the cities' expenditures depends on the extent of the 

health problem. Cities that have the highest (lowest) mortality rates 

also have the highest (lowest) health expenditures. 

Puerto Princesa had the most substantial increase as well as the 

biggest h_alth expenditure per capita in 1991 and 1994. The city 

aimed to reduce its mortality rates, which were the highest among 

the selected cities in 1990 and 1995. 

In Olongapo City, the share of health expenditures to total 

expenditures dropped significantly from 26 percent in 1991 to 8 

percent in 1994. The city had the smallest increase in health 

expenditure per capita between 1991 and 1994. Although it had the 

highest health expenditure pcr capita in 1991, it ranked fifth only in 

1994. It minimized its health expenditures considering that it had 

the lowest infant and child mortality rates in 1990 and 1995 and ranked 

third lowest in maternal mortality rate in 1995. 

Likewise, Lapu-lapu City's low health expenditures may be 

associated with its having low mortality rates. The city had the second 

smallest increase as well as the lowest health expenditure per capita 

in 1991 and 1994. It had the second lowest infant, child and maternal 

mortality rates in 1990 and 1995. 

These cities may be deemed as good examples since they have 

been adjusting their expenditures to the severity of the problem-- 

pending more when the problem is greatest and spending less when 

the health problem has been minimized. 

Health Concerns and Strategies 

st sfor 

/th 

In several cases, the cities confronted the same constraints to 

health service delivery. These problems and the corresponding different 

approaches used by the cities in resolving them are as follows:


Table 2. Population Density and Land Area of Selected Cities 

Density (persons/sq. kin) Land Area 

City 1990 1995 (sq. kin) 

Lapu-lapu 2,516 2,990 58_1 

Olongapo 1,872 1,740 103.3 

Naga 1,488 1,638 77.5 

Cotabato 722 834 176.0 

Butuan 433 470 526-3 

Surigao 409 428 245.5 

Gingoog 204 216 404.6 

Puerto Princesa 44 62 2,106.7 

Philippines 202.3 228.7 300,000 

Source: 1997 Phili_ine .Statistical Yearbook, National Statistical Coordination Board_ 

Table 3. Infant Mortality* Rates 

City 

Infant Mortality Rates 

Rank 

1990 1995 % chan_e ]990 1995 

Olongapo 41.2 30_9 -25.0 ]. 1 

Lapu-lapu 42.0 32.8 -21.9 2 2 

Cotabato 45.0 36.1 -19.8 5 3 

Surigao 44.3 36.3 -18.1 3 4 

Butuan 45-9 36.7 -20.0 6 5 

Gingoog 44.7 36:7 -17.9 4 6 

Naga 49.6 42.2 -14-9 7 7 

Puerto Princesa 52.7 44.8 -15.0 8 8 

Philippines 56.7 48.9 -13.8 

* Infant mortality: infant deaths per 1,000 live births. 

Sources: Herrin (1998) ; National Statistical Coordination Board. 

Table 4. Child Mortality* 

Rates 

Child Mortality Rates 

City 

Rank 

1990 1995 % change 1990 1995 

Olongapo 54.0 40.2 -25.6 1 1 

Lapu-lapu 55. I 43-0 -22.0 2 2 

Cotabato 60.9 50_0 -17.9 3 3 

Gingoog 61.1 50.2 -17_8 4 4 

Surigao 61.8 50.8 -17.8 5 5 

Butuan 65.0 52.2 -19.7 6 6 

Naga 66.6 56_2 -15.6 7 7 



* Child mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5 years of age per 1,000 

children of the same age range_ 

Sources: Herrin (1998); National Statistical Coordination Board.


Table 5. Maternal Mortality* Rates 

City 

Maternal Mortality Rates 

1990 1995 % chan_e 1990 1995 

Naga 150_7 128.1 -15.0 1 1 

Lapu-lapu 157.7 130_8 -22,0 2 2 

Olongapo 184.0 138.0 -25,0 4 3 

Cotabato 182.8 149.9 -18.0 3 4 

Rank 

Gmgoog 190_3 156.1 -18.0 5 5 

Sufigao 237.7 194_9 -18.0 6 6 

Butuan 251.3 201.0 -20_0 7 7 



* Maternal mortality: number of materrxal deaths per 100,000 live birtl_s. 

Sources: Herrin (1998); National Statistical Coordination Board 

Table 6. Health Expenditures 

and Ratio to Total City Expenditures 

Health Expenditures (_)/ 

City Health Expenditures (]_) Total Expenditures 

1991 1994 1991 1994 

Gingoog 2,295,264 10,774,523 0_06 0.09 

Butuan 12,262,330 27,512,850 0.11 0.10 

Cotabato 3,016,387 8,470,312 0-07 0.05 

Naga 3,594,597 10,456,201 0.07 0.06 

Puerto Princesa 6,512,001 20,119,268 0.07 0.05 

Surigao 3,888,840 12,066,714 0.09 0.06 

Lapudapu 2,821,137 6,099,927 0-07 0.04 

Olongapo 18,764,434. 23,586,670 0.26 0.08 

Table 7. Ratio of Basic Health and Hospital Expenditures to Total Health 

F_.xpenditures 

1991 1994 

Basic Health Hospital Exp,/ Basic Health Hospital Exp./ 

City Exp,/Total Total Health Foxp./Total Total Health 

Health Exp. Exp. Health Exp. F_xp. 

Naga 0.48 0_51 0.41 0.59 

Olongapo 0.44 0.56 0-41 0.58 

Butuan 0.34 0.66 0.43 0.55 

Puerto Princesa 0.96 0.00 0.74 0.17 

Gingoog 0.97 O-00 0.61 0.05 

Cotabato 0.75 0.24 0,95 0.00 

Surigao 1.00 0.00 0.77 0.00 

Lapu-lapu 0_65 0.00 0.88 0,00 

Source: Local Government Audit Office (LGAO).


Table 8. Health Expenditures Per Capita, 1991 and 1994 

Health Expenditures Amount of 

City Per Capita 

1991 

(_) 

1994 

Increase (_) 

1.991 

Rank 

1994 

Puerto Princesa 61.51 160.21 99 2 1 

Gingoog 27.46 124.54 97 6 2 

Surigao 38.31 115-98 78 4 3 

Butuan 52-96 113.20 60 3 4 

Olongapo 95.01 111.99 17 1 5 

Naga 30.58 83.96 53 5 6 

Cotabato 22.86 56.46 34 7 7 

Lapu-lapu 18.65 36.28 18 8 8 

Table 9. Basic Health Expenditures Per Capita, 1991 and 1994 

Basic Health Expenditures Amount of 

City Per Capita Increase (_) 

Rank 

1991 1994 1991 1994 

Puerto Princesa 59.25 118.66 59 1 1 

Sufigao 38.31 88.98 51 3 2 

Gingoog 26.65 76_15 49 4 3 

Cotabato 17.25 53.59 36 5 4 

Butuan 18.05 48.78 31 6 5 

Olongapo 41.88 46.03 4 2 6 

Naga 14,68 34.68 20 7 7 

.Lapu-lapu 12.04 31.76 20 8 8 

Table 10. Hospital Expenditures Per Capita, 1991 and 1994 

Hospital 

Expenditures 

City Per Capita Amount of Rank 

1991 1994 Increase (P) 1991 1994 

Olongapo 53.13 65.12 12 1 1 

Butuan 34.91 61.97 27 2 2 

Naga 15.55 49.27 34 3 3 

Puerto Princesa 0.00 27.38 27 - 4 

Gingoog 0.00 5,82 6 5 

Cotabato 5.43 0.00 (5) 4 

Surigao 0.00 0.00 0 

Lapudapu 0.00 0.00 0 

• _.r__ofbarangay health stations 

Conducting outreach activities in rural barangays. To deliver basic 

services to people who live far from government facilities, Gingoog 

City implemented the Gingoog Total Integrated Development 

Approach (G-TIDA) in December 1988. The G-TIDA is an outreach 

program to rural barangays. It is integrated since it provides health 

medical, infrastructure and other services.


A G-TIDA core group, organized by the mayor, is responsible 

for planning, identifying the target barangays, and implementing the 

outreach program. The core group is composed of the G-TIDA 

coordinator, the G-TIDA Secretariat, transportation coordinator, 

lo_sdcs coordinator, and specific service coordinators represented 

by the department heads of the concerned agencies. 

The city conducts G-TIDA outreach activities usually once or 

twice a month. During the G-TIDA Day, members of the team meet 

with the people and their leaders to discuss the needs and problems 

of the barangvay, if problems cannot be solved immediately, they are 

referred to the appropriate agency. The G-TIDA team informs the 

people about the functions and services provided by each agency in 

the city so everyone would know which to approach for specific needs. 

The G-TIDA approach contributed to the building of people's 

capabilities and participation in local governance. Encouraged and 

guided by the G-TIDA team, people in some of the far-flung barangays 

were able to install water pipes connected to a spring using their own 

local resources and relying on the ba_anihan (mutual assistance and 

exchange of labor) system. 

Gingoog's outreach program is now on its tenth year of 

implementation. It has provided a means for delivering health care 

services in areas without BHSs. During the early implementation of 

the program, the G-TIDA team stays for two days and one night in 

the barangay. However, as requests for outreach activities increased, 

the conduct of G-TIDA outreach activities is now limited to about 

one day per barangay. Presently, all the 50 rural barangays have BHSs 

manned by at least a barangay health midwife and volunteer health 

workers. 

The expenses incurred by the various agencies in providing 

services during the G-TIDA outreach are taken from the regular 

agency budgets. No new appropriations are provided except for the 

budget for overhead expenses like gasoline, transportation and food. 

In 1996, the city government appropriated P189,400 for G-TIDA. 

Use of barangay halls and rooms of private homesfor BHS. Cotabato 

City aimed to provide a BHS for every barangay so that the people 

could have ready access to basic health care services and facilities. 

However, the city's Office of Health Services (OHS) had very limited 

financial resources. Its regular budget was just enough to cover 

personal services and maintenance and operating expenses. In the 

city's experience, building cost for a concrete BHS was about P100,000.


At most, the city could construct only three concrete BHS structures 

per year. Despite such constraint, the number of BHSs increased from 

nine in 1990 to 35 in 1991. 

The OHS overcame the lack of permanent BHS structures by 

using (free of charge) barangay halls and rooms or spaces in homes 

of concerned citizens as health stations. This strategy enabled the 

provision of a BHS for each of the city's 37 barangays. At present, 

Cotabato City has 37 BliSs and seven BHS extensions. Of these, 23 

are permanent structures constxucted by the city while the rest are 

temporarily placed in barangay halls or private homes. 

Inadequ_umber of health pexs_nnel 

Mobilization of health volunteers. The common approach to 

augment manpower is to mobilize volunteers. Cotabato City activated 

100 volunteer health workers, mostly trained hilots (traditional 

midwives), to assist midwives in the BHSs ..... nilarly, Olongapo has 

about 300 health vohmteers. For its rescue and emergency medical 

assistance program, Naga City has 400 trained first responders and 

emergency medical technician volunteers. The volunteers render free 

services so the cities save on salary expenses. As token of appreciation, 

Cotabato City gives each volunteer P500 cash gift during December; 

Olongapo entitles them to hospitalization benefits; and Naga provides 

them with uniforms, group insurance, and free fbod while on duty. 

Organization of women's gnmps. Women proved to be valuable 

partners of the city governments in the health sector. Olongapo has 

its Balikatan Ladies of Olongapo Movement (BLOOM). The group 

has 6,000 members, most of whom are housewives in the community. 

Its members participate in the city's cleanliness drive and undertake 

various barangay projects. Members who also serve as health 

volunteers work without pay as nursing aides in the city hospital and 

also assist the health workers in the immunization drive, and in the 

organization and conduct of health classes. 

Similarly, Lapu-lapu City has its mothers' support groups, 

composed of 410 members. Health personnel ask help from the 

mothers during advocacy activities such as feeding the children during 

nutrition month. 

Surigao City mobilized the largest number of women for health 

care. its Primary Health Care Federated Women's Club (PHC) has 

over 12,000 members as of 1996. This represents about 63.2 percent 

of the 20,240 households in the city at that time.


The PHC is a people's organization initiated in 1986 by a City 

Health Office (CHO) midwife who conducted three-day seminars on 

health matters and thereafter formed PHC Clubs. The CHO adopted 

and expanded this strategy all over the city. It appointed a coordinator 

whose task is to launch PHC clubs. In addition, it provides the training 

package and resource persons for the PHC classes. Upon completing 

the course, the participants form a PHC chapter at the pur0k I level 

and elect a set of officers. 

As health volunteers, the PHC members are involved in the 

operation and maintenance of BHS and feeding centers. They record 

immunization, bring the pregnant women for prenatal checkup, assist 

in feeding the children, conduct health education activities, 

encourage and teach plant propagation to those who do not have 

herbal or vegetable garden, and do the necessary follow-ups, such as 

on children who have not been immunized. They have also learned 

to treat common illnesses and make herbal cough preparations and 

liniments. Since the PHC members work on a voluntary basis, this 

brought the CHO considerable savings on salaries while having 

thousands of health workers on call. 

Involvement of private companies/medical practitioners. Lapu-lapu 

City asked private companies and institutions to adopt barangays that 

they could assist in terms of health care needs. These entities help by 

engaging the services of their own doctors (retainers) to conduct 

regular monthly free clinic in the adopted barangays and by donating 

facilities or supplies. One company even handled fogging activities in 

the entire Lapu-lapu City. At present, 10 private companies and 5 

educational institutions have adopted 8 barangays. 

The Lapu-lapu City CHO also involved private medical 

practitioners from the Mactan Doctors' Organization and nursevolunteers 

from the Mactan Community Hospital in the immunization 

program. It provides vaccines for the group during such collaborated 

• program. Moreover, it also requested the doctors and nurse-volunteers 

to render free services to the barangays. Currently, 50 doctors and 

about 100 nurse-volunteers give their services for free for such a cause. 

A small district within a barangay 

(village) ; subvillage.


Hiring of temporary part-time health personngl. To reach more 

people and serve them better, Cotabato City OHS's target was to have 

one midwife stationed in every barangay. However, the regular budget 

could not finance the employment of additional permanent midwives. 

To solve this problem, the OHS hired casual midwives and funded 

the salaries from the 20-percent Development Fund. Thus, the city 

was able to employ 37 casual midwives for its 37 barangays and other 

casual personnel for the Main Health Center starting 1993_ Salary 

expenses for these personnel totalled P2.5 million yearly. 

For its Satellite Clinics Project, which was also financed from 

the 20-percent Development Fund, Puerto Princesa City hired five 

doctors on contractual and part-time basis. At present, it has five 

strategically located satellite clinics. Each doctor ys for two days a 

week in his/her assigned satellite clinic. For the rest of the week, he/ 

she is free to work in hospitals or engage in private practice. The city 

government pays each doctor a monthly salary of P10,000. 

The schedules of the doctors in the satellite clinics are 

synchronized to maximize their availability. For example, in one 

satellite clinic, the doctor's schedule is Monday and Tuesday. In the 

nearest satellite clinic, the doctor's schedule is Thursday and Friday. 

During the days when the doctor assigned to a satellite clinic is not, 

scheduled to come, tile patient can go to the other satellite clinic and 

avail of another doctor's services. 

Lack of emergencyJl3_]igal2_s_ 

Emergency Rescue Naga (ERN). In April 1991, the Naga City 

government initiated the establishment of the Emergency Rescue 

Naga (ERN) under its Disaster Preparedness Program. The ERN is a 

quick response unit led by the Naga City Hospital personnel. It 

provides emergency medical assistance, rescue services, and transport 

to a hospital. It also gives medical backup assistance to events and 

conducts regular training on Disaster Preparedness and Management 

to ERN volunteers and various groups. 

The ERN has two telephone hotlines and two VHF controls. Its 

volunteers are equipped with beepers. Average ERN response time is 

3-5 minutes within the city proper and 30 minutes for the farthest 

mountail_ barangays some 17 kilometers away. As the ERN has become 

metrowide, calls come not only from Naga City but from neighboring 

municipalities as well. Within Metro Naga, an extensive radio network 

links all offices of the mayor, the ambulances, and the police and fire


stations. Handheld radios were also distributed to key personnel of 

each LGU. Of the 14 LGUs comprising Metro Naga, only four have 

fire protection bureaus and five have ambulances. Making the ERN 

metrowide enabled sharing of these limited facilities and magnified 

their benefits. 

The ERN's core staff includes a paramedic, a driver, and 

volunteers. Regular hospital staff, numbering 40, are on call. It has 

400 trained First Responders.and Emergency Medical Technician 

volunteers. Its participating partners include the Philippine National 

Police, Bureau of Fire Protection, City Disaster Coordinating Council, 

Task Force COMET (for calls involving peace and order problems), 

and other civic organizations equally prepared to serve when disaster 

strikes. 

The ERN started with only one ambulance. At present, its 

facilities consist of three ambulances, one all-terrain rescue vehicle 

and one rubber boat stationed at its base at the Naga City Hospital, 

and a trauma van posted at the Naga City Bureau of Fire Protection. 

All ambulances are on call 24 hours a day and manned by a crew of 

three per vehicle. The city government spent a total of P150,000 for 

ERN for 1997. 

For 1996, the ERN responded to 2,257 emergency and transport 

cases or an average of 6.2 trips per day. It has provided valuable rescue 

services during calamities. For example, when Super Typhoon Rosing 

struck Naga in 1996 and floods rose to more than five feet, ERN 

rescued and evacuated about 310 families or more than 1,700 persons. 

In recognition of its exemplary performance, the ERN was honored 

with several awards. These include the Galing Pook Award (Top 

Twenty) in 1994, Disaster Management Award (Regional Level 1995 

and 1996, National Level 1995) and Alay Buhay Award (given by thc 

Department of Health in 1996). 

Puerto Princesa City's satellite clinics. The city has five strategically 

located satellite clinics to serve far-flung rural barangays that do not 

have access to health services. These clinics handle emergency cases 

and simple illnesses. For more serious or complicated cases, the clinics 

have ambulances ready to bring the patients to hospitals. 

In the absence of telephones, the satellite clinics use radio 

communication equipment. Each barangay and tribal community is 

provided with hand-held radio (VHF transceivers). Emergencies are 

reported to the barangay chairperson who then calls the nearest 

satellite clinic for an ambulance and health personnel. If patients


require hospitalization, radio communication enables the clinic to 

make an advance call to the receiving hospital. This gives the hospital 

time to prepare and have a team of medical personnel ready for the 

arrival of the patient from the rural barangay. 

Each satellite clinic is manned by two midwives, a radio operator, 

a driver and a utility man. A doctor stays two days a week and a dentist 

comes every two weeks. To accommodate patients who are too weak 

to move or are in need of further observation or awaiting transport, 

each clinic is equipped with four to five beds, These patients are 

confined in the clinics for about one to three days. 

From 1993 to 1997, the clinics have served an average of 47,000 

patients per year. Most cases attended to were respiratory infections 

and other simple illnesses. The clinics serve as a vital link to the city's 

referral system. They resulted in an increase in the reported 

emergency cases and a decline in the number of patients with simple 

illnesses going to the hospitals. The satellite clinics project was one of 

the top 20 Galing Pook winners in 1996, For 1997, the budget fbr this 

project was P6.2 million. 

__int 

an daaagmen/afiaQ 

Barangay funds for health. Olongapo requires its barangays to 

allocate 5 percent of their IRA to health and welfare. Drug allocation 

to the barangays are sourced from this fund. In Cotabato City, the 

barangays also finance the medicines. In the case of Lapu-lapu City, 

the barangays provide the allowance for barangay health workers. 

Depending onthe budget, the allowance ranges from P400 to P1,500 

per month. Sourcing funds from the barangays reduces the financial 

burden on the cities and encourages greater involvement of barangay 

officials in health matters and in monitoring the activities of the 

barangay health workers. 

20percent Development Fund. Cotabato City and Puerto Pfincesa 

City used the 20-percent Development Fund to be able to hire 

temporary health personnel and set up satellite clinics, respectively, 

which otherwise could not be financed from their regular budget. 

Contributions. Financial constraints were somehow alleviated by 

contributions. In Surigao City, the Barangay Environmental and 

Sanitation Implementation Group (BESIG) members contribute labor 

services while the government provides fimds for small infrastructure 

projects, such as construction of health stations and feeding centers. 

The city's PHC Federated Women's Club obtained P1.5 million for


the construction of its training center from a senator's Countrywide 

Development Fund. 

Under the share-food project of a Butuan City barangay, wellto-do 

families sponsor malnourished children for three months. 

During this period, the sponsoring family feeds a child every mealtime. 

In Lapu-lapu City, private companies and congressmen 

contribute for the milk feeding of preschoolers and Grade 1 pupils 

while a food manufacturer regularly provides noodles for children's 

feeding. They also donate facilities or supplies to barangays. 

Strategies Related to Systems Administration 

Regular visitatlon/interaction with the barangay residents 

To identify the people's needs and ways of improving the delivery 

of health care services, the Lapu-lapu city health officer toured all 

barangays for one month. He traced the city's low performance in 

the Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) and the peoples' 

limited access to health care services to the absence of a specific 

schedule for immunization, the doctors' unavailability, and the 

people's lack of interest. The CHO therefore set a permanent 

schedule for the immunization and the doctors' visits and encouraged 

people to go to the BHS and avail of health care services. As a result, 

Lapu-lapu was awarded the Most Accelerated City in EPI in 1991. At 

present, the city health officer still goes to the barangays three to 

four times a week to check on the status of programs being 

implemented. The mayor also accompanies the CHO to the barangays 

about three to four times a month. 

The Lapu-lapu City health officer also conducts a barangay 

assembly meeting every quarter. He presents the current health 

programs and projects initiated by the government and solicits from 

the community their health problems and priorities. Through the 

assembly, the community participates in coming up with solutions to 

address its own problems. 

In the case of Olongapo City, the mayor goes to the barangays, 

together with all the department heads, to personally see the people's 

situation and needs. All the 17 barang, ays are visited within one quarter. 

During barangay consultations, the people inform the mayor of their 

problems and needs. The department head concerned is then tasked 

to act on these matters the following day. The people report to the 

mayor any problems that remain unsolved.


.Integrated approach 

Gingoog City opted fbr an integrated approach to its outreach 

program to rural barangays. Its officials recognize that there are 

problems that can only be solved by several agencies working together. 

One example is the malnutrition problem. The City Health and Social 

Welfare personnel address this problem by feeding malnourished 

children, teaching mothers proper nutrition, and educating people 

about thmily planning. Stafffrom the agriculture department are also 

needed to teach people how to plant and grow nutritious food. 

Infrastructure services are required to construct health centers and 

water systems. 

Olongapo City, on the other hand, strengthened the linkage 

between health and sanitation by integrating its environmental 

management program with health activities. The CHO plays a major 

role in the city's solid waste management project. Its sanitary inspectors 

regularly check their assigned areas and issue citation tickets (fines) 

to residents and owners of business establishments who violate 

sanitation ordinances (such as having unclean premises and putting 

out garbage outside of the scheduled collection time). The 

combination of health and environmental management resulted in 

the reduction of sanitation-related diseases such as l_¢phoid fever and 

paratyphoid infections from 75 percent in 1988 to 9 percent in 1995 

per 100,000 population. 

Chtstering, of barangays 

For more effective supervision and monitoring, the Cotabato 

OHS grouped its 37 barangays into seven clusters. Each duster is 

headed by a coordinator who supervises and monitors the activities 

of his/her BHS, and barangay midwives. Dividing the work of 

supervising and monitoring the 37 barangays among seven 

coordinators i_tcilitated these tasks. Because each is now focused on 

only a few barangays, coordinators can immediately respond to the 

problems and needs of the barangays within their respective clusters. 

Planning, monitoring and evaluation of programs 

and activities 

_..minats / wo r_ksh_o_ps 

Butuan City Nutrition personnel and Department of interior 

and Local Government (DILG) staff conduct nutrition program


planning seminars with barangay leaders. They compare the 

nutritional status of the puroks in the barangay and guide the leaders 

in making local plans for each quarter. I.ocal leaders are asked to 

identify problems, think of solutions, identi_ funding if needed, assign 

people to handle the problems, and make a timetable. 

The Cotabato OHS conducts semi-annual and annual reviews 

of its programs, activities and performance. Through the workshops, 

the OHS staff and health workers learn of better methods as they 

listen to lectures, interact with "each other, share their experiences, 

problems and solutions. The workshops therefore serve as an effective 

monitoring and management tool. 

Regtttar_mee gs 

In Surigao City, the PHC chapter's monthly meetings serve as a 

venue to identify and discuss community needs and problems, 

solutions, development projects, and plans at the puroklevel. To ensure 

prompt action and accountability in implementation, the PHC uses a 

monitoring chart specifying the problems or needs, the steps required, 

the persons responsible for each step, the target completion date, 

and the plans that have been accomplished. 

Monthly staff meetings, in addition to report submission, are 

also conducted in Olongapo City to monitor, compare and evaluate 

performance in the barangays. Likewise, health personnel and workers 

in each of Lapu-lapu's eight districts and nutrition workers in each of 

Butuan's 10 barangay clusters also hold monthly meetings for the 

same purpose. Accordingly, causes of low accomplishments are 

identified and appropriate actions are undertaken, resulting in a 

better performance. 

Surigao City's sustained implementation of the community data 

board enables it to know the health status of each household and 

identify their needs. Each household is represented in the data board 

by a small hut. The hut shows the house number, the name of the 

family head, the health concerns, and the quarterly period covered. 

For comparison, the previous year's quarterly performance is included 

as baseline data. 

The community data board is updated every quarter through a 

survey of all households. The survey covers health concerns such as 

pregnancies (pre/post-natal), immunization and nutritional status


of children, garbage disposal, water source, occurrence of diseases, 

PHC health insurance membership, and availability of toilet, herbal 

and vegetable garden. 

For each health concern, the health worker and the assisting 

mothers assign a colored circle to indicate health status. The color 

codes, their meanings and some examples of their application in 

different health concerns, are as follows: 

Color Meaning Example 

Blue Not Applicable Nobodyis pregnant in the household 

Yellow Improving Degreeof Malnutritionchangedt_omsevereto mild 

Green Safe Childrenare fullyimmunized 

Red Danger No PHChealth insurance 

By looking at the red circles, the health personnel are alerted 

on the needs of each household. The concerns of the purok can also 

be prioritized according to the number of red circles. The health 

concern with the most number of red circles is considered as the top 

problem. Comparison with the previous quarter will also show where 

performance has improved or deteriorated. 

Recognition of outstanding and worst performers 

In Surig_ao City, outstanding perfbrmances are recognized based 

on how the PHC chapters or members conduct health-related 

programs, projects and activities such as the most number of babies 

immunized and the most number of sanitary toilets constructed. 

Awards are given to the Ten Outstanding PHC Chapters, Five 

Outstanding Workers, and Outstanding Couple during the PHC 

annual convention. The awardees receive prizes in cash and in kind. 

Butuan City conducts an annual contest for the most 

outstanding barangay, known as the Search for Bulawanong (Golden) 

Barangay. Every quarter, the performances of the barangays are 

evaluated using various criteria such as prhnary health care activities, 

food production and livelihood programs. Prizes for the winning 

barangays range from P50,000 to P100,000. The city also ranks 

barangays in terms of rate of malnutrition and announces the poor 

performers during the barangay captains' meetings. The problems 

of these barangays and appropriate action plans are further discussed 

accordingly.


Recognition of the outstanding and worst performers motivates 

barangay leaders and constituents to give their best performance and 

cooperation in the implementation of programs and projects. 

Applicability and Suggested Improvements 

Gingoog City's outreach method (i.e., G-TIDA) of providing 

health care services is useful as temporary measure only for coping 

with the inadequate number of BHSs. The long-term solution is to 

provide additional BHSs to reach all barangays. People benefit from 

the curative and preventive health services provided during an 

outreach visit but there are health services that have to be done on a 

regular basis. The G-TIDA approach may be adopted by cities that 

are in the process of setting up additional BHS structures or looking 

for a facility to house, even temporarily, the BHS. To sustain health 

activities initiated by the outreach team, the CHO could train local 

residents as health workers and nutrition scholars. It could also form 

and mobilize people's organizations. 

Cotabato City's strategy of using barangay halls and rooms or 

spaces in private homes as BHSs is a sort of progression from the G- 

TIDA method. The strategy enables regular provision of health 

services rather than a one-shot approach. Another alternative is to 

rent a space for the BHS. Since the barangay will be the beneficiary 

of the BHS, the OHS, through the mayor or sanggunian, may ask the 

barangay officials to take the lead in finding a suitable place for a 

BHS. 

Equally important as having a BHS facility is the awailability of 

health personnel or workers to deliver the health care services. 

Mobilization of volunteers and mothers in particular is a good way to 

supplement the existing health manpower resources while providing 

the city considerable savings in salaries. Likewise, Lapu-lapu City's 

utilization of free services of private medical practitioners and doctors 

of private companies does not require any cost. 

The hiring of part-time doctors, as practiced by Puerto Pfincesa, 

enables the provision of curative services in the barangays. BHS 

personnel are mostly midwives who mainly focus on preventive health 

care. Because of the availability of doctors in the satellite clinics, the 

number of patients going to the hospitals for consultation and minor 

illnesses was reduced. Such strategy may also be extended to other 

health personnel such as dentists and medical technologists. Medical


personnel serve a number of barangays on rotation basis. The 

barangays covered may contribute to the salaries of part-time docto1_ 

and other health personnel. 

The providers of emergency medical assistance--Naga and 

Puerto Princesa--could learn from each other. Puerto Princesa could 

follow Naga City's mobilization of volunteers to handle emergencies. 

On the other hand, Naga City could station ambulances in strategically 

located barangays, as done in Puerto Princesa's sattelite satellite clinics, 

or in the farthest barangays. This way, the ambulance need not come 

from the city proper. Instead, any ambulance nearest to the place of 

emergency can respond immediately, thus saving on travel time. 

The cities in the case studies provide free services and medicines 

in their health facilities (BHSs and satellite clinics) and in the use of 

ambulances. In some cases, they were able to obtain cash and in-kind 

contribution from individuals or priwate companies. However, another 

option to source funds is cost-recovery, specifically by charging fees 

for the medicines, use of ambulances and medical services. Only those 

who are really indigent may be exempted from paying. This 

suggestion, however, requires a system for determining the people's 

capability to pay. 

Conclusion 

Like all LGUs, the cities in the case studies faced challenges 

arising from the devolution of functions. They were also confronted 

with various constraints to the delivery of health care services. Because 

of their ability to overcome these limitations and make devolution 

work to their advantage, they can be considered as model cities for 

others to emulate. 

Devolution is a step toward the fulfillment of the DOH's vision 

of"Health in the Hands of the People" by year 2020. In the course of 

the devolution, the government devised various measures to assist 

the LGUs. To advise the LGUs on health plans and budget, the 1991 

Local Government Code provides for the creation a Local Health 

Board per LGU composed of local chief executives and health officers, 

representatives from the DOH and the private sector or NGO. 

To ensure the speedy resolution of devolution-related issues and personnel 

problems, Transition Action Teams at the provincial and regional 

levels have been created. The DOH also established and tapped 

the Local Government Assistance and Monitoring Service to attend 

to local government concerns. It also provided for Comprehensive

Health Management:Strategies from Selected Cities 125 

Health Care Agreements, wherein priority health programs are implemented 

through DOH and LGU cooperation. 

A number of studies have identified some remaining issues that 

should be addressed so that devolution could work well [Legaspi 

(1995), BriUantes (1997) and Gaffud (1997) in Herrin (1998)]. 

Specifically, the following measures are needed: 

* resolution of the issue of the inequitable distribution of IRA 

shares vis-a-vis devolution burdens (IRA reallocafion bills are 

currently pending in Congress); 

* technical assistance to LGUs in exploring alternative ways for 

raising additional financial resources and in improving their 

capability in the management of devolved hospitals; 

* greater participation of NGOs and people's organizations in 

local special bodies; and 

* development of alternative modes of intergovernmental 

cooperation to deal with issues of service delivery and 

monitoring that cut across jurisdictional boundaries and to 

consolidate and strengthen efforts in advocacy and social 

mobilization. 

Meanwhile, the DOH could jointly undertake with the LGUs 

revenue enhancement projects in devolved hospitals and other 

facilities just as it has done in its retained hospitals such as the Rizal 

Medical Center in Pasig City and the Ilocos Regional Hospital in La 

Union. It could provide technical assistance in improving pricing, 

billing and collection systems of devolved facilities. Moreover, the 

DOH could help enhance the LGUs' capability in managing devolved 

facilities by providing Continuous trainings to LGU officials and 

personnel. 

The model cities provide some useful ways _br dealing with 

devolution issues. In general, their leaders and health officers 

promoted good management by interacting with the people and 

finding out their needs and problems. To alleviate financial 

constraints, they obtained funds and other forms of assistance from 

private companies, congressmen, and civic-minded individuals. 

Furthermore, they encouraged people to participate in the delivery 

of health care services by mobilizing volunteers, women's groups, and 

private medical practitioners. Inter-LGU cooperation was also 

achieved in the provision of emergency rescue services, as in the Case


of Naga City's ERN which has evolved into a Metro Naga activity 

involving a total of 15 LGUs. 

With the political will of leaders, commitment of health officers, 

and people participation (as exemplified by the model cities)n 

supplemented by national government support in terms of DOH 

assistance and equitable IRA distribution--and given sufficient dme 

for adjustment, devolution could work well and result in the 

improvement of health service delivery to the people. 

References 

Asis, M. 1994. Community-based Initiatives in Health: Development, 

Growth and Transformation. Occasional Paper No. 8. Manila: 

Department of Health (DOH)-Health and Management 

Information System (HAMIS). 

Borlagdan, S., G. Gabronino and A. Tracena A. 1993. Health Service 

Delivery: Issues, Problems, and Prospects of Devolution. 

Philippine Journal ofPublic Administration 37 (1). 

Herrin, A. 1998. Beyond 2000: An Assessment of the Health, Nutrition 

and Education Sectors, 1992-1996. Unpublished PIDS paper. 

Local Government Assistance and Monitoring Service (LGAMS) n.d. 

Devolution Matters: a Documentation of Post-Devolution 

Experiences in the Delivery of Health Services. Manila: 

Department of Health (DOH). 

n.d. Health Services and Local Autonomy. Manila: 

Department of Health. 

Manasan, R. 1995. Fiscal Decentralization: The EarlyYears of Code 

Implementation. Development Research News, Vol. 13, No. 4. Makati 

City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 

NCSB (National Statistical Coordination Board). 1997. Philippine 

Statistical Yearbook.Makati City: NSCB. 

Quieta, R. 1994. Health Strategies and Interventions: Extended Case 

Studies on Good Health Care Management in the Philippines. 

Occasional Paper No. 9. Manila: Department of Health (DOH)- 

Health and Management lnformatinn Sv._tem (HAMI.q_

Chapter 

5 

LocalEfforts 

in Housing Provision 

Anicia C. Sayos, Ross Q. Quisao and Rosario G. Manasan 

Introduction 

urbanization, resulting in a number of serious problems. 

.These n some placed cities, economic extreme pressure growth opportunities on urban services accelerated and 

infrastructure. Some of the urgent tasks that local government units 

(LGUs) in urbanized areas now face include coping with the demands 

of increased employment opportunities; insufficient housing 

(aggravated by high rental and land costs); congestion, pollution and 

other forms of environmental deterioration, lack of health and 

sanitation facilities as well as of peace and order. With the passage ot 

the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) in 1991, managing 

local projects to ease these urban problems has become more 

challenging. The Act mandates LGUs to discharge functions and 

responsibilities previously performed by national agencies in the 

delivery of basic services and facilities, including low-cost housin_ 

projects. The Code specifically states: 

Chapter 2. - Section 17 (a) "Local government units shall 

endeavor to be serf-reliant and shall condnue exercising the 

powers and discharging the duties and functions currently 

vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions 

and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved 

to them pursuant to this Code. Local government shall 

likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other 

functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, 

or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic 

services and facilities enumerated herein.

ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

(g) "The basic services and facilities herein enumerated shall 

be funded from the share of local government units in the 

proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and 

funding support from the National Government,..." 

Strengthened by these provisions of the Code, a number of 

LGUs have successfully provided the much-needed housing to the 

less-privileged sector of their communities. This paper presents an 

overview of the existing knowledge and policy experience in local 

housing finance and provision considering the recent decentralization 

initiadves and the notable innovations introduced in the cities of 

Puerto Princesa in Palawan, Naga in Camarines Sur, and San Carlos 

in Negros OccidentaU 

The next section of this study presents its objectives. The third 

section describes the level of urbanization and housing status of the 

cities under study. The fourth section documents the different 

approaches cities used to help ease their housing problem. And the 

last section highlights the key concerns and issues culled from the 

experiences of these cities. Additional concerns in urban housing 

strategies are also incorporated in this section to provide LGUs more 

options in addressing their respective housing problems. 

Objectives 

This study's main objective is to document the housing strategies 

and processes used by model cities to meet the challenges of rapid 

urban and population growth. This will examine the "replicability" 

and "adaptability" of the housing programs by other urbanized LGUs 

by exploring: 

1) The key elements of the model cities' local housing initiatives; 

2) The innovative manner by which these housing schemes were 

implemented in terms of financing and management, 

catalyzing the institutional involvement of other levels of 

government, private and government shelter agencies, 

nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's 

organizations (POs); and 

1All three cities are classified as fast income class cities as of 1996.

Local Efforts inHousing Provision 129 

3) The extent to which LGUs approach the full utilization of 

the authority and responsibilities in social service provision 

and management that are assigned to them under the Local 

Government Code (LGC). 

It is hoped that through a comparative discussion of the 

strengths and weaknesses of the programs in relation to the 

capabilities of the implementing LGUs, others may be guided in 

pursuing their own programs. The study does not prescribe but merely 

provides options on the type of housing program strategies other 

LGUs may find fit for their needs. 

Urbanization and Housing Needs 

The country's population increased from 36.7 million in 1970 

to 48.1 million in 1980 and 60.7 million and 68.6 million in 1990 and 

1995 and is projected to reach 76.3 million by the year 2000. 2 Twentysix 

(26) out of the 65 cities in the country in 1995 (Appendix 1) are 

classified as 100 percent urban. With most of the population living in 

urban areas, one of the significant areas of concern is the settlement 

of the urban poor as growing urbanization and poverty created serious 

shelter problems. 

The rising costs of land and construction materials especially in 

urban areas have deprived the "vulnerable sections of society" of the 

chance for available self-help housing. Housing costs rise due to land 

value speculations, and the problem is aggravated further by the high 

rents in the cities. Under this situation, the informal settlers are left 

with no choice but to squat. Generally, squatters or informal settlers 

are those people occupying government land and structures; those 

residing in reclamation areas and danger areas those affected by the 

road-widening project of the government; and those who are squatting 

in privately owned land. 

Ways to ease the burden of homelessness in the country have 

been the national government's concern as early as 1938 with the 

creation of the People's Housing Corporation. Later, in response to 

other shelter requirements, related housing agencies were created, 

including the National Housing Authority (NHA). Another law, 

2 1997 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, National Statistical Coordination Board.


Executive Order (EO) No. 90, was issued on December 17, 1986 to 

identify and define the mandate of government housing agencies s 

in ensuring the accomplishment of the National Shelter Program 

(NSP). The NSP is a comprehensive program aimed at assisting the 

lowest 30 percent of the income population with an affordable housing 

package 4. A more recent Act is the Urban Development and Housing 

Act (UDHA) of 1992, which provides the fi'amework ['or a continuing 

urban development and housing program and mandates the LGUs 

to take a principal role on the provision of housing services. 

Table 1 shows the degree of urbanization 5 of the three cities 

included in this study. Although San Carlos City is not as highly urbanized 

as the other two cities (with its urban population accounting 

for only 36 percent of total population in 1995), its "homeless" population 

are scattered all over the city. From 726 squatter households in 

1992, the figure rose more than fourfold to 3,233 in 1995. Note that 

the number of household in owner-occupied dwellings rose from 

19,889 in 1990 to 20,390 in 1995, reflecting an increase of less than 3 

percent. 

"_The key housing agencies of the National Shelter Program (NSP) are the National Housing 

Authority (NI-_), National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), Housing and 

Land Use Regulatory Board (HULRB), and the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation 

(HIGC)_ 

4 Zorayda A_CJklonzo in "Developments in Philippine Housing Finance" categorized the 

Philippine housing market into threc types: the ultra-poor or marginalized sectorwho cannot 

afford to pay for any Lype of housing; the low-income sector with low affordability but who can 

pay given file right package and some measure of financial assistance; and the middle/high 

income sectors who can afford to borrow at. market rates. 

•_The National Statistics Office defines an area as urbanized if it has the following characteristics: 

1. In their entirety, all cities and municipalities having a population density of at least 1,000 

persons per square kilometer_ 

2- Poblaciones or central districts of municipalities and cities which have a population density of 

at least 500 persons per square kilometer. 

3. Poblaciones or central districts regardless of the population which have the following: 

a. street pattern, i.e., network of street in either parallel or right angle orientations. 

b. at leastsix establishment, (commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/or personal 

services) ; and 

c. at least thrcc of the following: (1) a town hall, church or chapelwith religious services 

at least once a month; (2) a public plaza, park or cemetery; (3) a market place or 

building where ta-ading activities are cm_ied out at least once a week; and (4) a public 

building like a school, hospital, puericulture, and health center or library. 

4. Barangays having at least 1,000 inhabitants that meet the conditions set forth in 3 above, and 

where the occupation of the inhabitants is predominasafly nonfarrniag or nonfishery.

Local Efforts in Housing Provision 131 

Table l. Status of Urbanization 

City Population LandArea Population Density % Urban 

(sq kin) (person/sq. kin) Population 

1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 

Puerto 

Princesa 92,147 129,577 2,106.7 43.7 61.5 70.7 58.0 

Naga 115,329 126,972 77_5 1,488.1 1,638.3 100.0 100.0 

San 

Carlos 105,713 101,429 451.3 234.2 224.7 38.3 36.4 

Naga, being the center of trade among the three cities of Region 

V, also has the highest city population density among our three case 

studies. It is considered the most congested, population-wise, and 

has been classified as 100 percent urban since 1990. With a land area 

of only 77.5 square kilometers, Naga's 1995 population is about as 

large as that of Puerto Princesa, which has a land area of 2,106.7 square 

kilometers. Thus, Naga's population density is almost 30 times that 

of the latter. 

It is estimated that 25 percent of those who reside in the city's 

21 urban barangays are either squatters or slum dwellers. Naga City's 

1996AnnualReport states that the city's urban poor population ranges 

between 4,000 and 5,000 families compared to only 2,266 in 1980. 

While the city has granted business permits to 35 subdivisions (of 

which 27 are completed) covering a total area of 855.38 hectares to 

date, only 72 percent of Naga city households actually own or are 

amortizing their respective dwelling units, and 44 percent are 

amortizing their home lots. 

The survey conducted in 29 priority areas by the Office of the 

Mayor of Puerto Princesa in 1993 reveals that there are 5,174 

households in 4,352 structures needing housing assistance. In that 

year, 912 illegal structures were demolished and a total of 901 families 

were assisted. The city projects that for the period 1995-1999, a total 

of 6,473 housing units or 1,295 units a year would be needed. These 

projected figures are from a study conducted by the TCGI Engineers 

based on the data provided by the Office of the City Planning and 

Development Coordinator (OCPDC). 

Local Efforts in Housing Provision 

Population growth and migration to urban centers combined 

magnify the challenges being faced by city g6vernments in imple-


mendng programs for adequate shelter. Lands are more difficult to 

purchase due to increased demand. This in turn adds pressure to the 

already-limited financial resources of local governments. Selecting 

beneficiaries for the program also becomes more challenging as LGUs 

grapple with program sustainability while targeting the poor sector 

of the society. Lastly, the increased number of groups participating in 

housing programs has required creative institutional linkages and 

political will to ensure sustainability. 

This section documents local efforts in housing provision in 

the context of a decentralized governance, focusing on program package, 

identification of beneficiaries, measures against new squatters, 

funding requirement, cost recovery and institutional linkages. 

Programpackage 

The first order of business in designing a housing program is to 

identify the appropriate package for the LGU concerned. Normally, 

the choice is between lot and house/lot provision. The first option 

involves land acquisition, site development and establishment of 

property rights. The other includes, in addition to the above-cited 

elements, the construction of housing units. An LGU can either 

directly or indirectly finance and manage this component. 

Land acquisition is critical to any housing program as the rate 

of distribution depends on the available lots for disposal. The Local 

Government Code (RA 7160) speed up the procurement of lands 

among LGUs. Chapter 2, section 22 states that "every local government 

unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers...4) to acquire 

and convey real property." Essentially, this provision waives presidential 

approval in acquiring land, especially in cases where the cost of the 

property exceeds the "fair market value." With this waiver, perennial 

problems on bureaucratic red tape are avoided. 

On the one hand, establishing property rights prevents possible 

conflicting claims of ownership thatcan cause insecurity to the 

beneficiaries. It also means avoiding an administratively and financially 

demanding resettlement process among LGUs. 

On the other hand, LGUs' role in site development is enhanced 

by the authority given them to approve subdivision plans, which was 

previously the sole prerogative of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory 

Board (HLURB) (Sec.458 (2) IX]). Moreover, the Code facilitates 

the provision of basic services in the site like electricity by allowing 

LGUs to grant financial assistance to local electric cooperatives.


The housing programs of the three cities in this study centered 

on land acquisition, except for Puerto Princesa, which had a housing 

component. San Carlos and Puerto Princesa opted for the traditional 

direct purchase mode of land acquisition while Naga supplemented 

this scheme with swapping, exchange and sharing. 

San Carlos City's "Lote Para sa Mahihirap Housing Program" 

(phases 1, 2 and 3) distributed lots to members of the urban poor 

communities and government.employees. Phase 1 has a land area of 

five hectares, phase 2 has two hectares and phase 3 has three hectares 

with a total of 950 lots for distribution. This figure was 29 percent of 

the estimated 3,233 households that needed housing assistance. The 

average size of a lot is 54 square meters. The city directly purchased 

the lands and gave them out at cost to predetermined beneficiaries. 

The price of the land incorporated acquisition cost and site 

development. The latter includes construction of individual septic 

tank and toilets; basic facilities like roads, power lines, drainage and 

water systems; school buildings, health and day care centers and 

recreational facilities. The San Carlos's engineering staffhandled site 

development. In effect, the city subsidized the land price by excluding 

the cost of money and assuming the site development cost. 

Local officials of San Carlos maintained its "lots only policy" 

for all phases except phase 2 to give the poor a greater hand in 

building their house and to ease pressures on the city's resources: 

Besides, informal settlers were observed to utilize whatever material 

resources were at hand such as scrap wood cartons and flattened tins 

in home construction. 

Phase 2 of_the San Carlos housing project included the 

construction of housing units for city hall employees. However, the 

city was not directly involved in this component. Instead, the city 

government mobilized the Consuelo Zobel Alger Foundation- 

Philippine Branch, a nongovernment organization, to finance and 

manage this component. 

oThere is an empirical basis for such a strategy. A recent study by Urban Poor Associates 

(University of the Philippines) and Urban Research Consortium and the Alternative Planning 

Initiative (Ateneo) revealed that government-designed "medium- and high-rise buildings aimed 

at easing the urban housing problem are potential nuthouses for poor families occupying them." 

Designs such as long corridors in residential projects resulted in a feeling of alienation and 

dehumanization among the inhabitants ( Philippine Daily Inquiwr, August 20, 1998).


In contrast, Naga City experimented with various schemes to 

land acquisition. The Kaantabay sa Kauswagan Program adopted the 

twin approach of on-site and off site settlement. The on-site strategy 

involved facilitating transfer of land ownership from government and 

private owners to the individuals occupying the property in question. 

Meanwhile, the off, ire strategy required provision of resettlement 

sites for demolition and eviction victims. In both strategies, the city's 

primary task was to negotiate with landowners and other stakeholders 

with the ultimate goal of acquiring parcels of land. In this regard, 

direct purchases, land swapping, land sharing and land exchange were 

schemes adopted by the city. 

Direct purchase was the most commonly used mode. Seventeen 

projects applied this scheme, notable of which involved the 5.5 

hectares of Catholic Church-owned prime residential land located at 

Barangay Penafrancia. In the case of the Bagong Buhay Resettlement 

Project, land swapping--an exchange of property with another of 

roughly the same value (preferably without occupants)--was adopted. 

A total of 13,000 square meters of land were also given to beneficiaries 

under a mutual agreement between the private owner and the urban 

poor occupants (land sharing). Another project using the same 

scheme with 70 families from Barangay Concepcion Grande as 

beneficiaries is still under negotiation. The Community Mortgage 

Program was also successful in assisting 141 families to purchase a 

private property they were occupying in the Abella and Ronquillo 

properties located at Barangays Lerma and Igualdad, respectively. 

Lastly, the housing program obtained a resettlement area in 1996 

covering 14,900 square meters through a land exchange scheme. 

On the other hand, Puerto Princesa's response to improving 

its housing condition stemmed from its intent to clear the coastal bay 

of squatter shanties whose daily refuse pollutes the are a and eventually 

causes the outbreak of diseases. It was an offshoot of "Oplan Linis" 

that aimed to make Puerto Princesa a "squatter-free city." 

In 1993, 5.4 hectares of land in Barangay Sicsican was acquired 

at P4 million (at P73.86/square meter) using the city government's 

own funds. Also, P8 million was spent for horizontal development 

(P165.47/square mel:er) and another P19 million (P128,834.49/unit) 

for the construction of the housing units. A total of 452 families were 

expected to benefit in the program. As of this writing, an initial 150 

units were awarded an additional 170 units of duplex and 114 row 

houses were being negotiated for construction in collaboration with


the National Housing Authority. At present, the city is implemendng 

17 housing projects. Like Naga, Puerto Princesa adopted other 

schemes for procuring lands: three through the Community Mortgage 

Program (CMP); one through the Gro/up Land Acquisition and 

Development (GLAD) Program; eight through direct purchase; two 

public lands; and another two through land donation. 

t,u,,tltrtio,, ofb 

Identifying the target beneficiaries of the program can help to 

determine the legal claimants of housing projects. It also helps in 

prioritizing those who need immediate shelter given the limited 

number of lots available. Lastly, it defines what particular sectors are 

bound to benefit from the project. All cities included in the study 

formulated their own set of criteria with particular attention to 

socioeconomic status. 

The official census listing and structure mapping of the priority 

barangays along the coastal areajof Puerto Princesa was the primary 

basis in selecting prospective beneficiaries. Results of the census of 

squatters as of january 1995 yielded 4,009 households occupying 

coastal areas of the city. Another 638 families were found living in 

other places like watersheds. Puerto Princesa projected its housing 

needs at 6,473 (1995-1999), 7,078 (2000-2004) and 5,443 households 

(2005-2009). This estimate is based on the city's population growth; 

relocation of households living in dangerous/uninhabited areas, 

public parks, sidewalks; and lands needed by the government and 

squatters occupying private lands with orders of eviction. Initially, there 

were 2,990 prospective families in the nine target barangays. They 

represented 42 percent of the total number of households needing 

housing assistance. 

The city followed the Urban Development and Housing Act's 

(RA 7279) specific requirements. The law stipulated that heads of 

families muscVbe Filipino citizens; be underprivileged and homeless 

or living in makeshift dwellings with no security of tenure; not own 

any real property anywhere; not have availed of any government 

housing program except those in leasehold or rental payments; be 

residents of the area before the affectivity of the Act (March 1992); 

and not be professional squatters or members of a squatting syndicate. 

First preference was given to the qualified census-listed owneroccupant 

of the duly tagged structures. Secondary preference was 

accorded to those census-listed rent-free or sharer of the duly tagged


structures. The prog_am prohibited the sale and/or transfer of the 

property. It also prescribed disqualification of the guilty party from 

receiving any government housing assistance. 

Lastly, Puerto Princesa created the Council against Squatting 

Syndicates and Professional Squatters (CASSPS) as a safeguard against 

the proliferation of new squatters. It also organized the Coastal Area 

Protection or Coastal Patrol to assist barangay officials in monitoring 

and dismantling al! illegal construction in their respective barangays 

within 24 hours. 

Similarly, there were 3,233 households recorded as informal 

settlers in San Carlos City in 1995. These included people inhabiting 

government lands, structures, reclamation areas and private properties. 

Some were victims of road widening projects. In February 1992, 

a fire hit the city leaving 145 families homeless. The city, through the 

aggressive efforts of its mayor, recognized the need of these groups 

for shelter and they, thus, became the first beneficiaries of the Lote 

Para sa MahihirapProject. To expand sectoral coverage, requirements 

were made more liberal: residency of at least six months in the city 

and nonpossession of real property anywhere in the country. The 

beneficiaries iucluded tricycle/pedicab drivers, market vendors, carpenters, 

painters, construction workers and government employees., 

Section 5 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Deed of Absolute Sale given 

to program beneficiaries prohibited the sale or transfer of ownership 

of the lots and the offering of the same as collateral: 

"2. Unless through hereditary succession, the BENEFICIARY cannot 

sell or transfer ownership of the lot except by way of donation 

or sale to the City Government at the fair market value as 

determined by the City's Assessor's Office. 

3. Should the lot be offered as a collateral to any financing 

institution or any private party, the beneficiary shall first secure 

the approval of the City, represented by the City Mayor, of such 

mortgage proposal; and in the event there is foreclosure, the 

City Government shall be given the first option for its 

acquisition." 

Likewise, Naga City required that the recipient be a fitmily head, 

a permanent employee not an owner of house and/or lot and, 

preferably, from the locality. The city also required the beneficiaries 

to be members of community organizations recognized by the

Local Effortsin Housing Provision 137 

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Home Insurance 

and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) and by the Urban Affairs Office. 

Naga tasked community organizations to process requests from 

indigents for housing assistance. The requirements on permanent 

employment and community membership are unique features of the 

city's program. 

Funding requirement 

The three cities in this study primarily tapped the substantial 

increases in their annual internal revenue allotment (IRA) to finance 

housing-related activities. The IRA is the share of LGUs from taxes 

collected by the national government. It is a regular source of funds 

for development activities like housing. Section 28 of RA 7160 states 

that "each local government unit shall appropriate in its annum budget 

no less than 20 percent of its internal revenue allotment for 

development projects." At present, most LGUs obligate only 20 

percent of their IRA for development projects. Thus, the Local 

Development Fund is commonly known as the "20-percent 

Development Fund." 

From a mere P34.91 million in i991, San C'arlos' IRA increased 

to P125.1 million in 1993 and P169.1 million in 1996. With huge 

increments in its resources, the city allocated 3 percent of its annum 

budget to purchase home lots for squatters from 1994 to 1996. 

Moreover, departing from the prevailing practice, the city 

government of San Carlos appropriated 30 percent of its IRA for 

development projects starting in 1997. This liberal interpretation of 

section 28 of RA 7160 in favor of the social sectors reflected the serious 

commitment of the local leadership to provide housing to the poor. 

Essentially, this move enhanced the city's financial base for social 

development initiatives. 

This was an important measure because LGUs are, by nature, 

dependent on the IRA and other external resources. For instance, 

San Carlos' IRA share to total income is 68.9 percent in 1991, 83.7 

percent in 1993, and 79.7 percent in 1996. 7 

7The share of IRA in total LGU income rose from 42.3 percent in 1991 to 77.6 percent in 1993 

for all provinces, from 41.7 percent to 52.7 percent for all municipalities and from 35.3percent 

to 48.7 percent for all cities (Manasan 1998).


Naga City's IRA grew from P18.3 million in 1991 to P81.9 million 

in 1993 and P112.5 million in 1996. The share of housing investment 

in tile city's total budget was 4.2 percent in 1991. Then it rose to 10.2 

percent (1992) and 16.2 percent (1994). In 1995, however, it was 

down to 6.9 percent. The city government is committed to allocate 

P10 million per year or a total of P50 million in the five-year period 

(1991.-1998) to the Socialized Housing and Resettlement (SHARE) 

Program under the Medium-Term Development Plan (1994-98). It 

also plans to address price fluctuations in the market by buying more 

lands when they are cheap. Through this, Naga can stock parcels of 

land for distribution to beneficiaries without necessarily bloating the 

local budget. 

Owing to its big land area, Puerto Princesa received a larger 

share from national taxes compared to the two other cities in the 

study. In 1991, the city's IRA was P83.9 million, then rose to P325 

million in 1993 and P438.7 million in 1996. 

The average annual IRA growth rate during the years immediately 

"after the Code was implemented (1991-1993) was 96.8 percent 

in Puerto Princesa, 89.3 percent in San Carlos, and 111.5 percent in 

Naga. But in 1994-1996, IRA growth decelerated to 8.06 percent in 

Puerto Princesa, 6.96 percent in San Carlos and 5.8 percent in Naga. 

Moreover, recent budget guidelines from the Department of Budget 

and Management, which withheld 10 percent of LGUs' IRA in 1998, 

further tightened the financial position of most LGUs (Table 2). 

Aside from the IRA, LGUs fund local projects from locally 

sourced revenues. In this regard, LGUs have varying degrees of success. 

Per capita local-source revenue (LSR) in Naga and San Carlos 

increased substantially in 1991-1996. Per capita LSR in Naga rose by 

30.8 percent and 18.7 percent annually on the average in 1991-1993 

and 1994-1996, respectively. Likewise, per capita LSR in San Carlos 

grew by 23.3 percent and 17.1 percent yearly during the same two 

periods. In contrast, Puerto Princesa's LSR increased by only 7.3 percent 

yearly on the average in 1991-1993 and declined by 11.5 percent 

annually in 1994-1996. 

Naga City also made use of other sources of finance. The city 

government through the Sanggunian sought the assistance of a senator 

in the amount of P1 million fbr the upgrading of a resettlement 

site in Barangay Calauag. The same body also authorized the mayor 

to secure an additional credit line of P10 million from any commercial 

bank. Lastly, a trust fund was set UP for collections/proceeds from

Table 2. Income of Local Government Units 

Years Puerto Princesa City Naga City San Carlos City 

Total IRA LSR Per Total IRA LSR Per Total IILA. LSR Per 

Inc°melRA LSR Shz.re Share Capita Income IRA LSR Share Share Capita Income IRA LSR Share Share Capita 

(%) (%) LSR (t_) (%) (%) LSR (t_) (%) (%) LSR (t_) 

1991 104.283.9 10,311 80.52 19.0 193.11 55.2 18.3 30,578 33.15 53.0 259.14 50.7 34.91 15,707 68.86 31.0 149.59 

1992 194.1 174.5 19,629 90.00 10.0 183.45 81.4 44.8 36,567 55.00 45.0 304.73 84.1 67.2 16,925 80.00 20.0 162.74 

1993 400.4 325.0 25,346 81.17 06.0 222.33 136.0 81.9 54,123 60.22 40.0 443.63 149.5 125.1 23,433 83.68 16.0 227.60 

1994 432.3 375.7 50,891 86.91 12.0 417.14 181.8 100.5 59,313 55.28 33.0 474.50 192.7 147.8 31,826 76.70 18.0 312.02 

1995 469.5 409.9 37,120 87.31 08.0 285.54 173.0 104.8 67,696 60.58 39.0 533.04 188.0 157.7 37,504 83.88 19.0 371.33 

1996 577.9 438.7 45,039 75.91 08.0 326.37 200.1 112.5 86,329 56.20 43.0 669.22 212.3 169.1 43,245 79.65 20.0 428.17 

Growth 

Years thletlo Princesa City Naga City San Carlos City 

Rat_ 

Tot al Total Total 

hlcome IRA Income IRA I.ucome IRA 

1991-1993 96.02 96.87 56.96 111.55 71.72 89.30 

1994-1996 15.62 8.06 4.91 5.80 4.96 6.96 

1991-1996 40.86 39.21 29.38 43.79 33.16 37.10


resettlement sites, sale of government properties and community 

mortgage program's origination fees. 

Cost Recovery 

The institution of cost recovery measures can both lessen 

dependence on IRA and the need for "militant advocacy" plans to 

ensure project sustainability. In housing, cost recovery refers to setting 

the right price for each project package and efficiently collecting 

monthly amortizations. While the project by nature involves subsidy 

from the local government, defining a cost sharing scheme between 

the LGU and the beneficiaries concerned is important. For the cities, 

it means easing the pressure on its budget. On the part of the 

beneficiaries, shouldering the cost gives them a sense of dignity and 

ownership. Cost sharing can also ensure available funds for housin 

The cost and payment scheme that San Carlos offered Lv 

beneficiaries of its housing program was tailored-fit to the lowest 

income earners of the city. The city acquired parcels of land for the 

first phase at P45 per square meter and was sold at P100 per square 

meter. The difference of P55 per square meter was treated as site 

development cost. Home lots have an average size of 54 square meters. 

An easy mode of payment of P5 per day (Monday to Friday) for five, 

years (phase 1) with no downpayment and interest was provide -_ ° 

Section 4 of City Ordinance No. 160 series of 1994. The ordinance 

also stipulated that "any default in the payment of 40 accumulated 

dally installments shall cause the cancellation or termination of the 

Conditional Deed of Sale between the City Government and applicantbeneficiary." 

A collection officer was assigned to receive the daily 

payments. Of the 436 residents in phase 1 (1996), eight were fully 

paid. However, no data were available on the payment status of other 

beneficiaries. 

Naga City relied on community organizations in determining 

the share of the beneficiaries in the financial requirements of the 

projects. In the land sharing project of the Naga Centrum property, 

the recipients paid P469,900 (12 percent) out of the P3.9 million 

total cost. The city initially shouldered the remaining P3.43 million 

(88 percent) of the purchase price. For the direct purchase mode, 

the following cost sharing ratios between city and beneficiaries were 

formulated: 53-47 percent (Archdiocese property); 70-30 percent 

(Belmonte property); 89-11 percent (Veterans' Bank property). The


eviction/demolition victims. Otherwise, all claims and assistance were 

through NGO representatives. 

Naga City also coordinated with NGOs in determining the 

qualified beneficiaries and in conducting value re-orientation 

seminars. Four NGOs, which are members of Naga's urban poor 

association, were the main partner-beneficiaries of the city's housing 

program. As such, these groups handled the process of identifying 

the beneficiaries and their corresponding financial share. With this 

setup, the UPAO was able to focus on land acquisition. The Bicol 

Business Development Foundation, a private foundation, was also 

tapped as originator for the Community Mortgage Program. This 

tripartite organizational strategy helped minimize potential 

administrative bottlenecks (Table 3). 

In summary, Naga City shouldered the financial requirements 

of its various activities in coordination with national governments. 

However, it delegated to people's organization, NGOs and private 

business some of the administrative functions vital to the successful 

implementation of its housing program. 

For local programs that could not afford to take on the 

responsibility of constructing housing units, the assistance of NGOs 

may also be helpful. The city government of San Carlos authorized 

the Consuelo Mgers Foundation, a Hawaii/Guam-based NGO, 

through S.E Ordinance No. 187, to directly finance the construction 

component of phase 2. Thus, the foundation managed the site 

development and construction of houses for city hall employees. It 

also provided housing loans to city hall employees. Furthermore, the 

NGO conducted value-orientation seminar for the beneficiaries. 

In contrast, San Carlos' program under phases 1 and 3 focused 

only on lot purchase and distribution. In this regard, the local 

bureaucracy took charge of all administrative aspects of the project 

from selection, relocation, collection, tiding, and livelihood to 

monitoring. 

Unlike Naga's and San Carlos', Puerto Princesa's project approach 

depended both on its own financial and administrative resources. 

The city acquired 5.4 hectares of land at P4 million in 

Barangay Sicsican using money from its coffers. It also spent P8.5 

million and P19.3 million for site development and construction of 

housing units, respectively. To date, a joint venture proposal with the 

National Housing Authority is being finalized for the construction of

Local EffortsinHousing Provision 143 

Table 3. Participants 

and Their Respective Roles in the Kaantabaysa 

Name of Nature of 

Illdividtml_/Oggani_ltlorm Org'ani_tion Role/Area(s) of Involvement 

Government 

Agencies: 

1. Naga City government Local Main program implementor 

government unit 

2. Department of Environment Line Provider of authority to city 

and Natural Resources govemment government to supervise 

(DENR) department disposition of public lands in 

Naga City 

3. National Housing Authority Land shelter Production of housing units; 

(NHA) agency assistance in developing 

relocation sites 

4. National Home Mortgage Financial support for the 

Finance Corporation Community Mortgage Program 

(NHMFC) 

(CMP) 

5. Home Insurance Guaranty Government- Provider of interim financing to 

Corporation (HIGC) owned and CMP projects; property seller of 

controlled BLISS-I housing projects 

corporations 

(GOCCs) 

6. Government Service Financial support provider 

Insurance System (GSIS) through the _Tulong sa Lokal 

na Pamamahala" window 

7. Presidential Cmmmission for National urban Issue and program advocacy; 

the Urban Poor (PCUP) poor agency accreditation of urban poor 

organizations 

Nongovermnent 

Organintlons: 

1. Naga urban poor associations Nongovernment Main program partnerorganizations 

beneficiaries 

(YGOs) 

2. Community Organization of Development Community organization; social 

the Philippines Enterprise NGO preparation; issue and program 

(COPE) foundation advocacy 

:5.Bicol Business Development Private business CMP originator 

Foundation 

foundation 

4. Caceres Social Action Chureh-based 

Foundation (CASAF) organization 

Property 

Owners: 

1. Archdiocese of Caceres Religious 

2. Abella Family Private Sellers of property 

RonquiUo Family landowners 

Dy-Liaco Family 

Borebor Family 

Bernardo Family 

Belmonte Family 

Heir of Fabiana Arcjola


additional units. By virtue of City Ordinance No. 55-93, a housing 

council was further created. The mayor headed the council with the 

fiscal officers, environment and natural resources officer and the 

chairperson of the committee on housing and urban poor of the 

Sangguniang Panlunsod (city council) as members. The 20-percent 

Development Fund served as the annual financial source of the council. 

At the same time, other government agencies such as the 

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, NHA, NHMFC, 

HIGC, GSIS and Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) 

assisted the three cities in providing financial support, supervising 

the disposition of public lands, assisting in developing relocation sites 

and in program advocacy. Private sector participation was also 

encouraged in lending assistance projects such as the CMP and GLAD. 

Or_n/x/ng the/oca/bure___,_,___cy for program succe,_ 

PolitiCal will in the context of a housing program is determined 

by two factors. The first is the introduction of measures to ensure 

financial sustainability of the project. It involves both the identification 

of regular source of funds and the institution of cost recovery 

schemes. Just as important is the need to define the appropriate organizational 

structures within the LGUs' structure and their respecfive 

roles. In this regard, the city can either assume full responsibility 

in administering the project or it can delegate some of its functions. 

Two of the three model cities in this study put in place new 

structures that became the focal point of its housing efforts. In Puerto 

Princesa, City Ordinance No. 55-93 (Aug. 2,1993) instituted the 

Housing Council. Its primary responsibility was to implement the city's 

housing program. Originally, the Council was composed of the mayor 

as chairperson and the chief of police, the president of the Urban 

Poor Coordinating Council, the city attorney, and the chairperson of 

the Landed Estate of the City Council as members. At present, the 

members of the Housing Council include the city's fiscal officers, the 

environmental and natural resource officer and the chairperson of 

the committee on housing of the sanggunian. As in San Carlos, the 

local chief executive supervised the entire project. 

Similarly, the creation of the Urban Affairs Office (UPAO) was 

Naga's distinct local initiative. A separate unit in the local bureaucracy, 

UPAO took charge of negotiating and formulating appropriate land 

purchase schemes. It was also tasked in resettlement and auxiliary

Loca|Efforts in HousingProvision 145 

services. Lastly, UPAO was mandated to accredit community 

organizations involved in the program. 

At the same time, Naga harnessed community organizations in 

identifying potential benefits and their corresponding financial share. 

This setup augured well for UPAO as it focused more on land 

acquisition schemes. At the same time, the city sought the assistance 

of other government agencies like DENR, NHA and NHMFC, to name 

a few, in providing financial support, supervising the disposition of 

public lands and assisting in the development of relocation sites. By 

adopting a tripartite strategy, the city lessened its dependence on the 

local executive's initiative, unlike Puerto and San Carlos. 

In contrast, San Carlos opted for the collaborative efforts of the 

different units of the city's bureaucracy to manage the project. The 

Office of the Mayor exercised general supervision of the entire project. 

Thus, the local bureaucracy took charge of all administrative aspects 

of the project from selection, relocation, collection, tiding, and 

livelihood creation to monitoring in coordination with the NHA and 

homeowners' associations (Figure 1). 

Figure l. Organiza_onal Chart of the Lore Para sa Mahirap Program 

PANLUNSOD 

CITYMAYOR I [ SANGGUNIANG 

I 

CITY ] 1CITYADMINISTRATOR 

ADMINISTRATOR [ 1CLERK 

cOORDINATOR 

PROJECT [ 

, i 

URBANPOOR 1CYIYF_NGINEER 1CITYLEGAL II_GISTZROF iCITYPLANNING lCITYPLANNINC 

FEDF._,ATIONITRUCXDR/VKR OFFICER DZKDS &DEVELOPMENT ANDDEVT, 

1BARANGAY 4C..,AR/_.._ 1(_Y 1BOCUMLNTATION OFF/CER OF'flCF_R 

CAFTAIN 27 VOLUNT_RS TREASURER OffiCER 1CITYSOCIAL ICLERK 

ASSESOR 1_ 1 CLERK WELFARE 8tDEaf. 

OFFICBR 

1 DEC.$OYFfCER 

1 CONSUELOALGERS 

OR NGO OFFICER


Key Concerns 

While varying levels of success have been achieved in the three 

model cities, other LGUs experiencing growing urbanization can 

further evaluate the strategies they have undertaken to determine 

the most appropriate solution to their own housing problem. 

Significant concerns from the experience of the three model 

cities in this study are highlighted here to provide further lessons 

and guidelines to other LGUs. 

Projectopao 

The experience of other countries shows that "given the 

heterogeneity of people's prefbrences for a type of shelter and the 

speed at which they can or want to improve its quality," public housing 

projects do not often fit the "ideals" of the beneficiaries (Bahl and 

Linn 1992). People from all income brackets appear to be able and 

willing to finance the construction of their own housing unit provided 

that the required inputs like tenure, site development and to some 

extent capital are readily available. Even in cases of resettlement 

resulting from a disaster like the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, beneficiaries 

are observed to value their "freedom to build" their own house. In 

light of these facts, it is crucial for policymakers at the local level to 

decide whether the housing package should include the construction 

of housing units at the LGU's expense. Thus, in many instances, public 

resources allotted for housing construction are better placed in 

complementary inputs to housing like tenure and on-site services. 

Naga's case is a good example. The city's "lot only" policy, 

together with its participative organizational structure, allowed it to 

experiment more on various modes of land acquisition other than 

direct purchase of lands. Another option available to LGUs is to 

catalyze other institutions (NGOs, private sector) to undertake the 

construction of housing units. This was exemplified by San Carlos 

City, which authorized the Consuelo Algers Foundation to take charge 

of the housing construction component of phase 2 of its program. 

Such an arrangement allowed local government efforts to be redirected 

to lot distribution and construction of septic tanks and toilets, 

roads, power lines, drainage and water systems, school buildings, 

health/day care centers and recreational facilities.

Local EffortsinHousing Provision 147 

The econon_ of housing subsidy 

Local housing programs in these case studies heavily subsidized 

the provision of home lots. This is consistent with the experience of 

many countries that subsidized housing consumption either by 

underpricing land or implicitly by subsidizing interest. Often, land is 

valued at its acquisition cost to government. "While a first project 

may be able to draw on financially cheap public land, follow-up projects 

may have to purchase land at commercial prices from private owners. 

In that case, the replicability of the first project--it relies on subsidized 

land costs---is in doubC (Bahl and Linn 1992). 

At the same time, subsidies on housing tend to result in the 

overconsumption of this service relative to other goods and in overly 

ambitious expectations on housing standards because full cost is not 

borne by beneficiaries. Thus, the problem with these subsidies is that 

land appears to be cheap when in reality it is not. There is a tendency 

for the programs to provide bigger lot sizes than would otherwise be 

the case if the land were properly priced. Puerto Princesa's project in 

Baiangay Sicsican is a case in point. Individual lots measured 99 square 

meters, bigger than those in typical housing projects. 

I asdy, subsidies could also limit local government's capacity to 

finance the essential components of housing supply like urban 

infrastructure and services for which it usually has sole responsibility. 

Finn/ 

pta,m/ng 

All three cities in the study financed their programs utilizing 

the substantial increases in the IRA. As has been stressed earlier, 

growth in IRA should be seen in the light of devolution: more money 

for more responsibilities. Moreover, it is noted that the rapid growth 

in the IRAin the early years of the Code's implementation is no longer 

the norm. The growth in the IRA has, in fact, tapered off in recent 

years. 

An alternative scheme is financing through increased local tax 

effort. San Carlos and Naga both score high in this regard. They have 

expanded their local source revenues even as their IRA increased 

significan fly in 1991 -1996. 

Potentially another good source of continuing funding for the 

LGU's housing program is cost recovery. Cost recovery has two principal 

components: (1) correct service pricing; and (2) collection effi-


ciency. All three cities in the case studies have not shown much success 

in this regard. 

Lastly, after forecasting the potential financial needs and resources, 

the local government can explore the sourcing of funds from 

external sources like credit facilities s and the countrywide development 

fund of legislators. 

Structure and advocacy 

Slower IRA growth and poor local tax effort, together with increased 

responsibilities on social service delivery, has increasingly 

constrained the financial positions of LGUs. Housing programs had 

to compete with other priorities of the cities in the allocation of their 

resources. All three cities were fortunate to have mayors who share 

concern for housing. They exhibited strong political resolve in implementing 

their projects. They utilized their executive powers and influence 

to institutionalize the operational, financial and organizational 

aspects of the program. The office of the chief executive, possibly 

with new structures that are closely linked to him, acted as the overall 

operational nerve center. 

But the strong identification of housing program with the mayors 

is also a potential problem in the long run. Mayors are elected for 

a three-year term and if he fails to win a re-election, the new leader 

should at least have the same commitment to sustain the program. 

Unfortunately, Philippine policymaking both at the national and locad 

levels is observed to exhibit discontinuities. The creation therefore 

of a critical mass for housing is signiticant. In this regard, the 

role ofnongovernment and peoples' organizations in ensuring a continuous 

advocacy for housing cannot be minimized. They have been 

proven active and effective partners in program implementation as 

well. 

Lastly, the three model cities have all managed to tap the 

resources (financial and institutional) of various housing agencies at 

the national level such as NHA, NHMFC, CMP and DENR. 

s Llanto et aL (1998) formulated a framework for local government units' access to private 

• capital markets.

Local Effortsin HousingProvision 149 

References 

Alonzo, Z.A.C. 1997. Developments in Philippine Housing Finance. 

Housing Finance International. 

Bahl, R. andJ. Lim. 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. 

New York: Oxford University Press. 

Llanto, G.M., R.G. Manasan, M.B. I amberte andJ.C. Zoya. 1998. Local 

Government Units Access to the Private Capital Markets. Makati City: 

Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 

National Statistical Coordination Board. 1997. Philippine Statistical 

Yearbook. 

National Tax Research Center. 1997. The Philippine Housing 

Program: A Study. NTRC Tax Research Journal 9 (5). 

Philippine Daily Inquirer. August 20, 1998. p. 1,14. 

Rebullida-Genato, M.LG. 1993. Alternative Self-help Financing 

Schemes for Housing: an Exploratory Study on Indigenous, 

Voluntary, Community-based Groups in Urban Areas. Working 

Paper No. 934)3 Makati City. Philippine Institute for Development 

Studies. 

_,. n.d. Economic and Social Indicators. Pasig City: National 

Economic and Development Authority. 

Republic Act 7160. The Local Government Code of 1991. 

Republic Act 7279. 1993 Urban Development and Housing Act.


Appendix Table 1. Cities' State of Urbanization 

NCR 

Land Population Intercensal % Urban 

CITY Population* Area Density Growth Population *** 

(person/sq. kin) Rate** 

May. 1990 Sep 1995 (_q.km).. May 1990, Sep 1995 (1990-1995) 1990 1995 

Manila 1,601,234 1,654,761 38.3 41,807.7 43,205.2 0.62 100.0 I00,0 

Quezon 1,669,7761,989,419 166.2 10,046.8 11,970.0 3.34 100.0 i00.0 

Pamy 368,366 408,610 13.9 26,501.2 29,396.4 1.96 100.0 1O0.0 

Caloocan 763,4151,023,159 55.8 13,681.3 18,336.2 5.64 1O0.0 100.0 

Mandaluyong 248,143 286,870 26:0 9,544.0 11,033.5 2.75 100.0 100.0 

Pasig 397,679 471,075 13.0 30,590.7 36,236.5 3.22 100.0 100.0 

Makati 453,170 484,176 29.9 15,156.2 16,193.2 1.25 100.0 100.0 

Muntinlupa 278,411 399,846 46.7 5,961.7 8,562.0 7.02 100.0 100.0 

RegionI 

Dagupan 122,247 126,214 37.2 3,286.2 3,392.8 0.60 100.0 1O0.0 

Laoag 83,756 83,386 107,5 779.1 821.7 1.00 47_9 47.7 

San Carlos 124,529 134,039 166.4 748.4 805.5 1.39 11.7 10.7 

CAR 

Bagoio 183,142 226,883 48.9 3,745.2 4,639.7 4.09 100.0 100.0 

Region11 

Santiago nda 98,542 255.5 385.6 nda 1.55 nda nda 

Regionm 

Angeles 236,686 234,011 60.3 3,925.1 3,880.8 -0.21 100.0 100.0 

Cabanatuan 173,065 201,033 192.7 898.1 1,043.2 2.85 53.3 49.2 

Olongapo 193,327 179,754 103.3 1,871.5 1,740.1 -1.35 100.O 100.0 

Palayan 20,393 26,851 35.6 572.8 754.2 5.29 46.4 39.7 

San Jose 82,836 96,860 180.5 458.9 536.6 2.97 31.1 29.9 

Rein IV 

Batangas 184,970 211,879 283.0 653.6 748.7 2.58 68.3 100.0 

Cavite 91,641 92,641 11,8 7,766.2 7,850.9 0.20 100.0 100.0 

Lipa 160,117 177,894 209.4 764.6 849.5 1.99 70.0 68.6 

Lucena 150,624 177,750 68.5 2,189.9 2,594.9 3.15 100.0 100.0 

Puerto Princesa 92,147 129,577 2,106.7 43.7 61.5 6.60 70.7 58.0 

San Pablo 161,650 183,757 214.0 755.3 858.7 2A3 45.3 39.1 

Tagaytay 23,739 29,419 74.0 320.8 397.6 4.10 17.2 8.2 

Trece Martires 15,686 20,451 39_1 401.2 523.0 5.10 37.9 37.7 

RegionV 

Iriga 74,269 82,482 119.6 621.0 689.6 1-98 59.4 60.3 

Naga 115,329 126,972 77.5 1,488.1 1,638.3 1.82 100.0 1O0.0 

Legazpi 121,116 141,657 153.7 788.0 921.6 2.98 58.1 44.8 

_egimaVI 

Bacolod 364,180 402,345 156.1 2,333.0 2,577.5 1.88 100.0 100.0 

.Bago 122,863 132,338 402.1 305.6 329.1 1_40 42.6 41.6 

Cadiz 119,772 125,943 516.5 231.9 243.8 0.95 36.7 38,1 

Iloilo 309,505 334,539 56.0 5,526.9 5,973.9 1.47 100.0 100.0 

La Cat'lota 56,443 56,414 137.3 411.1 410.9 .4).01 52.4 49.5 

Roxas 103,171 ,118,715 102.0 1,011.5 1,163.9 2.66 100.0 100.0 

San Carlos 105,713 101,429 451.3 234.2 224.7 -0.77 38.3 36.4 

Silay 101,031 122,748 214.8 470.3 571.5 3.72 46.4 47.8 

l_egionVII 

Bais 59,591 63,355 316.9 188.0 199.9 1.15 100.0 100.0 

Canlaon 37_165 41,334 160.7 231.3 257.2 2.01 19.5 19.8


Appendix 

1 (continued) 

Land Population Intercensal % Urban 

CI'IY Population* Area j (person/sq.DemitYkm) _Rate** Population *** 

May 1990 Sep 1995 (sqatmj Malt 1990 Sep 1995 (1990-1995) 1990 1995 

Cebu 610,417 662,299 280.9 2,173.1 2,357.8 1.54 100.0 100.0 

Danao 73,358 79,932 107.3 683.7 744.9 1.62 33.4 33.3 

Dumaguete 80,262 92,637 55.8 1,438.4 1,660.2 2.72 100.0 100.0 

Lapu-Lapu 146,194 173,744 58.1 2,516.2 2,990A 3.29 100.0 98.6 

Mandaue 180,285 194,745 11.7 15,409.0 16,644.9 1.46 100.0 100.0 

Tagbilaran 56,363 66,683 30.3 1,860.2 2,200.8 3.2 100.0 100.0 

Toledo 119,970 121,469" 174.5 687.5 696.1 0,23 13.1 13.7 

Reglonvm 

Calbayog 115,390 129,216 903.0 127.8 143.1 2.14 25.3 24.3 

Ormoc 129,456 144,033 464.3 278.8 310.2 2.02 40.1 36.2 

Tadoban 136,891 167,310 100.9 1,355.7 1,658.2 3.83 100.0 100.0 

ReglonIX 

Dapitan 60,213 62,997 215.0 280.1 293.0 0.85 17.5 20.7 

Dipolog 79,887 90,777 220.0 361.3 412.6 2.42 46.0 40.3 

Pagadian 106,$07 125,182 378.8 280.6 330.5 3.11 57.2 49.7 

Zamboanga 442,345 511,139 1,414.7 312.7 361.3 2.75 63.6 03.0 

RegionX 

Cagayan de Oro 339,598 428,314 412.8 822.7 1,037.6 4.44 98.2 98.2 

Gingoog 82,582 87,530 404.6 204.1 216.3 1.10 36.0 36.0 

Oroquieta 52,500 56,012 194.9 269.4 287.4 1.22 50.5 49.2 

Ozamis 91,503 101,944 144.2 634.6 707.0 2.05 46.1 45.8 

Tangub 42,926 46,004 119.2 360.1 385.9 1.31 17.4 17.7 

m_io_xI 

Dawao 849,947 1,006,840 2,211.3 384.4 455.3 3.22 70.2 64.0 

General Santos 250,389 327,173 423.0 591.9 773.5 5.14 85.8 41.7 

ReglonXg 

Cotabato 127,065 146,779 176.0 722.0 834.0 2.74 100.0 100.0 

Iligan 226,568 273,004 730.5 310.2 373.2 3.56 30.7 18.2 

Marawi 91,901 114,389 22.6 4,066.4 5,061.5 4.19 nda nda 

CARAGA 

Butuan 227,829 247,074 526.3 432.9 469.5 L53 52.5 52.5 

Surigao 100,379 104,909 245.3 409.2 427.7 0.83 47.9 44.3 

Memo Item: 

PIqlIJPPlNES 60,703,206 68,616,536 500,000 202.3 228.7 2.32 

Sources: 1997_neStatiaical Yearbook, National Statistical Coordination Board. 

* 1990 and 1995 total Philippine population includes the household population, homeless 

population, Filipinos in Philippine embassies/consulates and missions abroad, and 

institutional population who are found living in institutional living quarters such as penal 

institutions, orphanages, hospitals, military camps, etc., at the rime of the census taking. 

** Intercensal growth rate from =Cities in the 90's: A Compilation of Basic Information." 

Compiled by E.T.Joaquin and E.S. Valeroso, Local Government Center, College of Public 

Administration, 

*** Percent Urban data (computed). 

nda - no dataavailable.

Part II. Case Studies

Chapter 

1 

Closingthe Urban 

Fiscal Gap: An Overview* 


Introduction 

rbanization has certain advantages. Agglomeration economies 

result in higher productivity as compared to the rest of the 

economy. As urbanization proceeds, cities are better able to 

capture the benefits from economies of scale, bringing about 

reductions in unit cost of delivering certain types of services like 

sewerage treatment, public t_nsportafion and the like. Urbanization 

also induces increases in the taxable capacity of cities such that more 

revenues can be mobilized from the same jurisdiction. 

There are, however, also certain problems which urbanization 

is associated with. Congestion is one. It leads to diseconomies like air 

and water pollution, slum settlements, and increased need for disease 

control and fire/police protection, which then offset the positive 

effects of technological economies of scale on input costs. Of course, 

basic services like potable water supply, telephones and health facilities 

also become critically inadequate in many large cities. 

Two types of responses are known to have been made to address 

these problems. One is to impose controls on rural-urban migration 

and rapid populadon growth. Another is to find efficient ways to 

manage and finance the urban sector. This pape r focuses on the 

latter--searching for ways to finance and deliver adequate public 

services in urban areas. 

The Heart 

of the Problem 

The immediate cause of the shortage and at times, near absence, 

of basic public services in large cities is the inability of governments 

to fund the delivery of the fight quantity and quality of these services. 

* First published as P1DS Policy Notes No. 994)2 entided "Closing the Urban Fiscal Gap: Some 

Considerations."

156 ManagingUrbanizationUnderaDecentralized GovernanceFramework 

In short, urban local government units (LGUs) typically face a 

financing problem known as _fiscal gap." This is defined as a gap 

between perceived service needs and available financial resources. 

This fiscal gap is different from the concept of fiscal deficit that reflects 

a shortfall of actual revenue collections relative to actual LGU 

expenditure. It is important to note this difterence at the outset since 

in the Philippine context, LGUs are not encouraged to engage in 

deficit financing of recurrent expenditures. . 

How does urbanization ilafluence the fiscal gap 

To be able to answer this, one should first take a look at how 

urbanization and population growth affect the expenditure 

requirements and revenue collections of urban LGUs. The increase 

in demand for public services is mostly driven by growth in population 

induced by natural growth and migration. In order to sustain a given 

level of service, some argue that LGU expenditures have to increase 

at a rate that is at least proportional to the rate of population growth. 

In cases where service provision entails an increasing marginal cost, 

the need for such response becomes even more pronounced. Clearly, 

urbanization exerts an upward pressure on local government budgets. 

However, LGU revenues may not respond as quickly and strongly to rapid 

population growth. Thus, while population growth, urbanization and 

the associated growth in per capita income at/tend toexpand the revenue 

capacity of urban governments, the growth in LGU revenue may not 

automatically expand since it is held back by the LGUs' limited taxing 

authority and lagging revenue efforts. One example is in terms of 

property values. While they tend to rise with urbanization, the increase 

is not immediately reflected in the statutory tax base unless assessment 

values are automatically indexed. Another illustrative case is the issue 

of inflation. Inflation drives up government spending requirements 

almost instantaneously, what with the rise in the cost of materials and 

supplies and the pressure to increase governmentemployees' salaries 

to be able to cope with the higher costs of living. Yet, LGU revenues 

are not as responsive. Again, this is because there is, among others, 

no automatic indexation of the assessed values of real property for 

tax purposes in most places. 

To bring adequate public services to the urban sector, then, it 

becomes critical to close the fiscal gap. To close the fiscal gap, more 

money should flow into governments. Conversely, service delivery must 

be made more efficient or innovative in order that some money may 

be saved and put into the government coffers.

Closingthe Urban FiscalGap: An Overview 157 

Dissecting the Urban Fiscal Problem 

It is useful to analyze and evaluate the determinants of the city 

local government units' (CLGUs) revenue performance and expenditure 

behavior to understand where and how more funds (and savings) 

can be sourced for the city government coffers thereby closing 

the fiscal gap. 

Determinants of revenue performance 

Reviewing the 1991-1995 period, the study measures LGU revenue 

performance in terms of per capita total LGU income and two 

components of per capita locally-generated revenues: per capita local 

business tax revenue (PCLBT) and per capita real property tax 

revenue (PCRPT). 

Results of a series of regression runs indicate that the degree of 

urbanization has a positive and significant effect on PCLBT. It is likewise 

positive but not significant in terms of its relationship or effect 

on the PCRPT. The latter apparently shows that real property tax systems 

have not been able to fully capture the positive effects on land 

values brought about by urbanization. 

Cities earn income from both local and external sources. Local 

sources come mostly from local business tax and real property tax 

while external sources are largely accounted for by the internal revenue 

allotment (IRA). A previous Manasan study (1995) showed that 

instead of acting as a stimulant for LGUs to raise their local revenue 

generation effort, the IRA served as a disincentive to local 

government's resource mobilization effort since it became a substitute 

source of income for LGUs. 

In view of this and because, as noted earlier, efforts in generating 

potential tax earnings from higher valued real property brought 

about by urbanization were not fully realized, it is therefore not surprising 

to find that the effects of urbanization and population growth 

on per capita LGU total income had simply been neutral. 

Determinants of CLGU expenditure behavior 

Meanwhile, the growth in demand for public services is often 

associated with the increase in population. Logically, LGU expenditures 

are expected tO grow more or less proportionately with respect 

to population in order to maintain a constant level of service. 

Ditto with the effects of urbanization. As urbanization proceeds, 

per capita personal income tends to rise. With the increase in per


capita personal income is the tendency to have an increase in the 

demand for most public services. Subsequently, too, the level of per 

capita expenditure is expected to rise. 

However, results of the regression analysis conducted by 

Manasan using data on Philippine LGU expenditures show that in 

1995, the degree of urbanization and per capita LGU expenditure 

(PCLGUEXP) were negatively and significantly related. For the other 

years, except 1994, while the urbanization coefficient turned out to 

be positive, it was nonetheless not significant. 

When the regression analysis was further extended to take a 

look at the effects of urbanization and population growth on the per 

capita LGU expenditure for health and education, the results showed 

that except in 1991, the association had been negative and statistically 

significant. Said result/s contrary to initial expectations and to what have 

been obtained in other countries, notably developed countries. 

What accounts for such difference and what is its implication 

The Unfortunate Consequence 

Put simply, the results showing a negative relationship between 

urbanization and population growth, on the one hand, and per capita 

CLGU expenditure, on the other, means that instead of increasing as 

would have been expected, the actual CLGU per capita expenditures, 

specifically for health and education services, declined as population growth 

rates and the degreeof urbanization rose. 

Consequently, the fiscal gap is not reflected in terms of a higher 

LGU fiscal deficit, as in other countries, but rather in reduced level 

of per capita expenditures. The implication of this is that the delivery 

of basic services, notably health and education, is adversely affected. 

It therefore becomes not merely afiscal problem but, sadly, a shortage 

and deterioration of urban service delivery especially in the areas of health 

care and education. 

Recommendations: Interventions to Close the Urban Fiscal Gap 

The urban fiscal gap can be closed in four ways: 

• increasing local revenue effort with unchanged revenue 

authority; 

• increasing LGU taxing authority; 

• increasing transfers from central government; and 

• more efficient use of existing financial resources in service 

delivery.

Closingthe UrbanFiscalGap: An Overview 159 

l_ng,/octd _,_ _fort 

To counteract the substitutive effect of the IRA distribution 

formula on local source revenue, tax effort may be explicidy taken 

into account in the IRA allocation formula. Alternatively, the IRA 

distribution formula may also be allocated to the different LGUs based 

on equalization of net fiscal capacities (revenue capacity net of 

expenditure needs). 

To address the problem of CLGU real property tax systems not 

fully Capturing the rise in urban land values, the Local Government 

Code should be amended in favor of automatic indexation of the 

schedule of fair market value between general revisions. This will 

protect the real property tax base from inflation during the years 

when no general revision is undertaken. By avoiding the need to make 

lumpy adjustments in the schedule, it will also narrow the gap between 

the official schedule of fair market values and the true market values 

of real property in the medium term. Moreover, to counter the 

tendency of local assessors to value real property below its true market 

value, the me of the zonalvalues of real property (on which the BIR 

bases its assessment of transfer taxes) should be considered. 

On the collection side, there is a need to separately monitor 

current real property tax coUectibles from delinquent accounts. 

Aggressive collection and enforcement after each quarter through 

notices of delinquencies would do the government good. At the end 

of the second quarter, when an account becomes delinquent, warrants 

of levy should be issued. If by the end of the third quarter, the account 

is still delinquent, auction notice should be issued. 

For local business taxes, the biggest problem is the 

underreporting of gross receipts of establishments. Requiring 

taxpayers to submit their income tax returns (ITRs) filed with the 

Bureau of Internal Revenue is perhaps the most direct way of obtaining 

information. Given the present tax calendar, this implies that local 

business tax be initially assessed on the basis of the previous year's 

ITR and adjusted later in the year as the current ITR becomes 

available. In addition, local treasurers may require large establishments 

to submit supplementary accounting records. In large urban areas, 

local treasurers should be trained in field examination to check the 

veracity of reported gross receipts. The use of presumptive income 

levels, particularly for small establishments, should also be explored. 

To improve collection and enforcement of nonreal property 

taxes, meanwhile, the following may be considered:


* establishing a roll for each type of tax (the conduct of a tax 

census and the development of a revenue data bank are key 

steps in this regard); 

* maintaining systematic records where tax payments are 

automatically entered as they occur; 

• Sending tax bills and conscientiously monitoring tax payments 

and delinquencies; and 

° strictly implementing, sanctions and penalties on erring 

taxpayers. 

A good number of cities has already implemented user charges 

to defray hospital expenditures. To supplement the effort, local 

sanggunians (councils) need to pass legislation removing restrictions 

on the retention of income generated by these hospitals since such 

restrictions discourage hospitals from collecting user fees. 

Meanwhile, the poor financial performance of CLGU business 

enterprises is becoming worrisome. Cost-based pricing is a way of 

addressing the problem. Still another way is through management 

contracts with the private sector. 

Increasing LGU taxing authority 

In the medium term, the assignment of taxing powers to various 

levels of government must be reviewed. Theory suggests that 

residence-based taxes and taxes on immobile factors such as the real 

property tax are appropriate for local taxation. Motor vehicle taxation 

is also suitable for CLGUs. Betterment levies (a tax aimed at recouping 

the public costs of providing urban infrastructure from the 

beneficiaries) should also be explored. Such charges have had positive 

• effects in Korea and Colombia. 

Improving efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery 

Case studies of best practices in LGU service delivery indicate 

that much improvement could be achieved in this area. Below are 

three major characteristics of selected Philippine cities which, faced 

with inadequate funds to finance urban services, shifted strategy by 

innovating and making more efficient the delivery of ser vices. 

One, there is greater participation ofv_ous stakeholders (local 

institutions and people) in the implementation process and funding. 

This helps ensure efficient and effective program results and sustmn 

implementation. For example, Surigao City and Lapu-lapu City 

_nobilized their women's groups to deliver health services. Naga City

Closing the Urban Fiscal Gap: An Overview 161 

tapped community organizations to identify and come up with the 

financial counterpart of housing program beneficiaries while Puerto 

Princesa's citizens participated widely in cleanliness and reforestation 

programs. 

Two, LGUs in best practice cases broke free from the financial 

constraints that face most urban LGUs. They took different routes in 

addressing the fiscal gap. Some introduced user fees (as in Olongapo 

City) while others designed well-planned cost recovery schemes (as 

in San Carlos City). Still other LGUs focused on mechanisms that 

reduced the cost of service production and delivery. Cotabato City 

used barangay halls and private homes in the absence of barangay 

health stations. Cotabato, Olongapo and Naga mobilized health 

volunteers. Other LGUs tapped additional funds from higher levels 

of government and the private sector. Olongapo city required its 

barangays to allocate five percent of their IRA to health and welfare. 

Surigao City obtained P1.5 million for the construction of a training 

center from the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) of a senator. 

Partnership with the private sector was a popular option. Other LGUs 

maximized own-resource use to finance development. San Carlos City 

set aside 30 percent of its IRA (instead of the mandated 20 percent) 

for its Local Development Fund. 

Three, the laudable programs are characterized by an integrated 

and intersectoral development strategy in order to capture the synergy 

from Program interdependencies. Puerto Princesa's Low-Cost 

Housing Project is, in reality, just one Component of a wider program 

called Bantay Dagat Program. Olongapo City strengthened the link 

between health and sanitation by integrating its environment program 

with health activities. 

Reference 

Manasan, R. 1995. Revenue Mobilization in Local Government Units: 

The Early Years of Local Government Code Implementation. 

PIDS Discussion Paper Series No. 95-02. Makati City: Philippine 

Institute for Development Studies.

Chapter 

2 

Metropolitan Arrangements 

in the Philippines:An Overview* 

Ruben G. Mercado and Rosario G. Manasan 

contemporary regional development phenomenon occurring 

n the Philippines is the emergence of new regional spaces 

hrough the formation of metropolitan arrangements. A 

metropolitan arrangement is a conglomeration of a highly urbanized 

city and the local government units contiguous to it, engaging in 

cooperative urban development ventures. 

Metropolitan/Arrangements vs. Decentralization 

Both th/e 1986 Philippine Constitution and the 1991 Local 

Government Code grant local governments the power to group 

themselves for purposes commonly beneficial to them. While these 

provide the legal basis for some intergovernmental structure as in 

metropolitan arrangements, the creadon of such a structure is 

interpreted by some as a form of re-centralization and a potential 

threat to the autonomy of local governments. 

Advocates of metropolitan arrangements counter that 

metropolitanization in fact strengthens decentralization when local 

governments themselves initiate such move. This view sees metro 

arrangement as a refinement of the decentralization thrust since it 

allows for a subnational level government as against central 

government provision of services characterized by economies of scale 

and externalities. 

From an economic standpoint, urban services can be more 

efficient if they are jointly planned and delivered thereby creating 

economies of scale. Moreover, greater positive externalities will spill 

over to society as a result of metro arrangements. 

There is, of course, difficulty in determining the best 

organizational structure to adopt considering that LGUs have equal 

* First published an PIDS Policy Notes No. 98-10 entitled _MetroDolitan Aslangements in the 

Philippines: A New Urban Development Challenge."


pohtical legitimacy. Competition and antagonism may hinder the 

prospects of a workable relationship among local governments within 

the metropolitan arrangement. 

Metropolitan Arrangements in the Philippines 

With the exception of Metro Manila, metro arrangements in 

the Philippines are a phenomenon of the 1990s. There are four major 

precursors of metropolitanization. First, common pressing problems 

can lead local governments to band together in hopes of a better 

soludon. Second, regional development programs, which define 

certain areas targetted for development, often provide the impetus 

for these areas to metamorphose into metro arrangements. Third, a 

simple edict from the national government can put a previously 

nonexistent metro arrangement into the map. And last, the initiatives 

of the locals themselves can give rise to metro arrangements. 

Majority of the country's metro arrangements are still in the 

process of forming their metro bodies. Many have a bias for an 

authoritarian style of leadership although local leadership is 

emphasized in executing councils. Again, majority of these metro 

arrangements are locally led. Local officials make the decisions within 

the framework of metropolitan bodies. 

Local governments are the driving force behind the 

sustainability of metro arrangements since component LGUs give 

fixed contributions (a percentage of the LGU's internal revenue 

allotment,) for the upkeep of the metro arrangement. 

Activities That Metro Arrangements Do Best 

While there is a general understanding and acknowledgement 

of the problems confronting them, many metropolitan arrangements 

still have to formalize systems to solve these problems. 

Theory says functions that are characterized by economies of 

scale and externalities are appropriate concerns for higher level 

governments. Practice bears this out. Water supply, sewage disposal 

and solid waste management--services requiring areas larger than a 

local jurisdiction for cost-effectiveness--are generally assigned to 

metropolitan governments worldwide. The same is true for services 

such as public health whose benefits and costs accrue to nonresidents 

of a local jurisdiction (i.e., ser vices which give rise to spatial 

externalities). Common to all metro arrangements are the pressing 

concerns of development planning, solid waste management, and 

transport and traffic management.

MetropolitanArrangementinthe Philippines 165 

Policy Issues 

Majority of metropolitan arrangements in the country are still 

in a nascent stage of development and as such, are still concerned 

with the problem of solidifying their identity. 

The following are issues that need to be resolved to enable metro 

arrangements 

entities: 

to evolve into fully-functional political and economic 

What structure to adopt 

Many metro arrangements are still searching for their ideal 

structure. Afew have made their choice but are still shopping around 

for better options. Problems are inherent in the Choice of structure 

especially since a core requirement is that it should be acceptable to 

all LGUs within the metro arrangement. 

The problem of structure also involves the problem of 

leadership. There are two sides to the issue. First, who should initialize 

the process of consensus-building on what structure io adopt. Second, 

how to determine a mode of leadership agreeable to all. The dominant 

city is expected to take the initiative because it has the greatest stake. 

It is recognized as a big brother to lesser LGUs. Moreover, other LGUs 

are constrained to make the first move, being structurally under the 

provincial government. Still, there is the apprehension that lesser 

LGUs may misconstrue the initiative as a political overture to expand 

power. Unhappily, this can result into a political stalemate. The choice 

of who should lead the formal structure adopted is thus a major 

challenge. 

Clearly-delineated and well-understood roles and functions of 

all political entities involved in the metro arrangement are paramount 

concerns for an effective metro structure. A metro arrangement, when 

it takes on the cloth of a formal metropolitan structure, inevitably 

also requires a full-time organization to become effective. 

Financial sustainability 

Sustainability requires a steady stream of financing to bankroll 

the metro arrangement. Different modes of financing are open for 

exploration. 

The introduction of a metropolitan structure changes 

significandy the relationships of political units in the local government 

system. Cities and municipalities planning to join a metro arrangement


can be faced with conflicting relationships with the province and the 

metropolitan body. 

Many believe, though, that this issue is not necessarily a problem 

in the legal-administrative perspective but may be so in thepolitical 

reRlm, 

Problems arise when local executives prioritize the interest of 

their respective constituents over that of the whole metropolis. The 

garbage problem is a prominent issue raised by LGUs for not wanting 

to join a metro arrangement. Municipalities with vast tracts ideal as 

landfill sites perceive such arrangement as a means by which they can 

be co-opted to serve as trash bin for the entire metro area. 

Harmony in diversity 

A formidable challenge is harmonizing the activities of sectors 

and agencies in urban development services. These agencies often 

develop independently of elected government and may resist 

participation in metro-wide planning. 

Sustaining Metropolitan Arrangements 

Addressing the issue through effe_ve metro planning 

and manogeme_ 

A clear understanding of the essentials of metropolitan planning 

and management, based on the experience of other countries, is 

necessary and would help identify the fight policy interventions. 

Effective metropolitan planning and development entails a 

common vision of preservation and development of the region, a 

unified economic and political base to implement the vision, and an 

appropriate metropolitan structure to provide an institutional 

framework. Ideally, the metropolitan area should also have a unified 

political jurisdiction and well-coordinated economic agencies 

operating in the area. Metropolitan planning and management differs 

from city or town planning since dealing with disjointed political 

jurisdictions often thwarts unified planning. 

Dealing with the legal limitations 

The 1991 Local Government Code, while strengthening the 

power of local governments, has overlooked the unique requirements 

of metropolitan arrangements. Serious problems have resulted in the

MetropolitanArrangementin the Philippines 167 

sharing of power between capital cities and peripheral municipalities. 

Meanwhile, although the Constitution authorizes the creation of 

special metropolitan political subdivisions, it delimits the extent of 

metro management. It rules that higher jurisdictional bodies such as 

a metropolitan authority can be established only through an act of 

Congress and that in the aftermath, cities and municipalities retain 

their basic autonomy and their local executives and legislative 

assemblies. These inadequacies should be remedied through 

appropriate amendments. 

Agenda for National Policy 

Metropolitan planning and development is fast becoming a 

feature of local governance. While most of the groundwork has been 

undertaken by local governments themselves, the national 

government plays a critical role by providing the legal framework and 

environment conducive to such undertakings. 

Below is an agenda in support of metropolitan development. 

Review of basic laws 

There is a need to review Article l0 of the Constitution to 

strengthen metropolitan structures and promote metropolitanization. 

Amendments could include a legal definition of a metropolitan area 

as a recognized territorial and political subdivision of the country. 

With recognition, provisions can be made for metro arrangements to 

exercise powers inherent in the definition. 

Review of provisions in the Local Government Code 

The 1991 Local Government Code has overlooked the dynamics 

of urbanization as it relates to local governance. Rapid urbanization 

has compelled local governments to expand their political and 

administrative linkages with neighboring cities and municipalities. 

There are at least two areas where amendments are needed. 

First is the assignment of urban functions to a metropolitan unit that 

is consistent with other LGUs or other government agencies. At the 

very least, the functions can take into account those which are 

metropolitan in character. Potential services for metropolitan units 

to assume include land use planning, traffic management, solid waste 

management, water and sewerage services, transport services, flood 

control and management, among others. 

The second area concerns the functional-relationship of the 

metropolitan Unit to other government entities which must be made


clear to maximize benefits. For instance, the 1991 Local Government 

Code gave the Department of Budget and Management power to 

review LGU budgets in lieu of the Metropolitan Manila Development 

Authority. This has institutionalized the disjointed programming and 

budgeting process in the metropolis and prevented the maximization 

of resources. The same lack of institutional linkage exists with sectoral 

line agencies making it difficult for the Metro Manila Development 

Authority (MMDA)to influence their priorities. 

Recognizing the role of nwtropolitan planning and insthttions 

Planners should recognize the implications of metropolitanization 

in the medium and long term. Recognition of metro institutions 

as orchestrator of inter-local service delivery is also important. 

The Regional Development Councils, as the development planning 

and policymaking body in the regions, can provide support to 

local governments which are politically constrained to initiate metro 

arrangements. 

Research and devdopment 

Philippine literature on metropolitan planning and 

management, including rigorous policy studies, are lacking. Focus 

has largely been only on Metro Manila. There should be more studies 

in metropolitan governance to assist in policy interventions especially 

in the areas of institutional development, financial management, 

urban environmental management and global competitiveness of 

megacities. 

Choosing the Appropriate Metro Structure 

There are three basic models of governance from which local 

governments may choose their preferred structure. 

Metropolitan city 

One is the metropolitan city under which a single LGU has 

responsibility for all local functions. This structure has the advantage 

of ease in coordinating activities and implementing plans. Duplication 

of services is less likely. The formation of a new city also resolves the 

issue of legal administrative ties between the province and the towns 

involved in the metro arrangement. Its weak point lies in its general 

inability to account for intra-city or neighborhood differences in the 

demand for the package of services.

MetropolitanArrangementin the Philippines 169 

3_t_d__ _ second._er 

The second model is jurisdictional fragmentation side by side 

with a second-tier governance structure, under which the 

responsibility for the same local functions is lodged with the 

component LGUs of the metro arrangement. The model promotes 

economic efficiency by bringing the government closer to the people 

and consequently, making it more responsive to local preferences. 

However, it is less able to capture the benefits from economies of 

scale. It is also not able to address well the problems associated with 

spillover effects of certain types of services. The creation of the secondtier 

governance structure in this model is precisely aimed at 

counteracting this inherent weakness in jurisdictional fragmentation. 

The upper-tier structure can be any of these three: a council, 

an authority or a metro government. The difference lies in the sharing 

of power among the LGUs in the metropolitan arrangement and the 

leadership structure in the second-tier. 

The metropolitan development council is a governing body 

composed of city and town mayors comprising the metro 

arrangement. Leadership is appointed from among the members. 

The structure provides relative ease in obtaining national support. A 

presidential executive order is all that is needed to make it legal. 

However, financial sustainability of the council is at risk because its 

budget is tied with the executive department. 

A metropolitan development authority is a much more attractive 

structure in view of its relative institutional permanence, greater 

corporate powers and functions and fiscal advantage. Since it is more 

of a technocratic organization than a political body, decisionmaking 

is de-politicized. An authority can only be created through a 

congressional law. The head of the authority is typically government 

appointed. 

A third form of upper-tier structure is the metropolitan 

government wherein component LGUs are subjected to a higher 

jurisdictional authority or government with an elected governor. 

There is a single-tier council and the city and municipal mayors act as 

area managers. The governor coordinates the sectoral departments 

of the national government. In the Philippines, this setup will only be 

possible with the amendment of the Constitution.


Finally, the third model is functional fragmentation under which 

component LGUs have limited responsibilities for service delivery. 

The model authorizes autonomous local endties with corporate 

powers to undertake specific services on a metro-wide basis. This is 

suitable in addressing economies of scale in capital-intensive services 

like public utilities and transportation which smaller LGUs would 

normally have difficulty financing. Corporatizing service delivery also 

has the advantage of encouraging the management of service delivery 

by professionals (versus politicians) whose decisions tend to be 

shielded from political interventions. Moreover, this mode promotes 

greater cost recovery.

Case Studies of Metropolitan Arrangements 

Owning the Metropolitan Vision: 

The Case of BLIST 

Setting an Institutional Framework 

for Metropolitan Management: Metro Cebu 

Providing a Metropolitan Perspective 

to Development Planning: Cagayan de Oro 

Metro Naga: A Continuing Challenge 

of Local Autonomy and Sustainability 

Metro Iloilo: A Struggle 

for Acceptance and Organization 

Metro Davao: In Search 

of Metropolitan Definition 

Governance and Urban Development: 

Case Study of Metro Manila

Case Study 1 

Owning the Metropolitan 

Vision: The Case of BLIST 

Ruben G. Mercado and Carmel P. Chammag 

contiguous areas in the regional center of the Cordillera 

Administrative LIST stands for Region Baguio, La (CAR). Trinidad, The BUST Itogon, isS_tblan not a geopolitical and Tuba-- 

entity but a planning area. When the Regional Physical Framework 

Plan of CAR was formulated in 1990, the BLIST was identified as a 

major subregional area due to the fast urban growth of Baguio City 

influencing the adjacent municipalities, most especially La Trinidad. 

The other municipalities close to the city are showing potentials of 

becoming the catchment area for Baguio's rapid growth. The BLIST 

currently plays a key role in the development of the CAR and the 

Northern Luzon as the region's educational, tourism and commercial 

center. The BLIST area is also one of the growth nodes of the North 

Western Luzon Growth Quadrangle (NWLGQ), which is being 

promoted as an economic and tourism zone linkingthe coastal 

provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union and Pangasinan with 

the BLIST in Benguet Province of CAR. 

Serious planning for the BLIST area has been undertaken after 

Baguio City was seriously damaged by the earthquake in 1990. It was 

thought then that rehabilitating the city should go beyond restoration 

and should address the city's long-term reconstruction. This 

necessitates a deliberate attempt to include in the development plan 

the city's future interaction and integration with its neighboring areas. 

Metro BLIST is a new term being introduced in this paper, which 

refers to the Urban BLIST. The original term was Metro Baguio, but 

was received with a strong negative reaction because it left the 

impression that the other areas are just extensions of Baguio City. 

This paper reviews the developments and challenges of Metro 

BLIST, focusing on the steps needed to deal with its present and future 

concerns.


Development Trends in Metro BLIST 

The population of Metro BLIST in 1995 is less than half a 

million, of which about 59 percent resides in Baguio City (Table 1). 

The population growth rate in the whole area is a little higher than 

the.national average. However, this average rate is unevenly distributed 

across each of the political units. While Sablan is growing ata modest 

rate of 1.67, Baguio and La Trinidad are experiencing very rapid 

growth of more than 4 percent. In contrast, Itogon and Tuba are 

losing population, quite rapidly in Itogon. Population density in 

Baguio City and La Trinidad is high relative to that of other 

municipalities because having a limited land size, they are home to 

three-fourths of the entire metropolitan population. 

Particular land uses would reveal the physical development 

features of areas composing Metro BLIST (Table 2). Average rates 

for the entire BLIST area do not accurately represent the land use 

features of Baguio City and La Trinidad. These areas have definitely 

larger built-up areas (almost half of the total land area in Baguio City) 

and smaller forest lands. Pressures of urbanization and urban 

development are expected to be experienced in the BLIST areas 

especially within Baguio City and La Trinidad. On the other hand, 

grasslands and forest lands dominate land uses in the three other 

municipalities. 

The BLIST Master (Structure) Plan 

A master plan has been prepared for the development of what 

soon will become a Metro. BLIST. This plan is essentially a structure 

Table 1. Metro BLIST:Demographic and ! and Characteristics 

City / Population Level GrowthRate Land Area PopulatiOnDensity 

Municipality 1990- (_ km) 1995 

1990 1995 1995 (persons/sq. 

km_ 

Bagnio City 183,102 226,885 4,38 48.9 4639.73 

La Trinidad 48,252 63,089 5.51 61.4 1027.51 

Itogon 61,773 47,781 -5.01 423.7 112.77 

Sablan 8,440 9,170 1,67 91.6 100.11 

Tuba 39,635 39,589 -0.02 314.4 125.92 

Metro BLIST 341,202 386#12 2.53 940.0 411.18 

Philippines 60,679,725 68,616,536 2.32 300,000 229 

Basic source: 1995 Census of Population and Housing, National Statistics Office.

Case Study:MetroBLIST 175 

Table 2. Metre Blis_ I-_d Use (in percent) 

[=md Use _ La Trinidad ltogon Sablan Tuba BLIST 

Built up 48.3 21.1 1.6 7.2 1.7 6.1 

Agriculture 1.6 6.9 1..6 _.3 0.0 1.6 

Grassland 44.7 60.8 56.8 76.3 53.7 57.3 

Forest 5,2 11.1 39.0 13.7 43.7 34.2 

Others 0.2 0.0 0.9 .05 0.9 0.8 

TOTAL !00.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 

Basic source: BDUPP Report, Volume B. Source of BDUPP report is DENR - CAR Geology 

Division,Land Use Map, 1:50,000scale,December 1991. 

plan thatconnotesgreaterflexibility than a masterplanwhich is 

conceptually stadcand fixed.The Urban BLIST planwaspreparedin 

1993byajointgroupofEuropean and Filipinoconsultants following 

theJuly 1990 earthquake.Although itisexpected thatfuture 

urbanizationwillbc feltmore increasingly 

Baguio Cityand La 

Trinidad,theplanconsidereda largerplanningareainviewof the 

influenceand integradonofdevelopmentofotherareassurrounding 

thesetwo places.Thus,Itogon,Sablanand Tuba,alongwithBaguio 

and La Trinidad,formcd partofthelargerurban planningarea. 

Completed inOctober 1994,the planhasalreadyinfluenced 

theplanningand invcstmcntprogramming oflocalgovcrnmcntunits 

(LGUs) as wellas regionalinstitutions, includingthe Regional 

Development Council (RDC, which consistsof the Cordillera 

ExecutiveBoard,CordilleraRegionalAssemblyand RegionalLine 

Agencies)and other government institutions. Since itsformal 

launchingin1994,theBLIST Urban MasterPlanhasinfluencedthe 

developmentplansoftheregionand LGUs (BcnguctProvinceand 

theBLIST LGUs). In addition,programs and projectsfound inthe 

planhavebecome aguideorbasisforprogram orprojectproposals 

forthearea.Consistencywiththemasterplanhasbecome one ofthe 

suggestedacceptancecriteria fortheseproposals. 

The formulation of the master plan was not an easy undertaking. 

It was met with strong resistance and open cridcism all throughout 

the stages of its development from various sectors, even among BLIST 

member-municipalities. One of the concerns articulated was the 

impression that the BLIST planning wasa strategy for Baguio City to 

transfer the city's problems to its neighbors. Some thought that urban 

concerns were not viewed as important by the municipalities of Itogon, 

Sablall and Tuba than it was by Baguio and La Trinidad. Because of 

these sentiments, public consultations and information dissemination

176 ManagingUrbanization Undera DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

were undertaken to clarify the objectives of the planning activity and 

to raise awareness about the need to integrate plans as well as to involve 

many sectors in plan formulation and decisionmaking. 

Potentials for Cooperation 

The following presents some of the master plan's major 

development areas where BLIST members can mutually benefit from 

a strong alliance and coordination: 

Water supply and distribution 

One of the most daunting challenges for Metro BLIST is the 

development of water sources and water distribution. The current 

water supply (as measured in average liters per capita demand (LPCD) 

for the area is still below the standard 220 liters (Table 3). Strategies 

to address this issue include the need to reduce system leakage and 

to install meters on all connections. 

The problem of water supply not only pertains to its production 

but more importantly, the distribution within the BLIST area. Most 

affected is Baguio City, whose topography constrains it to yield more 

water from the city's site itself, making water distribution technically 

difficult and expensive to manage. The situation is further complicated 

by an institutional problem. The Baguio Water District is perceived 

to exploit water resources in neighboring areas but does not have 

the responsibility of serving the needs of areas outside Baguio City. 

This led to serious conflicts in recent years--confficts that continue 

to fester the BLIST-member municipalities, x 

The three new water sources that are located in the BLIST area 

are the Budacao spring and waterfalls in Tuba, the Mohawk water 

sources at Baguio Gold Mines in Itogon, and the Irisan spring in 

Sablan. The challenge of the metropolitan arrangement in BLIST, in 

this case, is how to have an adequate water supply to meet the growing 

1 For example, the municipality of Tuba expressed its opposition to a proposed BLISTwide 

Water Resources Study (one of the projects proposed to be conducted under the 

Baguio and Dagupan Urban Planning Project). Resolution 377-96 of the Sangguniang 

Ikayan of Tuba dated October 29, 1996 said that "the BLIST Water Resources Study is 

rejected since it uses the municipality as resource tapping for the benefit of Baguio City 

without addressing the issue of revenue sharing and without a study for agricultural, 

domesd¢ and future industrial uses of the waters for future investors in the municipality. 

The municipality of Tuba has its own Development Plan for its water resources."


TableS. Metro BLIST:Water Demand, 1994-2020 

Year Population % Served Average Water _ Reqti_neuts 

LPCD Ave. (cu. m/day) Peak (cu. m/day) 

1994 312.000 58 190 34,400 48,135 

2000 358,000 70 210 54,600 73,700 

2010 421,000 80 220 74,100 103,700 

2020 473,000 90 220 93,700 131,100 

Source: Baguio and Dagupan Urban Planning Project (1994). 

requirements of Baguio City given the area's continuing rapid 

urbanization and development and, at the same time, how to pro,vide 

mutual benefit to the municipalities from where these resot.rces 

originate. 

Sol/dwaste 

Another important concern is solid waste management, 

particularly in the identification and development of a landfil_ site 

for the BLIST area. This is an immediate concern especially for Ba,guio 

City, whose dumping site is already reaching full capacity, and lotated 

within the city proper in an inhabited, steeply sloping area. It i_,also 

a source of conflict between Baguio City and Tuba as solid waste_, 

flowing down and seeping leachate _reaten the public health ;n the 

nearby barangay of Tadiangan. The presence of weathered rocks in 

the area also contribute to the pollution of the groundwater _able 

and downstream springs. 

The present dumpsite in Wangal, La Trinidad, is also beset with 

similar problems. It is located near an inhabited area and adjacent to 

a cemetery. The high population growth in La Trinidad is expected 

to further add to its present solid waste disposal problems. The other 

municip_dities (Itogon, Sablan and Tuba) do not undertake solid waste 

management activities. Households in these municipalities usually 

resort to burning or to placing their garbage in vacant lots or river 

banks, neither of which is enviionment friendly. Thus, these five 

municipalities stand to gain through reduced solid waste treatment 

and disposal cost if they come together for a joint development, use 

and maintenance ofa BLIST-wide solid waste management program. 

The waste collection scheme can further be made to service 

the more urbanized areas of La Trinidad and Baguio City as well as 

other BLIST areas, particularly Tuba. This will necessitate more


garbage collection vehicles, equipment and manpower as well as a 

better collection system. 

mnqt 

People in the BLIST area rely on road-based public transport 

for mobility. Such mode of transport remains indespensable and 

therefore shall continue in the future. All-weather highways, thus, 

play a very important role. At present, there are four main roads 

serving Metro BLIST, all of which needs rehabilitation and major 

improvement to withstand future earthquakes: Naguilian Road, 

Marcos Highway, Kennon Road and the Halsema Highway north to 

Bontoc. Since there is no road linking these major roads, the BLIST 

Master Plan proposed a Western Link Road that connects Halsema 

Highway to Naguilian Road (first phase), the Naguilian Road to 

Marcos Highway (second phase) and Marcos Highway to Kennon 

Road (third phase). This western link road provides an alternative 

route to the central business district (CBD) of Baguio City for those 

bound for La Trinidad or Tuba, thus reducing the number of vehicles 

passing through the CBD. 

Other alternative routes should also be developed to relieve 

the already congested areas such as Baguio City and La Trinidad as 

well as to encourage the development of peripheral locations. One 

such route proposed is the Western Link road which, according to 

the Plan, "will relieve pressure on the existing Baguio-La Trinidad 

route and open up the north and northwest of Urban BLIST for 

development." The new road will also serve as an emergency 

evacuation route, should both Naguilian and Marcos highway become 

impassable. The planned road also hopes to link Naguilian Road with 

Marcos Highway and the latter with Kennon Road. The new road will 

also help decongest Baguio City as travelers can bypass the central 

Baguio City to reach other areas of Benguet Province. 

A perennial problem is the heavy traffic between La Trinidad 

and Baguio along the major thoroughfares (Baguio-Bontoc Road), 

which continues despite the road-widening measures in this route. 

The large number of vehicles plying the Baguio-La Trinidad Road 

also somehow contributes to traffic along the Magsaysay and Bokawkan 

Road. This is because La Trinidad is where many workers in Baguio 

reside (and vice-versa). La Trinidad is also slowly transforming itself 

as a regional government center as some regional government offices

CaseStudy:MetroBLIST 179 

(e.g., Department 

municipality. 

of Science and Technology) have located in the 

Tour/smmanogvnwm 

Tourism is one of the important sectors in the BLIST economy. 

BLIST faces greater competition in attracting visitors or tourists 

considering the wide range of alternative locations in the Philippines 

and outside the country. Thus, there is a need to develop a 

comprehensive strategy that will maintain or improve existing tourist 

attractions as well as identify and develop new attractions or sites, 

especially outside Baguio City.Among the promising sites in the area 

are the West Itogon Countryside Park,Asin Hot Springs in Tuba and 

some water- and hill-based sites in Sablan. In addition, Baguio City's 

wooded parks, a popular destination for picnics, are no longer as 

available in the city as before. Instead, communal parks in the other 

LIST municipalities can be promoted for tourism and recreation, 

provided such will be complemented by the right facilities and 

playground for children. 

The BLIST area is one of the tourism clusters to be promoted 

under the CordilleraTourism MasterPlan. Itwill alsoserve as a primary 

service center and gateway to introducing other tourist destinations 

in the CAR. A string of places and activities within their cluster will 

be promoted. The BLIST municipalities stand to gain from this 

clustering, as it will ensure that their respective tourist attractions/ 

sites will likewise be visited. 

Baguio City's perennial problem is =squatting"or the prevalence 

of _infonnal dwellers."There is no definite data on how many squatters 

there are in Baguio City but they are widely acknowledged to be 

occupying various kinds of government reservations (such as forest 

andwatershed reservations) and even hazardous areas (steeply sloping 

areas). Where to relocate these "squatters _ and identify areas for 

housing development is a big problem. Baguio City is limited by not 

only the land area but by the fact that many of its available lands are 

declared as government reservations (meaning, not available for 

housing). 

Through the BLISTarrangement, housing development outside 

the city can continue to be encouraged, thereby lessening the pressure

180 Managing UrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

on land water resources in Baguio and La Trinidad while promoting 

economic activities and higher income from real property taxes in 

Itogon, Sablan and Tuba. 

Managing Metro BLIST 

Metro BLIST is fortunate to have a ready guiding framework 

for its development. Through the comprehensive Structure Plan, the 

area's physical framework plan has been formulated and policies, 

strategies, programs, projects, and investment costs, and schedules 

for implementation have been identified. There are two 

organizational setups handling BLIST-wide issues and programs. First 

is the BLIST Consultative Council (or BLIST Forum), which was 

organized when the BLIST Master Plan was being finalized in 1994. 

The second is the BLIST Area Task Force created by the North Western 

Luzon Growth Quadrangle (NWLGQ)Commission. Of these two, 

the BLIST Area Task Force is the more active in coordinating the 

area's affairs. As to which of these two organizations is more responsive 

in promoting the sustained implementation of the BLIST Plan will 

be discussed in the subsequent sections. 

Recommended organization for BUST under the Structure Plan 

The Plan points out two alternative structures that can 

implement the Plan and other BLIST-wide projects. These are the 

"metro authority" and the "consultative forum." 

A metropolitan authority, as explained in the Plan, is a body 

"which subsumes most or all major political and administrative powers 

and responsibilities currently undertaken by the individual BLIST 

authorities." The Plan explains that based on the public consultations, 

the LIST authorities do not favor such concept for two basic reasons. 

First, urban population is currently concentrated in Baguio City. The 

creation of a Metro BLIST would only be appropriate once the BLIST 

• population spreads into or increased in the other municipalities. 

Second, the need to establish a metro authoritywould only be urgent 

if inteflocal issues are not resolved within political boundaries. It is 

believed that mayors, however, are "talking" to each other to resolve 

these common issues. 

A more workable and acceptable proposal according to the Plan 

is the formation of a Consultative Forum composed of representatives 

from the five BLIST members. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the

Case Study: Metro BLIST 181 

proposed organization. The basic idea is that the forum can provide 

the general policy direction on BLIST-wide issues and those that would 

impact on more than one local entity. At the same time, local entities 

can directly control projects, service functions and planning activities 

"where these can be managed locally." Where concerns affect two 

municipalities, these can be managed jointly on an ad-hoc 

arrangement. The body can also set up organizations to deal with 

specific BLIST-wide issues. Examples cited in the Plan include a BLIST 

Water Board to deal with supply, distribution and identification of 

new water sources, an Inward Investment Agency to deal with resource 

marketing and a Land Delivery Unit to manage urban land delivery. 

The forum is envisaged to be composed of not only the five 

municipalities but also representatives from the provincial 

government, relevant national and regional agencies, nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) and leading private sector groups. 

Existing BLIST Structure 

It is difficult to categorically state that there is a real institutional 

mechanism in place to oversee the implementation of the BLIST Plan. 

A BLIST Consultative Council (or BLIST Forum) was informally 

organized in a memorandum of agreement signed by BLIST local 

government units (LGUs) on 19 February 1994. It was tasked to 

"coordinate the planning, implementation and monitoring of 

development activities in the BLIST area especially projects and 

activities that transcend political boundaries." Since February 1994, 

its members have met sporadically to act as adviser in the finalization 

of the BLIST Urban Master Plan and to oversee its implementation. 

Its last meeting was in the first quarter of 1996, to map out plans for 

the approval of the plan by the BLIST LGUs. Since that time, only 

the LIST mayors have met informally to discuss mutual issues and 

concerns. The forum has not yet been officially dissolved. 

Eventually, Executive Order 175 was issued creating the 

Northwestern Luzon Growth Quadrangle (NWLGQ) Commission 

(conveniently called the North Quad) which would be responsible 

for the overxll direction, coordination and supervision of the entire 

NWLGQdevelopment efforts. Under this Commission, the Quad East 

(or BLIST Area) Task Force, organized on March 26, 1996, was 

responsible for promoting the BLIST area as a growth node. Figure 2 

presents the current organizational structure of the said task force.

Figure I. Proposed OalganiT_Uion for Metro BIJST Under the Structure Plan _o 

General 

Policy (e.g., Structure Plan coordination, Water Supply, Tourism) q 

I 

-_. 

CONSULTATIVE FORUM ON BLIST-WIDE ISSUES ] a" 

'o 

, National C 

Joint Development Western Link 

_ ' _ Regional _-_d Q- 

Provincial 

Projects Area Road Private Sector ._ 

etc. 

Plan Projects Countryside Development Areas Development o. 

(specific examples) Park & Central Area Area t Oh-3 

Individual 

Responsibilities 

(to organize 3 

& coordinate) [ Local Planning/Feasibili_/Fmancing/Development Controt/Im)lementation J = O_ 

Source: BDUPP (1994). 

3 

_"

Case Study:Metro BLIST 18,3 

The BLIST Task Force (BTF) essentially has the same 

composition as the Consultative Forum under the BLIST Plan. The 

BLIST Plan proposed to consist of five mayors with representatives of 

the provincial government, other relevant national and regional 

agencies, NGOs and leading private sector organizations. The function 

of the BTF is to oversee the planning, coordination and 

implementatioi, of programs/projects in the BUST area within the 

context of the overall North Quad Plan. 

The same Consultative Forum of the BLIST Plan is being retired 

now by the BLIST Task Force on the rationale that the North Quad 

Plan is consistent with the original BLIST Master Plan. 

Whether the BLIST Task Force has been addressing the very 

basic issues of the Structure Plan is a sensitive question. Those in the 

know would claim that the BUST Task Force has been tackling these 

urban development issues and are trying their best through their 

regular meetings to address such. For example, in terms of solid waste, 

the agreement of the BTF in their February 1998 meeting is to wait 

for recommendations of the consultancy firm undertaking a feasibility 

study on the BLIST solid waste project. On the other hand, others 

think that since the local governments in the BUST area are still 

singly undertaking solid waste management in terms of recycling and 

re-use of refuse as well as landfill site identification through local or 

nationally assisted programs, it may indicate that the BTF may not be 

completely successful in this regard. It should be emphasized that 

the BLIST LGUs are aware of the need to have a common solid waste 

management system for the entire BLIST area. The same holds true 

for water supply distribution and development of new water sources. 

Also, the fact that other urban development concerns such as housing 

shortage, traffic, transportation are not given much attention by the 

BLIST Task Force may add to the need for a more responsive BLISTwide 

structure other than the Task Force. 

In terms of projects, the BLIST Task Force was able to exert 

some "pressure" on line agencies to "implement" the identified BLIST 

projects. The NWLGQ Commission _champions" these identified 

priority projects to then President Fidel V. Ramos and the heads of 

the national departments. These priority projects refer to those 

identified in the BLIST Plan such as the Western Link Road and the 

West Itogon Countryside Park. 

It may, however, be unreasonable to judge the effectiveness of 

the BLIST Task Force on the basis of how it addresses these concerns.


Functionally, it was created to look into area project planning, 

coordination and implementation in the context of the North Quad 

Plan. Moreover, activities of the Task Force are also determined 

substantially by higher order structures and the availability of funds 

within the NWLGQ Commission. The BLIST Task Force, by virtue of 

its name, is not a policymaking body but an implementing arm of the 

larger structure (the NWLGQCommission) and gets its overall policy 

guidelines from the Commission. One of the policy guidelines of the 

Commission is that activities to be promoted within the BLIST Area 

should complement or be supportive of other activities being 

promoted in other growth nodes within the North QUAD Area. 

Given such a case, it can be said that there is a form of structure, 

i.e., BLIST Task Force looking at BLIST concerns. However, its 

propensity and motivation to deal with the larger and broader 

concerns and the scope of its responsibilities can stand improvement, 

Recent events in the CAR, particularly the revival of the metro 

issue, show the lack of mechanism that deals with current urban 

concerns. Various groups now have different understanding or 

interpretation of the "BLIST cooperation," which surfaced with the 

rejection during a plebiscite of the Cordillera Autonomous Region 

Act. 2 To all these, the Office of the President had initiated reforms in 

the management of the BLIST by tasking the National Economic 

Development Authority-CAR to draft an executive order that will 

create a BLIST Coordinating Council. 

Points for Consideration in Handling Metro BLIST 

Given the preceding account of development planning in the 

BLIST area and the institutional transformations that took place, the 

following may be of value to policymakers who would want to take a 

second look at BLIST and the challenges that it continues to face. 

Recently, the Metropolitan Baguio concept was again revived as a means of spurring 

development in Baguio City and its neighboring areas after the defeat of Republic Act 8438 (An 

Act to Establish the Cordillera Autonomous Region). An article in the March 29, 1998 issue of 

M/d/and Cour/er rifled "Groups Asked To Be Calm on Post-Autonomy Moves" mentioned that 

some leaders vowed to convert Baguio City and its neighboring towns into a Metro Baguio 

status similar to that of the Metro Manila Development Authority. Likewise, an article rifled 

"Autonomy Officially Rejected" in Z/g-Zag dated March 15, 1998 mentioned that the "creation 

of a Metro Baguio composed of Baguio and adjoining areas was also reiterated by Congressman 

Edgar Avila as another avenue for development" The revival of the metropolitan Baguio concept 

came a_ this was perceived to be a strategy to achieving development at least for Baguio City as 

an alternative to the rejected Cordillera Autonomous Region Plala.

Case Study:Metro BLIST 185 

]F_I_L_, 2. BUST Ate-. TaskForceUnder theNWLGQ 

(Governor of Benguet , (Mayor of Baguio 

Province) 

1 

City) 

Clmlrmml J Co-Chsirmg 

.(NGO Rep) 

1 

(BLIST Mayors, Line Agencies) 

Owning the vision and revonsidmng the benefits of coopem6on 

The difficulty in instituting a mechanism to handle BLIST 

concerns can be partly attributed to the municipalities' seeming lack 

of appreciation of the benefits to be gained from cooperation under 

one structure. Although they understand the importance of the 

BLIST Plan, the mayors are uncertain about the benefits. The 

historical resistance and the allegation that the plan will mostly benefit 

Baguio while the adjoining municipalities will only absorb Baguio's" 

dirt may have created a barrier to forming a more solid cooperative 

management or structure in the BUST area. The mayors also fear 

that they may consequently lose their executive powers and 

prerogative to the formal structure that will be installed for this 

purpose. 

Looking at BLIST as a "single organism," one of the metaphors 

shared in one of the BLIST public consultations, may provide a graphic 

concept of a BLIST cooperation. It would be worthwhile for 

municipalities to revisit what they have conceived to be the benefits 

as well as their major contribution to the cooperation as expressed 

during the various consultations held for the BLIST plan preparation 

(Table 4). From this initial listing, they can sit down again and validate 

or add other items they expect from the cooperation, and discuss 

how they can work out their full realization. 

In,vb_ing a more binding and authoff__6ve structm'e 

It is important for local governments to talk to one another. 

Local governments in the BLIST area discuss mutual concerns but


the public have complained that *talking takes too long." This concern 

indicates the public's clamor for local governments to deal with issues 

with dispatch and authority; especially on immediate issues. To effect 

such call, a strong management structure has to be in place. 

As have been the experience of many emerging metropolises 

in the country, the crafting of an appropriate institutional structure 

is not an easy undertaking. Metropolitan arrangements in the 

Philippines vary in form, functions and scope. Under the current 

decentralized system, however,the structure that has received much 

attraction is one that guarantees LGU executives sufficient powers 

while surrendering certain functions or responsibilities to an 

integrative body. A menu of options is available, including a 

metropolitan government, a metropolitan corporation or a 

reconstituted political entity. 

It may be worthwhile to evaluate two alternative structures 

proposed in the Structure Plan. First is the metro authority. Defined 

as a body "which subsumes most or all major political and 

administrative powers and responsibilities currently undertaken by 

the individual BLIST authorities," the metro authority is close to 

establishing a metropolitan government. However, it is not feasible 

to establish because of resistance from the BLIST municipalities. Also, 

it violates the present Constitution. The present charter safeguards 

LGUs from any form of disempowerment as a result of the 

establishment of metropolitan authorities or similar bodies. 

The other proposal calls for a consultative forum that is similar 

to a metropolitan council (as in the case of Metro Naga and Metro 

Cebu) in that membership largely consists of the member 

municipalities. Leadership, however, is not well defined in this 

•proposed forum. Perhaps one can derive a lesson from the 

experiences of a former Coordinating Forum whose leadership was 

vague and eventually ceased to exist. _It may be workable to adopt 

such model for evolving a new BLIST structure. However, the structure 

should have a comprehensive mandate, power and authority, have 

the independence to work out its own policies within the BLIST area 

of coverage (not necessarily being limited to working within a higher 

framework of development), be given sufficient funds for its 

operations and have a full-time secretariat. 

There are instances where the need for cooperation is so glaring 

and completely understood but not one of the member municipalities 

or cities would want to take the initiative. Generally, the initiative is


Table 4. Expected Benefits From and Share in the BLIST Cooperation 

BUST Wbat It Can Benefit What It Can Simre/Prevlde 

Baguio Water source from Sablan, Itogon, Perform the role of a service center 

Tuba or La Trinidad to meet high to LIST. 

demand for water. 

Provide a sustainable market for 

Po_ble an-angements for a ccmmnon LIST products and services. 

landfdl s/re. 

Provide payment for water provided 

Better traffic situation espcciaUy with by LIST municipalities. 

effective coordination with La 

Trinidad. - ' Provide gateway to other BLIST 

tourism sites. 

De-congestion as other _ f_ctiom 

(/ndusuial,r_dentt_,c_ 

and institutional) can be relocated to 

the other LIST municipalities. 

Cleaner, better urban environment 

with the decongestion of urban 

functions and better traffic situation. 

La More integrated approach to better Provide an altemat/ve busine_, 

Trinidad handle urban growth and expan_on educational, industrial center and 

especially in the aspect of housing residential area for Baguio 

and road development, residents or other in-migrants. 

Water eourccs from Sablan, Tuba or Provide poesible area for landfall. 

Itogon. 

Tourism sites. 

Local economy more developed due 

to relocation of certain urban Agricultural production area. 

functions such as commerce, 

education, industry, etc. and due to IndusU-ial sites for light, nonmore 

expanded and intensified pollutive, low-water consumption 

tourism activities. More employment industrieS. 

opportunities and potential for 

higher income for its residents. 

Higher revenue collections from 

greater real property and businem 

taxes collection on the part of the 

LGU. 

Itoggn Tourism plans can increase Provide water source. 

employment oppornmities and 

income of residents. Provide land for housing, 

industrial, residential purposes. 

Road development for better access. 

Provide possible area for landfill.

188 Managing Urb:,,_ization Under a Decentralized Governance Framework 


_JST What It C_t Benefit What It Cam Share/Provide 

Itogon Local economy more developed due Provide area for countryside 

(cont'd) to relocation of certain functions such tourism. 

as commerce, education, industry, 

etc. and due to more expanded and Agricultural production area. 

intensified tourism activities. More 

employment opportunities, potential 

for higher income of its residents. 

Higher revenue collections t/or' real 

property and business taxes on the 

part oftheLGU. 

Additionalincome from payment of 

waterfrom otherBLIST 

municipalities_ 

Market foritsagricultural products. 

Sablan Road development and positive Provide water source. 

effects on transport of vegetable 

produce. Provide possible area for landfill. 

Resolution of boundary disputes with Provide possible area for housing 

La Trinidad and Tuba. and industrial sites. 

Local economy more developed due Tourism sites. 

to relocation of certain functions such 

as commerce, education, industry, Agricultural production area. 

etc. and due to more expanded and 

intensified tourism activities. Better 

employment opportunities, potential 

for higher income for its residents. 

Higher l_evenue collections from real 


part of the LGU. 

Additional income from payment of 

water from other BLIST 


Market for agricultural products 

leading to higher income. 

Tuba Road development. Provide water source. 

Arrangement can provide • Land fo/- residential, institutional, 

opportunity for local government to commercial, industAal purposes. 

determine resource utilization and set 

appropriate user fees for the same. Tourism site.



IKJST What It Can Benefit What It C_m Share/Prevbie 

Additional income from payment of Agricultural production area. 

water used by other BLIST 


Possible area for landfill. 

Local economy more developed due 

to relocation of certainfunction such 

as commerce, education, industry, 

etc. and due to more expanded and 

intensified tourism activities. Better 

employment opportunities and 

potential for higher income for its 

residents. 

Higher revenue collections from real 


part of the LGU. 

Market for agricultural products 

..... leading to higher income. 

Basic source: Documentation of various municipal public consultations on BDUPP, 1994 and 

inputs from NEDA-CAR Technical Staff. 

expected to come from the dominant city because it has the greatest 

stake in the arrangement and is usually regarded as the "big brother" 

to other LGUs. Also, the other municipalities are ethically constrained 

to make the first move because they are structurally under the 

provincial government. Even though Baguio City admittedly has the 

largest stake in the arrangement in the immediate term, it is 

concerned with the sensitivities of the other municipalities. Hence, 

its initiative might be misconstrued as a move to expand its political 

power or authority given the past adverse reaction against the 

formation of Metro Baguio. On the other hand, the "little brothers" 

(adjoining municipalities), who find the urban development problems 

too enormous and complex, may prefer other agencies to handle or 

coordinate the resolution of the metropolis problems, but with their 

cooperation. The mayors of these other "little municipalities" can 

then concentrate their efforts on "doable" and "high-impacC projects 

within their political jurisdiction. 

In this particular situation, national leaders or regional 

authorities can provide the push for the creation of the needed 

management structure. There are existing models that can be


replicated in this regard. The recent establishment of the Metro Cebu 

Development Council is an example of a Regional Development 

Council (RDC) initiative. On the other hand, the Metro Naga 

Development Council is an arrangement formed by Naga City and 

the 14 municipalities in the province of Camarines Sur but only legally 

created through an executive order by the President so it can find 

funding support for its programs and projects. 

In all these options, it would, however, be unwise to adopt a 

model without understanding the socioeconomic and political context 

within which the model was proven to be workable. It is important to 

realize that the failure to operationalize the BLIST metropolitan 

arrangement is largely due to the difficulty in fostering local ownership 

of the vision for BLIST area. Until this is resolved and fully 

comprehended by all concerned, structures that will be placed even 

those originating from top leadership will not be effective and 

sustainable. 

Conclusion 

The paper has suggested the need for BLIST municipalities to 

reconsider their full support to a cooperative arrangement by 

considering the benefits to each and the support they can give to 

such cooperation. With this as the foundation, an institutional or 

management structure can be created to directly address the 

immediate and long-term urban BLIST concerns. 

The BLIST Task Force plays an important role in realizing the 

North Quad Plan and in facilitating the implementation of the BLIST 

Master Plan, given the "hiatus" of the Consultative BLIST Forum. 

Thus, it is suggested that the Task Force be retained. However, it seems 

imperative to evolve an independent structure (similar to the BLIST 

Forum) thatwill directly handle key urban issues such as water supply, 

solid waste management, transport, road development and tourism. 

This structure should likewise oversee the updating or re-planning 

of the BLIST area and coordinate, implement programs/projects. 

Given the sociopolitical dynamics in the area and in the spirit of 

decentralization, such structure must be locally led and managed. 

However, it must be clothed with sufficient powers and authority to 

equal the responsibility involved in setting up BLIST-wide policies. 

The public complaint that "talking takes too long" may be 

addressed if local government try to get organized, make agreements


more binding and translate the same into concrete actions. The BLIST 

mayors have to be the first to fully own or espouse the vision presented 

in the BLIST Master Plan and recognize the urgency to come together 

to attain greater synergy in their development efforts. 

References 

Baguio and Dagupan Urban Planning Project. 1994. Baguio (Urban 

BLIST) Main Volume, Final Report. 

Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Cordillera 

Administrative Region (DENR-CAR). n.d. Feasibility Study for 

Integrated Solid Waste Management and Development in BLIST 

Area of Cordillera Region, Diagnostic Report. 

National Economic and Development Authority. 1993. CAR Regional 

Development Plan 1993-1098.

Case Study 2 

Setting an Institutional Framework 

for Metropolitan Management: 

Metro Cebu 

Ruben G. Mer_do 

etropolitan Cebu or Metro Cebu is undoubtedly as wellknown 

domestically and internationally as Metro Manila. 

Since the early eighties, regional plans refer to Metro Cebu 

as the principal urban setdement of the Central Visayas Region 

(Region VII). Its pre-eminence over the rest of the areas in the region 

has been attributed to the following: its importance as one of the 

earliest Spanish setdements; its excellent harbor; and its central 

location both in the Cebu island and in the whole region. 

Composition and Management of Metro Cebu 

What composes Metro Cebu While the name Metro Cebu has 

been an accepted term for an extended Cebu City, its composition 

has yet to be formally defined. Various planning documents, however, 

have attempted to define the cities and municipalities constitute the 

metropolis. For instance, the Central V'tsayasRegional Project (CVRP) 

in 1983 has defined Metro Cebu as consisting of the administrative 

areas of three cities (Cebu, Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu) and the six 

municipalities (Naga, Minglanilla, Talisay, Cordowa, Consolacion and 

Lilo-an). The Metro Cebu Development Project (MCDP), which is 

the reconstituted project of the CVRP, has carried on this definition. 

The Cebu integrated Area Development Master Plan Study 

(CIADMPS) undertaken in 1994 redefines Metro Cebu based on a 

25-kilometer radius to include the municipality of Compostela. The 

recently proposed bill for the creation of the Metro Cebu 

Development Authority (MCDA) defines its composition as one with 

this metropolitan coverage. Interviews conducted with key informants 

in the region suggested the inclusion of Danao City.There are others, 

however, who, albeit unusual, defined Metro Cebu as encompassing 

the whole Cebu island.


The development of Metro Cebu has been carded out by a 

council called the Metro Cebu Planning Advisory Council (also known 

as MCC). It is chaired by the governor of the province, with the mayors 

of the three cities and six municipalities as members. The MCC is 

supported by a secretariat drawn from the regional offices of the 

Ministry of Local Government and Community Development 

(MLGCD), Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), and the National 

Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) (whose Regional 

Executive Director serves as the head). The MCC has been beset not 

only by insufficient manpower to work full-time on Metro Cebu 

planning but more importandy, by its weak authority to implement 

the decisions because city and municipal governments can elect not 

to adhere to the recommendations. The MCC thus became a shortlived 

body when the UP School of Regional Planning (SURP) 

undertook the Metro Cebu Land Use and Transport Study 

(MCLUTS), which later became the urban component of the CVRP. 

(The CVRP became the MCDP.) 

The MCDP structure took on the management of development 

activities in Metro Cebu although geared mostly on infrastructure 

provision. The MCDP, however, covers only six out of the 10 local 

government units (LGUs). Four municipalities excluded are those. 

of Liloan, Compostela, Minglanilla and Naga. 

This study is an attempt to present the metro-wide challenges 

faced by Metro Cebu in critical services and discusses the issues and 

optional management structure that can deal with these challenges. 

Metro Cebu Population and Land Characteristics _ 

There are about 1.4 million people in Metro Cebu based on 

the 1995 Census of Population and Housing. Metro Cebu's growth 

rate during the five-year intercensal period 1990 to 1995 approximates 

the national average (Table 1). Looking at the cities and municipalities 

that constitute the metropolis, one finds that except for the cities of 

Cebu and Mandaue, population growth rates registered more than 

the metropolitan average. In fact, except for the municipality of Naga, 

these areas grew more than three percent during the period. 

I For the purpose of this paper, Metro Cebu shall refer to the CIADMPS definition of 

Metro C,ebu.

Case Study:MetroCebu 195 

Table 1. Metro Cebu: Demographic 

Chamcteri_cs 

City / Population level _mCdl ra_ Land Population Density 

Mmfidimllty 1990- area 1995 

1990 ]995 1995 (sq. lun) (persons/ha) 

Cebu City 610,417 662,299 1.54 315 21 

Lapu-Lapu City 146,194 173,744 3.29 58 29 

Mandaue City 180,285 194,745 1.46 25 77 

Cordova 22,331 26,613 3.34 17 15 

Consolacion 41,270 49,295 3.35 147 3 

Lfloan 42,587 50,973 3.43 52 9 

Compostela 22,006 26,499 3.04 54 4 

Talisay 97,955 120,292 3.92 86 13 

Minglanilla 50,875 62,523 3.94 66 9 

Naga 60,425 69,010 2.52 102 6 

Metro Cehu 1,274,345 1,435,903 2-$9 923 15 

Phl "lippines 60,677,725 68,616,536 2.49 300,000 229 

Source: National Statistics Office (1995). 

Table 2. Urbanization Projections for Metro Cebu 

Metro Celm in 1990 1.3 708 18 

M©wo Gclm in 2010 2.3 708 32 

Land Area with le_ erosion 

potential in Metro Cebu 2010 2.3 212 92 

Source: JICA/RDC VII (1994). 

Population density in Metro Cebu and for the areas constituting 

it is relatively low. However, because of its hilly topography, only 212 

square kilometers out of the 708 square kilometers have been assessed 

to be areas with less erosion potential (JICA/RDC VII 1994). Thus, 

rapid urbanization would bring pressure to hilly areas, which may 

lead to environmental problems such as erosion, further deforestation 

and flooding of lowland areas, in the process. Thus, the CIADMP 

study team has proposed a desirable urbanization projection for Metro 

Cebu of 2.3 million or a density of 32 persons per hectare or 92 persons 

per hectare based on the land area with less erosion potential (Table 

2). 

Current Activities in Metro Cebu 

The development of Metropolitan Cebu has been propelled 

primarily by the various regional projects implemented. Metro Cebu 

has been continuously promoted as the regional administrative and


industrial center of the Central Visayas Region and the major link 

with the rest of the Visayas and Mindanao. With the presence of an 

international port, airport and other higher-order infrastructure and 

facilities, it is most preferred as the site for a regional industrial center 

(RIC). 

I_ 

devdopment 

The MCDP in the past nine years has implemented 

infrastructure projects in Metro Cebu. These projects include the 

construction/improvement of national roads, bus terminals, and 

traific management. These infrastructure efforts aim to assist local 

government in Metro Cebu in coping with rapid urbanization as well 

as enhance these areas' potential for further economic development. 

The responsibility over the coordination and management of the 

MCDP lies with the Regional Development Council (RDC) of Region 

VII. 

Health 

and sanitation 

Cebu City, through its City Health Office, has been initiating 

various activities on health services and sanitation together with the 

other city and municipal health offices in Metro Cebu. For instance, 

some foreign-funded projects being implemented in the different 

LGUs require each LGU to prepare and submit its work and financial 

plan. Initially, all health officers representing each LGU meet 

beforehand to discuss how best to synchronize their efforts so that 

complementarities are achieved and duplication or inconsistencies 

are avoided in the implementation of the project. This applies to the 

purchase of health equipment and other facilities. Such mechanism 

for joint planning has been established with the initiative and 

leadership of the Cebu City Health Officer. 

Potentials for Cooperation 

Sol/d waste ma_ 

In the absence of data for other areas in Metro Cebu, Table 3 

presents a picture of the quantity of solid waste generated in Cebu 

City alone. CIADMP study revealed that a significant volume of 

garbage remains uncollected. Household and industries continue to 

dump their garbage along the main streets as well as in many rivers 

and creeks.

Case Study:MetroCebu 197 

Table 3. Quantity of Solid Waste in Cebu City 

1991 1992 1993 

Average solid waste 

Generation (tons/day) 363.1 

Total solid waste 

Collection (1000 cu. m) 309.53 343.19 

Average solid waste 

colloclion per.day (cu. m/day) 775.0 859.91 953.31 

Source: J'[CA/RIX_ VII (1994), 

Garbage disposal in the metro area is a growing problem as 

garbage collection. The absence of a sanitary landfill for the 

metropolis' garbage provides some health risk as open dumping can 

increase the risk of disease outbreak or lead to an epidemic. Moreover, 

water-borne diseases may be caused by continued disposal of garbage 

near water systems such as rivers and creek. Sanitary landfill 

investment, however, is admittedly huge and so is maintaining its 

operation. Considering the land and money involved to develop and 

maintain a landfill site, this cannot be undertaken by one local 

government unit. Economies of scale can be realized in this regard 

through an inter-LGU cooperation. 

Tra 

In Metro Cebu, transport and traffic management is one of the 

priority concerns. Although its traffic situation may not be as severe 

as in Metro Manila, Metro Cebu is confronted with traffic congestion 

especially in its major road sections. If the existing situation is not 

improved (i.e., unless new road constructions and/or road expansions 

are undertaken in the future), aU of these areas will be totally clogged 

with road users by the year 2000. 

Table 4 shows past and future traffic demand and how this 

translates in selected road sections of MetroCebu. Metro Cebu's traffic 

demand will continue to experience rapid growth of over 3 percent 

in the millenium. By then, its major roads would have gone beyond 

their full capacity as revealed by the computed congestion ratios. 

Traffic management and engineering as well as road 

development in the metropoliswill need a strong cooperation among 

LGUs. The challenge also applies to the provision of railway transport 

and reorganization of routes of various existing public transport 

modes.


Table 4. Past and Future Traffic Demand in Metro Cebu, 1979-2010 

1979 1992 2000 2010 

Person trips (000) 

Private 111 347 583 901 

Public 1029 1346 1728 2309 

Total 1139 1695 2311 3210 

Annual growth rate 3.05 3.89 3.29 

Selected sections 

(person trips in 000) 

Talisay_-.ebu 35 61 85 

Cebu-Mandaue 51 110 159 

Mandaue-Consolacion 25 55 82 

Mactan-Mainland 17 36 58 

Road congestion ratio 

Talisay-Cebu 1.18 2.03 2.83 

Cebu_Mandaue 0.64 1.38 1.99 

Mandaue-Consolacion 1.25 2.75 ' 4.10 

Mactan-Mainland 0.86 1.8 2.90 

Assumptions 

Population (000) 1,274 1,712 2,301 

Trip maker (000) 956 1,284 1,726 

Trip rate per trip maker 1.68 1.8 1.86 

Private vehicles (000) 65 110 170 

Source:JICA/RDC VII (1994). 

Water su_/y d/st__ 

As early as 1975, a metropolitan organization has been formed 

to develop and manage water supply and distribution in Metro Cebum 

the Metro Cebu Water District (MCqArD).The MCWD is tasked to 

plan, design, construct, operate and maintain water works within areas 

of Metro Cebu, namely, Cebu City, Talisay, Compostela, Liloan, 

Consolacion, Mandaue City and Lapu-Lapu City. Funding is sourced 

through the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). 

Recent studies (JICA/RDC VII 1994; David et al. 1998) show 

that the water supply capacity of the MCWD at present isnot sufficient 

for the growing number of urban population in the metropolis. Table 

5 provides a picture of the current shortfall and the projected demand 

and supply of urban water up to the year 2020 based on the identified 

water projects during the period, especially the operation of the 

Lusaran Dam. 

The challenge for Metro Cebu, therefore, is how it will formulate 

a long-term solution to the current and future water supply problem. 

This will mean more projects that allow the development of other 

alternative water sources, including the rehabilitation of non-

Case Study:Metro Cebu 199 

Table 5. Water Balance in Metro Cebu (in cu. m/day) 

1995 1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 

Wate¢ suppty 108,118 116,466 157,000 417,000 547,000 807,000 807,000 

257,000* 387,000* 647,000* 

Water Demand 

PIDS1 (High use 293,483 357,583 429,374 508,092 592,485 680,806 

anumpaon) 

PIDS2 (Low use 254,352 309,905 372,124 440,346 513,487 590,032 

assumption) 

aADMPS (Med. 

Ass.) 

216,374 270,501 331,944 406,877 

Expcrtelligence 227,744 270,662 509,999 360,067 

Electrowatt 223,540 281,794 349,469 424,543 

JICA 161,918 211,507 316,164 478,356 609,315 763,288 

Source: David et.al. (1998). 

* Without Lusaran Darn Project. 

operational dams, have to be fast-tracked. More importantly, as David 

et .al. (1998) has highlighted, there is an urgent need for a more 

integrated and holistic approach to the otherwise fragmented and 

relatively weak institutional structure that handles water resource 

management. The study also sought the resolution of current conflicts 

related to inter-LGU water transfers and intersectoral use of water 

such as the case of Compostela wellfield. 

Institutional Structure for Managing Metro Cebu 

Metro Cebu's development has been carried on without a formal 

inter-local government structure. Cebu City, as the "Big Brother," has 

traditionally taken the lead in many respects and since the 

reorganization of the Regional Development Council (RDC) in the 

region, the concerns of the metropolis has been addressed especially 

with the implementation of the MCDE 

Lately, there has been a stronger call for the establishment of a 

permanent body that will look closely at the various needs of the 

metropolis beyond the infrastructure needs already addressed by the 

MCDP. 

M0ot/t.. 

In 1998, a bill creating a Metropolitan Cebu Development 

Authority (MCDA) has been filed in Congress. The proposal is almost

200 ManagingUrbanization Undera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

the replica of the MMDA as far as functions, responsibilities and 

organizational structure are concerned. The only differences are that 

MCDA is not under the Office of the President and the Chairman 

will be elected annually from among the members of the council. In 

contrast, the MMDA's chairman is a presidential appointee. 

Interestingly, however, the MCDA general manager and the assistant 

general managers shall be appointed by the president. In addition, 

the Chairman is vested the rank, fights and privileges of a cabinet 

member--in effect making him part of the presidential cabinet. 

Because of political complexities in the region, the proposed bill has 

waylaid and the call for its passage was received poorly. 

Metropolitan council 

Triggered by the end of the MCDP and the absence of a 

coordinating body to plan, implement and monitor metro-wide 

programs and projects, the RDC passed a resolution on ] 2 December 

1997, approving the creation of a Metro Cebu Development Council 

(MCDC). 

The MCDC shall be the coordinating body that will deal with 

the priorities of the metropolis, including garbage disposal, traffic 

management, power, water, mass transportation, peace and order, and 

maintenance of basic urban infrastructure. 

The MCDC shall be composed of the governor of Cebu, the 

mayors of the cities of Cebu, Mandaue and Lapu-lapu and the mayors 

of the municipalities of Compostela; Liloan, Consolacion, Cordova, 

Minglanilla,Talisay and Naga. The former MCDP office project 

director has been designated as the MCDC executive director, and 

fund balances, records, equipment and facilities of the MCDP Office 

will be turned over to the MCDC. 

The operationalization of the newly created MCDC, however, is 

yet to happen. The RDC Secretariat, which is the NEDA Regional 

Office in Central Visayas, has been tasked "to prepare the necessary 

documents and conduct consultations with concerned LGUs and 

agencies for the orderly and immediate implementation of the 

resolution." 

One of the most important tasks this new metropolitan organization 

could initially take on is to clearly define its authority, delineate 

the roles and clarify the expectations of the various actors that 

would be involved in addressing Metro Cebu's development priori-

Case Study:Metro Cebu 201 

des. There are two levels of coordination that must be addressed. 

First is the structural relationship and second the functional relationship 

of these various institutions. 

With respect to the structural relationship, two levels of coordination 

must be clarified: vertical and horizontal. 

Vertical coordination refers to how the MCDC shall relate with 

the regional institutions especially the RDC. Will the MCDC be under 

the direct supervision of"the RDC or can it act independendy 

Can it deal directly with national government agencies, private groups 

or foreign institutions What are and how far can the MCDC exert its 

power and authority considering that it is a body created by the RDC 

What does the term "coordinate _ mean in operational terms in the 

aspect of project development planning, implementation and monitoting 

Horizontal coordination refers to how the MCDC shall deal with 

government agencies, NGOs, private sector and business groups. No 

mention was made on how these groups will participate in the MCDC 

as the composition of the MCDC is purely interlocal government 

based. In terms of the member-LGUs, how leadership will be determined 

would be an important Consideration. Will there be an incumbency 

issue in the leadership of the MCDC and the RDC 

On functional relationship, one needs to look at the mandate 

and responsibilities of existing institutions in the regions regarding 

provision of urban services in the metropolis. There might be a need 

to identify which ones MCDC will take on so that all parties concerned 

can assist each other and avoid or reduce an overlap in functions, 

Once they have looked at how their roles and functions are and can 

be delineated, the next step is to discuss and come up with a consensus 

on how to go about defining their roles further. 

Conclusion 

The creation of the MCDC by the RDC can be considered as 

the first big step toward a more focused approach to Metro Cebu's 

development in almost 20 years. Defining the composition of Metro 

Cebu is not direct but implicit in the participating areas of the MCDC. 

It is not surprising that in the future, the composition will expand to 

other areas. But first, it has to start somewhere and the 10 local areas 

in the inner core may provide the impetus for such growth and expansion.


The success of Metro Cebu rests primarily on how well the 

various development actors cooperate and work togethor. The 

initiative of the RDC to create the MCDC may be the initial step toward 

instituting a collaborative system among government agencies, LGUs 

and the other development sectors. 

References 

David, C.C., A.B. Inocencio, EM. Largo and E.L. Walag. 1998. The 

Case of Policy and Institutional Reforms in Metro Cebu. Paper 

presented at the Workshop on Urban Water Issues in Metro 

Cebu, Cebu City. 

House of Representatives. 1996. House Bill No. 1316 (Introduced'by 

Rep. Raul V. del Mar). An Act Creating Metropolitan Cebu, 

Establishing the Metropolitan Cebu Development Authority, 

Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefore 

and for Other Purposes. 

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)/Regional 

Development Council (RDC) VII. 1994. The Study on the Cebh 

Integrated Area Development Master Plan (CIADMP). 

Metropolitan Cebu Development Project Office. 1995. Final Report 

on Metro Cebu Development Project, Phase I. 

Regional Development Council - Central Visayas Region. 1994. 

Regional Physical Framework Plan. 

. 1996. Updated Central Visayas Regional Development 

Plan 1996-1998. 

.1997. RDC Resolution No. 117: A Resolution Approving 

the Creation of a Metro Cebu Development Council. 

Republic of the Philippines. 1992. Central Visayas Regional 

Development Plan 1993-1998. 

World Bank. 1979. Development Strategy and Investment Priorities 

for the Central Visayas. Working Paper.

Case Study 3 

Providinga Metropolitan 

Perspectiveto Development 

Planning:Cagayande Oro 

Ruben G. Mercado and Cas/m/m 

E/kdandra 

agayan de Oro (CDO) is the regional capital of Northern 

Mindanao and considered the primary gateway to the rest of 

the Mindanao region s. As a port city, it is a transhipment hub 

and economically linked with other port cities of the country. With a 

population of over 400,000 people occupying mostly the urban 

portion of its 469 square kilometer area, the city's socioeconomic 

and political influence extends to another 400,000 people sparsely 

distributed in almost 5,400 square kilometers of the provinces of 

Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental. It will not be long before CDO 

develops into one of the bustling metropolises in the country. 

The perceived emergence of a metropolis with CDO as the core 

city led to the conceptualization of the Metro CDO Special 

Development Project (MCSDP) in 1990. With the joint leadership of 

the Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Chambers of Commerce and Industry and 

the support of Regional Development Council (RDC) X and XII, the 

MCSDP paved the way for the Czagayande Oro-Iligan Corridor Special 

Development Project (CIGSDP) in 1993. Out of the governmentprivate 

sector partnership, the CIC Master Plan and Feasibility Study 

for a CIC International Airport was born, which was completed on 

November 30, 1991. After two years of public consultation which 

• ended with the presentation and approval of the CIC Master Plan by 

the NEDABoard on September 8, 1992, Executive Order 85 was issued 

on May 5, 1993, ushering the plan's implementation. However, after 

five years of CIC investment promotion both locally and abroad, so 

much still needs to be done specially in the development of projects 

that will impact on the originally conceived Metro Cagayan de Oro. 

Authorities later realized that the Metro CDO SDP had focused 

more on the development of the infrastructure links between CDO 

and Iligan City. Thus, in 1996, a comprehensive master planning for


the Metro CDO was proposed, this time focusing more on the 

planning for Cagayan de Oro City and its immediate environs. Toward 

this end, the Cagayan de Oro government undertook preparatory 

consultations with the municipalities in Misamis Oriental, including 

Jasaan, VtUanueva, Tagoloan, Claveria, Opol, E1 Salvador, Alubujid, 

Laguindingan, Gitagum, and the municipalities in Bukidnon 

including Libona, Manolo Fortich, Talakag, Baungon, Malitbog, and 

Sumilao. These areas, together with CDO City, comprise the 

envisioned Metro CDO. Such composition was determined based on 

the areas' interdependence in watershed and water supply as well as 

infrastructure linkages for seaports, airports, and highways. The 

Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon provincial governments were also 

represented in these consultations. 

This study aims to discuss recent developments related to the 

planning of Metro CDO and to highlight areas that need greater 

emphasis and further improvements. 

Metro CDO Current Development and Prospects 

Demographic cha_ 

Almost half or 49.7 percent of the over 800,00 people in Metro 

CDO, as it is presently defined, is largely concentrated in Cagayan de 

Oro City (Table 1). The city grew at a high rate of 4.7B percent during 

the period 1990-1995. The 10-year intercensal growth rate of the city 

has been high, registering 6.5 percent in 1960-1970, 5.9 percent in 

1970-1980, and 4.0 percent in 1980-1990. 

The development activities undertaken through the years in 

terms of infrastructure support, investment generation, and the 

promotion of the city as a regional growth center, especially with the 

establishment of the country's largest industrial estate in the midseventies, 

have affected other localities, especially the municipalities 

geographically close to the city. Thus, one will note that population 

in most of these municipalities have been growing at rates of over 3 

percent during the period 1990-1995. Among these municipalities 

areJasaan, Villanueva, Tagoloan, Claveria, Opol, and El Salvador whose 

high population growth rates are attributed to the employmentgenerating 

impact of the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. 

Other areas comprising the envisioned Metro CDO are also 

expected to increase both in their population level and growth rate 

in the near future. The Northern Mindanao Regional Development

Case Study:MetroCagayan de Oro 205 

Table 1.Metro CaCayamdeOro: DemolFaphicCharacteristics 

City/ Population Level _ rate Land area Population density 

Municipality 1990 1995 1990-95 (sq. kin) (persons/ 

_q.k=) __ 

Cagayan de Oro City 

MJmmisOriental 

339,598 428,314 4.75 469.30 913 

1. Tagoloan 33,919 40,929 3.83 117.73 348 

2. Vfllanucva 17,122 21,310 4.47 48.80 437 

3. Claveria 31,130 39,020 4.62 894.90 44 

4. ja,_,q 29,146 33,598 2.88 77.02 436 

5. Opol 20,473 23,958 3.19 80.85 296 

6. El Salvador 26,721 31,500 3.34 87.13 362 

7. Alubijid 19,531 21,765 2.19 103.45 210 

8. Laguindingan 15,503 16,521 1.28 16.74 987 

9. Gitagum 10,994 11,327 0.60 43.40 261 

Bukidnon 

1. Libona 29,652 31,897 1.47 343.20 93 

2. Manolo Fortich 61,329 67,400 1.91 405.19 166 

3. Talakag 35,379 39,378 2.16 186.40 211 

4. Baungon 19,774 22,617 2.72 245.30 92 

5. Malithog 14,934 16,414 1.91 581.85 28 

6. Sumilao 13,494 15,640 3.0 196.95 79 

Metro Cagayande Oro 718,699 861,588 3.69 3,898.21 221 

Metro Manila 7,929,867 9,454,040 $.58 633.21 14,930 

pl'n".'Bplfil_ 60,677,725 68,616,556 2.49 300,000.00 229 

Source: National Statistics Office (1995). 

Plan for the 21= Century identified three major events that will shape 

the future of CDO City and its surroundings. These are the 

construction of an international standard airport in Laguindingan, 

expansion and upgrading of the CDO port, and development of the 

PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate in Tagoloan and Jasaan where an 

integrated steel mill will be put up. The implementation of these 

flagship programs will boost economic growth and attract movement 

of people into these areas. 

Land use deve_ 

Cagayan de Oro 1 is the first city in the country to have a zoning 

plan. Guided by the 1962 zone plan, its growth further accelerated 

lCagayan de Oro became a chartered city on June 15,1950 during the term of President 

E. Quirino. Among the five cities studied in the mid-sixties under the Regional Cities 

Development Project (RCDP), Cagayan de Oro was considered as one of the best planned 

cities in the country, owing to its first Land Use/Zoning Plafi dating back to 1962.

206 ManagingUrbanizationUndera Dec,entralizedGovernanceFramework 

when it became the regional capital (in 1972) of Northern Mindanao. 

The region was originally composed of 10 provinces and nine cities. 

The composition was reduced to seven provinces and seven cities when 

Region XII was created in 1976. When Region XIII (CARAGA) was 

established in 1994, the composition was further brought down to 

only four provinces and six cities. Despite the reduction in the region's 

geographic size, Cagayan de Oro's socioeconomic influence continues 

to extend even beyond these areas. 

In 1986, the city's agriculture, pasture and forestlands accounted 

for 91.5 percent of the total land area. At present, it is down to less 

than 82 percent (including open spaces). Almost 60 percent of 

agricultural lands (37 percent of total) are devoted to corn and 

coconut, while some 30 percent are aUoted to banana, rice, and 

cassava. The remaining 10 percent are used to grow abaca, root crops, 

and vegetables. 

While builtup areas then was only 8.5 percent, it is now a little 

over 18 percent and still growing. Residential districts/areas alone 

increased from 4 percent to 12.4 percent in just a decade (Table 2). 

The central business district (CBD), which includes commercial and 

institutional areas, parks and plazas; accounts for a little over 4 percent, 

while the industrial area is just about 2 percent. 

The full development of the Phividec Industrial Estate-Misamis 

Oriental (PIE-MO) and the strategically located mini-industrial parks/ 

estates will impact on the overall development of the corridor, 

including the hinter areas, which should by then be reached through 

farm-to-market and bypass roads. 

CDO: Mindanao's transhi_ hub 

Cagayan de Oro City, while being primarily agricultural, has 

become one of the important commercial centers not only for 

Mindanao but also for the Philippines owing to its strategic location 

as a port city. The city's international seaport and trunkline airport 

facilitate the flow of people and cargoes from the Visayas and Luzon 

to all points in Mindanao and vice versa. This is through a network of 

highways originating from the Agora station, a five-minute drive from 

the seaport and 20 minutes from the airport. 

Foreign ships unload and pick up cargoes coming from as far 

south as Davao City. Luxury liners, waterjets and passenger-cargo boats 

ply the Cagayan de Oro-Manfla route (via Cebu, Iloilo or Bohol) almost

Case Study:Metro Cagayande Oro 207 

Table2. Exi_ L_d Uses 

LandUse_ 1986 1996 

Agriculture 37.0 

Pasture 38.0 

Forestlands 14.0 

Wetlands and miscellsneous 9.5 

Bvdltup m-eas 8._ lg.t l, % 

Residential 

._:.1 

Others 

4. _: 

Institutional, parkBand 

plazaJ and commerciat 

_,0_ 

Residential 

_,_.38 

Tetel 100,0 % I_,.0% 

Source:CAtyPlanningand Development Office,C_gaya_ d¢ 0__ City, 

Table $. PassmgerandCargoTra_ 

attheCI)O-PMO andAirport 

1995 1996 1997 

== paperer __..C._'gO Passenger Cargo Pas_nger C_,go 

r - .... 

CDO- 

PMO* ,_,I_7,68_ 4,085,281 mt 2,147,787 4,B29,517 mt 2,748.777 4,385,351 _r_t 

Airport 324,442 8,263 mt 85S,872 9,093 mt 516.571 9,[29 mt 

Total _4_1,124 4=_09&_144mt 2_i01,659 4.q29,610 mt 3_65,348 4,$94,480 mt 

Annual Growth Rate (1995-97) 14.7% 3.6% 

* CDO-PMO covers the parts of CDO, Misamis Oriental .and Camiguin. 

Sources: Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Region X;, Air Traffic Office (ATO) Region X. 

daily. Moreover, owing to Cagayan de Oro's long-standing trade links 

with Cebu, the Cagayan de Oro_ebu route has the heaviest traffic as 

may be gauged by the two-to-three passenger cargo and waterjet trips 

taken daffy by four of the country's major shipping companies (WGA 

Ferries, Sulpicio Lines, Tram-Asia, and Negros Navigation). A random 

interview with arrivees confirms that final destination is Cagayan de 

Oro and including Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao, Davao, and even 

Cotabato and Zamboanga. During the last three years, the passenger


and cargo traffic rose by 14.7 and 3.6 percent, respectively (Table 3). 

The Agora bus stadon is filled with passengers to/from all major 

centers in Mindanao, specially the Cagayan de Oro-Bukidnon-Davao 

route, 24 hours of the day. On the other hand, the Cagayan de Oro 

trunldine airport serves the needs of the Cagayan-Iligan Corridor as 

well as the provinces of ARMM and Region XII. The airport is served 

by four airline companies (Philippine Airlines, Cebu Pacific Air,Grand 

Air, and Mindanao Express). 

Econom_ andfinan¢4_ acc/_t/es 

From the 1989 Survey of Establishments by the Department of 

Trade and Industry, 14 percent or 8,312 of business firms in Northern 

Mindanao (the old Region 10) were located in Cagayan de Oro City. 

About two-thirds of the total were trading firms; almost one-fourth 

were service establishments; and the remaining 10 percent, 

manufacturing and agribusiness (Table 4). 

Cagayan de Oro serves as the commercial center of Northern 

Mindanao. It trades in consumer goods, construction materials, 

hardware and auto supplies, and agricultural products, most of which 

are produced in the region.Its dominant industries are food 

processing, furniture and metalworks. Agribusiness largely constitutes 

livestock and poultry, and fruits/crops production and processing. 

Cagayan de Oro is likewise the financial capital of Region 1.0 

and nearby areas. In anticipation of more growth in commerce and 

industry, especially along the corridor, banks and financial institutions 

have converged phenomenally in the regional capital. More than 60 

bank-branches, 200 or more financial institutions, including 

pawnshops have located in the city. Many of the banks provide regional 

banking services with broader authority to act with dispatch on major 

Table 4. Types of Busin_-ssEstablishments 

Sea_ Number %Share 

Txading 5,486 66+0 

Service 2,070 _4.9 

Manufacturing andAgrilmsiness 756 9.1 

Total 8,312 100.00


financing and credit decisions involving domestic and foreign 

transactions. The frenzy of activities within the Metro Cagayan de 

Oro and its influence areas paves the way for specialized credits such 

as Quedan financing, International Guarantee Loan Fund (IGLF), 

integrated rural financing, including Barangay Credit Guarantee 

Schemes. The government likewise offers regional development funds 

for agribusiness, small and medium enterprises, schools and hospitals 

as well as special development financing for strategic sectors such as 

transportation and communication, power and other utilities, on a 

long-term basis. The other service subsectors are those that are 

supportive of tourism like hotels and restaurants, travel agencies, renta-car 

services, tailoring, and recreation parlors. Warehousing, trucking 

service, and auto repair shops are located in strategic places. 

Flagship pr_ects 

As have been mentioned in the preceding sections, the Northern 

Mindanao Plan for the 21 _tcentury (RDP21) identified three major 

events that will shape the future of Metro Cagayan de Oro and its 

surroundings. These are: (1) the construction of the CIC international 

standard airport in Laguindingan; (2) the expansion/upgrading of 

•the Cagayan de Oro Port or the establishment of a Cargo port at the 

PIE-MO, the country's largest industrial estate; and (3) the setting 

up of the Integrated Steel Mill (ISM) at the PIE-MO. 

The first two will further enhance Metro Cagayan de Oro as a 

major transshipment hub of Mindanao. The CIC airport will likewise 

hasten the construction of by-pass/farm-to-market roads (1) to 

decongest traffic along the existing highway; (2) to facilitate 

movement of people from as far as Bukidnon to this new airport; and 

(3) to open up the resource-rich areas within the hinter part of the 

corridor and bring them closer to the markets. The option of 

establishing a new commercial cargo port at the PIE-MO will shorten 

travel time coming all the way from Davao. Most importantly, it will 

lessen the tm_c in the city proper (i.e., should the traffic of the cargo 

component of the port service be re-directed.). 

The establishment of an integrated steel mill at PIE-MO will 

induce both upstream and steel metal-based downstream industries, 

enhancing the full development of the PIE-MO, including SMEs.


Agricultural development could also be hastened with the 

manuihcture of appropriate farm tools and implements. Thereafter, 

farmers will be motivated to achieve higher productivity levels to 

ensure 'adequate inputs for processing. 

I-Ii_hways/raa&% bridges and railway 

CIC highways roads. Very essential to the development of the 

Lintedands and ren,o_: areas of the MeU'o Cagayan dc Oro and the 

corridor is a iletwol'k of improved farm-to-market roa,_ls, Both RDC 

10 and 12 have endol'aed this pcopoaal to _he Deparam'•• E:_•t of Public 

Works and Highways (DFWH) celitral o_ce. This complements the 

CIC Highway Expansion projec_ from Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to 

Tubod, Ianao del Norte, for a total length of 157 kilometers and a 

•cost of t_1.9 billion. This Higkway Expansion project is aimed not 

only to ease up the worsening traffic problem along the Iligan- 

Cagayan-Butuan roads but also to facilitate the integration of the 

corridor with other growth centers in Mindanao. 

CDO bridge& The Cagayan River, which separates the city into 

die easters and westem bay areas, is presently connected by only two 

bridges: one of an early 20th century American vintage steel bridge 

and another which is a wider Marcos-era concrete bridge. 

Considering that the airport as well as new middle- and upperclass 

subdivisions are in the western bay while the seaport, bus: station 

and shopping malls are in the eastern side, the worsened traffic 

problems can only be. solved with the construction of two more 

bzidges. The Puntod Bridge will require another access road and 

bridge across the Iponan River. This requiI_es more budget than the 

Macasandig..Upper Baiulang Bridge wkich will decongest the Upper 

Balulang trat_c running from the airport and the mushrooming 

middle- and upper-class subdivisions. Both have an initial budget of 

_zS0 million (from CDF) and _g23 million (Cagayan de Oro 

Government Budget), respectively. 

• Another bridge provides the critical gateway from the city proper 

to the country's largest industrial estate, the PIE-MO. Yhis is part of 

'_le Cagayan de Oro-Butuan backbone serving vehicles to and from 

_:_ao, Bu_uai% and Surigao ana even aU t_Teway from a:i_d_o VisaFas 

and Luzon mrough [he Lipata, Surigao Ferry Service Station. The 

bridge, which requires a prestressed concrete parallel with a capacity 

of 20-25 tons, needs a P166 million budget and targeted to be f'mished 

by2000.

Case Study: Metro Cagayan de Oro 211 

Mindanao Railway and Metro CDO/CIC-wide LRT Project. The 

entire project involves a 1,436-kilometer single railway line passing 

through major cities in Mindanao. Phase I of this project will stretch 

from Iligan City, pass through Cagayan de Oro-Bukidnon and end in 

Davao City. At least 10 local and foreign companies have reportedly 

expressed interest to form a consortium to undertake the project by 

built-operate-transfer system. While the Cagayan de Oro government 

had already signed a memorandum of agreement in 1997 with the 

Metro Cagayan de Oro LRT Project consortium for the conduct of a 

feasibility study for the construction, finance and operation of the 

Light Railway Transit system, the DOTC recommends the inclusion 

in the study of th e entire CIC stretch to ensure financial viability of 

said project. 

Telecommunications 

Metro Cagayan de Oro now enjoys an 8.20 telephone per 100 

persons density and even the entire CIC enjoys a 5.6 densitym 

definitely higher than the national average of 4.09 in 1997. This is 

the favorable result of the deregulation of the telecommunications 

industry through EO 109, known as the Service Area Scheme. 

However, the present system still lacks interconnection lines among 

its service providers/telephone companies. 

By year 2000, a total of 222,503 lines shall have been installed 

and subscribed to in Metro Cagayan de Oro. This constitutes a 193 

percent increase over what were installed and subscribed to as of 1997 

•(Table 5). It is hoped that by then, these various telephone systems 

will have been interconnected. 

Approaches to Metro CDO Development 

A growth center perspective 

Metro CDO is presendy viewed in the context of a regional 

growth area, Lying at the central section, and identified in the 

Mindanao 2000 Development Framework Plan as the North Coast 

Economic Growth Cluster (the land mass from CARAGA in the 

Northeast to Panguil Bay in the Northwest), Metro Cagayan de Oro 

is expected to sustain its crucial role of linking and unifying this high 

potential growth cluster for both agricultural and industrial 

development. The North Coast Economic Growth Cluster with the 

Metro-Cagayan de Oro and Iligan Corridor at the center is envisioned


Table 5. Telephone Situation in Metro Cagayan de Oro 

Currently 

Installed Planned Projected Total 

Company/Service Area Lines/ Expansion (2000) 

Subscribed (1998- Number Ave. Annual 

to (1997) 2000) of Lines Growth Rate 

A. Company 

1. MISORTEL Digital (Cagayan de 10,900 38,450 49,350 65.4% 

Oro, Alubijid and Claveria) 

2. Cellular Mobile Telephones 27,311 27,311 

(CDO) 

EXTELCOM 7,897 7,897 

PILTEL 5,000 5,000 

SMART 10,000 10,000 

GLOBE TEL 1,714 1,714 

ISLACOM 2,700 - 2,700 

3.1TALTEL (NTP Tranche 1-3) 7,152 14,838 21,990 45.4% 

Phase il (Cagayan de Oro) 7,152 5,698 12,850 21.6% 

Phase IV (Misamis Oriental) 9,140 9,140 - 

4. PHILCOM (Major Telecoms) 29,280 92,553 121,833 60.8% 

C,agayan de Oro 29,280 54A62 83,742 41.9% 

Misamis Oriental 38,091 38,091 

51WEMORTELCO (Opol-Lugait) 219 219 

6. PLDT (PHIVIDEC) 1,020 780 1,800 20.8% 

B. Service Area 

I. Metro Cagayan de Oro 75,882 146,621 222,503 43.1% 

Digital 48,571 146,621 195,192 58_99% 

Cellular 27,311 27,311 

Density 8.2 telephones/100 21.5 telephones/100 

persons 

persons 

2. Lanao clel Norte/I]igan City 20,602 27,368 47,970 32.5% 

Digital 13,752 26,668 40,420 43.2% 

Analog 200 200 

4.0 telephones/100 19.2 telephones/100 

persons 

persons 

3. CIC 96,484 270,473 41.0% 

Digital 62,323 173,289 235,612 55.8% 

Cellular 33,961 700 34,661 0.7% 

,Analog 200 200 

Density 5.6 telephoneC100 21.1 telephones/100 

persons 

person 

Source: CIC-SDP PMO (1997).


to play triple roles in the next 15 years. These are: (1) as domestic 

food basket and agri-industrial exporter; (2) as the Industrial Corridor 

of Southern Philippines; and (3) as the gateway to the domestic market 

with potential for creating market niches in the Northeast Asia. 

The current Metro CDO Special Development Project aims to 

spur the growth of the Northern Mindanao region through the 

implementation of strategic infrastructure including seaports, airports, 

and highways; and promote agri-industrial activities including 

industrial estate development in CDO City and its surroundings. 

Recently, a master planning of Metro CDO is being proposed to be 

undertaken. The master plan is based on the framework of this growth 

center strategy, with the objective of producing what is essentially a 

land use plan for CDO and the 15 adjoining municipalities. This plan 

will serve as basis for amending zoning ordinances, guide land 

reclassification, and provide direction to government and private 

sectors regarding their investment decisions. 

A metropolitan perspective 

An important complementary perspective in looking at CDO 

City and the neighboring municipalities as a regional growth center 

is to view it as an emerging metropolitan settlement. Cagayan de Oro 

City is now behaving like a widely sprawling city, spreading its influence 

to nearby municipalities. It is difficult now to distinguish its boundaries 

as the differentiation between localities is already being virtually 

erased. For example, the DMPI plantation in Manolo Fortich 

(Bukidnon) and the Industrial Estate ofTagoloan-V'fllanueva (Misamis 

Oriental) are part of Cagayan de Oro City's tourism-investment 

promotion package. 

Moreover, the normative experience of a metropolis, including 

urban blight and decay in the inner core resulting from slum dwelling, 

mounting garbage, and rising criminality, are already being felt even 

at this stage. The spillover effects of urbanization, especially 

population pressures to convert agricultural land for urban uses such 

as housing and industry, are a threat to food security. Enticed by 

better income opportunities and the good life in the city, farm workers 

have abandoned their seasonal farm activities in search of the 

proverbial greener pasture but only to land in odd jobs or end up as 

beggars in the city. Thus, a paradigm shift in planning and 

management has to be looked into to be more prepared in the


immediate future in dealing with complex urban issues inherent in a 

metropolis. 

Metropolitan Concerns in the CDO Area 

Current urban concerns that transcend local boundaries and 

assume a metropolitan character have been identified by regional 

and local officials in the region's development plan for the next 

century. These include water supply and distribution, solid waste 

management, and transport and traffic management. 

Water supp/y and d/str/bu6on 

In the city proper, water is not yet a problem, what with a density 

of 13 persons to a Level III facility or 9 persons per combined Level II 

and Level III facility. However, the adjoining municipalities of the 

Metro Cagayan de Oro are still partly served by Levels I and II facilities. 

One municipality each of Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are largely 

served only by Level I facility (Table 6). 

Although the water supply may not yet be a critical problem, 

there is a growing concern over the existing uneven water distribution 

among households in various LGUs. Such is attributed to the 

increasing rate of population primarily due to in-migration and the 

entry of new industries. There are ample evidences that the per capita 

cost of developing an effective and efficient water distribution system 

across municipalities is lesser if done in an integrated fashion. Thus, 

the master plan for Metro Cagayan de Oro must consider a water 

distribution and management program that is integrated and holistic. 

Need for improved solid waste rna_ 

One of the thorniest issues confronting highly urbanized cities 

concerns solid waste management. As pointed out in the region's 

physical framework plan (RPFP, 1995-2025), the indiscriminate 

disposal of wastes by households, institutions and industries into 

waterways and water bodies (lagoons, rivers and seas) causes water 

pollution of major water sources for domestic and industrial/ 

commercial uses. 

Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), both 

waste collection and disposal are now a responsibility of the LGUs. 

For most LGUs, waste collection is presently managed effectively. 

However, for some, waste disposal is a major problem, particularly 

with regard to the choice of a landfill site where pollution effects will

Case Study:Metro Cagayan de Oro 215 

not spill over to the nearby LGU. For instance, Tagoloan's landfill 

•lies along the precipice of a highway boundary leading to Malitbog, 

Bukidnon, where the wastes are eventually scattered in a nearby creek 

(Malitbog side). Another difficulty usually faced by the LGUs is the 

costly establishment and maintenance of a landfill site or an 

incineradon facility. Discussions among municipalities will ensure a 

workable arrangement especially concerning the issue of landfill site 

identification, waste recycling program that can be jointly 

implemented by a cluster of LGUs and arrangement relative to cost 

sharing and management. 

Worsening traffic 

As in other highly urbanized cities, traffic congestion in CDO is 

becoming a serious problem. Most of the work establishments in the 

city have adopted a "flexi-time" work schedule due to the 

unpredictability of the road traffic. This is blamed on the tremendous 

increase in the number of vehicles. Heavy traffic occurs in the 

intersections fronting the City Hall and after the Carmen Bridge 

leading to the Cagayan de Oro international Airport, the JR Borja 

Hospital, and the Carmen market; and the crossing in front of the 

malls/commercial complexes, especially those leading to the Agora 

Market and the Cagayan de Oro port. The worst traffic happens within 

the one-kilometer stretch where one goes through six choke points 

from the Ororama Megamall to the Licoan (leading to the Cagayan 

de Oro port or the Divisoria.), and the intersection at the western 

end of the Marcos bridge. 

The increased economic linkages between the eastern and 

western bay areas and the surrounding municipalities/cities on both 

sides have increased the mobility of both people and goods. Strategic 

infrastructure development, including road widening, construction 

of two more bridges, and installation of a metro rail transit, will help 

decongest the traffic not only within the Metro CDO area. It will 

help the Cagayanqligan and the Cagayan-Bukidnon-Davao corridors 

as well. A more purposive coordination among the concerned 

provinces, cities, and municipalities will further improve traffic 

management. 

Metro CDO Planning and Governance 

Both the opportunities and challenges that transcend 

geopolitical boundaries have implications on the planning of an


Table 6. Water Supply Facilities, 1996 

Number of Facilities by Level Potential 

Population Level I Level n Level Eli Sources 

Cagayan de Oro 427,627 0 31 46,519 

Tagoloan 42,543 859 173 2,469 Rosario _pring 

Villanueva 23,080 142 10 2,957 Imelda spring 

Jasaan 36,251 116 70 3,840 springs* 

Oaveria 37,021 166 96 526 Mat-i spring 

Opol 20,473 122 7 590 spring 

E1Salvador 26,946 136 99 155 Deepwell 

Alubijid 22,265 565 201 415 spring 

Laguindingan 17,677 58 125 514 spring 

Gitagum 12,231 62 96 471 spring 

Libona 31,821 258 32 1,923 Sil-ipon spring 

Manolo For rich 70,331 65 172 4,023 

Talakag 38,719 39 10 362 

Baungon 22,655 716 55 179 Pat-pat spring 

Malitbog 17,044 27 84 288 spring 

Sumilao 13,378 56 69 350 Lupiagan 

spring 

Total 860,062 3,387 1,330 6_,581 

*Napapong, Dagulos, Inlomayang 

Level I - Deepwells, shallow wells, spring development 

Level II - Community faucets 

Level III- Individual faucets 

Source: Schema Konsult, Inc, (1996). 

emerging metropolis. Individually, LGUs cannot efficiently and 

effectively handle the type and magnitude of concerns and services 

that have spilled over effects on the nearby LGUs. Traditional urban 

planning approaches confined to a single political unit would have to 

give way to a metropolitan planning and governance system whose 

concerns transcend the LGUs'. 

LGU Preferences on the Sharing Pattern of Urban-Related 

Activities and Service Delivery 

Majority of LGUs have expressed their desire and willingness " 

to collaborate with the Metro Cagayan de Oro in undertaking the 

following: 

Planning activities 80% 

Delivery of public health services, along with 

hospital grants and ambulance services - 80% 

Pofice and fire protection 67% 

Housing and resettlement 60%

Case Study: MetroCagayande Oro 217 

Public transport: 

Infra and traffic management - 60% 

Garbage collection, recycling and disposal - 53% 

The LGUs also recognize the need to collaborate with line agencies 

and/or the private sector in the following areas: 

Planning - 53% 

Health - 47% 

Housing - 47% 

The institutional mechanism should not create unhealthy 

competition among implementing agencies/LGU/NGOs. The members 

of the Metro Cagayan de Oro governing body must complement and 

collaborate for greater results.Any unabated conflict between and among 

member LGUs agencies or NGOs can be dysfunctional to the entire 

system and impede the progress of the metropolis. Rather, the 

mechanism should serve as a means to cut red tapes and enable the 

community to participate in the decisionmaking process. As the Metro 

Cagayan de Oro progresses, the existing institutional mechanism would 

have to sustain the same momentum of change in the component LGUs/ 

areas of the metropolis. 

The LGUs are willing to cooperate with NGOs and the private 

sector on two areas, namely: 

a) Garbage collection and disposal/recycling - 40% 

b) Housing and resettlement - 40% 

Only a few favor the idea of Metro Cagayan de Oro to solely 

undertake the following development activities: 

a) Transport 40% 

b) Garbage collection and disposal 20% 

c) Housing and resettlement - 20% 

On the question of what activities are for LGU undertaldng 

the results are as follows: 

only 

Licensing and inspection 80% 

Finance and taxation - 73%


Planning, particularly land use 

planning and zoning - 67% 

Housing and resettlement - 67% 

Garbage collection/disposal - 53% 

Health services - 53% 

Police and fire protection - 53% 

Public transport 40% 

The LGUs' response shows their eagerness to undertake by 

themselves manyofthe important activities or to provide services over 

which they would want direct responsibility. However, they are ready 

or willing to collaborate with Metro Cagayan de Oro, line agencies 

and NGOs in many of these concerns. In fact, some expressed their 

impatience at the slow process of "metropolitanizing" that hampers 

their being able to deliver better and higher levels of facilities and 

services. 

The installation of an institutional mechanism for metropolitan 

governance within Metro Cagayan de Oro is a unique challenge in 

itself. The models in Mindanao are those of the Area Development 

Board of SOCSARGEN and the CIC Steering Committee of the CIS- 

SDE These institutions operate as coordinative mechanisms that can 

provide a forum not only to coordinate the broad concerns of" 

development but also to facilitate the implementation of inter-agency/ 

inter-LGU projects as well, They also provide the mechanism for 

encouraging participation and support of national agencies, LGUs 

and NGOs, and the private sector. 

Ex-i_'ng/poten6al barriers to Metro CDO 

The LGUs were candid in pointing out some critical barriers to 

metropolitanization: 

No-xlzLnvolvement of the provincial governmext_s_i.n the 

organt px 

The support of the provincial governments is crucial to the 

smooth functioning and enjoyment of mutual benefits. However, the 

initial reluctance of the provincial government of Bukidnon stems 

from the unclear delineation of what type of development will happen 

in the participating LGUs. Moreover, there is an emerging fear of 

losing its municipal constituents once these political units join Metro 

Cagayan de Oro.


Once the momentum is established, the second task is to undertake 

a meaningful master plan for Metro Cagayan de Oro, which shall 

proceed from a comprehensive review and analysis of human 

resources, natural endowments, economic advantages and 

opportunities as well as sociopolitical institutions. By reviewing what 

it has, Metro Cagayan de Oro will be able to define its power base. 

This will serve as the benchmark for framing doable initiatives that 

can respond to the complex challenges and concerns of an emerging 

metropolis. 

How policymakers regard the area would have implications not 

only on the concerns from which development programs shall be based 

on but also on the institutional mechanism that will be established to 

address the formidable tasks at hand. It is thus important to clearly 

distinguish the perspectives on Metro Cagayan de Oro as a geographical 

subject for developmenL Taken as a regional growth area, Metro Cagayan 

de Oro can be seen as a strategic area for locating major infrastrucutral 

and capital investment that will set the stage for its economic growth. 

Seen as a metropolis, more attention can be provided to the challenges 

of Metro Cagayan de Oro that would have to be addressed, which are 

unique to such form of an urban area. 

References 

CIG-PMO (Cagayan de Oro-Iligan Project Management Office). 1997. 

CIC-SDP 1997 Accomplishment Report. 

CPDO City Planning and Development Office). 1997. Socio- 

Economic Profile of Cagayan de Oro City. 

DMJM International, Inc. 1995. Mindanao 2000 Development 

Framework Plan. 

NEDA-RDC X. 1995-2025 Regional Physical Framework Plan (RPFP). 

1999-2004 Regional Development Plan of the 21"tCentury 

(i DP21). 

NSO (National Statistics Office). 1995. Census of Population and 

Housing. 

Schema Konsult, Inc. 1996. Assessment of Domestic Water Supply 

and Sanitation Sector of Northern Mindanao.

Case Study 4 

Metro Naga: 

A Continuing Challengeof Local 

Autonomy and Sustainability 

Ruben G. Mercado and V/ctor B. Uba/do 

etro Naga is composed of Naga City and the surrounding 

municipalities ofBombon, Calabanga, Camaligan, Canaman, 

Gainza, Magarao, Milaor, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, Pill, 

and San Fernando. Recently, the municipalities of Bula and Ocampo 

have been included in this metropolitan composition. These 

municipalities are all in the Province of Camarines Sur. Metro Naga is 

relatively new, having been given official recognition as a metropolis 

only in 1993. 

The metropolis is located within the heart of Bicol's largest fiver 

basin area. Thus, it is dominated by a flat topography. It lies on the 

foot of Mt. Isarog where a rolling terrain may be found. The area is 

part of the traditional rice granary of Bicol. The extent of prime 

agricultural lands for rice production has become a major constraint 

in the urban expansion of the component municipalities. In addition 

to the extensive prime agricultural lands, large tracts in the metropolis 

are likewise flood-prone as these are in the lower basin area. 

Management of the Metropolis 

Under Executive Order 102, the Metro Naga Development 

Council (MNDC) has been tasked to formulate, coordinate and 

monitor programs, projects and activities in the areas composing 

Metro Naga for "the acceleration of the economic and social growth 

and development .... in coordination with the governor of the province 

of Carnarines Sur." The MNDC is composed of the mayors of the 

political units in Metro Naga plus a representative each from the 

provincial government of Camarines Sur, the departments and 

agencies represented in the National Economic and Development 

Authority (NEDA) Board, including the Department of Education,

222 ManagingUrbanization Undera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

Culture and Sports (DECS), and the Department of Social Welfare 

and Development (DSWD). Representatives from the private sector 

and nongovernment organizations comprise one-fourth of the fully 

constituted council. 

Metro Naga is one model of metropolitan arrangements created 

by virtue of local initiative and cooperation. This paper attempts to 

document Metro Naga's experience in metropolitan development 

and presents the challenges involved in the process of sustaining 

metro-wide activities in the spirit of local cooperation and autonomy. 

Demographic and Land Characteristics 

Metro Naga's population is only a little over halfa million with 

about 23 percent of it found in Naga City (Table 1). Population growth 

rate in the whole metropolis is lower than the national average but 

higher than the regional average. The population in seven component 

local government units (LGUs), including Naga City, grew at rates 

lower than the regional average. However, the rest have registered 

high growth rates, especially the municipalities of Milaor, Pili and 

San Fernando, where growth is close to or over 3 percent. The rapid 

population growth of Milaor and San Fernando may be due to their 

being receptacles of population spillover from Naga City as these areas, 

have extensive potential areas for urban expansion. This is evidenced 

by the increase in the number of residential and subdivision 

development in the area. Pili, on the other hand, is a traditional 

secondary growth center and a hub of agricultural trading activities 

especially for the Caramoan-Partido area. Recent trends indicate an 

increase in local economic activities. These factors may have served 

as a magnet for the rural population to relocate to this growth node. 

Population density in Naga City and Camaligan is relatively 

higher compared with the other areas in the metropolis. Moreover, 

the population density of Camaligan is higher as compared with that 

of Naga. Camaligan has the smallest land area but has a population 

bigger than Gainza and Bombon (where the land area is 5 and 9 

times that of Camaligan). But Camaligan's proximity to the central 

business district of Naga Citywas a major reason for the municipality's 

high urban development. It has become the primary receiver of Naga 

City's population spillover. Its attractiveness was further intensified 

with the location of the Camaligan Fishing Port complex in the 

municipality.

Case Study: Metro Naga 223 

Table1. Metro Nasa: DemographicandLand Characteristics 

CAty/ Population Level Growth Land Population 

Municipality Rate, Area Density, 1995 

1990 1995 1990-1995 (sq. km) (pentons/sq. kin) 

Naga City 115,329 126,972 1.82 84.5 1,503 

Bombon 10,874 11,739 1.44 44.2 266 

Calabanga 54,261 59,164 1.63 163.8 361 

Camaligan 15,436 17,411 2.28 4.7 3,720 

Canaman 20,298 22,732 2.14 43.3 525 

Gainza 7,095 7743 1.65 14.8 524 

Magarao 16,623 18,264 1.78 45.0 406 

Milaor 18,199 21,213 2.91 33.6 630 

Minalabac 35,922 37,574 0.85 126.1 297 

Pamplona 24,097 26,176 1.56 80.6 325 

Pasaeao 31,960 36,070 2.29 149.5 241 

Pill 52,481 61,520 3.02 126.3 487 

San Fernando 20,608 24,196 3.05 71.8 337 

Bula 48,240 54,650 2.37 151.3 361 

Ocampo 30,876 34,898 2.32 118.3 295 

Metro Naga 502,299 560,322 2.19 1,257.7 445 

Region V 3,910,001 4,325,307 1.91 17,633.4 249 

Philippines 60,679,725 6,861,6556 2.32 300,000.0 229 

H3storical Antecedents/The Metro Naga Development Program 

(MNDP) 

When shortage of oil products was experienced resulting from 

the Gulf War in 1991, Naga City and the surrounding municipalities 

worked together in resolving the issue of gas sourcing and allocation. 

This initial interlocal discussion on an immediate concern eventually 

paved the way for more interaction on other broader issues. Naga 

City spearheaded the conceptualization of a Metropolitan Naga 

Development Program (MNDP), which provided the framework for 

the development of the areas that constitute Metro Naga and the 

required organizational machinery to orchestrate such development 

activities. 

The MNDP seeks to improve the employment condition, 

agricultural production and delivery of basic services in the 

development area. With these objectives, the MNDP identified the 

roles of participating LGUs based on their resource endowments and 

comparative advantage and potentials for future cooperation. The 

process of identifying these roles is a worthy example of how local 

governments can meet and decide on issues with due consideration


to their extemal environment. Initially, these roles met stiff resistance 

from some of the LGUs specially those that perceived their assigned 

roles as minimal and running counter to their own local aspirations 

and development path. It took them a long and difficult time to come 

to termswith each other. But the general welfare of the metropolitan 

area and the realization that a holistic approach is needed to solve 

major problems and challenges confronting the metropolitan area 

eventually dawned on the local chief executives. Thus, the local chief 

executives came to agree on their identified roles, which are 

summarized in Table 2. 

Naga City and the other municipalities have been informally 

meeting to discuss how they would operationalize the strategy. Based 

on the provision of the Local Government Code, particularly in 

Section 23, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed on 23 April 

1993 wherein each member-LGU was: 

1) To formulate and implement an equitable and complementary 

development program; 

2) To establish the Metro Naga Common Fund through contributions 

of the members, which shall be no less than 2 percent 

of the LGUs' Economic Development Fund (or 2 percent 

of 20 percent of their respective internal revenue allotment 

[IRA]); 

3) To participate in the identification, preparation and implementation 

of development programs, projects and activities; 

4) To supervise, implement, assist and/or coordinate programs, 

projects and activities of the council within their respective 

territorial jurisdiction in coordination with the council; and 

5) To extend technical, resource, financial and other forms of 

assistance to member LGUs to the extent allowed by the general 

welfare of their respective constituents. 

Because of the huge financing needed to concretize the vision, 

they sought a means to access national funds. They hoped to tap some 

financial sources such as an annual subsidy from the Philippine 

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) or the Philippine 

Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). To effect this, they asked 

Malacafiang to issue an executive order creating the MNDC and 

providing funds for its programs and operations through these 

sources. Eventually, Executive Order 102 from the Office of the


Table 2. Area-Specific Roles in Metro Naga 

Resource Endowment/ Potential Development Activity/ 

City/Municipality Comparative Advantage Industry 

Naga City Modern urban facilities Center of trade, financial, 

educational and professional 

services/convention site 

Surface water in Panicuason Source of potable water 

Agriculture Auxflliary food crop supplier 

Historical sites and religious Tourism 

festivities 

Pili Airport Airlinktomajor centersof the 

country 

Trade and comlnercial center 

Bombon Rich agriculture Primary food bowl 

Presence of spring water Source of potable water 

Calabanga Rich agriculture Primary food bowl 

Fishery Source of fresh fish and processed 

fishery products and by-products 

Camaligan Modern fish port, ice plant Expansion offish processing 

and cold storage facilities industry 

Nearness to Naga City Trading activities 

Spillover of residential population 

from Naga City 

Canaman Nearness to Naga City Trading activities 

Spillover of residential population 

from Naga City 

Gainza Agriculture Auxiliary food crop supplier 

Handicraft enterprises Further development of handicraft 

industry 

Magarao Rich agriculture Primary food bowl 

Milaor Nearness to Naga City Ideal site for warehouses and bulk 

Lower tax rates storage 

Minalabac Agriculture Auxiliary food crop supplier 

Pamplona Hilly terrain idealfor grazing Gatflc and dairy industry 

Pasacao Hilly terrain ideal for grazing Cattle and dairy industry 

Port Port development to accommodate 

deep sea vessels and serve as Metro 

Naga's gateway to domestic and 

foreign market 

Fishery Source of fresh fish and processed 

fishery products 

San Fernando Hilly terrain ideal for grazing Catde and dairy industry 

Presence of spring water Source of _otable water 

Source of basic data: Mendoza (1997).


Table 3. Financial Sources of the MNDC 

LGU 

YearXSource Contributions GAA/CDF/CIA Total 

1993 539,000* 500,000** 1,039,000 

1994 600,000 2,000,000 2,600,000 

1995 No data available 0 0 

1996 100,000 4,000,000 4,100,000 

1997 500,000 5,000,000 5,500,000 

Total 1,739,000 11,500,000 13,239,000 

"Naga City's contribution is P328,000 or about 65 percent of total while the rest are divided 

among the other member-municipaiities. 

*'Released from the Office of the President as seed money for operations. 

President was issued on 18June 1993 creating the MNDC. The order 

also provided an amount of P500,000.00 from the Office of the 

President asseed money for its operations and mandated the inclusion 

of the MNDC in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the 

succeeding years in consultation with the Department of Budget and 

Management. 

From 1993 to date, member-LGUs have contributed a total of 

P1.73 million (Table 3). Due to the relatively good financial standing 

of Naga City, more than half of the contribution came from this city. 

The amount was used to finance the priority activities the council. 

lined up for the member-LGUs. The absence of a hiatus in the 

council's activities may have contributed to the LGUs' sustained 

interest in the partnership. 

The internally generated •financial resources were augmented 

by externally generated assistance, most of which are assistance from 

the national government. However, some activities such as the medical 

and health mission being held yearly were financed by the private 

sector. 

To date, the MNDC received a total of P1.5 million in assistance 

from the national government through the GAA, inclusive of the seed 

money provided in Executive Order 102. The appropriations in the 

GAA were mosdy attributed to the collective lobbying of congressmen 

from the province of Camarines Sur. The MNDC has likewise received 

a total amount of P1.73 million in contributions from the LGUs. 

Programs/Accomplishments 

As of June 1997, the Council formulated and implemented the 

following programs and projects in response to the immediate needs 

of its member-LGUs:


• Establishment of the Metro Naga Emergency Rescue Network; 

• Metro Naga Senior Citizens Program; 

• Formation of the Metro Naga Equipment Pool; 

• Metro Nag_a Enterprise Development Program; 

• Metro Naga Employment and PlacementAssistance Program; 

• Metro Naga Water Supply Enhancement Project; 

• Metro Naga Project Assistance Fund; 

• Support to Health Services; and 

• Resource/Project Accessing. 

Metro Naga Emergency Rescue Netumrk 

There was a need to pool resources for emergency use because 

out of the 14 member LGUs, only four had fire protection bureaus 

while five had ambulances. Moreover, hospitals are still concentrated 

in Naga City only. To ensure access to these facilities in times of 

emergency, an extensive radio network was installed in all mayors' 

offices, and ambulance, police and fire stations. Hand-held radios 

were also distributed to key personnel of each LGU. All Metro Nag_a 

LGUs were provided with VHF base and portable radios while all 

ambulances had mobile base radios. Completing the network were 

the VHF facilities of the Bureau of Fire Protection. Communication 

network has since formed the backbone of the Metro Naga Emergency 

Rescue Network (MNERN). It proved crucial not only in maintaining 

the coordination among member-LGUs. As the base and portable 

radios were also made available at the barangay level, the 

communication network was also crucial to the success of activities 

within each LGU. 

Some noteworthy accomplishments of the MNERN include: 

1)Conduct of annual Emergency Medical Technician 

(EMT) course for the paramedics handling the 

ambulances of the member-LGUs; 

2) Conduct of one medical mission in one barangay in 

Calabanga to check the spread of illnesses after 

Typhoon Rosing; 

3)Establishment of a coordination center among 

different emergency units of Metro Naga, particularly 

when there is a need for additional ambulance units 

or for the services of the Bureau of Fire Protection;


4)Rescue of trapped residents in flooded areas of 

Magarao and Naga City during the height of typhoons 

Monang and Posing; and 

5) Distribution of potable water to flooded areas of the 

municipalities of Minalabac, Milaor, Camaligan, 

Calabanga, Bombon and Magarao after the typhoons. 

Metro Naga Senior Citizens Program 

The program that bestowed privileges to Naga City senior 

citizens under the city's own senior citizens program was later 

extended to other senior citizens within Metro Naga. These consist 

of discounts in selected stores and establishments within the city and 

in the use of certain facilities of the city government. Upon the 

effectivity of the Senior Citizens Law, the program rationalized the 

grant of privileges to all the senior citizens within Metro Naga, 

particularly when it came to discounts on medicines. 

The program also organized the Metro Naga Senior Citizens 

League that serve as an umbrella organization of the different senior 

citizens federations within the metropolis. The league coordinated 

the activities of different federations so as to facilitate the grant of 

senior citizen privileges as well as inter-LGU senior citizens activities. 

Through the league, in cooperation with the Department of Social 

Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Camarines Sur Drugstores 

Association, a total of 13,000 medicine purchase discount booklets 

were printed and distributed to members. The league also became 

the venue for the formation of the Metro Naga Senior Citizens' 

Cooperative that now runs its own drugstore. Elderly residents in 

Metr ONaga can now avail of discounts while gaining some profit from 

their own purchase. The drugstore also drew support from the city 

government of Naga when the latter provided the site and building, 

and from the SOLCENTF, which added P200,000.00 to Metro Naga's 

working capital. 

Metro Naga Equipnwnt Pool 

One of the important MNDC projects is the pooling of 

engineering equipment for use by the MNDC-member LGUs. The 

Metro Naga Equipment Poolwas formed to give member-LGUs access 

to heavy equipment for local infrastructure projects as well as vehicles 

for transportation purposes. The MNDC assumes the maintenance 

cost of these equipment while the borrowing LGU shoulders the fuel


cost. Through this scheme, savings have been generated by the LGUs 

in their construction activities, especially in the repair of farm-tomarket 

roads. 

Equipment from the pool were utilized for the following: 

• Opening of Comaguinking Road, Calabanga 

• Opening of Tugayan-Comaguingking Road, Calabanga 

• Repair and rehabilitation of Labog-Binanwaanan Road, 

Calabanga 

* Repair and rehabilitation of various sugar roads, Pili 

° Repair and maintenance of various barangay roads, 

Pasacao 

• Repair and maintenance of various barangay roads, 

Canaman 

° Repair and maintenance of unpassable portions of the 

Naga-Gainza Road 

Metro Nabou Enterprise Deve!opnwnt Program 

This program assists rural entrepreneurs in undertaking microenterprises 

or in augmenting their working capital. Priority is given 

to disadvantaged sectors such as women and the disabled and to 

projects that utilize indigenous materials. To date, 14 organizations 

have benefited from the program. 

Metro Na_ Emp/oyment and P/acement Ass/.Cance Program 

This program aims to match the skills of the local labor pool 

with the needs for domestic and foreign enterprises. In coordination 

with the Department of Labor and Employment, the MNDC regularly 

holds annual jobs fairs. It is also into job placement and has established 

an Overseas Placement Assistance Fund using the prize it received 

from the Galing Pook Awards. The OPAF provides funds to those 

who have already secured firm employment contracts abroad and 

ensures their speedy deployment. To date, about 27 residents of 

Gainza, Magarao, Pili, Milaor, Pamplona, San Fernando and Naga City 

have been extended overseas placement assistance. 

Metro Naga Water Supply Enhancement Project 

This project was undertaken in response to the need of distant 

Metro Naga communities for clean and potable water. Under the 

program, Level I water systems are distributed to member-LGUs. To


date, about 280 units of Level I water systems have been deployed 

throughout the Metro Naga area. Each unit consists of ajetmatic or 

pitcher pump, three to four pieces of GI pipe and a bag of cement. 

Labor for the construction of the water system is provided by either 

the local government or by the beneficiary groups. Also under this 

program is the assistance extended by the MNDC to the municipal 

government of Canarnan in the expansion of its Level IIi water services 

to three barangays adjacent to the poblacion (central district). 

Metro Naga Project As_istance Fund 

As co-host of the PalarongPambansa in 1997, the council alloted 

P100,000 to each member-LGU for Palaro-related projects and 

activities. This scheme of sub_alloting the council's resources has now 

been adopted as a mechanism to augment member-LGU resources 

for other priority projects of the council. 

Support for hea/th serv/ce_ 

When the provision of health service functions were devolved 

to LGUs by the Local Government Code, many municipalities were 

unable to provide the medical supply requirements of their respective 

health centers. The little financial resources that accompanied the, 

devolved function have often been used to pay for personal services. 

Becoming aware of this predicament, the MNDC aimed to support 

this function and provided medicines to the rural health units (RHUs) 

of its member municipalities. In 1996, over P800,000 worth of generic 

drugs were purchased by the council and distributed to the members. 

To further support health services provision, the Council--in 

coordination with a foreign-based association of Bicolanos, the Bicol 

Medical Center and the Naga City Hospital-----organized a surgical 

mission primarily to address the increasing number of untreated 

surgical cases in the metro area. The council packaged the mission 

such that both professional services and pre- and post-operative 

medicines were given free to patients. A total of 127 patients were 

treated during the mission. 

Resource a_cess/ng and generat/on act/v/t/es 

The. council used its collective clout to access resources to 

finance priority development projects of member-LGUs. The 

financing of the following projects was facilitated through the council's 

intermediation: (1) construction of the Pili diversion road; (2)


construction of cut-off channel no. 3; (3) upgrading of the Naga 

•airport; (4) increased calamity assistance for member-LGUs; (5) 

reconstruction of the Calabanga municipal hall; and (6) concretizing 

of the Naga-Gainza road. 

The council also played an important role in the generation of 

additional private sector investments in the area. By projecting Pili 

and Calabanga, Pamplona and Naga City as attractive investment areas, 

the council was able to convince private investors to put up businesses 

in these areas. 

Future Plans 

To sustain the momentum 

of the MNDC initiatives, the council 

engaged in several long-term activities that include the preparation 

of a Metro-Naga Development Plan, promotion of ecozone 

development and preparation of the Mt. Isarog Watershed 

Management Program. 

Metro Naga Development Plan 

The Metro Naga Development Plan has been on the drawing 

board for quite some time now. The council's limited resources 

that could be used for planning had to be supplemented. Thus, 

the council had to explore external financing assistance in the 

early stages of this proposed activity. The council tapped a 

consortium of NGOs to access funding from the Ford Foundation. 

The consortium initially proposed to prepare a master plan for a 

pilot area that consisted of Naga City's immediate neighboring 

municipalities of Gainza, Camaligan, Milaor and Canaman. Upon 

presentation of the plan to the council, however, other member- 

LGUs began to request for their inclusion in the master planning 

activities. A revised proposal was therefore submitted by the 

consortium to the Ford Foundation. 

While waiting for a feedback from the Ford Foundation on the 

revised proposal, the council was able to access additional trading 

from the national government---enough to be able to proceed with 

the proposed master plan preparation. It first requested the National 

Economic and Development Authority Regional Office V to help 

prepare the Terms of Reference and related documents preparatory 

to the bidding and hiring ofa consultancy firm. Hopefully, they could 

start on the study on the Metro Naga Master Plan before the terms 

of existing local executives expire.


Promotion of ecozone devdopment 

The Council, in coordination with the provincial office of the 

Department of Trade and Industry, has begun laying the groundwork 

tbr the entry of an ecozone developer in Pamplona and a selfcontained 

agro-processing community in Magarao. Contacts with 

investors had been established and all possible assistance extended 

to facilitate their entry to the project. 

ML Isarog Watershed Management Program 

The council, together with various NGO groups, has been in 

the process of preparing a watershed management program for Mr. 

Isarog through the assistance of the Asian Institute of Management. 

The project is meant to protect its main source of water as well as 

mitigate the runoff of surface water that causes flash floods in the 

Bicol River Basin area. Among the participating member-LGUs are 

Pill, Magarao and Naga City. 

Key Features 

of Success 

Leadership and lon_term development vision of Mother City 

The MNDC's success was principally bolstered by the leadership 

of the mother city, Naga City. Because the city's strategy was anchored 

on long-term city development and local inter-dependency, the 

development goals had been far-sighted and had considered a 

planning perspective that went beyond political boundaries. The 

current Naga City leadership did not view its development challenges 

as something confined to the city itself. It knew that the shortage of 

space, water, migration, squatting and employment could not be 

resolved by the city alone; rather, it had to integrate the development 

factors of the surrounding areas. Its good relations with neighboring 

LGUs and ability to integrate each other's concerns helped sustain 

the development efforts. Moreover, Naga City took its role seriously 

as the Big Brother in the area by initiating programs or activities that 

helped other LGUs deliver basic services to their respective 

constituents. 

In a nutshell, Naga City's long-term view of city development, 

together with its resolve to help its neighbors and the political 

leadership to initiate cooperation, are significant hallmarks of the 

MNDC success.


De-,,topme,ven vs.poratea 

cooperation 

Naga City's MNDC is an exercise in partnership that viewed 

mayors not just as political figures but as investors in the development 

business. The solid partnership among the LGUs as well as their 

accomplishments so far are manifestations of a cooperative 

undertaking that ignores partisan considerations in favor of achieving 

development benefits. Municipal mayors acknowledged the benefits 

gained by the arrangement, most claiming to have received more 

than what they give to the partnership. This arrangement has sustained 

the interest of members-LGUs on the activities of the council. 

Resource poling and serowe 

The MNDC experience shows how it maximized the use of 

existing assets and resources. By pooling resources, either financial 

or nonfinancial, LGUs find that such could be extended to other 

government units rather than confmed to only one or few local areas. 

This combination of resources increases LGUs' capacity to d_eliver 

services and is particularly crucial for those with meager resources. 

Seriously taking on major development roles is important if 

cooperating LGUs are to have a workable and sound integrated 

development plan for their areas. This integrated plan could form 

the basis upon which individual LGUs' socioeconomic and physical 

development plans would be formulated or revised. Meanwhile, the 

roles that LGUs have agreed upon under the MNDC will serve as the 

guiding framework for the detailed master plan that will be developed 

for Metro Naga. It is opined that this master plan will be operational 

and useful than the master plans formulated by professional 

organizations or consultants that were based on formal regional 

development theories and approaches only. It is hoped that any 

consultant that would be hired would base his/her recommended 

master plan on and/or enhance the development concept and the 

area-specific roles that the MNDC has envisioned. 

Future Challenges 

The MNDC faces three major challenges hereon. First is to beef 

up its organizational machinery. Second, to address financial 

sustainability. Third, to manage the transition of leadership and sustain 

the partnership.


The first challenge stems from the MNDC's mounting 

development activities and the insufficient technical support existing. 

Management support must be expanded. Meanwhile, more 

accomplishments can be achieved and innovations introduced if 

technical planning and administrative support for MNDC are in place. 

The LGUs' contribution and national government support to 

MNDC should also be in line with any expansion of MNDC 

responsibilities in the future. The council has to be more creative in 

sourcing funds especiallywhenever the national government tightens 

its belt. 

Finally, the most critical to MNDC's sustainability is leadership. 

Given that the strength of the MNDC largely lies in its leader and the 

strong partnership forged among the current members, it is hoped 

that the current vision will continue and the development-oriented 

perspective as well as the established camaraderie of the proponentleaders 

will be carded on by whoever would be chosen to replace 

them. 

References 

Mendoza, F. 1997. Metro Naga: A Model in Integrated Area 

Development. 

Naga City Government. 1996. Annual Report 1996: Naga City. 

Naga City Mayor's Office. n.d. 

Development Council. 

A Briefing Paper on the Metro Naga

Case Study 5 

Metro Iloilo: A Struggle 

for Acceptance 

and Organization 

Ruben G. Mercado and Raul S. Anlocotan 

stablished in 1890 and located in the Western Visayas Region, 

Iloilo City is one of the oldest cities in the Philippines. Currently 

one of the major urban centers in the country, the city is densely 

populated with a small land area (56 square kilometers) and a 

population of more than 300,000 residents as of 1995. 

The burgeoning population in a small land area greatly affected 

the urban functioning of the city. Among the city's current problems 

include a domestic airport that cannot be expanded, slum dwellers 

in the city's commercial district that cannot be relocated, and solid 

wastes that cannot be properly disposed of. The easiest solution is to 

expand the city's land area. However, this is an impossible option for 

Iloilo as it is bounded in the east by Guimaras Strait, where the trench 

is steep, making reclamation improbable. Four municipalities bound 

the other sides of the city, namely, Oton in the south, San Miguel in 

the northwest, and Pavia and Leganes in the north. As such, urban 

planners are seeking viable alternative solutions that will decelerate 

urban blight. 

The creation of Metro Iloilo has been a dream of many urban 

planners and businessmen in the city. The plan involves the formation 

of a metropolitan arrangement between Iloilo City and its adjacent 

municipalities within a 15-kilometer radius. While it is difficult to 

establish how this concept was brought to the fore, some precursors 

to its formation can be identified. 

In an interview with key informants in the Western Visayas 

Region, the idea of a Metro Iloilo was first spread by a group of 

businessmen and eminent persons in Iloilo City sometime in the early 

nineties. The idea was not given much attention as the city was 

experiencing its most turbulent period. At that time, the incumbent


mayor was in the midst of a political battle with the Department of 

the Interior and Local Governments (DILG) over several suspension 

orders issued to him by the DILG. For several months, the city was 

placed under the care of the vice-mayor who eventually gained the 

mayoral post in the succeeding elections. The incessant political 

bickering in the city during the first half of the nineties severely 

constricted long-term development efforts as local officials concerned 

themselves with parochial matters. The lackadaisical attitude of the 

SangguniangPanglunsod (city council) toward long-term planning even 

aggravated the lack of coherence in the city's developmental efforts. 

In 1996, the concept was revived. Mayors of the four concerned 

local government units, namely, Iloilo City, Oton, Pavia and Leganes, 

met to identify areas of possible cooperation. These three 

municipalities and the city of Iloilo were identified to constitute 

Metropolitan lloilo. With the help of the private sector, a draft 

memorandum of agreement was prepared for the creation of the 

Metropolitan Iloilo Development Council (MIDC). For this 

cooperative undertaking to be legally binding, it has to comply with 

the requirements of the Local Government Code of 1991 which 

stipulates that a resolution stating the concurrence of the Sanggunian 

has to be passed. All the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) of 

the three municipalities, except that of Iloilo City, passed their 

respective resolution of concurrence for the creation of the MIDC. 

The implementation of the Metro Iloilo concept was stalled by 

the political stalemate between the Iloilo City mayor and the 

SangguniangPanglunsod, In refusing to pass the necessary resolution, 

the Sangguniang Panglwnsod of Iloilo argued that the memorandum 

of agreement did not pass through a process of consultation with 

concerned sectors of Iloilo City. The council alleged that the mayor 

acted on his own and without the SangguniangPanglunsodproviding 

him the mandate to undertake formal arrangements with the 

concerned municipalities. The members of the Sangguniang 

Panglunsod also alleged that it will be the city of Iloilo which will be 

carrying most of the financial burden entailed by this metropolitan 

arrangement. 

On the surface., it seems that the SangguniangPanglunsod view 

the issue as not based on substance but rather, on the process that 

went through such undertaking. However, there seems to be a deeper 

issue involved. A source commented that the memorandum of

Case Study: Metro Iloilo 237 

agreement was drafted without a technical study to back it up. There 

is, therefore, a very unclear understanding and appreciation of the 

rationale for such cooperative arrangement. 

With the preceding account as backdrop, this paper will attempt 

to present the local officials' initial thinking on the substantive aspects 

of the said cooperative undertaking. It will also try to briefly present 

the crucial steps that have to be taken to address the current dilemma. 

All of these are in line with the ultimate goal of effecting a more 

acceptable cooperative arrangement for Metro Iloilo in the context 

of the institutional and political arrangements existing in the area. 

Demographic and Land Characteristics 

Metro Iloilo, as to its initial compositional definition, has a 

population of close to half a million largely concentrated in Iloilo 

City (76.5 percent in 1995). Next to CAMADA (Metro Dagupan), 

Metro Iloilo is the smallest in terms of population and land size and 

the slowest in terms of population growth rate compared to other 

metropolitan arrangements in the country. The slow growth in 

population reflects the overall low growth rate in the whole Western 

Visayas Region attributable to the significant level of population outmigration 

(NEDA 1993). Relatively high growth rate, however, can 

be observed in Pavia in view of the designation and promotion of the 

area as a Regional Agro-Industrial Center (RAIC). 

While the present level and growth rate of the population in 

the various areas of Metro Iloilo are quite low, increased urbanization 

can be anticipated following the increased vigor to establish 

infrastructure support for the development of the RAIC and other 

industrial sites. The spadal expansion of the city to the north (to the 

municipalities of Leganes and Pavia) is supported with a 

comprehensive road network connecting Iloilo City to other points 

Table 1. Metro hollo: Population and Land Characteristics 

Area 

Population level Growth rate Land area 

1990 1995 1990-1995 (sq. kin) 

Iloilo City 309,505 334,539 1.47 56,0 

Leganes 18,505 19,235 0.83 32.2 

Pavia 23,814 26,756 2.21 35.0 

Oton 52,125 56,821 1.63 84.6 

Metro lloilo 403,909 437,351 1.59 907.8 

Source: National Statistics Office (1995).


in Panay Island. The latest of these projects is the coastal road opening 

a second link to the municipalities of Leganes and the adjoining 

municipalities of Zarraga and Dumangas in the north as well as to the 

Iloilo International Port Complex. The municipality of Leganes has 

also started a large-scale multipurpose land development that will 

establish it as an attractive industrial and residential zone. The plan 

includes a reclamation of about 200 hectares of seashore along the 

Guimaras Strait. 

Identified Areas for Cooperation 

The municipality of Pavia was identified by the Regional 

Development Council in the late eighties as the region's center for 

industrial development. Since then, infrastructure support projects 

were implemented by different government agencies to enhance the 

attractiveness of the area. In the early nineties, however, the 

municipality of Leganes, an adjoining town, started promoting itself 

as an industrial center. A grandiose plan, including schemes to reclaim 

part of the seashore to give way to an international port, an industrial 

site, and other facilities was hatched. A multinational firm indicated 

its willingness to finance the project through the build-operatetransfer 

(BOT) scheme. 

Confusion as to where the industrial site should be located 

ensued. A presidential directive instructed the Regional Development 

Council of Region VI to decide immediately which of the two 

municipalities, Pavia or Leganes, should be proclaimed as the RAIC. 

The RDC decided in favor of Pavia. Several businessmen, however, 

proposed that a cooperative scheme between Iloilo City and the 

surrounding municipalities will avoid this kind of confrontation in 

the future. They believe that collaboration rather than competition 

will provide the synergy necessary for the area's progress. 

The urgency of the matter prompted a group of well-meaning 

individuals in the city and the three concerned municipalities to 

conduct consultative meetings to push for the metropolitan concept. 

The group, in consultation with the representatives of the four 

concerned LGUs, proposed the creation of the Metropolitan Iloilo 

Development Council (MIDC), which will be composed of members 

coming from these four areas. After concurrence by the mayors of 

Iloilo City and the three concerned municipalities was received, a 

memorandum of agreement was then drafted and presented to the 

respective sanggunians.


The draft memorandum of agreement listed the following as 

the areas to be coordinated in by the proposed MIDC: 

Development planning. This refers to the "preparation of mediumand 

long-term development plans including the formulation of 

projects, investment programming, and monitoring of its 

implementation." The areas constituting Metro Iloilo, presently within 

a 15-kilometer radius, is envisioned to have a common development 

plan. If the metropolitan arrangement is found successful, the area 

can be expanded to cover the 25-kilometer radius. The plan basically 

identifies their major development roles so that complementarity of 

development goals will be assured. Moreover, land use planning will 

be more coordinated and investment planning will be more 

rationalized. For instance, the network of road system can be more 

reasonably designed and implemented if functional service roles will 

be identified (e.g., Pavia for agroindustry, Leganes for heavy industry, 

Oton as a primary residential area, and Iloilo City as the trade, 

commercial and industrial center). 

The Metro Iloilo concept is seen as a way of sharing benefits, 

especially in logistics and resources. The objective is to provide avenue 

where issues of consumer concerns can be discussed and addressed. 

An example of a possible cooperative undertaking is the water 

resources that Leganes is willing to share if a formal arrangement 

can be made with other areas. Leganes and interested investors would 

like to take advantage of the economies of scale in the development 

of the water system. According to its former mayor, Leganes has 

approximately 80 million gallons of surplus water. Several investors 

have indicated their willingness to finance the construction of water 

reservoirs and distribution systems provided there is a commitment 

from other areas to open their markets and share in the investment 

cost. 

Transport, traffw engineering and management. This encompasses 

"the formulation, coordination, design and monitoring of policies, 

standards, and programs and projects to rationalize the existing and 

proposed transport operations, infrastructure requirements with the 

end in view of integrating into a single network the roads andmajor 

thoroughfares of member local government units." 

Iloilo City is the center of trade, commerce and industry in Panay 

Island. As a trading center, the city boasts of several shopping malls 

and retail market facilities. It is also one of the major centers of higher


learning in the country, having five major universities, including the 

Visayas campus of the University of the Philippines and a number of 

tertiary schools. Iloilo City is "alsothe regional center of Western Visayas 

Region. During ordinary days (especially school days), the city's 

population bloats significantly. Considering the enormous number 

of people coming in and out of the city, there are only four exit points, 

one for each of the four adjoining municipalities. 

Worsening the city's traffic problems is the tremendous increase 

in the number of utility vehicles plying the city's major thoroughfares. 

Fueled by rising standards of living, car ownership in the city and 

surrounding municipalities rose. Unfortunately, the city, like other 

aging cides, still has streets designed to accommodate only the caretela 

and calesa. Worse, provincial buses and public vehicles have to enter 

the "city proper" (as the downtown area is called). Currently, buses 

and other public vehicles coming from the provinces of Antique, Aklan 

and Capiz have stations or terminals in the city proper. To resolve 

this, the plan calls for two bus terminals outside the city proper, one 

for southbound buses and another for northbound ones. 

A road network that will ease the ingress and egress of vehicles 

in the city is imperative. During rush hours, the four exit points are 

clogged. Collaborative arrangements can, therefore, be made to 

design a road system that will ease the traffic flow from the city's 

commercial district to other urban centers in Panay Island. To 

encourage city dwellers to reside in Oton and the adjoining 

municipalities in the south, the main road leading to southern Iloilo 

must be expanded and rehabilitated. Moreover, there is a need to 

plan a road network that will open wide tracks of land in Oton for 

residential purposes. 

A road network directly linking Oton to Leganes and Pavia 

should be carefully studied. This will enable industrial workers in Pavia 

and Leganes to commute to their residences in Oton without passing 

through the major thoroughfares of Iloilo City. Presently, commuters 

coming from the north to the south, and vice versa, will have to pass 

through Iloilo City. 

Environmental sanitation, waste management and disposal This 

involves the "formulation, coordination, design and monitoring of 

policies, standards and programs and projects for proper and sanitary 

waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and 

operation of sanitary landfill, incinerator, recycling facilities and


related facilities intended to develop an environment-friendly 

metropolitan level." 

The establishment of a common solid waste management system 

and facilities will greatly benefit many. Currently, Iloilo City is having 

difficulty in the disposal of solid waste. Residents in the Mandurriao 

district are protesting that the current disposal site is too near the 

residential areas. An alternative common solid waste disposal site 

located at the outskirts of the metropolitan area (preferably in Oton) 

will prove to be more sustainable and cost-effective. The needed 

facilities will not only be built with dispatch through sharing of costs 

but their use will also be maximized. Moreover, considering that the 

selection of a landfill site is a contentious issue, it can be worked out 

so that the host municipality will be provided disturbance 

remuneration or other forms of compensation. 

Flood control and sewerage management. This refers to "the 

formulation and implementation of policies, programs and projects 

for an integrated and comprehensive flood control system, drainage 

and sewerage." 

Like many old settlements in the Philippines, Iloilo City sprouted 

at the mouth of major rivers---the Iloilo and Jaro rivers. As transit 

point for commercial goods, Iloilo City's economy grew and 

progressed, and migrants from outlying municipalities came to reside 

in the city. The proliferation of squatter colonies especially in the 

riverbanks, took its toll on the environment. Stilt houses were built 

along riverbanks thereby constricting the rivers' flow. Moreover, 

subdivisions and residential houses in theJaro district claimed several 

esteros (natural floodway) leading to Jaro River. The onset of the 

rainy season during the month of May proved to be devastating to 

the residents of Jaro and Lapaz districts and Pavia. Old residents would 

claim that floodwaters rising above their roof decks was just a recent 

phenomenon. In some cases, Pavia and Leganes are virtually cut off 

from Iloilo City for several days, halting commerce and trade between 

these areas. The constant flooding of the Jaro district and Pavia 

significantly affected the attractiveness of the latter as an 

agroindustrial zone. 

Only a comprehensive flood control system in the whole 

metropolis can ease the perennial flooding in Iloilo City and Pavia. 

In this regard, a cooperative scheme can be worked out that will involve 

the dredging of the Jaro River from Jaro district upstream to Pavia


and the construction of a network of floodways that will facilitate the 

flow of floodwater during heavy rains. 

Moreover, as the pace of urbanization accelerates, the need for 

a comprehensive and efficient sewerage system must already be 

considered for Iloilo City and the surrounding municipalities. The 

absence of a system is causing the underground water aquifer to be 

continuously degraded. 

Urban reTwwal,land use and zoning and shelter services. This refers 

to the "planning and implementation of'policies, rules and regulations 

and programs and projects to rationalize and optimize land uses and 

provide direction for urban growth and expansion." 

Because of the small area, the uses for Iloilo City's land are 

limited. A larger scale for physical planning will allow for a more 

rational use of its existing land and permit greater economic and 

spatial links with its neighboring areas. The concept of a Metro Iloilo 

and the formulation of an integrated land use and zoning plan will 

synchronize and give more meaning to the existing land use and 

zoning plans and regulations of the respective member-areas. The 

metropolis plan, for instance, can identify and develop suitable land 

for industry, housing sites for urban dwellers, including the 

resettlement of slum dwellers in the city, and a suitable landfill site, 

for solid waste management, among others. It should also anticipate 

the need for future expansion and any implications on infrastructure 

support that will sustain and manage urban growth. 

Networking of economic support infrastructure. This involves the 

"identification and implementation of a system of transport networks 

linking and integrating the various road networks of the member 

local government units into one big web of roads and thoroughfares." 

In addition to the existing four exit points from Iloilo City, 

another one known as the "coastal road" is soon to be opened. The 

road will link the eastern coast of Iloilo City to the municipalities of 

Leganes and Dumangas in the north. The eastern coast has been 

identified by the Iloilo City government as the city' s site for industrial 

development. It is the location of the Iloilo International Port 

Complex and a number of commercial warehouses. Once completed, 

it will complement the proposed industrial complex in Leganes and 

win open a wide area of Iloilo City, Leganes and Dumangas for housing, 

industries and commercial establishments.


Collaboration between Iloilo City and Leganes is essential for 

•the success of both the Iloilo International Port Complex and the 

proposed industrial complex in Leganes. Located just less than 10 

kilometers from each other, any competition between the two ports 

can result in ill feelings between the two local government units. The 

proposed MIDC is the best venue for discussing how the two ports 

can complement each other. 

Another major infrastructure support project that will require 

collaborative efforts between the province of Iloilo and Iloilo City is 

the proposed construction of an international-standard airport in lieu 

of the present airport located at the Mandurriao district in Iloilo City. 

The limited land area currently used by the Iloilo Domestic Airport 

significantly restricted the size of aircraft that can land. Also, the 

increasing number of residential houses around the airport's 

periphery makes aircr_t navigation hazardous and difficult. 

The province of Iloilo is proposing that an airport of 

international standard be constructed in the municipalities of 

Cabatuan and Sta. Barbara, which are adjacent to Pavia. The proposed 

airport wiU require a wider national highway, which incidentally passes 

through Pavia. Such plan will greatly enhance the attractiveness of 

Pavia as an industrial area since the airport will increase the volume 

of traffic along the highway. 

Public safety, maintenance ofpeace and orderand disaster manag_m, nt. 

This refers to "the creation of metro wide police force and the control 

and supervision of police force in the member local government 

units...the setting up of mechanisms for the prevention of disasters 

and effect mitigation of the same." 

As there are separate police commands in four areas of the 

would-be metropolis, coordination of police matters is done by the 

police directorates in Camp Delgado, Iloilo City. This setup does not 

create confusion as police command and responsibilities are well 

defined and efficiently structured. It can, however, be enhanced if 

coordination of peace and order efforts by the four-government unit 

is improved. A coordinating unit preferably situated at Camp Delgado 

can be created to coordinate and supervise police activities in the 

metropolis. This is to ensure immediate action on reports of disaster 

and crimes such as kidnapping, carnapping, robbery, and incidences 

of hit-and-run.


Trade and investment promotion. This pertains to "the formulation 

and implementation of a comprehensive investment strategy for the 

whole area, and the rationalization of investment rules and 

regulations, with the end view of developing the whole area into one 

big economic zone." 

The brewing conflict between Pavia and Leganes as related 

earlier prompted several concerned individuals to reconsider the 

metropolitan idea of making Leganes, Pavia, and Iloilo City as one 

investment area. The current practice of implementing separate trade 

and investment promotion activity is not cost-efficient and oftentimes 

conflicting. While the Department of Trade and Industry, the Iloilo 

Business Club, and the Iloilo Investors Foundation, Inc. have devised 

_romotional packages for these three growth sites, they did not 

nprove the proposed investment area's attractiveness. What is needed 

succeed is an assurance from investors that industrial development 

a the area will be holistic and well-coordinated. The translation of a 

omprehensive and integrated socioeconomic and physical framework 

lans duly ratified and endorsed by all four concerned LGUs can 

elp achieve success in this regard. 

'ossible Next Steps 

Dealing with the acceptance dilenuna 

The basic current issue among LGUs pertains to how they are 

) provide everyone a clear understanding of the need to forge an 

tterlocal arrangement. At present, the need to accept the benefits 

f collaboration lies strongest in Iloilo City, where the acceptance 

ilemma is evident and strongest. Both the substance and the process 

ave to be dealt with. 

What is needed is a broad discussion among LGUs on the 

meral concept of the metropolitan arrangement as well as the 

_ecific areas where cooperation will be forged. A concept paper might 

e needed to articulate the basic discussions and the already- 

;tablished agreements among the leaders of the member-areas. A 

sk force composed of mayors and/or representatives from the 

ember-areas may be created to draft this concept paper.


Dffinlng the appropriate ins6tutlonal structure 

Having a clear understanding of the concept and objectives of 

the arrangement, the next Step is to identify the appropriate 

institutional structures that will coordinate the arrangement. While 

the draft memorandum of agreement has initially proposed for a 

council type of body (i.e., the MIDC), there might be a need to 

consider such suggestion vis-A-visother alternative structures that may 

be proposed. Whatever the agreed structure will be, it should be clear 

about its roles and how itwiU sustain its organizational structure and 

financial requirements. It should also define how it will horizontally 

and vertically relate with existing institutional structures in the region. 

Conclusion 

Metro Iloilo is a metropolitan arrangement that is struggling 

for acceptance and organization. Customarily, the difficulty in forging 

the cooperation occurs in the member-municipalities involved in the 

arrangement. In the case of Metro Iloilo, it is the city that has caused 

delay in making a headstart. While the problem may be tagged as 

something political, it may seem to have brought the need to make a 

rethinking of the whole concept and objectively assess the real need 

for such cooperative undertaking. The present paper hopefully can 

be useful in providing the impetus for further discussion through 

the documentation of the initial thoughts articulated by the local 

executives concerned on the substance of the desired cooperation. 

References 

Provincial Government of Iloilo. n.d. Draft Memorandum of 

Agreement (between the mayors of Iloilo City and the 

municipalities of Leganes, Pavia and Oton) 

National Economic and Development Authority. 1993. Western Visayas 

Regional Development Plan 1993-1998. 

• 1997. Western Visayas Regional Development Plan 1998-2004. 

National Statistics Office. 1995. Census of Population and Housing•

Case Study 6 

Metro Davao:In Search 

of Metropolitan Definitions 

Ruben G. Mercado 

theoretical sense. Angotd (1993), in writing a modern-day 

efining perspective a metropolis on metropolitanization, should not be has difficult, suggested at least a general in the 

rule-of-thumb in defining a metropolis or at least distinguishing it 

from a city. In the context of the twentieth century, the term 

"metropolis" refers to large urban setdements, usually crossing local 

jurisdictional boundaries, with at least one million population. The 

term "city,, on the other hand, refers to a medium-sized settlement 

of between 100,000 and one million population. Following this 

categorization, therefore, settlements under 100,000 population are 

considered "rural." Admittedly, this is a broad definition. However, 

the definition is handy in making a broad categorization of urban 

settlements. 

Another criterion has also evolved from the experience of other 

so-called metropolises in the country. This criterion defines a 

metropolis beyond the urbanization measure and population size. 

That is, an area is considered a metropolis if it undertakes 

metropolitan functions or activities. These activities refer to those 

which are distinctly urban in nature and dimension. Usually, when 

one or more political jurisdictions are involved, an institutional 

mechanism is needed to undertake them. This criterion helps avoid 

loosely defining metropolis only on the basis of population or the 

amalgamation of contiguous political units. The term _metropolitan 

arrangement" becomes more applicable to any cooperation between 

city/ies and municipalities which do not meet the population and 

largely urban criteria but are performing expanded urban service 

functions. 

The case of Davao presents some major definitional dilemma. 

Reference to Metro Davao has taken on new meanings in recent years. 

What is being referred to by the term "Metro Davao_ Is it Davao City


or is it beyond the city's political and administrative jurisdiction How 

valid and meaningful are these defnitions 

This paper attempts to describe three emerging operational 

definitions of Metro Davao. The aim is not only to present the 

definitional dilemma at hand but more importantly to draw insights 

or lessons on the importance of definitions beyond the terminological 

exercise. 

The Three Def'mitional Models of Metro Davao 

Model I: Davao City 

Based on the basic definition of a metropolis, Davao City may 

in itseffbe considered a metropolis. In 1995, Davao City registered a 

population of a little over one million from about 850,000 in ]990 

(Table ]). Growth rate has remained high since the ]980s, posting 

3.39 percent growth from the period 1990-1995. A large percentage 

of its total population resides in areas classified as urban. However, it 

should be noted that the urban land area is only less than 2 percent 

of the total land size. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish density in the 

whole city and density in the urban areas within the city to appreciate 

the' state of its urban geography. One needs to understand also that 

Davao City is, land-wise, a predominantly agricultural and forest area. 

Table 2 presents the land use pattern in Davao City in 1994, showing 

that the built-up area (depicting urban area) comprise only less than 

6 percent of the total land area of the city. 

Table I. Davao City:Basic Demographic and "LandCharacteristics 

1980 1985 1990 1995 

Population 

Growth Rate 

614,124 724,935 

3.32 

849,947 

3.18 

1,006,840 

3.39 

Percent Urban 67 69 74 n.a 

Population Densityin 

the City (persons/ha)* 2.5 2.97 3.48 4.53 

PopulationDensityin Urban 

Areas(persons/ha)** 116.9 142.1 178.7 

* Total land area: 244,000 ha. 

** Total urban land area: 3,520 ha. 

Basic sources: National Statistics Office, Census of Population and Housing (for 1980, 199() 

and 1995 figures) and population projections, 1980-2010 (for 1985 figures).

Case Study: Metro Davao 249 

Table 2. General Land Use, 1994 

Use Area (ha) Perc_t to Total 

Built-up 13,373 5.48 

Agricultural 184,651 76.84 

Forest 43,147 17.86 

Total 244,00@ 100.00 

Source: 1996 Solid Waste Management Profile, Davao City. 

Table 3. Population Distribution, LandArea and Density, 1990 

District/ 

mmmgay 

Population Land Area 

(ha) 

Density 

(poputation/ha) 

DisWict1 

Poblacion 141,090 1,028 137.0 

Talomo 183,356 11,040 16.6 

District II 

Agdao 75,295 489 184.5 

Buhangin 118,550 9,222 12.8 

Bunawan 68,785 6,550 10.5 

Paquibato 27,756 23,360 1.0 

District Ill 

Baguio 19,894 82,725 0.2 

Calinan 53,379 22,360 2.4 

Marilog 35,295 50,796 0.7 

Toril 82,501 13,130 6.3 

Tugbok 44,096 23,300 2.0 

Total 849,947 244,000 3.5 

Source: City Government of Davao, 1996 Solid Waste Management Plan. 

Davao City is considered the largest city in the world in terms of 

land area) Its size is more than three times the size of Metro Manila 

and more than twice of Metro Cebu. Nevertheless, population is 

unevenly distributed. The city is divided into three major districts. 

Table 3 presents how population is distributed in each of these three 

administrative areas in 1990. Note that majority of the population is 

concentrated in the first district, where the built-up areas are located. 

This district alone comprises already more than a third (38 percent) 

of the total population while occupying only 5 percent of the total 

land area. 

Davao City, taken as a whole, can be considered a metropolis in 

terms of its population level. High growth rate has been exhibited in 

t Recently, however, Puerto Princess City also now claims to be larger than Davao City in terms 

of land area (253,982 hectares).


the recent past, and is expected to continue in the medium- and longterm 

future. While majority of the city's area is agricultural and forest, 

the percentage of population living in the urban area is considerable: 

more than 75 percent of the city's total population. 

Model 2: Davao City plus neighboring nmnicipalities 

A recent (re)definition of Metro Davao (Carino and Kintanar; 

Gaffud 1997) is the one that takes Davao City in relation with the 

immediate municipalities of Sta Cruz in the south and Panabo in the 

north. The definition is, admittedly, prospective and based on the 

fact that these municipalities are the nearest catchment areas for 

Davao City's eventual expansion. Sta. Cruz and Panabo are 38 and 32 

kilometers away, respectively, from the city proper. 

The involvement of the two municipalities is seen as just a 

possibility and there are actually no immediate interlocal concerns at 

hand. In fact, data on average daily traffic (ADT) shows that it is in 

the city proper, particularly in the central business district (CBD) of 

Davao City, where traffic is greatest and where choke points are 

located. Furthermore, the three local government units (LGUs) have 

their own water districts. The Davao City Water District alone has an 

excess production capacity of about 5 million cubic meters, more 

than enough to supply its population. On solid waste management, 

Panabo and Sta, Cruz generate a relatively small amount of garbage 

although Panabo has a six-hectare sanitary landfill (dump site). Davao 

City ha'_ a four-hectare dumpsite, and because the city has land, any 

future expansion and/or addition of sanitary landfill sites will not be 

as much problem as those experienced by other rapidly growing cities. 

The garbage issue is not a metropolitan problem since each of the 

three -0oliticaljurisdicfions can singly handle the concern. Housing 

is similarly a local government issue and can be handled through the 

respective LGUs' housing programs. 

Table 4. General Information on Davao City,St& Cruz and Panabo 

Population 

Land 

Area 

Population 

Growth 

Percent 

1995 Urban 

(sq. km) 1990-95 

Davao City 2440 1,006,840 3.39 74 

Sta. Cruz 320 59,139 1.11 35 

Panabo 193 130,585 3.40 50 

Total 2,953 1,196564 2.66 69 

Source of basic data: National Statistic Office (1990/1995).

.Case Study:MetroDavao 251 

While there is no problem viewing Metro Davao as one that 

encompasses the city as well as the adjoining municipalities of Sta. 

Cruz and Panabo in terms of population size as a criterion, it is still 

premature to define Metro Davao in this manner in view of the 

absence of a real need for the areas to jointly undertake basic 

metropolitan services and to establish an institutional mechanism for 

this purpose. These municipalities may be considered only as a 

geographic expansion rather than an interlocal cooperation. The 

addition of Sta. Cruz and Panabo into the urban circle even makes 

the whole area less urban. 

Model 3."Lkwao City Plus Neighboring Provinces 

The third definition of Metro Davao is more expansive in scope 

in that it brings together Davao City and the three provinces of Davao 

del Norte, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental. Unlike the second 

definition, the inclusion of these provinces is based on a formal 

agreement between the concerned political units. This consolidation 

is specified in the established Davao Integrated Development Program 

(DIDP). 

The DIDP evolved from the original proposal for a Metro Davao 

Integrated Development Project Master Plan and Feasibility Study. A 

similar suggestion was submitted in June 1993 to NEDA Regional 

Office XI by a group ofJapanese consultants. The Metro Davao being 

referred to in the plan is Davao City only. The proposal aimed to 

enlarge urban functions by improving or expanding urban 

infrastructure and utilities for the growing urban population while 

maintaining a balance with agricultural activities in the predominantly 

rural area. There are, however, numerous activities in the program 

which extend beyond the urban concerns. 

In October 1993, an initial discussion in Hong Kong by the 

Chairman of the Regional Development Council, councilors of Davao 

City and the Governor of Davao Province (del Norte) focused on the 

possibility of ajoint socioeconomic undertaking between the city and 

the three provinces of Davao. This was later followed by consultations 

and meetings among the local government units. Eventually, in July 

1994, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the implementation 

of the DIDP was signed by the Davao City mayor and governors of 

Davao del Norte and (]el Sur. The original proposal in July 1993 was 

revised to expand the planning space and widen the areas for concern 

by considering the complementarity and integrated development of

252 ManagingUrbanization Under a DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

these territories. In October 1994, the MOAwas amended to include 

Davao Oriental. 

The DIDP has identified nine key result areas or sectoral focus: 

agri-industrial and marine industry, sea and air transport services, 

physical infrastructure development, tourism, natural resources 

management and conservation, peace and order, disaster 

preparedness, cultural exchanges, human resources and technology 

development. 

Of the above, the immediate opportunities for joint undertaking 

are found in tourism, infrastructure and maintenance of peace and 

order. The development of Samal Island, one of the priority tourism 

development sites under the Tourism Master Plan, is also a priority of 

DIDP concern. Supporting tourism are programs meant to maintain 

peace and order, particularly in the border areas of Davao, as well as 

the rationalization of plans for the development of infrastructure to 

enhance the area as a tourist investment destination through the 

provision of more access roads, wharves,jetties and other embarkation 

points. Similarly, tourists' interests will be promoted if land and water 

transportation facilities are made available for key destination points. 

The DIDP is being run by an Executive Committee composed 

of the Local Chief Executives of the LGUs who are members and 

participants of the Program and the Chairman ofRDC XI as Ex-officio 

member, it is a collegial body and its meetings are chaired and 

presided over by the host Local Chief Executive. 

The DIDP is a local government undertaking without national 

government funding. It relies solely on the contribution of each LGU. 

Each contributed P300,000 for the initial funding requirements of 

the program. A Project Management Office was set up in May 1996 to 

provide overall supervision and coordination in the implementation, 

monitoring and evaluation of DIDP projects and activities. 

It is difficult to classify the DIDP arrangement as the new Metro 

Davao. If the areas are consolidated, population would go beyond 

one million and the entire areawould become more rural than urban. 

Table 5 shows that with the low percentage of urban population in 

the three provinces, the total urban proportion of the entire area is 

only 43 percent. It is also not appropriate to refer to them (DIDP 

areas) as a metropolitan arrangement inasmuch as the concerns of 

the DIDP are neither primarily urban-related nor metropolitan in 

character. It is instead appropriate for such consolidation to be called

Case Study: MetroDavao 253 

Table 5. General Information on Davao Integrated Development Program 

Land 

DAVAO Area PopulationPopulation Percent No.of No.of Capital 

(_q"k_) 1995 Growth Urban MunicipalitiesBarangaysTown 

City 2,444 1,006,840 3.37 74 180 

Del Norte 8,130 1,191,443 3.82 30 22 458 Tagum 

Oriental 5,165 413,472 2.40 24 11 183 Mad 

Del Sur 3,934 677,069 2.72 30 15 337 Digos 

Total 19,673 3,288,824 2.29 43 48 1,158 

Source: Davao Integrated Development Program. 

a subregional development cooperation or conventional integrated 

area development (IAD) undertaking. 

Conclusion 

The above analysis presented the three emerging definitions of 

Metro Davao and evaluated these based on the simple definition of a 

metropolis as "a largely urban settlement with a population of at least 

a million and usually extending beyond political jurisdictions." Of 

these, viewing Metro Davao as comprising Davao City alone is the 

definitional model that meets the two criteria. The second model 

(Davao City plus neighboring municipalities) would also qualify but 

is still considered prospective because of the absence of immediate 

inter-urban concerns at present. Also, based on the theoretical 

distinction between a city and a metropolis, Davao City was found to 

have graduated from being a city and into a full-fledge metropolis in 

1995. Thus Davao City alone can already be classified as a metropolitan 

city. 

Given the high growth in population experienced not only in 

Davao Citybut in all of the Davao provinces, Gaffud (1997) has rightly 

pointed out that the DIDP can be "an initial vehicle in the promotion 

of cross-border management of urban services." Perhaps, there might 

also be a need to develop a subcomponent of the program for Metro 

Davao (i.e., Davao City) concerns. Because Davao City has a strategic 

role as the international trade center and gateway to the Southern 

Pacific Rim, particularly in the BIMP-EAGA, a distinct program must 

be crafted to make the city a well-functioning and competitive metropolis. 

It might be useful to develop a separate Metro Davao Development 

Master Plan (i.e., Davao City concept) but anchored on the 

framework and broad strategies of the DIDE


The transformation of Davao City into a metropolis should not 

be seen only as an urban redefinition. More importantly, it implies 

that the urban management paradigm of the city should be broadened 

rather than follow the traditional city management approach. 

The development plan for the new metropolis must consider a contemporary 

urban-management system (i.e, organizations, human 

resources, operational systems and approaches) that will aid this transition 

process. 

References 

Angotti, T. 1993. Metropolis 2000. Planning, Poverty and Politics. New 

York. 

Carifio, L.V. 1997. Preparing for a Developed Future Through a 

Comparative Study of Five Current and Emerging Metropolitan 

Areas: An Introductory Statement for Consideration of Local 

Governments. Unpublished. 

Davao City Government. 1996. Solid Waste Management Profile. 

. n.d. Terms of Reference for the Feasibility Study on Metro 

Davao Urban Development Project. 

Gaffud, R. and N.E. Kintanar. 1997. The Interplay of Population, 

Resources and Public Services Toward Balanced Development 

in the Emerging Metro Davao. Unpublished. University Center 

for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the 

Philippines. 

NEDA Regional Office X. 1993. Profile of the Davao Integrated 

Development Program. Davao City.

Case Study 7 

Governanceand Urban 

Development:CaseStudy 

of Metro Manila 


and Ruben G. Mercado 

Introduction 

etro Manila has had a long history. For 250 years before the 

Spanish arrived, Manila has been a prosperous city engaged 

in trading with neighboring China, Vietnam, Indonesia, 

Malaysia, Borneo and Kampuchea and with Acapulco as well. Because 

it was a progressive city with rich agricultural hinterland, Manila be- 

_:ame the Spanish and, then later, the United States' colonial capital. 

Aside from being the direct link between the Philippines and its colonial 

rulers, Manila served as the gateway for the export of agricultural 

products and raw materials and the import of manufactured. 

goods from Europe and the United States. During the Spanish and 

American rule, colonial policies promoted the development of Manila 

as a primate city. In this sense, the countryside was "economically 

exploited to support the colonial bureaucracy in Manila" (Caoili 1985 

based on Cushner 1971 and Regidor and Mason 1905/1925). After 

World War II, economic policies have contributed further to the uneven 

development between Manila and the rest of the country. Manila 

was the favored location of industrial establishments because of 

its developed infrastructure and its being the country's principal port 

and financial and commercial center. This, together with political 

unrest and underdevelopment in the other regions, has encouraged 

rural migration to Manila and accelerated the urbanization process 

in the area. 

Geography 

Metropolitan Manila (or the National Capital Region, NCR) is 

located in the southwestern portion of Luzon, directly below Central 

Luzon. It is bounded by the province of Bulacan in the north, the 

Sierra Madre mountains and Laguna de Bay in the east, Manila Bay


in the west, and the provinces of Cavite and Laguna in the south. 

With a land area of 636 square kilometers, Metro Manila is comprised 

of the cities of Manila, Caloocan, Las Pifias, Mandaluyong, Makati, 

Marikina, Muntinlupa, Parafiaque, Pasay, Pasig, and Quezon, as well 

as the municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, san Juan, Taguig, 

and Valenzuela. 

Oemogmphy 

In 1995, the total population of Metro Manila reached 9.5 

million, accounting for 13.8 percent of the country's population and 

some 25.1 percent of its urban population (Table 1). The primacy of 

Metro Manila has been declining continuously after reaching a peak 

of 34 percent in 1970. The diminishing primacy of the metropolis is 

partly attributed to the deceleration of the rate of growth of its 

population from a peak of 4.9 percent annually in the 1960s to 3.0 

percent in the 1980s (Pernia and Israel 1994).1 Still another factor 

that helps explains primacy reversal is the decline in the contribution 

of net migration to the growth of the metropolis. To wit, the 

proportion of migrants in Metro Manila's population in 1975-1980 

was 18.2 percent compared to only 11.5 percent in 1985-1990. 

The population density of Metro Manila in 1995 is estimated at 

14,865 persons per square kilometer, 65 times the national average 

of 229 persons per square kilometer. Congestion in Metro Manila is 

more glaring if one looks at the individual cities and municipalities 

in the region. Congestion, as measured by population density, is more 

evident in Manila, Makati, Pasay, Navotas Pasig and Caloocan. 

Although population growth in the first three local government units 

(LGUs) has slowed down in 1990-1995, the same cannot be said for 

the last three LGUs. 

Metro Manila's population is young and a substantial portion is 

at the peak of their productive years. While the metropolitan 

population is not as young as that of the entire country with only 4g 

percent of its population below 20 years of age compared to the entire 

country's 49 percent, the proportion of the population between 20 

and 35 years of age is higher in Metro Manila (30.7 percent) than in 

the rest of the country (24.6 percent). 

t However, the population growth rate of Metro Manila rose to 3.3 percent yearly in 1990-1995, 

almost 50 percent higher than the national average of 2.3 percent-

CaseStudy:MetroManila 257 

Gross domestic product 

The gross domestic product (GDP) of the NCR reached P835.6 

billion (US$28.4 billion) in 1997. The share of Metropolitan Manila 

in the total economy's GDP initially went down from 30.1 percent in 

1980 to 28.3 percent in 1985 before recovering to 32.7 percent in 

1997 (Table 2). Thus, it appears that although the NCR was more 

badly affected by the economic crisis that confronted the Philippines 

in 1983-1985, it was also the major beneficiary of the turnaround in 

the economy in the late 1980s and the 1990s. In more specific terms, 

the annual rate of growth of NCR's real GDP declined from 6.3 

percent in 1975-1980 (compared to the Philippines' real GDP growth 

rate of 6.2 percent) to negative 1.9 percent in 1980-1985 (compared 

to the national average of negative 0.5 percent) but bounced back to 

3.9 percent in 1985-1997 (compared to the national average of 3.2 

percent). Consequently, the region re-established its hold on 

economic primacy (in contrast to urban primacy) in 1986-1997. 

Table 1. Demographic Facts About Metro Manila 

1948 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1998 _' 

Total Metro Manila 

Population ('000) 1,569 2,462 $,967 5,926 7,948 9,454 10,012 

Urban Metro Manila 

Population 1,526 9,427 $,967 5,926 7,948 9,454 i0,012 

Level of Urbanization _- 

Total Metro Manila 97.3 98.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 

Level of Urbanization - 

27.0 29.8 31.8 $7.1 47.0 55.0 

Total Philippines 

Metro Manila Primacy 29.4 30.1 34.0 33.2 27.8 25.1 

Metro Manila Population 

as % of Total Philippine 7.9 9.0 10.8 12.3 13.1 15.8 13.7 

Population 

Growth Rate of Total 

Metro Manila Population 3-8 4.9 4.1 3.0 3.3 1.9 

Growth Rate of Total 

2.9 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 

Philippine Population 

Growth Rate of Urban 

3.9 5.0 4.1 3.0 3.3 1.9 

Metro Manila Population 

Growth Rate of Urban 

Philippine Population 3.8 3.8 4.3 4.8 5.7 

Total Philippine 

Population ('000) 19,234 27,088 36,684 48,098 60,703 68,617 73,131 

* 1998 figures arc based on NSO medium assumption projections.


Table 2. Gross Domestic Product Structure 

1975 1980 • 1985 1990 1999 1997 Ave 

1985-1997 

Metro Manila (MM) Share in National Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/ 

Gross Value Added (GVA) 

GDP 28.99 30.16 28.35 32.27 32.39 32.74 34.48 

GVAin Industry Sector 44.18 40.94 42.97 38.82 38.30 38.41 38.71 

GVA in Manufacturing 47.86 48-02 45.80 42.97 42.03 43.26 43.82 

GVA in Construction 38.40 32.84 40.97 36.49 34.09 30.08 30.46 

GVA in Service Sector 3'7.84 37.89 35.06 43.29 43.69 44.09 44.81 

Rate of Growth (in constant prices) 

MM GDP 6.28 (1.88) 5,01 (1A3) 5..04 3.92 

MM GVA in Industry Sector 6.84 (2.20) 2.16 (3-68) 5.16 2.39 

MM GVA in Manufacturing 6.45 (2.00) 2-13 (3.51) 4.63 2.19 

MM GVA in Construction 9.16 (6.37) 5.72 (10.13) 7.10 3.45 

MM GVAIn Service Sector 5,69 (1.52) 7.54 0.26 4.96 5.22 

Phil GDP 6.21 (0.54) 3.30 (0.12) 4.43 3.19 

Phil GVA in Industry Sector 7.34 (2.82) 4.97 (1.61) 5.33 3.99 

Phil GVA in Manufacturing 5.82 (1.42) 4.09 (1.09) 4.45 3.36 

Phil GVA in Construction 12.54 (9.83) 8.76 (6.93) 9.59 6.31 

Phil GVA in Service Sector 5.76 (0.40) 4.05 0.59 4.71 3.74 

Source: National Income Accounts, National Statistical and Coordination Board (NIA, NSCB). 

The resurgent economic primacy of the NCR is largely driven 

by the recovery of the services sector (especially the finance and 

housing subsector). In contrast, NCR's industrial sector (including 

the manufacturing and construction subsectors) lagged behind the 

rest of the regions'. In particular, NCR's gross value added (GVA) in 

the services sector grew by 5.2 percent yearly on the average in 1985- 

1997 (compared to the national average of 3.7 percent) while its GVA 

in construction and manufacturing increased by 3.5 and 2.2 percent, 

respectively (compared to the national average of 6.3 and 3.4 percent, 

respectively). 

Consequently, the services sector became the most dominant 

sector in the NCR starting in 1988 in terms of GVA shares. Prior to 

this year, the industrial sector contributed the majority of regional 

GDP. The relative contraction of the industrial sector in the NCR is 

largely attributed to the declining share of the manufacturing

CaseStudy: MetroManila 259 

subsector in the said period. In turn, this development may be traced 

in part to the deconcentration of manufacturing activity from the 

NCR to Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon in the late 1980s although 

the encroachment of the peripheral regions appeared to have 

waned in the 1990s. However, the manufacturing subsector, which 

accounted for over 40 percent of total NCR GDP in 1985, exhibited a 

less vibrant performance in the 1990s. 

F rxapaa_gne 

In 1997, per capita GDP in Metro Manila stood at P82,832 

(US$2,811). Although there has been some diminution in the relative 

well-being of the NC1L as measured by per capita GDP in 1975-1985, 

this trend was reversed in 1985-1997. However, the improvement in 

Metro Manila's per capita GDP in the latter period was not enough 

to bring it back to the position it enjoyed (relative to the other regions) 

in 1975. Nonetheless, the metropolitan region continues to dominate 

all the other region s with a per capita income that is 2.5 times the 

national per capita GDP of P33,722 US$1,144), 2.1 times the per capita 

GDP of the second richest region, Cordillera, and 7.7 times the per 

capita GDP of the poorest region, Muslim Mindanao (Table 3). 

Poverty 

The sterling performance of Metro Manila in terms of 

improvements in per capita GDP is mirrored in the trend in poverty 

reduction. Of the 2.0 million households living in the metropolis, 8.0 

percent live below the 1997 poverty line of P71,800 per year for a 

family of five. This compares favorably with the national poverty 

incidence of 32.1 percent_ It also represents a marked improvement 

in poverty reduction as the 1985 poverty incidence in the region was 

almost three times higher at 23.0 percent (Table 4). 

spa 

a/opm 

The composition of Metro Manila has not changed since its 

formation in 1975 under Presidential Decree (PD) 824 to the current 

legal geopolitical composition under Republic Act (RA) 7924. The 

only change has been the recent reclassification of some municipalities 

into cities, namely, Makati, Muntinlupa, Mandaluyong, Pasig, Marikina, 

Las Pifias and Parafiaque. 

Metro Manila has been geographically subdivided in previous 

planning documents into inner core and intermediate core. This

Table 3. Regional GDP Per Capita 

1975 . 1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 1997 

Regiomd 

Per Capita Product 

NCR METRO MANIL _, 6,690.74 [3,470.54 25,019.63 43,248.94 5 t ,037.53 65,997.11 82,832.38 

PHII.IPPINES 2,7_'26.30 5,502.34 11,207.01 17,611-42 21,107.53 27,778.00 33,722.49 

Ratio of Regional Per Capita Product to National Per Capita Product (%) 

NCR METRO MANILA 245.41 244.81 223.25 245.57 241.80 237.59 245.63 

PHILIPPINES i00.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.O0 100.00 100.00 

Annual Rates of Change (%), at Constant Prices 

1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-I990 1990-1992 1992-1997 1985-199 

NCR METRO MANILA 2.60 (4.93) 1.98 (4.58) 1.68 0.73 

PHILIPPINES 3.4I (3.06) 1.01 (2.38) 2.05 0.86 

Source: 

Basic data from NIA, NSCB.

Case Study: Metro Manila 261 

Table 4. Poverty Incidence of Families, by Region and Urbanity, 1985-1997 

Reduction 

Region 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997" 1985-1994 1985-1997 

Philippines 44.2 40.2 39.9 35.5 32.1 8.7 12.1 

NCR 23.0 21.6 13.2 8.0 7.1 15.0 15.9 

Areas Outside NCR 47.5 43.1 44.2 39.9 36.2 7.6 11.3 

* Preliminary results of the 1997 Family Income and Expenditure Survey_ 

Source: Economic and Social Stadstics Office, NSCB. 

subdivision has been largely based on the circumferential road 

boundaries (Figure 1). The inner core is composed of the cities of 

Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Makati and Mandaluyong and the 

municipalities of San Juan, Navotas and Malabon. The intermediate 

core consists of the cities of Pasig, Parafiaque, Muntinlupa, Marikina, 

! :_ Pifias and the municipalities of Valenzuela, Taguig and Pateros. 

In the immediate post-war period, urban development radiated 

from the city of Manila, which has been the administrative, economic, 

educational and social center since the colonial period, and situated 

northwards to Caloocan City and southwards to Pasay City. Meanwhile, 

the development of government housing projects in Quezon City and 

the private sector development of Makati as a financial, commercial 

and residential center in the late 1950s and the 1960s completed the 

filling up of the inner core between Manila Bay and EDSA (or C-4). 

Industrial and residential development intensified in Navotas, 

Malabon and Valenzuela in the late 1960s and in Marikina, Pasig, 

Parafiaque, Las Pifias, and Mundnlupa in the 1960s and 1970s (League 

1993). By 1975, the distinction between inner and outer core has 

been obliterated as infrastructure and economic finks have virtually 

made all these local units a unified core and have spatially merged 

them into a metropolitan area that was then loosely referred to as 

Greater Manila Area. 

Related to this, the Physical Framework Development Plan for 

Metro Manila (MMDA 1996a) identified an outer core consisting of 

municipalities beyond the originally identified intermediate core and 

located in the neighboring regions particularly in the provinces of 

Rizal, Cavite, Laguna and Bulacan. These areas are outside the legal


Figure 1. Major Road Network of Metro Manila 

_ource: MMDA (1996a) 

composition of Metro Manila but are included as part of the planning 

region of Metro Manila. 

The development of Metro Manila beyond its present legal 

boundaries has been more pronounced in recent years than it was 20 

years ago. Aside from the above cited planning framework for Metro 

Manila, the Philippine National Development Plan for the 21" Century 

or Plan 21 (NEDA 1998) has made explicit its recognition of Metro 

Manila's spatial development by referring to a Metropolitan Manila 

Growth Network that includes the industrial areas of the neighboring 

regions, namely, the Southern Tagalog Region (Cavite-Laguna- 

Batangas-Rizal Quezon or CALABARZON and the Manila-Rizal- 

Laguna-Quezon or MARILAQUE areas) and the Central Luzon 

Region (areas linking Manila with the Subic and Clark Special 

Economic Zones).


Metropolitan 

Governance 

Early antecedents of metropolitan m__ 

In the 1950s and 1960s, rapid and uncontrolled population 

growth, resulting from a high rate of natural increase and significant 

internal migration, contributed to the economic growth of Manila 

but brought countless problems in the process. These problems 

include poverty and housing shortage exemplified by the proliferation 

of slums and squatter settlements, inadequate public transportation 

system, traffic, deteriorating health and sanitation condition due to 

lack of potable water and unsanitary disposal of waste, lack of drainage 

and sewage system, pollution (air, water and noise) and worsening 

peace and order situation. Caoili (1985) argues that the failure to 

address the problems of Metro Manila during the immediate postwar 

period up to the 1960s stemmed from the piecemeal and 

uncoordinated solutions employed by local governments due to party 

politics and jurisdictional disputes over responsibility for service 

delivery. Also, there was a highly uneven distribution of financial 

resources among local units resulting in wide disparities in the 

availability and quality of public services. _ 

The need to consolidate service efforts in view of the urban, 

services transcending local jurisdictions in Metro Manila became more 

obvious in time. Thus, ad-hoc bodies or local government 

arrangements were established to address specific problems or needs. 

These included the United Intelligence Operations Group (tasked 

to implement cooperative laws among the cities and municipalities), 

Fire Protection Organization, Metropolitan Health Council, Inter- 

Police Coordinating Council and the Metropolitan Mayors 

Coordinating Council. Nonetheless, these ad-hoc arrangements were 

found to be inadequate in addressing the complex problems of the 

metropolis. 

At about the same time as well, the needs of Metro Manila 

became a priority concern of the national leadership. This concern 

was hinged on two major considerations. The first centered on the 

Caoili (1985) cites that "...in fiscal year 1974-75, per capita revenue among MMA units ranged 

from P16 in Pateros to P223 in Manila. Per capita expenditures during the same year varied 

from P19 in Pateros to 243 in Makati. In calendar year 1980, per capita revenue among MMA 

units ranged from P$4 in Pateros to P412 in Makati. Per capita expenditoreB during the same 

year varied from P28 in Pateros to P351 in Makati."


need to improve public services in the areas geographically embracing 

the center of government. Inefficient and uncoordinated services in 

the metropolis in the face of rapid urbanization caught the attention 

of the Marcos leadership. The second stemmed from the need to 

develop a region that will serve as the showcase of the country's 

modernization thrusts. Given these considerations, Memorandum 

Order No. 314 (dated November 10, 1972) was issued creating the 

inter-Agency Committee on Metro Manila. 

The Inter-Agency Committee was tasked "to study the system of 

municipal/city government in Metropolitan Manila and to 

recommend whatever measures of coordination and integration are 

deemed appropriate and to study the functions and responsibilities 

of the National Government in the metropolitan area, and to 

recommend whatever changes in structure and interrelation with 

municipal governments are deemed appropriate". The committee 

proposed for the creation of a Metropolitan Manila Authority under 

the Office of the President through a promulgation of a Presidential 

Decree. 

Metro Manila C_ 1975-1989 

A referendum was called for to get the people's support for the 

new jurisdictional delineation of Metro Manila and to give the 

President the authority to create a new administrative structure for 

the National Capital Region (NCR). Eventually, PD 824, creating the 

Metro Manila Commission (MMC), was issued in 1975. Moreover, PD 

824 delineated the territorial jurisdiction of the MMC to include the 

17 LGUs enumerated earlier. The important features of the MMC 

are summarized in Table 5. 

The MMC was tasked to take primary responsibility in the 

delivery of garbage collection and disposal, transport and traffic 

services and fire control services. It was also mandated to coordinate 

and monitor government and private activities pertaining to the 

delivery of essential services like water supply and sanitation, flood 

control, health, social welfare, housing, and park development. Moi-e 

important, the Commission was ordained to develop a comprehensive 

social, economic and physical plan for the region.


PD 824 enabled the MMC to act as a central government to 

establish and administer programs and provide services common to 

the area. The MMC was also vested with legislative powers; it can enact 

and approve ordinances and resolutions. In addition, the MMC was 

also authorized to levy and collect taxes and fees, expend and borrow 

money, issue bonds and others instruments of indebtedness. 

Moreover, it was empowered to review, amend, revise or repeal all 

ordinances and resolutions of the different LGUs within its 

jurisdictions including their annual budgets. 

Organizational strucABr_ 

The MMC was composed primarily of the Governor, Vice- 

Governor, and three Commissioners, one each for Operations, 

Finance and Planning. All of these officials were appointed by the 

President of the Philippines. 

The Governor and Vice-Governor also assumed the position of 

General Manager and Deputy General Manager, respectively. As such, 

they were responsible tbr the implementation of MMC's policies, 

programs and regulations. At its peak, the MMC's personnel 

numbered 35,000, majority of whom were in Operations. 

Finance 

The MMC had access to the following revenue sources: (1) 

internal revenue allotment (IRA) share; (2) central government 

subsidies; (3) contribution from the member-LGUs; (4) share in 

proceeds of specified taxes imposed by member-LGUs; and (5) own 

collection of taxes and fees. Effectively, the MMC was treated much 

like a provincial-level government in terms of share in the IRAs and 

in terms of taxing powers. Specifically, the MMC received 45 percent 

of the proceeds from the municipal collections of real property tax. 

Itwas also entided to varying proportions from the collection of other 

taxes and fees imposed by member-LGUs like the corporate residence 

tax, excavation fees, building and sanitary permit fees, parking fees 

s The IRA is the mandated share of LGUs in internal revenue collections of the Bureau of 

Internal Revenue (BIR). Prior to 1991, total IRA was at the maximum equal to 20 percent of 

BIR collections three years prior to the current year. The IRA is allocated to the different levels 

of local government and to specific LGUs within each level according to a pro-determined formula 

that is based on population, land area.and equal sharing.

Case Study:Metro Manila 267 

and the like (HUDCC and LOGODEF 1995). Moreover, the MMC 

also imposed and collected the following taxes/fees: cinema tax, 

franchise tax, delivery van tax, peddlers tax, tax on transfer of real 

property and traffic violation fees. Lasdy, member-LGUs were 

ordained to contribute 20 percent of their regular income to the 

MMC. 

In 1988-1989, yearly MMC revenues amounted to P1,037 million 

on the average in 1992 prices. Statutory contributions of member- 

LGUs were the single biggest source of revenue for the MMC. Its 

share in total MMC income was 34.7 percent on the average during 

this period. More than 30 percent of total MMC income came from 

its share in the real property tax, 13.1 percent from other taxes, 11.1 

percent from fees and charges (non-tax revenues), 5.4 percept from 

the IRA and 5.6 percent from subsidies from the central government 

(Table 6). 

MMC-LGU relations 

PD 824 effectively emasculated its member-LGUs. It abolished 

the legislative councils of the member-LGUs and vested MMC the 

power to enact ordinances. In principle, the city/municipal mayors 

retained the powers and functions assigned to them prior to the 

issuance of PD 824. However, they were also tasked to execute MMCapproved 

programs in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, they 

became area administrators/managers. 

l,inkages with national government agendes 

As earlier stated, the MMC was mandated to coordinate and 

monitor key sectoral services. Largely, because of the political clout 

of the First Lady (Imelda Marcos) who was Governor/General 

Manager of the MMC for 10 years, the MCC exercised more than a 

coordinative function over said services (League 1993). Senior officials 

of key national government agencies (like the Department of Public 

Works and Highways, Department of Health Department of 

Education) were appointed as Action Officers of the MMC. Through 

this arrangement, the MMC formalized its influence over national 

government line agencies in terms of ensuring budget support to 

metropolitan projects.

Table 6. Comparative Revenue Sources of Metropolitan Organization 

I. Metro Manila Commission 1988-1990 

Level in Cm'rent Prices (P million) Level in 1992 Prices (P million) % Shares 

Sotwce 1988 1989 Average 1988 1989 Average 1988 1989 Average 

t. Tax Revenues 268.75 336.37 302.56 416.20 477.78 446.99 44.25 42.16 43.20 

A. Real Property Tax 192.37 228.17 210.27 297.9i 324.09 311.00 3]..67 28.60 30.13 

B. Business Taxes 45.26 55.29 50.28 70.09 78.53 74.31 7.45 6.93 7.19 

C. Other Taxes 31.12 52.91 42,02 48.19 75.15 61.67 5.12 6.63 5.88 

1. Non-Tax Re_,enues 

2. Other Income 

62,13 94.64 78.39 96.22 134.43 115.32 10.23 11.86 11.05 

(Receipts) 276.50 366.91 321.71 428.20 521.15 474.68 45.52 45.98 45.75 

A. Statutory Contributions 

B. Internal Revenue 

198.28 293.15 245.72 307.07 416.39 361.73 32.65 36.74 34.69 

Allotment 26.01 52.61 39.3 t 40.28 74.73 57.50 4.28 6.59 5.44 

C. Capital Revenue 0.08 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.47 0.30 0.01 0.04 0.03 

D. Grants & Aids 52.13 20.82 36.48 80.73 29.57 55.15 8.58 2.61 5.60 

Total Income 607.38 797.92 702.65 940.62 1133.36 1036.99 100.00 100.00 100.00 

% of GDP 24.18 26.72 25.51 

H. Metro Manila Authority 1991-1993 

Level in Cm-rent Prices (P million) Level in 1992 Prices (P million) % Shares 

1991 1992 1993 Average 1991 1992 1993 Average 1991 1992 1993 Average 

1. Tax Revenues 464.87 167.08 79.14 237.03 501.62 167.08 74.16 247.62 41.01 28.57 13.35 27.64 

A. Real Property Tax 355.31 " i49.13 79.i4 194.53 383.40 149.13 74.16 202.23 31.35 25.50 13.35 23.40 

B. Business Taxes 62.85 10.67 0.00 24.51 67.82 10.67 0.00 26.16 5.54 1.82 0.00 2.46 

C. Othec Taxes 46.71 7.28 0.00 18.00 50.40 7.28 0.00 _9.23 4.i2 1.24 0.00 1.79 

1. Non-Tax Re_,enues 


112.02 85.46 77.42 91.63 120.88 85A6 72.55 92.96 9.88 14.61 13.06 12.52 

(Rec eip_s ) 556.64 332.27 436.25 441.72 600.64 332.27 408.82 447.25 49.11 56.82 73.59 59 _84 

A. Statutory Contributions 


422.26 0.00 0.00 140.75 455.64 0.00 0.00 151.88 37.25 0.00 0.00 12.42 

Allotment t28.36 184.45 32i .28 211.36 138.5i 184.45 301,08 208.01 11.32 31.54 54.20 32.35


II. Metro Manila Authority 1991-1993 

Level in Current Prices (P million) Level in 1992 Prices (P million) % Shares 


C. Capital Revenue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

D.Grants & Aids 6.02 147.82 114.97 69.60 6.50 147.82 107.74 87.35 0.53 25.28 19.39 15.07 

Total lacome 1,i33.53 584.81 592.81 770.38 1223.14 584.81 555.54 787.83 100.00 100,00 100.00 100.00 

% of GDP 27.66 13.36 12.34 17.79 

HI. Metro Manila Development Authority 1996-1998 

Level in Cument Prices (P million) Level in 1992 Prices OPmillion) % Shares 


1. Tax Revenues 0.00 0.0O 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

A. Real Property Tax O.O0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.O0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

B. Business Taxes 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.O0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

C. Other Taxes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

1. Non-Tax Revenues 


120.51 111.73 122.50 118.25 87.55 76.4t 76.16 80.04 7.68 6.11 6.77 6.85 

(Receipts) 1448.28 1716.24 1687.61 1617.38 1052.18 1173.72 1049.21 1091.70 92.32 93.89 93.23 93.15 

A_ Statutory Contributions 37'2.96 471.62 476.99 440.52 270.96 322.54 _'296.55 _o96.68 23.77 25.80 26.35 25.31 


Allounent 

307.89 313.16 361.80 327.62 223.68 214.17 224.94 2,_0.93 19.63 17.13 19.99 18.92 

C. Capital Revenue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 

D. Grants & Aids 767.43 931.46 848.82 849.23 557.53 637.01 527.73 574.09 48.92 50.96 46.89 48.92 

TotalIncome 1568.80 1827.97 1810.11 1735.62 1139.73 1250.13 119_5.38 1171.74 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 

% of GDP 21.78 21.88 19.59 21.06 

Sourve: Data for MMC and MMA from MMM_S 1993; Data for MMDA from MMDA_ 

cO


_s_s_essme nt 

League (1993) noted that because of the unique situation 

brought about by the appointment of the First Lady as Governor of 

Metro Manila while being the head of the powerful Ministry of Human 

Settlements (MHS), the MMC enjoyed a position of primacy in the 

metropolis. While no formal evaluation of the performance 

effectiveness has been undertaken, there is some agreement that the 

MMC was effective in more ways than one (League 1993; HUDCC 

and LOGODEF 1995). For instance, the squatter problem was 

reportedly better controlled; traffic and public transport were better 

managed; the environment was cleaner and greener. Moreover, the 

MMC was able to generate strict compliance from LGUs with respect 

to the remittance of their mandated contributions. The MMC was 

able to prepare the first metropolitan land use and zoning plan which 

was enforced through a zoning ordinance. Much of this success was 

dependent of the personality/individuality of the First Lady who was 

able to generate the greater support and cooperation of LGUs and 

national government agencies than would have been possible if any 

other person were appointed Governor (HUDCC and LOGODEF 

1995). 

In spite of the MMC's enormous power and influence, it did 

not evolve into a real metropolitan institution. The MMC actually 

performed a rather limited range of normal metropolitan services. 

For most services, it was unduly dependent on national government 

agencies. 

Table 7 shows that in 1988-1989 the MMC spent 84.3 percent of 

its budget on operations. In turn, 91.9 percent of this amount was 

expended on solid waste management. On the other hand, Table 8 

documents MMC's reliance on central government agencies. In 1988- 

1989, MMC's expenditures accounted for a low 7.5 percent of total 

general government expenditures in Metro Manila,. The bulk (62.2 

percent) of total general government expenditures in the region was 

expended by central government agencies. In comparison, member- 

LGUs contributed a sizable portion (30.3 percent) of total general 

government expenditures. The latter were allocated largely to local 

concerns.

Case Study:MetroManila 271 

League (1993) further noted that without a NEDA 4 Regional 

Office in the NCR, there was no Regional Development Plan to guide 

the development of the metropolis in an integrated fashion with its 

neighboring regions and with national priorities. Consequently, the 

MMC had a tendency to concentrate on "high visibility impact 

projects .... reactions to specific problems or showcase projects which 

were not sustainable". It was not until the 1980s when the 

Commissioner for Planning (within the MMC structure) was 

appointed to take on the functions and responsibilities similar to those 

of a NEDA Regional Director. However, the MMC was shortlived with 

the ouster of the Marcos government following the People's Power/ 

EDSA Revolution in February 1986. 

Metropolitan Manila Authority, 1990-1995 

The collapse of the Marcos administration in 1986 and the 

adoption of a new Constitution (which passed on to Congress the 

task of determining the appropriate institutional mechanism for 

metropolitan management) placed Metro Manila in institutional 

limbo, with an ambiguous structure and leadership. The growing 

problems of Metro Manila, most especially with respect to traffic and 

garbage, triggered then President Corazon Aquino to issue Executive 

Order (EO) 392 in 1990 that created the Metro Manila Authority 

(MMA) as an interim body pending the creation of a more permanent 

metropolitan organization fbr the region in a manner that is consistent 

with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 

The MMA is considered by many as a weaker version of its 

predecessor (the. MMC) in terms of both executive and revenue 

powers. Moreover, the passage of the new Local Government Code 

in 1991, which enhanced the autonomy of LGUs, further debilitated 

the MMA. The more important features of the MMC under the more 

decentralized framework are presented in Table 5. 

The MMAwas given jurisdiction over the delivery of basic urban 

services requiring coordination. These basic services included among 

others: land use, planning and zoning; traffic management; urban 

4National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) is a constitutional body mandated to 

provide overall leadership in economic and social development planning and policy formulation.

272 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernance Framework 

development and renewal; disaster management; and sanitation and 

waste management. 

The MMA had no legislative authority. Prior to the passage of 

the Local Government Code (or LGC), the MMA had the authority 

to collect taxes which were accruing to it 100 percent. This was no 

longer true in the post_LGC period. 

Organizational structure 

The MMA was governed by the Metro Manila Council which 

was composed of the mayors of the member LGUs. The Chairman of 

the Council was elected from among its mayor-members for a sixmonth 

term and performs a largely titular (e.g., preside over 

meetings) and recommendatory function. The Secretaries of the 

Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), 

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), and Department 

of Budget and Management (DBM) attended the meetings of the 

Council as non-voting members. The Council was responsible for the 

formulation of policies on the delivery of services and the 

promulgation of resolutions of metro-wide application. However, EO 

392 provided that a General Manager, appointed by the President of 

the Philippines, was to be in charge of day-to-day operations. 

Finance 

EO 392 reduced mandatory LGU contributions to the MMA 

from 20 percent to 15 percent of LGU regular income. With the 

implementation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the share of 

the MMA in the real property tax was also reduced from 45 percent 

to 35 percent. Moreover, provincial taxes, previously accruing to the 

MMA prior to the LGC, were withdrawn and assigned to member 

LGUs. Also, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the 

LGC provided that cities and municipalities were no longer required 

to make contributions to the MMA, causing the member LGUs not 

to remit any contributions at all. However, the LGC provided for 

higher aggregate IRA levels. In sum, the MMA, post-LGC, had to 

content itself with the following sources of revenue: (1) higher IRA 

share; (2) reduced/voluntary LGU contributions; (3) reduced share 

in some taxes levied by member-LGUs; and (4) central government 

subsidies.


Table 6 highlights the diminution of MMA income with the 

implementation of the LGC. Effectively, MMA income (expressed in 

1992 prices) was reduced by more than 50 percent in spite of larger 

central government subsidies during the period. Expressed as a 

proportion of GDP, MMA declined from 0.3 percent of GDP in 1991 

to 0.1 percent of GDP in 1992/1993. 

At the same time, there was a dramatic shift, in the composition 

of MMA income. The IRA emerged to be the most important revenue 

source. Its share in total MMA income rose from 12.2 percent in 1991 

to 50.8 percent in 1993. The share of central governments subsidies 

also rose dramatically from 0.6 percent to 18.2 percent. In contrast, 

the share of tax revenues dropped from 44.2 percent to 12.5 percent. 

MMA-LGU relations 

LGU legislative bodies were re-constituted with the 

implementation of the LGC. As earlier noted, mayors of member 

LGUs are voting members of the Metro Manila Council. While the 

MMA was given the primary responsibility over metro-wide services, 

LGUs were assigned locality-specific services. In the post-LGC period, 

LGUs refuse to remit their contributions to the MMA. 

Linkages with national government agencies 

The MMA coordinated the program implementation with 

sectoral national government agencies. The venue for this was 

essentially the participation of selected Secretaries in the Metro Manila 

Council. 

The combination of institutional ambiguity and reduced 

revenue generating powers as a result of the passage of the Local 

Government Code constricted and hampered MMA's provision of 

public services in the metropolis. Given its very limited funding, the 

MMA has had to rely more on its coordinative role. However, in 

practice, neither the MMA Chairman nor the General Manager has 

sufficient clout to effectively coordinate with national government 

agencies or with themember LGUs. Moreover, the very short term of 

office of the MMA Chairman did not promote continuity in policy 

formulation and program implementation. As such, the focus of 

policies and programs changes with every turnover in the 

chairmansh:-


Table 7. Expenditure Pattern of Metropolitan Body 

Levels (in million pesos) % distribution 

L MMC 1988 1989 Average 1988 1989 Average 

Administrative 

Office 53.41 97.17 102.00 10.99 13.59 12.09 

Operations 417.46 587.64 711.28 85.89 82.22 84-33 

of which: 

solid waste 383.23 540.63 653.54 78.85 75.64 77.49 

others 34.23 47.01 57.74 7.04 6-58 6.85 

Other Purposes 15.18 29.94 30.i5 3.12 4_19 3.57 

Total 486.05 714.75 843.43 100.00 100.00 100.00 


IL MMA 1991 1992 1993 Average 1991 1992 1993 Average 


Office 80.16 72.06 73.48 225.70 7.29 8,97 10.37 8.64 

Operations 888.70 720.97 625.82 2,235.49 80.77 89.79 88.32 85.59 

of which: 

solid waste 822.94 658.97 561.99 2,043.89 74.79 82.07 79.31 78.26 

others 65,76 62.00 63.83 191.60 5.98 7.72 9.01 7.34 

Other Purposes 131.42 9.91 9.29 150.62 11.94 1_23 1.31 5.77 

Total 1,100.28 802.94 708.59 2,611.81 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 


m. MMDA 1996 1997 Average 1996 1997 Average 


Office 124,920.85 128,125.38 188,983-54 8.05 7.27 7.77 

Operations 1,247,011_37 1,377,775.76 1,935,899.25 80.34 78.20 79.57 

of which: 

solidwaste 1,041,997.15 1,188,062.01 1,636,028.15 67_1.3 67_43 67_24 

traffic 119,523.79 125,132.01 182,089.80 7.70 7.10 7.48 

infrastructure 

dev't_ 57,070.44 36,661.87 75,401.37 3.68 2.08 3.10 

pollution 

control 7,288.19 6,098.17 10,337.27 0.47 0.35 0.42 

others • 21,131.81 21,821-69 32,042.65 1.36 1.24 1.32 

Other Purposes 180,246.01 255,936.17 308,214.09 11.61 14.53 12.67 

Total 1,552,178.22 1,761,837.31 2,433,096.88 100.00 100.00 100.00 

Sources: Data for MMC and MMA from MMMS (1993); data for MMDA from MMDA. 

Concomitant with the dramatic decline in MMA income with 

the implementation of the Local Government Code, MMA 

expenditures also contracted from 0.3 percent of GDP in 1991 to 0.1 

percent of GDP in 1993. However, the composition of MMA 

expenditures did not change that much. In 1991-1993, 86.3 percent 

of MMA expenditures went into operations. Of this amount, 78.3 

percent was allocated to solid waste managemerrt (Table 7).

Case Study: MetroManila 275 

During this period, LGUs gained increasing prominence as their 

share in total general government expenditures rose from 31.5 

percent in 1991 to 42.6 percent in 1993 (Table 8). This occurred as 

the expenditures of both the MMA and central government agencies 

declined in terms of 1992 prices and when expressed as a proportion 

of GDP. Note that many health and social welfare functions previously 

discharged by the central government were devolved to LGUs during 

this period. In like manner, LGUs took over some of the services in 

solid waste management 

that the MMC used to provide. 

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, 

1995 to the present 

Mounting metropolitan problems continued to beset Metro 

Manila and the clamor for a better and stronger metropolitan body 

became stronger. It was not until 1995 that the Lower House and the 

Senate were able to reach a compromise bill and enacted RA 7924. 

RA 7924 reaffirms the compositional definition of Metro Manila 

constituting it into a "special development and administrative region" 

subject to direct supervision of the President of the Philippines. The 

law also provided for the creation of the Metropolitan Manila 

Development Authority (MMDA). In general terms, the MMDA shall, 

perform planning, monitoring, coordinative, regulatory, and 

supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within 

Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of LGUs 

concerning purely local matters. RA 7924 grants a more permanent 

term for the MMDA Chairman. A feature of RA 7924 not found in 

previous legislation is the prescription for the MMDA to work closely 

with nongovernment organizations (NGOs), peoples' organizations 

(POs) and the private sector. 

R 9 maaut 

RA 7924 mandates the MMDA to (1) formulate, coordinate, 

and regulate the implementation of medium- and long-term plans 

and programs, including investment programs, for the delivery of 

metro-wide services, land use, and physical development; (2) 

undertake and manage its own metro-wide programs and projects 

for the delivery of specific services under itsjurisdiction; (3) set policies 

concerning traffic in Metro Manila; and (4) install and administer a 

single ticketing system; fLx,impose 

all kinds of traffic violations. 

and collect fines and penalties for


RA 7924 defines the scope of MMDA's functions to include 

services "which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political 

boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be 

viable for said services to be provided by the individual local 

government units comprising Metro Manila." These services include 

development planning, transport and traffic management, flood 

control and sewerage management, urban renewal, zoning and shelter 

services, health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control 

and public safety. 

Auths/riti_ 

The MMDA, like the MMA, has no legislative powers. Neither 

can it levy nor collect taxes. 

Organizational structure 

The MMDA structure is almost identical with that of the MMA. 

It has a Chairman, a General Manager (GM), and three Assistant 

General Managers (AGMs), one each for Planning, Operations, and 

Finance and Administration (Figure 2). The Chairman is given 

executive functions, which he shares with the General Manager. The 

Chairman is appointed by the President of the Philippines, holds the 

rank of a Cabinet member and holds office at the discretion of the 

President. The GM and AGMs are also appointed by the President. 

The Metro Manila Council remains the policymaking body. The 

membership of the Metro Manila Council is expanded to include the 

president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors League, and the president 

of the Metro Manila Councilors League, the heads of the Department 

of Tourism (DOT), Housing and Urban Development and 

Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and the Philippine National Police 

(PNP) in addition to all the mayors ofmember-LGUs and the heads 

of the DOTC, DPWH, DBM. 

MMDA has 10,820 personnel service positions, 70 percent of 

which are filled as of April 1998. About 90 percent of the total plantilla 

positions are allocated to the Environmental Sanitation Center (ESC), 

which are mainly composed of metro hardinero or streetsweepers. 

There is a realization that the MMDA should no longer hire street 

sweepers in as much as the LGUs hire their own in their respective 

localities. The current proposal to correct the lopsided distribution 

of manpower complement in the whole organizational structure has 

been submitted by MMDA to the DBM for consideration and study.

Figure 2. Organizational Structnre: Metropolitan Manila DeveLopment Authority 

NI_DAC 

COUNCIL SECRETARIAT Te_l nica[II'lS(_-_{_ - B_ _" 

GENERAL 

MANAGER | _= 

L----- / 

s_ 

_. 

_. 

-I 

........... . C 

i = 

i Pubiclr_Of_ : / M_B_e Q. 

Managerfor Rnanceand _ Gerlera_Managerfor [_ t GeneralManagerfor _ 

Treasury /_oundt_ I I -- { 

TRAFRC AND 

_ 

• • I ,SOLIDW,a_i"E TRANSPORT Ul"banOesign Planning 

B_ Opera_(_ AdIl_h!_m_te MANAGEMENT I I ....... _ _ -- S.pp0rt and 

o 

........ CENTER 

I_°'_t--_Ad_" I co_°, ,............ "--" < 

CONTROL AND URBAN In_e_'et_ve Z0_ing -n 

DRAINAGE - PROTBC'RON Ranning Adrnini_ 

O 

(D 

Source:MMDA ([996_). 

L''_'_'"__ _1_._j_,_ _,._,_ C_R _ o 

[ .s Gr_.,p ] _--

CaseStudy:MetroManila 279 

The proposal basically reduces the number of ESC personnel while 

beefing up personnel complement in the technical departments 

especially in the office of planning, operations and administration. 

Finance 

RA 7924 prescribes the following sources of revenue for the 

MMDA: (1) its own IRA share; (2) subsidies from the national 

government; (3) contribution ofmember-LGUs set equal to 5 percent 

of their total annual gross revenue of the preceding year, net of IRA; 

and (4) fines and fees the MMDA may impose and collect for services 

rendered. As such, the MMDA is highly dependent on central 

government subsidies. In 1996-1998, central government subsidies 

accounted for 48.9 percent of total MMDA income (Table 6). In 

comparison, the share of mandatory contributions from member- 

LGUs was 25.3 percent while that of the IRA was 18.9 percent during 

the period. 

MMDA-LGU relations 

Policy coordination with the LGUs is done within the MMDA 

structure through the Metro Manila Council. However, operational 

coordination with respect to area-wide services such as traffic and, 

transport management, solid Waste management, disaster management 

as well as planning functions such as physical framework, socioeconomic 

and land use planning are coordinated with individual 

LGUs. 

I.inkages with national government agencies= NGOs/POs and 

nrivate sector 

"Several sectoral national government agencies and government 

corporations are undertaking various programs and projects in Metro 

Manila. These include the DPWH responsible for roads, bridges, flood 

control and drainage as well as traffic engineering; the DOTC and its 

various bureaus 5 dealing with transport and traffic management; the 

National Housing Authority (NHA) on housing; the Housing and 

_These include the Transportation Planning Service of the DOTC CenWal for overall formulation 

of transportation policies; Land Transportation Office (LTO) for vehicle registration, vehicle 

inspection and issuance of drivers' license; and the Land Transportation Franchising and 

Regulatory Board (LTFRB) for issuance of franchises to motorized road ba_d modes of public 

transport services_


Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for subdivision plans; the 

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) for water 

supply; the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 

(DENR) for environmental management; the Laguna Lake 

Development Authority (LLDA) for the management of the Laguna 

de "Bay region encompassing the five cities in Metro Manila; the 

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) for 

management of LGUs as well as in police assistance; the National 

Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for the planning, 

monitoring and evaluation of plans and projects; and the Department 

of Health (DOH) for health and sanitation. On top of these 

government agencies are ad-hoc commissions or task forces created 

by the President including the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste 

Management, the Presidential Task Force on Traffic Improvement 

and Management (TRAFIMM), the Philippine Council for Sustainable 

Development and the Cabinet Officer for Regional Development 

(CORD) ° for NCR who is the HUDCC Chairman serving as the link 

of Metro Manila to the President. 

MMDA coordinates its interregional concerns basically through 

the NEDA. This is with respect to the formulation of its regional 

development plan and physical framework taking into account the 

spatial development of the metropolis in the neighboring regions of 

Region III (Central Luzon) and Region IV (Southern Tagalog). 

However, MMDA needs to improve its linkage with institutions 

responsible for translating the intererregional framework to actual 

plans and programs. For instance, at present, the MMDA has no 

involvement in the MARILAQUE Commission established by the 

President to plan for and develop the growth corridor from NCR to 

the provinces ofRizal, Laguna and Quezon. Neither is MMDA involved 

with efforts relative to CALABARZON development. 

The MMDA is mandated to enhance institution-building and 

effective people's participation in governance through (1) private 

sector/NGO involvement in MMDA programs and projects; (2) 

The CORD system was introduced by the Aquino administration and was carried over by the 

Ramos administration. Each of the 15 regions is assigned a CORD coming from the members of 

the Executive Cabinet. During the Estrada administration, Executive Order No. 7 created seven 

(7) Presidential Assistants for Regional Concenls (PARECO). Unlike the CORD system where 

the CORD is a Cabinet member, the PAKECO is a Presidential appointee under the adnfinistrative 

control and supervision of the Executive Secretary and holds office at the NEDA Regional Office. 

The PARECO system has been carried on by the Macapagal-Arroyo Administration.


improved transparency through the provision of better private sector 

access to information on government activities; and (3) promotion 

of private sector initiatives in urban development. 

Asse.amxem 

The relatively stable term of office of the Chairman of the 

MMDA enhances institutional focus and sharpens its vision. Although 

the scope of its mandate over metro-wide services has been expanded 

to include more services, it continues to perform a largely coordinative 

role because its revenue-raising powers are still limited. 

The expenditures of the metropolitan entity (expressed in terms 

of either 1992 prices or a propordon of GDP) doubled with the 

establishment of the MMDA. But what is perhaps more significant is 

the fact that the MMDA effectively expanded its ambit to include 

more metro-wide responsibilities. While the operations budgets of 

both the MMC and the MMA were spent almost solely on solid waste 

management, that of the MMDA's is now allocating sizable amounts 

for traffic and infrastructure development (Table 7). 

However, the majority of total general government expenditures 

in Metro Manila still come from central government agencies. At the 

same time, LGUs continued to expand in 1996-1997 (Table 8). 

Major Metropolitan Governance Challenges 

In a nutshell, the problems in metropolitan governance in Metro 

Manila manifest themselves in the inefficient and inadequate deliv_-y 

of metro-wide services. Largely, this lack stems from the rather 

unwieldy institutxonal setup. The following discussion on the 

important management challenges in Metro Manila provides a more 

detailed explanation of these problems. 

and 

As in many big cities in the world, traffic management dominates 

Metro Manila's development challenge. The deterioration of 

transport and traffic condition has afflicted Metro Manila since the 

1950s. Simply put, traffic woes in Metro Manila stem primarily from 

an insufficient road system, the rapid increase in car ownership, the 

lack of quality public transportation services, poor enforcement of 

traffic regulations and lack of discipline on the part of both motorists 

and pedestrians. These problems are again validated in the initial


findings of the Metro Manila Urban Transportation Integration Study 

(MMUTIS 1997).7 In addition, there is a problem of overlapping of 

functions and duplication., of services in view of the multiplicity of 

players involved in transport and traffic management in the 

metropolis. 

Insufficient road system 

Major roads in Metro Manila are no longer sufficient to 

accommodate the rapidly rising traffic volume that have increased by 

more than 50 percent on the average during the last 15 years (Table 

9). Private cars and trucks dominate tr'_c volume even in bus and 

jeepney-dominated major routes such as EDSA (C4) and Shaw 

Boulevard (R5). 

AccdeaatedJncr_easedo.xar_wnexzhip 

The number of registered vehicles in Metro Manila more than 

doubled during the period 1980 to 1995, growing at an average rate 

of 6 percent annually (Table 10). The increase has been more evident 

during the 1990s. During this period, personal incomes have 

improved significantly concomitant with the economic recovery. At 

the same time, liquidity in the banking system was relatively relaxed 

and credit access (for car financing) easy. 

At present, more than 40 percent of all registered vehicles in 

the country are plying in Metro Manila. This represents 1.1 million 

private and "for-hire" vehicles. Of these, almost half are privately 

owned cars and utility vehicles. Household car ownership doubled 

from 9.5 percent in 1980 to 19.7 percent in 1996 (Table 11). The 

percentage of households with more than one car has also risen. A 

similar trend is also evident in areas adjoining Metro Manila. 

7 The MMUTIS Project was launched in March 1996 with technical assistance from the Japan 

International Cooperation Agency (IICA). The project, join@ undertaken by the Depas-tment 

of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), Metro Manila Development Authority 

(MMDA), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the University of the 

Philippines (UP), is based at the UP National Center for Transportation Studies (NCTS). The 

long-term objective of the projects is to established and update transporation database that will 

aid in the fo_nulation ofa transportaion master plan for Metro Manila within the present time 

to year 2015. The short-term objective is to prepare feasibility studies on priority projects that 

can be implemented within the present time to year 2005.


Table 9. Traffic Volume on Major Roads, 1980 and 1995 (vehicles/day) 

1980 1995 Ratio of 

Road (Location) Total Total Car/ Jeepney/ Total Cotmt 

1. EDSA 

Count Cotmt Truck Bus 1995/1980 

(between Guadaiupe and Buendia) 99,900 172,500 154,700 17,800 1.7 

2. South Super Highway 

(intersecting Pres. Quirino Avenue) 72,900 113,700 111,300 2,400 1.6 

3. Quezon Avenue 

(near Espafia Rotonda) 53,300 102,500 68,400 34,100 2.0 

4. Roxas Boulevard 

(intersecting P. Burgos) 67,800 82,300 74,100 8,200 1.2 

5. Ortigas Avenue 

(intersecting Santolan) 51,500 76,300 72,900 3,400 1.5 

6. Shaw Boulevard 

(intersecting Acacia Lane) 37,300 43,500 27,800 15,700 1.2 

Source: 1990JUMSUT and 1995 DPWH-Traffie Engineering Center (TEC) (inJICA/MMUTIS 

1997). 

Table 10. Number of Registered Vehicles in Metro Manila, 1980, 1990 

and 1995 

Pr/mU 

Type 1980 1990 1995 1980-1995 

Ratio 

% / year 

Motorcycles 36,854 50,159 73,014 2.0 4.7 

Cars 218,964 297,094 410,814 1.9 4.3 

Utility Vehicles 36,770 223,976 368,002 10.0 16.6 

Buses 918 491 - 

Trucks/Trailers 97,590 51,351 76,060 7.1 10.3 

Subtotal 391,178 623,498 928,381 2.4 5.9 

For Hire 

Motrocycles 4,801 16,418 34,478 7.2 14.0 

Taxis 10,125 1,715 21,702 2.1 5.2 

Cars 1,461 8,150 5,601 3.8 9.4 

Utility Vehicles 27,202 27,659 53,362 2.0 4.6 

Buses 3,578 4,329 7,824 2.2 5.4 

Trucks/Trailers 8,797 3,009 4,344 0.9 -12.5 

Subtotal 55,964 61,280 127,331 2.3 5.6 

TOTAL (Metro 

Manila) 446,142 684,778 1,055,692 2.4 5.9 

Source of basic data:JICA/MMUTIS (1997); Land Transportation Office (LTO).


The increase in household car ownership has been found to be 

positively correlated with household income. Thus, MMUTIS (1997) 

projected car ownership to increase by 2 percent annually from 1996 

to 2015 as population and income levels continue to rise. Car 

ownership in the adjoining areas was projected to increase at an even 

higher rate of 5.1 percent. 

Increased demand_ua_ty publicdxansport services 

Public transportation services are mainly provided by buses, 

jeepneys, taxis and tricycles. While the supply of these services had 

increased dramatically through the years (Table 12), traffic congestion 

has decreased the quality of service of these transport modes in terms 

of travel speed, riding comfort and in-vehicle air quality. Although 

air-conditioned bus units have increased in terms of both the number 

of units and routes, in-vehicle crowding is still evident and only a few 

are well-maintained to provide comfort to the riding public. To satisfy 

the demand for better transport services, the number of Tamaraw 

FX or shared taxi on fixed route has increased rapidly since 1905. On 

the one hand, the addition of these udlity vehicles provided an 

alternative mode of transport for passengers willing to pay a higher 

than the normal fare for efficiency and travel comfort. On the other 

hand, it contributed further to the increase in the already high traffic 

volume and to the further worsening of the traffic situation in the 

metropolis. 

Urban rail transport services are still limited. While there are 

already three light railway transit (LRT) lines that are operating in 

addition to the Philippine National Railways (PNR) that provides rail 

transport services, a comprehensive inter-urban rail strategy for Metro 

Manila needs to be established. 

Table U. Car Ownership Structure, 1980 and 1996 

Metro Manila 

1980 1996 Adjolnh_g Areas 

% of Car-owning Households 9.5 19.7 16,9 

Average No. of Cars per 

Car-owning Household 1.4 1.3 i .2 

% of Multiple 

Car-owning Households 19.0 20.1 13.3 

Source:JICA/MMUTIS (1997); MMUTIS Person Trip Survey.


Table 13. Transport and Traffic Management in Metro Manila 

Governance National Metro Local Others 

_Activity 

Policy OP MMDA LGUs 

Formulation DOTC (Traffic 

(Central, LTO, LTFRB) Management 

DPWI-I 

Units, 

(Central, DPWH-NCR) Local Traffic 

DILG (PNP) 

Ordinances) 

TRAFFIM 

Transport DOTC MMDA LGUs DeveLopers 

Planning (Central, LTFRB, LRTA, BCDA (Fort and 

PNR) Bonifacio) Operators 

PEA (Manila of busi.ness 

Bay Area) complexes 

Transport 

Services 

Rail 

DOTC 

(PNR, LRTA) 

Bus DOTC (L'ITRB) Private 

MMTC 

Companies 

Jeepneys DOTC (Office of 

Transport Cooperatives, 

LTFRB) 

Tricycles 

and 

Pedicabs 

LGUs 

Shuttle 

Services 

Private 

Companies 

with MMA or within the member agencies of the MMLTCC. For 

instance, the construction by DPWH of a fly-over along a section of 

Circumferential Road 4 (C-4) that favors private vehicles conflicted 

with the DOTC's long-term plan to construct a public-oriented rail 

• transit system within the same corridor, The presence of the fly-over 

led to complications in the construction of the ongoing Metro Rail 

Transit thereby increasing construction and engineering cost, 

prolonging" the construction, and further aggravating traffic 

congestion in the area. 

In the initial phase of the MRT project, there has been a serious 

clamor from private citizens and the business sector to address the 

traffic problem in the metropolis that has already reached a crisis 

stage. Then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 351 in

287 

August 1997 creating the Presidential Task Force on Traffic 

Improvement and Management (TRAFIMM) as the integrating, 

coordinating and directing authority on traffic management 

nationwide, particularly in Metro Manila and other urban centers. 

The TRAFIMM in Metro Manila is headed by the Secretary of the 

Department of Transportation and Communications with a 

representative from the private sector appointed by the President as 

co-chairman. The members include the Secretaries of the DPWH, 

the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the 

Department of National Defense (DND), the Chief of the PNP, the 

Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the MMDA Chairman, 

concerned local chief executives, and three representatives from the 

private sector appointed by the Chairman of the Task Force. While 

the TRAFIMM has made a significant effort in easing the traffic 

condition in Metro Manila through the enforcement of new rules 

and regulations for land transportation, the Task Force is faced with 

certain constraints. It does not have the policy formulation mandate 

and review and approving authority over programs and projects of 

the various agencies that would have direct or indirect impact to the 

transport situation in the whole metropolis. Moreover, TRAFIMM's 

area of intervention is only limited to the national highways of the 

metropolis. The management of traffic in the rest of the road network 

remains the responsibility the LGUs concerned. The traffic 

management in Metro Manila thus reflects weakened metropolitan 

planning and policymaking vis-a-visthe national government and local 

government policy processes. 

F/ood control 

The occurrence of both big and isolated flash floods is one of 

the biggest problems facing the metropolis. The reasons for flooding 

are multitu_nous.They include the overflow of major river systems 

during intense rain or storm, poor local drainage due to inadequate 

capacity and maintenance of the system, and illegal encroachment 

on river and other natural channels by squatters, business 

establishments and residential houses (MMDA 1996b; HUDCC and 

LOGODEF 1995). Coordination problems between DPWH, MMDA 

and LGUs have also caused delayed response to flooding and hindered 

a more proacdve approach to solve or to mitigate flooding in known 

flood-prone areas like the KAMANAVA area (Kalookan, Malabon, 

Navotas, Valenzuela), Central Metro Manila (Tondo, Sta. Cruz,


Sampaloc, Sta. Mesa, San Andres, Balon-Bato, Talayan-Tatalon and 

San Juan-Mandaluyong), Upper Marikina area, and North Laguna 

Lakeshore (Manggahan and Taguig-Pateros). Moreover, there is an 

inadequate regulatory framework with respect to subdivision and 

housing development, particularly that related to the provision of 

sotind and sufficient drainage facilities. 

Flood control in Metro Manila is the concern of a number of 

national and local government instrumentalities. The DPWH is the 

major implementor of all flood control and drainage projects. The 

NCR Office of the DPWH provides administrative and technical 

supervision over the operation and maintenance of completed flood 

control and drainage projects. With the establishment of the MMDA, 

this responsibility including the operation and maintenance of 

pumping stations and floodgates, is transferred to the MMDA within 

a transition period of about two years. At present, the turnover of 

DPWH functions and facilities to MMDA relative to flood control has 

yet to be formalized. The acquisition of the necessary technical and 

management capabilities of the MMDA from the DPWH is yet to be 

determined and evaluated before a turnover shall be effected. 

The nature of the flooding problem in the metropolis is 

multidimensional as it does not only require infrastructure 

improvement but also institutional approaches and regulatory policies. 

Thus, program and policy coordination may have to be tightened by 

rationalizing the functions of the various agencies that have roles to 

play in flood mitigation, including the Environment and Management 

Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 

(DENR/EMB), the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board 

(HLURB), the Metropolitan Water Supply and Sanitadon System 

(MWSS), the DND, NEDA, the Laguna Lake and Development 

Authority (LLDA), and the LGUs. 

Sol/d waste managvment 

Metro Manila is facing three major challenges with respect to 

solid waste management. The first concerns the need to improve waste 

collection. The second is the need to address the problem of final 

disposal. The third concerns an institutional dilemma. 

_/aztex.ollecdoa 

Out of the 5,350 tons per day waste generated in Metro Manila, 

about 75 percent are collected while the rest are illegally dumped in


open spaces or thrown in metropolitan waterways (JICA and MMDA 

1998). 

Under the current metropolitan arrangement, LGUs are 

responsible for waste collection while MMDA is primarily responsible 

for final disposal of waste collected. Collection coverage for 1997 

among the 17 LGUs range from a low of 40 percent in the case of 

Navotas to a high of 98 percent in the case of Makati City. The disparity 

may be attributed to the fiscal capacity of the respective LGUs. LGUs 

having high collection coverage performance are those that have fully 

or partly consigned waste collection and haulage to private companies. 

JICA (1998) has projected collection coverage of LGUs in the 

metropolis to increase or approximate full coverage with greater 

privatization of collection and haulage services during the next 

decade. 

Waste disposal 

One of the biggest challenges in solid waste management in 

Metro Manila is the identification and maintenance of final disposal 

sites. At present, there are tour available sites for final waste disposal 

in the metropolis: the two open dumpsites in Payatas and Catmon 

and the two landfill sites in San Mateo and Carmona. The Payatas 

and Catmon sites have been closed because of health and 

environmental risks. The Carmona site was also closed due to 

complaints from the nearby residents and the municipal government. 

The San Mateo landfill will reach its full capacity by 2004 but with the 

closure of the other sites its full capacity will be reached before the 

turn of the century. In this regard, the identification and development 

of a new landfill site will be a critical concern in the immediate term. 

The recently prepared study/master plan for solidwaste management 

in Metro Manila by jICA (JICA 1998) has identified and made a 

technical evaluation of possible disposal sites. Five sites were identified 

and ranked: Pintong, Bocaue (Rizal), sea landfill in the Navotas 

offshore area, Kalawakan (Bulacan), Maragondon (Cavite) and 

Bacolor (Pampanga). The development of any of these sites will be 

critical given the circumstances plaguing the existing disposal sites. 

Institutional problem 

Pardo (1996) in his analysis of solid waste management in Metro 

Manila highlighted the absence of a single agency that has overall 

responsibility for all aspects of solid waste management from

290 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFra 

Table 14. Land Use Classification in Metro Manila 

Land Use 1972 1980 1991 

Hectares % Hectares % Hectares % 

Residential 13,750 28.0 18,948 29.4 41,405 65.0 

Commercial 530 1.0 2,573 4.0 1,911 3.0 

Industrial 1,365 3.0 4,037 4.7 2,548 4.0 

Institutional 1,800 4.0 2,892 4.5 3,185 5.0 

Utilities 890 1.4 637 1.0 

Open Space 30,980" 64.0 14,380 22.3 5,096 8.0 

Agricultural 7,806 12.1 5,733 9.0 

Cemetery/Memorial Parks 637 1.0 

Recreation Parks Sports 13,012 20.2 6_7 1.0 

Rivers/Waterways 1,911 3.0 

Reclamation 671 1.0 

AgTo-Industrial 236 0.4 

TOTAL 48,425 I00.0 64,445 100.0 63,760 100.0 

* Open space and others. 

Basic sources: 1972 figures from Manosa (1974) in NEDAJoumedofDevelopmentVol. 1/2. 

1981 figures from Metro Manila Commission (1983). 

1991 figures from NCR Regional Development Pla_l (1993-1998). 

collection, transport and transfer, recycling and final disposal. MMDA, 

the LGUs and the various units of the DENR and DPWH take on 

various functions, jurisdictions and SWM responsibilities. However, 

there is no single body that orchestrates all these activities to ensure 

that they will be complementary and not conflicting. Such 

coordinating entity can also develop mechanisms to improve financing 

arrangement in the delivery of this important urban service. 

Land use, housing 

Land use 

and urban poverty 

Rapid urbanization over almost 30 years has altered Metro 

Manila's landscape as can be gleaned from the changes in the land 

use mix from 1972 to 1991 (Table 14). Residential land use currently 

predominate land use activity in the metropolis. Three decades ago, 

open spa_e was the__predominant land use. Recreation land uses 

including parks and sports area comprise only one percent of total 

land area in 1991 compared to 20 percent in 1980. A large percentage 

of dlese lands for open spaces and for other purposes have been 

used for housing. 

In spite of this large tract of land currently allocated for 

residential use, lack of housing is still a major problem as manifested 

by the increased demand for rental housing, the concomitant rise in


rental rates, and the increased number of squatter households. High 

land prices and the low-income capacity of many families in the 

metropolis hinder many households to participate in government and 

private housing projects. Thus, about halfofNCR households do not 

own the land they occupy. The number of squatter families has been 

rising as many opt to build substandard dwellings in private and public 

lands within the metropolis so as not to be too distant from their 

employment or livelihood source. 

Institutional arrangements 

Housing programs for the poor and low-income had been the 

purview of national government and LGUs rather than of the 

metropolitan body. The HUDCC is the national agency tasked with 

coordination of all government and private housing programs. It 

provides guidelines to implement RA 7270rathe basic law for a 

comprehensive and continuing homing program being participated 

by national agencies, LGUs, NGOs and the private sector. The National 

Housing Authority (NHA) is the sole agency engaged in direct shelter 

production. The Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP) supports 

the financing requirements of the Social Security System (SSS), 

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Home. 

Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), otherwise known as the PAG- 

IBIG Fund. The 1991 Local Government Code empowered LGUs to 

assume greater responsibilities in delivering and financing basic 

infrastructure and urban services. 

Squatting problem 

In Metro Manila, the biggest task of LGUs is how to deal with 

the many squatters that occupy danger areas such as riverbanks, esteros, 

railroad tracks, garbage dumps, shorefines, waterways and other public 

places sach as sidewalks, roads, parks and playground. There are also 

those who are threatened with eviction by private landowners. The 

law allows for the eviction and demolition under these circumstances. 

However, LGUs and the NHA are given the responsibility to provide 

a relocation or resetdement site "with basic services and facilities and 

access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet 

the basic needs of the affected families". 

There are not many LGUs in Metro Manila that have been 

successful in resetding squatters not only because of the political


repercussions but also due to the operational and financial cost, 

especially when the LGU does not own the available land for such 

relocation. Two cities, however, have successfully done so, namely, 

Marikina City and Muntinlupa City. Marikina City, as part of its river 

management effort, facilitated the relocation of families from the 

riverbanks through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The 

CMP is an innovative concept of low-income home financing program 

of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the 

government corporation which administers the UHLP, whereby an 

undivided tract of land may be acquired by several beneficiaries 

through community ownership. Marikina City took effort in 

convincing families of the dangers of residing along the riverbanks 

and the benefits of eventually owning their own house with very 

minimal financial cost. Muntinlupa City also availed of the CMP 

program and enjoined an NGO to provide interim financing and 

assistance in negotiations with private landowners. There is no 

denying, however, that some LGUs have tolerated squatting for 

political advancement. 

Squatting problem as a metropolihan governance challenge 

While LGUs are given the biggest responsibility in dealing with 

the squatting problem, the issue takes on a metropolitan dimension 

in the following situations: (1) when LGUs are constrained with the 

absence of land for relocation; (2) when the constraint for relocation 

is the inaccessibility of people to their place of work due to poor 

transport system; (3) when squatting becomes a major factor in the 

clogging of waterways and sewerage and fiver systems causing flooding 

and aggravating the traffic condition in the metropolis; and (4) when 

the substandard living environment becomes the breeding ground 

for infectious diseases and viruses causing illnesses and deaths in the 

metropolis (e.g., dengue fever). It becomes a national issue when 

taken in totality as squatting is the glaring symptom of urban poverty 

which have to be dealt with by improving not only the macroeconomic 

condition but also by providing employment opportunities in the 

other regions to curtail further in-migration to the metropolis. The 

current administration has put forward poverty alleviation as its major 

tbcus. In terms of housing for the urban poor, the newly installed 

leadership underscored the need for government intervention in 

housing production, which forms part of its pro-poor program and 

addresses the current crisis in the government's housing finance.


Future Challenges and Directions 

Addressing the challenges of Metro Manila over the mediumand 

long-term would entail pursuing three development direcdons: 

regional development dispersal, institutional strengthening of the 

metropolitan body, and setting up of a more unified and coordinated 

mechanism for the various key players involved in the management 

of Metro Manila. 

History tells us that the problems of Metro Manila have to be 

dealt with at its roots: addressing the uneven development between 

geographic regions. Developing the metropolis should be done 

simultaneously with the other equally promising cities in the country 

as well as promoting growth in the countryside. This would contribute 

to minimizing further pressure on the already strained metropolitan 

environment and would invariably help in managing the continued 

growth of Metro Manila. Furthermore, the development of Metro 

Manila should always take into account the development of its 

immediate regions and spillover areas. In this respect, interregional 

efforts taken through the MARILAQUE Commission should be 

continued. The same effort should be extended with respect to 

developments in the CALABARZON area so that it will not conflict 

with and instead contribute to realizing the metropolitan vision. 

On the other hand, a sound and respectable metropolitan 

institution, politically and technically armed to address the problems 

and needs of the metropolis is critical, if success is to be achieved. 

Metro Manila's management experience under three governance 

regimes over the past three decades has highlighted the importance 

of finding the optimal mix of powers, functions and responsibilities 

among the national government agencies, LGUs and the metropolitan 

body in managing the metropolis. What is evident is that the LGUs 

can singly handle local concerns effectively and efficiently depending 

on the leadership, the administrative capability and the financial 

capacity of the LGU concerned as shown by the model cities 

presented. However, international experience indicates that a 

metropolitan body plays a distinct and critical role in addressing 

concerns that transcend local boundaries and are characterized by 

economies of scale and externalities. 

A number of challenges and opportunities are evident in the 

need to strengthen the MMDA. First, although it may still be relatively 

premature to evaluate the effectiveness of the exisdng organization 

in tackling metropolitan issues, there is a perception among the LGUs


in Metro Manila at present of the MMDA's incapability to command 

respect and authority over them. The appointment of the MMDA 

Chairman should always be given serious thought--the same fervency 

as appointing a major cabinet post. The MMDA leadership must be 

able to put political and national government leaders together while 

making the organization more credible to earn the command and 

respect from the LGUs it coordinates. 

Second, in the medium-term, the national government has to 

seriously examine MMDA's proposed reorganization plan so that it 

will be enabled to improve its capacity to fulfill its roles and functions 

both from the standpoint of effectiveness and efficiency. Of greatest 

importance is the need for the metropolitan body to revitalize the 

development planning function that has not been adequately carried 

out of late. MMDA should provide the planning leadership in the 

pursuit of area-wide functions and in inspiring LGUs to attain a 

common vision for the metropolis. Such planning function cannot 

be carried out effectively if human resource availability and 

professional expertise are not improved. 

Third, the review of the performance of the different 

metropolitan arrangements in Metro Manila in the past indicates that 

a common thread that runs through the various experiments is the 

very limited role the metropolitan body has actually played in terms 

of actual delivery of metro-wide services. The MMC, MMA and MMDA 

have all relied for the most part on national government agencies in 

ensuring that metro-wide services are made available to Metro Manila 

residents. To a large extent, all three metropolitan bodies have 

exercised their coordinative function more than their service delivery 

function. While the MMDA appears to have taken on more 

responsibilities in the delivery of metro-wide services, a hefty 

proportion of metro-wide services still remains with national 

government agencies. This development is primarily explained by 

the fact_ that although the national government has continuously 

provide d subsidies to the metropolitan body, it still allocates a sizable 

portion 6fthe budget for metro-wide services to national government 

agencies. Thus, funding support for metro-wide services is principally 

retained in the budgets of national government agencies. (In contrast, 

funding support given to the metropolitan body, whether in terms of 

revenue-raising powers or direct budget support, has never been 

commensurate with its expenditure assignment.) These agencies,


being line departments, are inherently concerned with their own 

sectoral priorities rather than with serving the needs of the metropolis 

per se. Consequently, the metropolitan body is left with the very 

difficult task of having to orchestrate the sectoral programs of various 

national government agencies, including metro-wide services. This 

situation not only makes government effort almost intractable but 

also increases costs in terms of both manpower and financial costs. 

The recently installed national leadership has recognized the 

problems of urbanization, in general, and Metro Manila, in particular. 

The present study, which attempts to digest some of the lessons 

learned from the experimental laboratory that Metro Manila has 

become in the recent past, should help provide the needed inputs in 

moving the metropolis toward greater efficiency and global 

competitiveness. 

References 

Caoili, M. 1985. Reflections on Metropolitan Manila Reorganization 

and Social Change. Journal OfPublic Administration 29 (1). 

Congress of the Philippines. 1995. Republic Act No. 7924. An Act 

Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, 

Defining Its Powers ar.d Functions, Providing Funds Therefor 

and for Other Purposes. 

Corpuz, A.G. 1995. Metro Manila Growth Directions: Location, 

Distribution and Shape. Input Study for the National Urban 

Policy prepared for NEDA. 

Go-Soco Jr., B. 1988. A Study on the Possibility of Establishing A 

Regional Development Council (RDC) and Promoting 

Coordinated Development in the National Capital Region. 

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HUDCC (Housing and UrLbgl_Development Coordinating Council)/ 

Housing and Urban Regulatory Board. 1994. National Urban 

Development and Housing Framework 1993-1998, 2"dedition.


HUDCC and LOGODEF (Housing and Urban Development 

Coordinating Council/Local Government Development 

Foundation, Inc. 1995. Metropolitan Manila Management Study. 

HUDCC and PADCO (Housing and Urban Development 

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Interagency Committee on Metropolitan Manila. 1973. Metropolitan 

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on Metro Manila's Transportation and Traffic Situation (draft 

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JICA and MMDA (Japan International Cooperation Agency and 

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority). 1998. The Study 

on Solid Waste Management for Metro Manila in the Republic 

of the Philippines (Master Plan Report). 

League, j.A.L. 1993. Manila Metropolitan Management Experience. 

Paper prepared for the World Bank in connection with the 

Metropolitan Management Systems Workshop on Policy 

Options, 6 February 1993, Manila. 

MMA (Metro Manila Authority). 1993. National Capital Region 

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UNU Press.

J=lealth Management Strategies of Selected Cities 301 

Coping with Insufficient Health Stations 

Reaching out 

Gingoog City delivers basic services to people who live far from 

government facilities through an outreach program. The Gingoog 

Total Integrated Development Approach or G-TIDA was initiated in 

December 1988 as an outreach program to rural barangays. It provides 

health, medical, infrastructure and other services. 

A core group, organized by the mayor, plans and implements 

the program. It is composed of several coordinators and a secretariat. 

Outreach activities are done once or twice a month. The G-TIDA team 

meets directly with the people and their leaders to discuss the 

problems of the barangay. If problems cannot be given immediate 

attention, they are referred to higher authorides. The team informs 

people about the services provided by agencies in the city so they 

would know which to approach for their specific needs. 

Througlx the G-TIDA approach, people in some of the far-flung 

barangays were able to install water pipes connected to a spring using 

local resources and relying on the bayanihan (mutual assistance and 

exchange of labor) system. 

Gingoog's outreach program is now on its tenth year and has 

provided a means for delivering health services in areas without health 

stations. At present, all 50 rural barangays have health stations manned 

by a midwife and volunteer health workers. During the program's 

early years, the G-TIDA team stayed for two days and one night in a 

barangay. However, outreach is now limited to one day per barangay 

due to increased demand for outreach set vices. 

Expenses for outreach activities by participating agencies are 

taken from their regular agency budgets. There are no additional 

appropriations except for overhead expenses such as gasoline, 

transportation and food. In 1996, Gingoog City appropriated P189,400 

for the program. 

Tapping privale homes for public needs 

To solve its lack of BHSs, Cotabato City tried a different 

approach. Since building costs for a concrete BHS is about P100,000, 

the city can, at most, only afford to build three structures a year. Unable 

to build more of these structures due to its limited funds, Cotabato

302 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFrarnewm, k-- 

City opted to use barangay halls and priwate homes as venues for health 

services. These alternative venues are flee of charge. Today, Co_abato 

City has at least one health station for its 37 barangays and seven 

more extensions. Of these, 23 are pemaanent structures constructed 

by the city while the rest are lodged in barangay halls or private homes. 

When Health Workers Are Scarce 

Volunteers for the comnum good 

Another major problem when providing health care is the lack 

of personnel. The common approach to beef up manpower is to 

mobilize volunteers. Cotabato City activated 100 volunteers, mostly 

trained hilots (traditional midwives), to assist midwives in BHSs. 

Olongapo City has some 300 health volunteers. For its rescue and 

emergency medical assistance program, Naga City has 400 trained 

first responders and emergency medical technicians, all of whom are 

volunteers. 

Since volunteers render free services, the city is'able to save on 

salaries. In return, the cities reward them through other means. For 

instance, Cotabato City gives a P500 Christmas gift to each volunteer 

while Olongapo City provides them hospitalization benefits. Naga 

City volunteers receive uniforms, group insurance, and food while 

on duty. 

Women power 

Women's groups are valuable partners of city governments. 

Olongapo's Balikatan Ladies of Olongapo Movement (BLOOM) has 

6,000 members, many of them housewives. Aside from cleanliness 

projects, members volunteer as nursing aides in the city hospital, assist 

health workers in immunization drives and conduct health classes. 

Lapu-lapu City has mothers support groups consisting of 410 

members. The city taps this group in its advocacy activities such as 

feeding children during nutrition month. In Surigao City, the Primary 

Health Care FederatedWomen's Club (PHC) laid claim to over 12,000 

members in 1996, over 63 percent of households in the city at the 

time. As volunteers, PHC members operate and maintain BHSs and 

feeding centers. They record and follow up the immunization of 

children, assist pregnant women to obtain pre-natal checkup and

lealth Management Strategies of Selected Cities 303 

onduct health education activities. They also learned to treat 

ommon illnesses through herbs and liniments. 

Involving private companies and medical practitioners 

Lapu-lapu City requested private companies and institutions to 

assist in the health needs of specific barangays. Companies donate 

supplies and facilities as well as the services of doctors (retainers) 

who provide free clinics in adopted barangays on a monthly basis. At 

present, ten companies and five educational institutions have adopted 

eight barangays. Lapu-lapu City's Health Office has also involved 

doctors affiliated with the Mactan Doctors Organization and nurses 

from the Mactan Community Hospital in its immunization program. 

The city provides the vaccines while the volunteers provide their 

services. Currently, 50 doctors and 100 nurses offer free services to 

different barangays. 

Maximizing available health praeationer,s 

Cotabato City's Office of Health Services initially targeted at 

least one midwife stationed to each barangay. However, limited funds 

again hampered this goal, so the city shifted strategy and hired casual, 

instead of permanent, midwives. Salaries were sourced from the 200 

percent Development Fund. Starting 1993, the city was able to provide 

one midwife, employed on a casual basis, to all 37 barangays. More 

casuals were hired to beef up manpower in its main health center. 

Salaries for casuals total P2.5 million yearly. 

Puerto Princesa City's satellite clinics, another project financed 

by the 20-percent Development Fund, hired five doctors on a parttime 

basis. The city has five strategically located satellite clinics. A 

doctor provides medical services in his assigned clinic for two days 

per week. The remainder of the week, he works in hospitals or engages 

in private piactice. The city pays its doctors P10,000 a month each. 

The schedules of doctors in satellite clinics are synchronized to 

maximize their availability. For instance, in one satellite clinic, the 

doctor's schedule is Monday and Tuesday. In the other nearest satellite 

clinic, the doctor's schedule is Thursday and Friday. This way, during 

those days when the doctor assigned to a satellite clinic is not 

scheduled to come, the patient can instead go to the nearest satellite 

clinic and avail of another doctor's services.


Meeting Medical Emergencies 

Qui_k re_,ase saves lives 

Naga City initiated Emergency Rescue Naga (ERN) under its 

disaster preparedness program in April 1991. The ERN is a quick 

response unit led by the Naga City Hospital. It provides emergency 

medical assistance, rescue services, and transport to a hospital. It also 

gives medical backup assistance to particular events. 

The ERN has two telephone hotlines and two VHF controls. Its 

volunteers are equipped with beepers. Average ERN response time is 

three to five minutes within the city proper and 30 minutes for the 

farthest mountain barangays some 17 kilometers away. Emergency 

calls come not only from within Naga City but also from neighboring 

towns. ERN has an extensive radio network linking the offices of the 

mayor, the ambulances, police and fire stations within Metro Naga. 

Key personnel of the 14 local government units (LGUs) comprising 

Metro Naga were also provided with hand-held radios. 

ERN has one paramedic, a driver, and 400 trained first 

responders and emergency medical technician volunteers. Regular 

hospital staff, numbering 40, are On call. Assistance is rendered by 

the Philippine National Police, Bureau of Fire Protection, City Disaster 

Coordinating Council, Task Force COMET (for calls involving peace 

and order problems) and other civic organizations. Facilities consist 

of three ambulances, one all-terrain rescue vehicle, one rubber boat, 

and a trauma van. 

In 1996 alone, ERN responded to 2,257 emergency and t_ansport 

cases or an average of six trips per day. It has provided valuable rescue 

services during calamities such as super typhoon Rosing which caused 

floods of more than fwe feet in Naga in 1996. ERN evacuated more 

than 1,700 persons during that operation. The city spent P150,000 

on ERN operations in 1997. 

Emergency Rescue Naga won the Galing Pook Award (top 20) 

in 1994, the Disaster Management Award for the regional level in 

1995 and 1996, the national level in 1995, and the DOH Alay Buhay 

Award in 1996. 

Saving lives in the boondocks 

Puerto Princesa City has five strategically located satellite clinics 

to serve far-flung barangays with no access to health services. The

Health Management Strategies of Selected Cities 305 

clinics handle emergency cases as well as simple illnesses. For more 

serious cases, ambulances bring patients to hospitals within the city. 

All barangays and tribal communities are provided with handheld 

radios (VHF transceivers). Emergencies are reported to the 

barangay chairman who relay the information to the nearest satellite 

cliriic which fields an ambulance and health personnel. If patients 

require hospitalization, the satellite clinic makes an advance call to 

the receiving hospital. 

A satellite clinic is manned by two midwives, a radio operator, a 

driver, and a utilityman. A doctor provides medical services for two 

days a week and a dentist comes every two weeks. A clinic is equipped 

with four or five beds. 

Between 1993 and 1997, the clinics have served an average of 

47,000 patients per year. Most cases were simple illnesses such as 

respiratory infections. The clinics serve as a vital link to the city's 

referral system. They resulted in the increase in emergency cases and 

the decline in the number of patients with simple illnesses clogging 

hospital docks. 

Puerto Princesa City's satellite clinics had a budget of P6.2 

million in 1997 and are among the top 20 Galing Pook winners in 

1996. 

Augmenting 

Finances 

Mandatory baranguy allocations for health 

Olongapo City requires its barangays to allocate five percent of 

their IRA to health and welfare. Drugs allocated to the barangays are 

sourced from this fund. In Cotabato City, baiangays also finance their 

own medicines. Lapu-lapu City requires its barangays to provide 

allowance for barangay health workers ranging from P400 to P1,500 

per month. 

Twenty percent Community Development Fund 

Cotabato City and Puerto Princesa City both use their 20-percent 

Community Development Fund for projects, salaries of temporary 

health personnel and satellite clinics. 

Contr/buaom 

In Surigao City, the Barangay Environmental and Sanitation 

Tmplementation Group (BESIG) members contribute their labor

.,-306 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

while the government provides the fu,lds for infrastructure projects 

such a_shealth stations and feeding centers. The city's PHC Federated 

Women's Club obtained P1.5 million for the construction of its 

training center from a senator's Countrywide Development Fund. 

Under the share-food project of a Butuan City barangay, wellto-do 

families sponsor malnourished children for three months. In 

Lapu-lapu City, companies and congressmen contribute to a milk feeding 

program for school children while a food manufacturer regularly 

gives noodles. They also donate facilities and supplies to the barangays. 

Identifying Health Needs: Knowing the Problem Gets You Half 

the Way There 

Tour of duty 

In Lapu-lapu City, the city health officer toured all the barangays 

tor one month to identify the people's needs and ways of improving 

health service delivery. He traced the city's low performance in the 

Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) to the absence of a specific 

schedule for immunization and doctor's visits and people's lack of 

interest. A permanent schedule was set and people were encouraged 

to go to their BHSs. As a result, Lapudapu was awarded the "Most 

Accelerated City in EPI" in 199 I. 

Currently, the city health officer goes to the barangays three to 

four times a week to check on the status of programs. The mayor goes 

visiting with him three to four times a month. The health officer also 

conducts a barangay assembly every quarter. He presents current 

government health projects and solicits comments from the 

community on their health priorities. The community participates 

in coming up with solutions to address its problems. 

Going down to the grassroots levd 

In Olongapo City, the mayor goes to the barangays accompanied 

by his depar_lent heads to sce the actual situation at the grassroots. 

The mayor visits all 17 barangays within a quarter. During barangay 

consultations, the people air their problems to the mayor. The 

department head who has jurisdiction over the problem is tasked to 

take action and start with the solution the following day. People report 

to the mayor in case the problem remains unsolved.


Integrated Approach: The Sum Is Greater Than Its Parts 

Gingoog City opted for an integrated approach for its outreach 

program, well aware that there are problems which cannot be solved 

by one agency alone but by several agencies working together. 

Olongapo City strengthened the linkage between health and 

sanitation by integrating its environmental management program with 

health activities. The Community Health Office plays a major role in 

solid waste management. Its sanitary inspectors conduct regular 

rounds and issue citation tickets (fines) to violators of sanitation 

ordinances (such as unclean premises and putting out garbage outside 

of the scheduled collection time), This combination of health and 

environmental management resulted in the reduction of sanitationrelated 

diseases such as typhoid fever and paratyphoid infections. The 

occurrence of these diseases declined from 75 percent in 1988 to 9 

percent in 1995 per 100,000 population. 

Clustering of Barangays: A New Meaning for Hamletting 

For more effective supervision and monitoring, Cotabato's 

Office of Health Services grouped its 37 barangays into seven Clusters. 

Each cluster is supervised by a coordinator who monitors the activities 

of his respective cluster. Dividing the 37 barangays among seven 

coordinators simplified the task of supervision and monitoring since 

it enabled the coordinators to immediately respond to the problems 

of the barangays within their respective clusters. 

Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation: 

Don't Expect What You Don't Inspect 

Sem/nars 

Butuan City's nutrition personnel together with the Department 

of the Interior and Local Government conducts planning seminars 

with bavangay leaders. They compare the nutritional status ofpuroks 

(subvillages) in the barangay and guide leaders in making their 

quarterly action plans. The Cotabato Office of Health Services 

conducts semi-annual and annual review of programs. 

Regular feedback through meetings 

In Surigao City, the PHC chapter monthly meetings provide 

the means for identifying community problems at the purok level. 

Monthly staffmeetings, in addition to reports, are also conducted in


Olongapo City to monitor and evaluate perfbrmance in the harangays. 

Health workers in each of Lapu-lapu's eight districts and nutrition 

workers in each of Butuan's 10 barangay clusters hold monthly 

meetings for the same purpose. 

Community data board 

Surigao City's community data board posts the health status of 

households. Each household is represented in the board by a small 

hut. The hut shows the house number, the name of the family head, 

the health concerns, and the period covered (first to fourth quarter). 

For comparison purposes, 

is included as baseline. 

the previous year's quarterly performance 

The community data board is updated every quarter through a 

survey of all households. The survey inquires on health concerns such 

as pregnancies, immunization and nutrition status of children, 

garbage disposal, water source, occurrence of diseases, PHC health 

insurance membership, and availability of toilet. For each health 

concern, the health worker assigns a colored circle to indicate health 

status (below is an example). 


Blue Not applicable Nobody is pregnant in the household_ 

Yellow Improving Degree of malnutrition changed from 

severe t.o mild. 

Green Safe Children are fully immunized. 

Red Danger No PHC health insurance. 

By looking at the red circles, the health personnel is alerted on 

the most pressing health need of the households. The concerns of 

the ]mrok can also be prioridzed according to the number of red circles. 

It follows that the health concern with the most number of red circles 

is the most pressing health need of a purok. Comparison with the 

previous quarter shows where performance has improved or 

deteriorated. 

The Best and the Worst: Appealing to the Filipino Ego 

In Surigao City, the PHC recognizes outstanding performance 

based on'a set of criteria such as the number of babies immunized 

and the number of sanitary toilets constructed. Awards are given to 

10 outstanding PHC chapters, five outstanding workers, and 

outstanding couple during the PHC annual convention.


Butuan City conducts an annual contest for outstanding 

barangay. Every quarter, the performance of the barangays are 

evaluated using various criteria such as primary health care activities, 

food production and livelihood programs. Prizes range from P50,000 

to P100,000. The city also ranks barangays according to prevalence of 

health problems such as the rate of malnutrition, and announces the 

poor performers in ABC (Association of Barangay Captains) meetings. 

Recognition of best and worst performers motivates the barangays to 

give programs and projects their best shot. 

More Improvements in the Current Setup 

Gingoog City's outreach method is useful as a temporary 

measure for coping with insufficient BHSs. However, the long-term 

solution is to provide additional health stations to reach all the 

barangays. While people benefit from the curative and preventive 

health services provided during outreach activities, othei- health 

services have to be done on a regular basis. The G-TIDA approach 

may be adopted by cities while they are in the process of setting up 

additional health structures. To sustain outreach activities, local 

governments could train people from within the area as health workers 

and nutrition scholars. In addition, they could mobilize people's 

organizations. 

Cotabato City's use of barangay halls and private homes as 

additional health stations is a progression from the G-TIDA approach. 

This enables regular provision of health services rather than being 

just a one-shot approach. Another alternative is to rent a space for 

the BHS. 

Equally important is the availability of health workers. Mobili_ng 

volunteers and mothers, in particular, is a good way of supplementing 

manpower without paying salaries. Likewise costless is Lapu-lapu City's 

channeling of the services of medical practitioners who are retained 

by private companies. 

The hiring of part-time doctors, as practiced by Puerto Princesa, 

enables curative services to reach remote barangays. The availability 

of doctors in satellite clinics reduce the number of patients going to 

hospitals for minor illnesses. The city's strategy can be extended to 

dentists and medical technologists. To sustain this activity, barangays 

may contribute for the salaries of part-time doctors and other health 

personnel. The latter may serve the barangays on a rotation basis.

3] 0 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

Naga and Puerto Princesa can learn from each other's 

experience in emergency medical assistance. Puerto Princesa could 

follow Naga's mobilization of volunteers for handling emergencies 

while Naga may consider the stationing of ambulances in strategically 

located barangays as done in Puerto Princesa's satellite clinics. This 

way, the ambulance need not come from the city proper but any 

ambulance nearest to the place of emergency can respond 

immediately, thus saving travel time. 

Cities provide free services and medicines in public health 

facilities including the use of ambulances. In some cases, they are 

able to obtain financial and in-kind contributions from individuals 

or companies. One possible source of funds is cost-recovery, 

specifically, charging fees for medicines, use of ambulances, and 

medical services. Only the really indigent may be exempted from 

payment. This, of course, requires a system for determining people's 

capability to pay. 

Health in the Hands of the People: in Conclusion 

The Department of Health (DOH) sees health in the hands of 

the people by 2020. Devolution was a major step toward this vision. 

The government has set mechanisms to soften the impact of 

devolution. To advise local governments on health plan and budget, 

the 1991 Local Government Code mandated local governments to 

create Local Health Boards (LHBs) composed of local executives, 

health officers and representatives from the DOH and the private 

sector or nongovernmental organizations. To ensure the speedy 

resolution of problems brought about by devolution, Transition Action 

Teams (TATs) at provincial and regional levels were created. The DOH 

added another office to its structure--the Local Government 

Assistance and Monitoring Service (LGAMS)--to attend to local 

government concerns. It also provided for Comprehensive Health 

Care Agreements (CHCAs) between the DOH and local governments 

to implement priority health programs. 

A few more kinks, of course, need to be ironed out. Specific 

studies have identified these concerns, namely, the resolution of the 

issue of the inequitable distribution of IRA shares vis-a-vis devolution 

burdens (IRA reallocation bills are currently pending in Congress), 

technical assistance to LGUs in exploring other schemes for raising 

financial resources and in improving the management capability of

311 

devolved hospitals, greater participation of nongovernment 

organizations and people's organiTations in local special bodies, and 

development of alternative modes ofintergovernmental cooperation 

to deal with issues of service delivery and monitoring that cut across 

jurisdictional boundaries. 

On the part of the DOH, it can jointly undertake revenue 

enhancement projects in devolved hospitals with local governments 

just as it has done in hospitals that continue to stay in its aegis (such 

as the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City and the Ilocos Regional 

Hospital in La Union). It can provide technical assistance in improving 

pricing, billing and collection systems of devolved facilities. Lastly, 

the DOH can help local governments gain competence in managing 

devolved facilities through continued trainings.

Case Studies of Health Management Strategies 

Reaching Out: Gingoog City's Total Integrated 

Development Approach (G-TIDA) 

Puerto Princesa City's Satellite Clinics: 

A Curative Rural Network 

Emergency Rescue Naga: An LGU-Managed 

Emergency Rescue Project 

People Power at Work: The Case of Surigao City's 

Primary Health Care (PHC) Federated Women's Club 

Financing and Delivery of Health and Sanitation 

Services: A Case Study of Cotabato City 

Lapu-lapu City's Partnership for Health 


Butuan City: A Consistent Regional Outstanding 

Winner in Nutrition

Case Study 1 

ReachingOut: Gingoog City's 

Total Integrated Development 

Approach (G-TIDA) 

Virginia S. Pineda and Clark Y. Clarete 

ingoog City is on the northern coast of Misamis Oriental, 122 

kilometers east of Cagayan de Oro City and 74 kilometers 

west of Butuan City. It has a total land area of 404.6 square 

kilometers, 1.71 percent of which is classified as urban areas. Around 

56 percent of its total area are public forest lands (both classified and 

unclassified forests). The city is composed of 79 barangays, of which 

29 are classified as urban and 50 as rural barangays. As of 1995, it has 

about 17,128 households. 

In 1990, the city's population was estimated at 82,852 persons. 

By 1995, it has grown to 87,530 persons or by about 5.65 percent. Of 

these, 32.51 percent live in urban areas and 67.48 percent in rural 

areas. Population density per square kilometer slightly increased from 

204 in 1990 to 216 in 1995. 

Currently, about 3,924 households (roughly 23 percent of the 

population) live within the poverty threshold level (i.e., with average 

gross family income of P6,000 and below per month). The middle 

income group or those with average gross family income of P6,001 to 

P40,000 a month, constitutes 68 percent (11,601 households) while 

the high-income group (over P40,000 a month) makes up the 

remaining 9 percent (1,603 households) of the population. 

Health Facilities and Expenditure/Budget 

The health facilities of Gingoog City include one government 

hospital--the Gingoog District Hospital (run by the provincial 

government)--two private hospitals, one main health center (located 

within the urban core), and 50 barangay health stations or BHSs (one 

for each rural barangay). It has also five family planning centers and 

a puericulture center for maternity services.

] ] 6 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

The Gingoog District Hospital has a bed capacity of 50 while 

the private hospitals have a combined bed capacity of 60. These 

hospitals serve the whole population of Gingoog City as well as the 

neighboring municipalities of Magsaysay and Medina. Because of the 

greater access of the urban barangays to the hospitals and the main 

health center, only the rural barangays are provided with BHSs. 

In 1991, before the devolution, the city's health expenditures 

amounted to P2.3 million, or around 6 percent of its total 

expenditures. This was spent almost wholly for basic health services. 

In 1994, after devolution, Gingoog's health expenditures and its 

proportion to total expenditures increased to P10.7 million and 9 

percent, respectively. The city provided financial assistance of P500,000 

to the Gingoog District Hospital and spent the remainder for basic 

health services, and operation and maintenance of health facilities. 

Of its P184.2 million total budget for 1996, the city appropriated 

P16.1 million for health services or an equivalent of 8.7 percent of 

the total city budget. It set aside P500,000 (or 3.11 percent) of the 

health budget for its annual financial aid to the Gingoog District 

Hospital. The rest of the health budget is for the operation and 

maintenance of the city health facilities, which mainly provide primary 

health care services. 

Health 

Performance 

Gingoog City's infant, child, and maternal mortality rates have 

been declining and were lower than the average for the Philippines 

from 1990 to 1995 (Table 1). However, the percentage of malnourished 

children remained almost the same: 62 percent in 1991 and 60 

percent in 1995. The malnutrition rates were even higher than the 

national average for the same years. 

The G-TIDA Approach 1 

In the late 1980s, the Gingoog City government received reports 

from concerned citizens that people rated its delivery of services, 

particularly health and nutrition, as "very poor" and "very slow." The 

mayor at that time, Arturo Lugod, observed that the delivery of services 

Information on G-TIDA was sourced from interviews with the G-TIDA coordinator and team 

members and fi"om Quieta (1994).

CaseStudy:Gingoog's City's TotalIntegratedDevelopmentApproach 3 ] 7 

Table 1. Mortality and Nutrition Indicators, 1990 and 1995 

1990" 1995 

I,_dt,--tor _ _ c_goog Ph_'p_ 

Mortality Rates: 

Infant 44.7 56.7 36.7 48.9 

Child 61.1 79.6 50.2 66.8 

Maternal 190.3 209.0 156.1 179.7 

Percentage of Malnourished 

Children (0-83 nmnths old): 

Mild 40.4 41.3 38.2 30.7 

Moderate 20.0 14.3 20.4 8.4 

Se_re 1_4 2.1 1.5 1.2 

Tou.l 61,8 57.7 60.1 40,3 

*Malnutrition data are for 1991. 

Infant mortality: infa_lt deaths per 1,000 live births 

Child mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5 years of age per 1,000 

children of the same age range 

Maternal mortality: number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births 

Sources: Herrin (1998); National Statistical Coordination Board; DOH Nutrition Service. 

by government agencies to rural areas was fragmented and 

uncoordinated. In the health sector, for instance, the Emergency 

Hospital and the City Health Office implement their respective 

outreach programs without coordinating with each other. Mayor 

Lugod also noted that people in remote rural barangays have limited 

access to services because they live far from government facilities and 

those with low education are either shy or afraid to ask for help from 

government officials and personnel. 

As a response, the mayor's strategy was to bring the services to 

the people and make sure that the delivery of basic services is planned 

and integrated. At a specific date, various service agencies were to 

converge in a target barangay to deliver basic services. 

He called the agencies to a meeting and presented this proposal. 

The agency heads were initially hesitant because they thought it would 

require a huge budgetary allocation. Mayor Lugod assured them that 

concerned agencies will be using only their regular allocation and 

resources in the implementation of the G-TIDA and that the city 

government would provide for overhead expenses like gasoline, 

transportation and food subsidies for the participants.

3 ] 8 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

Starting with two target barangays (Bal-ason and Hindangon) 

in December 1988, the program is now on its tenth year. Its goals are: 

1. To bring the government closer to the people, and 

2. To improve the delivery of frondine services to the people, 

especially in the hinterland barangays. 

The G-T1DA team 

Through the G-TIDA, the mayor instituted a systematic and 

integrated outreach program to rural barangays. He organized a G- 

TIDA core group composed of the G-TIDA coordinator, G-TIDA 

Secretariat, transportation coordinator, logistics coordinator, and 

specific-service coordinators represented by the department heads 

of the concerned agencies. The group, which is headed by the mayor, 

is responsible for planning, identifying target barangays and 

implementing the G-TIDA program. 

BeJ_breany outreach activity, the G_TIDA sends a survey team to 

assess the needs of the identified barangay and set with the residents 

the date for the visit of the main team. After the assessment, all 

concerned agencies are called to a G-TIDA meeting, informing them 

of the problems and needs of the barangay. The whole G-TIDA 

machinery is then set into motion, bringing along all the necessary 

equipment and personnel to serve the target barangay. The food 

requirements of the team who will be staying in the barangay are 

served by the G-TIDA kitchen team. 

During the G-TIDA Day, members of the team meet directly 

with the people and their leaders to discuss the needs and problems 

of the barangay. If problems cannot be solved immediately, they are 

referred to the appropriate agency. The G-TIDA team informs the 

people about the functions and services provided by each agency in 

the city so the latter would know which to approach for their specific 

needs. 

On the average, about 80 government personnel are involved 

in G-TIDA activities. The main G-TIDA team consists mainly of the 

personnel from the City Mayor's Office, City Planning and 

Development Staff, City Agriculturist Office, City Health Office, City 

Population Office, City Engineer's Office, City Treasurer's Office, 

Assessor's Office, Local Civil Registrar, Provincial District Hospital, 

Department of Agriculture, Department of Social Welfare and

Case Study: Gingoog'sCity's Total Integrated DevelopmentApproach 3 ] 9 

Development, a nongovernmental organization representing the 

religious sector, and other line agencies. 

Services offered 

With Gingoog's integrated approach, the people in the 

barangays are provided with a variety of services. Topping this list are 

health and infrastructure support. Medical services include 

consultation, diagnostic tests, circumcision, tooth extraction, pre-natal 

care and counseling, family planning services and vaccinations, and 

provision of free medicines. Nutrition services are also provided like 

supplemental feeding of malnourished children and counseling of 

mothers. 

Infrastructure services consist mostly of road repairs such as 

grading, and filling up of potholes; street lighting; installation and 

repair of water facilities; and construction and repair of health and 

daycare centers and other structures. 

Other services provided include mass weddings, registration of 

births, and issuance of community/residence certificates, registration 

and issue Of certificate of ownership of large animals. 

Frequency of and budget for G-TIDA outreach activities 

The city conducts G-TIDA outreach activities once or twice a 

month. During the early implementation of the program, the G-TIDA 

team stays for two days and one night in the barangay. However, as 

requests for outreach activities increased, the conduct of G-TIDA 

outreach has been limited to about one day per barangay. 

The expenses incurred by the various agencies in providing 

services during G-TIDA outreach are taken from their regular agency 

budgets. No new appropriations are given except for the budget for 

overhead expenses like gasoline, transportation and food. In 1996, 

the city government allotted P189,400 for G-TIDA. 

Impact of the G-TIDA Program 

Improvement in people' "ces 

During their initial visits in remote barangays, the G-TIDA team 

found many people with untreated diseases as well as crude ways of 

treating an illness. Doctors got frustrated because many patients from 

the mountains allowed their diseases to worsen before they finally 

sought medical attention.


When the G-TIDA goes to the barangay, its medical team 

members provide preventive, curative and referral services. They teach 

the people proper health practices and disease prevention as well as 

provide medical and dental consultation and treatment. If patients 

require hospital confinement or longer medical attention, the G-TIDA 

team brings or refers them to the hospital. Through the G-TIDA, more 

people in the mountains came to know of the Gingoog District 

Hospital as a place where they could go for operations and other 

health services. 

Since 1988, a good proportion of the rural people have benefited 

from the program. For the period covering 1988-1991 alone, the C,- 

TIDA has served a total of 17,034 persons, of which 70 percent (or 

11,879 persons) availed of health services. It is only unfortunate that 

the program cannot be properly evaluated because of the absence of 

a program impact monitoring mechanism. The testimonies of some 

key informants, however, lauded the positive impacts of G-TIDA on 

the lives of the rural people. 

Eohancement _ .... " -- 

The G-TIDA approach helped build the people's capalsilities _- 

and participation in local governance. It fostered community planning 

and teamwork. During public consultations, people air their 

problems, views and ideas directly to the agencies and persons concerned. 

Their direct participation in solving their problems and the 

prioridzation of their needs improved their cooperation with the local 

officials in the implementation of their programs and projects. 

One decisionmaking example is between installing a water system or 

constructing a waiting shed or basketball court. As a result of meetings, 

the people came to realize that the installation of a safe water 

system is more important to their health. The system would help prevent 

diarrhea and other gastro-intestinal diseases brought by dirty 

water supply. Encouraged and guided by the G-TIDA team, people in 

some of the far-flung barangays were able to install water pipes connected 

to a spring using their local resources and relying on the 

bayanihan (mutual assistance and exchange of labor) system. 

Imlarovem_nt of the imag_ of the _overnmertt 

Particularly for the hinterland barangayswhere people feel only 

a minimal presence of the government, bringing the services directly 

to them can make them realize the government's existence. For some

Case Study:Gingoog'sCity'sTotal IntegratedDevelopmentApproach321 

people perhaps, G-TIDA day is the only time they could consult 

medical practitioners. For others, it may be the only time in the year 

that their barangay roads are repaired and improved. 

/_ob/ems 

encounterad 

Noncooperation of some local leaders 

There have been instances wherein barangay captains hindered 

the implementation of community development projects because 

these activities did not benefit them personally. For example, a 

barangay captain blocked the opening of the Botika sa Barangay 

(village pharmacy) because his daughter was not chosen as the 

storekeeper. There was also the case of a barangay captain who did 

not cooperate in the installation of a water facility because this would 

lessen his chances of being re-elected. Although these may be isolated 

incidents, they still point out the need to involve not only the barangay 

leaders but all people in the community in selecting and 

implementing barangay projects. 

People's 

attitude 

Some local residents avail of free medicines by pretending to 

be sick and then stock the medicines for possible future use. This 

proves to be a problem as the stock could be used by people for the 

wrong ailment. Or the medicines may be taken by individuals even 

beyond their expiration dates. The people should therefore be 

informed of the dangers of self-medication and expired medicines. 

Limited resources 

The concerned agencies can only provide limited services to a 

barangay because the expenses for G-TIDA outreach are supported 

by their regular funds only. The most common complaint is the 

inadequate supply of medicines distributed during the outreach day. 

In some instances, when a team is unable to provide certain medicines, 

it could only give out prescriptions slips to the patients. 

Scheduling of outreach activities 

Although the G-TIDA secretariat prepares a schedule for 

outreach activities, the conduct of a G-TIDA outreach is mosdy onrequest 

basis. Therefore, the barangays that file the most number of 

requests get most of the G-TIDA services.


The G-TIDA secretariat plans at least two outreach activities per 

month but the actual conduct greatly depends on the availability of 

resources, the urgency of requests and the availability of personnel. 

if G-TIDA strictly follows its twice-a-month schedule, only 24 barangays 

can be covered within one year. Considering that the city has 50 rural 

barangays, it will take two years to make a complete round. (G-TIDA 

is aimed at rural barangays that are far from city health facilities.) 

Ten years since the initial implementation, some barangays (from 

the coastal areas) have been visited by the G-TIDA Team two to three 

times only. 

Very limited time for _mXr_e_ 

The G-TIDA team used to stay for two to three days in the target 

barangay. At present, outreach activities are carried out at an average 

of one day per barangay. With this very limited time, the delivery of 

services, specifically those pertaining to infrastructure, are often left 

uncompleted. In one case, a barangay complained that the one-day 

availability of dump trucks and other equipment was not sufficient to 

finish the road repairs (filling up of potholes and road grading) they 

requested. 

Lack_og_impacLmo_it oring mechanism 

Evaluating the impact of the program is difficult due to the lack, 

if not the total absence, of area-specific data such as the number of 

people served, the impact on health status (e.g., reductions in 

mortality and morbidity), and many other important information. 

The program should therefore include a mechanism for monitoring 

and evaluating its impact. 

Key Elements for Success 

The sustained and successful implementation of the GoTIDA 

program for nearly 10 years may be attributed to the following: 

Leadership of the city chief executive 

The G-TIDA was born out of the insistence of the local chief 

executive to bring the services directly to the people. It was the mayor 

who proposed a planned, integrated outreach program to rural 

barangays, convinced the concerned agencies of its viability, and 

organized the G-TIDA team. The outreach program then became a

Case Study: Gingoog's City's Total Integrated DevelopmentApproach 323 

regular activity as the local chief executive continues to support it 

and allocate funds for its overhead expenses. 

Orgunized setup 

The creation of a G-TIDA Secretariat to oversee the activities 

and the assignment of specific tasks to agencies and personnel 

facilitated the mobilization of people and resources and sustained 

the G-TIDA activities. 

Cooperation of the bara_y officials 

Barangay officials play crucial roles in the scheduling of the G- 

TIDA outreach and its actual implementation. Although the G-TIDA 

Secretariat prepares a calendar of activities, it admitted that the 

calendar is often not followed and the actual conduct of the "outreach 

day" is dependent on the barangay officials' requests. The barangay 

officials are the ones responsible for gathering the people together 

and organizing them to provide the manpower and do project 

followup activities that may be required. 

The Loca/Government 

Code 

Although the G-TIDA started before the devolution, the full 

implementation of the Local Government Code contributed to its 

successful implementation. With the city executive's direct control 

over all the service departments, coordination in the delivery of 

services is facilitated. 

Areas 

for Improvement 

Clustering of service areas 

It may be advantageous if outreach services will be provided 

simultaneously to a cluster of two to three adjacent barangays. The 

service teams may be assigned to a specific barangay but move freely 

into the other barangays within the cluster as soon as they have 

completed servicing a certain area. This will lessen the logistical 

requirement of the team such as food and transportation and 

maximize the number of barangays served per outreach schedule. 

Strengthening people "s participation 

As the G-TIDA outreach service is practically a one-shot 

approach, there is a need to follow it up to sustain its benefits as well


as complete the components that cannot be finished during the G- 

TIDA Day. Support in the institutionalization of programs as well as 

in strengthening supportive people's organizations may be necessary. 

Minimizing dolocmt approaches 

Although many of the services offered during the G-TIDA are 

welfare services, there may be a need to institute cost-recovery 

measures so as not to unwittingly cultivate the dole-out mentality 

among the barangay people. Unless all the people in the barangay 

e indigents, it may be helpful if certain forms of payments will be 

,llected for the services, materials, and supplies being provided. 

inimal fees can be charged and then turned over to the local 

organizations that will sustain or pursue the completion of programs 

or projects initiated during the G-TIDA outreach. 

Setting up of an impact monitoring system 

To filly appreciate the benefits of the program, an impact 

evaluation system is needed. It is necessary to gather and process data 

that would allow analysis of the impacts of the projects instituted, 

such as monitoring the decrease in the occurrence of diarrhea and 

skin diseases after the installation Of a community water system. 

Applicability and Replication 

The G-TIDA was conceived at a time when only a few of the 

rural barangays have health stations. Although the G-TIDA consisted 

of all the services available, delivery of health services was the main 

concern especially in areas without any BHS. 

Presently, all the 50 rural barangays have BHSs manned by at 

least a barangay health midwife and volunteer health workers (i.e., 

the barangay health workers and barangay nutrition scholars). On 

the other hand, because of their proximity and greater access to the 

hospitals and the main health centerin the city, the urban barangays 

are not provided with BHSs. Except for the services of BHS in the 

rural areas, there is only little, if none at all, of the other services that 

could be directly accessed by the people at the barangay level. 

The G-TIDA approach can easily be adopted by other local 

government units (LGUs), especially those that have not yet fully 

provided their barangays with BHSs. They can conduct outreach 

activities to unserved barangays while working toward setting up the 

BHSs. To undertake an integrated, planned and coordinated outreach

Case Study:Gingoog'sCity'sTotalIntegratedDevelopmentApproach 325 

program like that of Gingoog City, local officials could do the 

following: 

1.Call a meeting with department heads to present the proposal, 

get their cooperation and involve them in planning. 

2.Form an outreach team, select the people and specify their 

dudes and responsibilities. The team may be composed of an 

overall coordinator and specific coordinators (such as for transportation, 

logistics, food, medicines and other supplies), the 

department heads, and a representative from nongovernment 

organizations. 

3. Organize a survey unit within the outreach team. The survey 

unit will be responsible for scheduling the barangays to be 

visited, undertaking a survey and assessment of the needs of 

the chosen barangay, setting the outreach date with the 

people, and identifying the agencies which should participate 

in the outreach activities. 

Conclusion 

4. Based on the report of the survey unit, the coordinator could 

mobilize the persons involved to prepare the activities, 

transportation, food, medicines and other supplies that should 

be brought to the barang-ay. 

5.The outreach team could stay for two or three days in the 

barangay, discuss with the people the problems and solutions, 

attend to the people's needs, and conduct health education 

and other information dissemination activities. The team 

should keep a database of the services rendered, the number 

of people served, and health indicators in the barangay for 

monitoring and evaluation purposes. 

6.To sustain health activities after the departure of the outreach 

team, particularly in barangays without health stations, the 

city health office could train residents to serve as barangay 

health workers and nutrition scholars as well as organize 

people's groups to promote proper health care. The barangays 

could pro#de allowance to the BHWs and BNSs, depending 

on their financial capability. 

In the final analysis, an outreach method of delivering health 

services is useful as an interim or temporary measure for coping with


the problem of insufficient BHSs. People benefit from the curative 

and preventive health services provided during an outreach visit but 

this is sporadic or nonregular. They should have continuing access to 

health services. To make this possible, the long-term strategy is the 

provision of additional health stations and health workers to reach 

all barangays. 

References 


and Education Sectors, 1992-1996. Makati City: Philippine 

Institute _br Development Studies. Unpublished. 

Quieta, R. 1994. Health Strategies and Intervention: Extended Case 

Studies on Good Health Care Management in the Philippines. 

Department of Health (DOH) - Health and Management 

Information System (HAMIS) Occasional Paper No. 9. 

Manila:DOH-HAMIS.

Case Study 2 

Puerto Princesa City's, 

Satellite Clinics: 

A Curative Rural Network 


uerto Princesa City is the capit_ 1 of the province of Palawan 

and the largest city in the country. With a total land area of 

2,106.7 square kilometers, Puert a Princesa accounts for about 

17 percent of the total land area of P_;twan. The city is composed of 

66 barangays, 24 of which are urban a nd 42 are rural. It has about 

25,542 households as of 1995. 

The city's population increased fi om 92,147 in 1990 to 129,577 

in i 995 or by 41 percent. About 65 perq :ent of the population resides 

in the rural barangays. Settlement ._reas in the city are highly 

dispersed. Population concentration i_ densest in the eastern coast, 

where the city proper is located. Rural barangays are scattered over 

the length of the city's coastline, with undeveloped tracts of lands 

separating the eastern from the western barangays. Five rural 

barangays in the west coast arca are almost blocked off by rugged 

mountains and thick forest. Two of thes e barangays are not yet linked 

to the city's road network system (Puerto Princesa City Local 

Government Performance Report 1994i). 

Health Facilities and Expenditure/]$udget 

The city has one main heath cent :r, 18 barangay health stations 

(BHSs), three hospitals, and five satellite clinics. The hospitals have 

a total capacity of 175 beds: 75 in the go ternment hospital, the Puerto 

Princesa Provincial Hospital, and 50 ea_:hin the two private hospitals. 

Each satellite clinic has a capacity of fc ur to five beds. The hospitals 

and satellite clinics serve patients fror _ the city as well as from the 

neighboring municipalities of Palawan.


Prior to the devolution of functions in 1991, the city 

government's expenditures on health amounted to P6.5 million, 

mostly for basic health services. This constituted 7.5 percent of the 

city's total expenditures. After the devolution, the city's health 

expenditures increased to P20.1 million in 1994 but its proportion to 

the city's total expenditures decreased to 5 percent. Basic health 

expenditures also declined to 74 percent of the total health 

expenditures with the establishment of satellite clinics that provide 

medical services. In 1995-1997, the budget for the city health office 

(CHO) and the satellite clinics accounted for an average of 4.4 percent 

of the total city budget. Table 1 shows the respective amounts. 

Health 


Under the city's comprehensive health care program, both 

preventive and curative services are provided to the people. The CHO 

focuses on primary health care. Its barangay health workers implement 

the following programs: expanded program on immunization, 

maternal and child care, tuberculosis (TB) control, family planning, 

nutrition, diarrheal disease control, environmental sanitation, malaria 

control, and laboratory services. If patients need curative care, the 

barangay health workers refer them to the satellite clinics. Such health 

programs helped reduce mortality and malnutrition rates as indicated 

in Table 2. 

The city's infant and child mortality rates are lower but its 

maternal mortality rates are higher than the average for the 

Philippines in both 1990 and 1995. Nevertheless, the reduction in 

Puerto Princesa's maternal mortality rates (38 per 100,000 livebirths) 

was slightly greater than that for the Philippines (29 per 100,000 

livebirths). The percentage of malnourished children in the city also 

declined from 66 percent in 1991 to 34 percent in 1995. 

Table 1. Budget for the CHO and Satellite Cli.ics, 

1995-1997 (P million) 

Share in Total 

Year City Health Office Satellite Clinics Total City Budget (%) 

1995 14.2 5.8 20.0 4.0 

1996 17:_ 7.8 22.1 4.6 

1997 20.9 6.2 27.1 4.7 

Source: Puerto Princesa City Planning and Development Office.

Case Study:PuertoPrincesa'sSatelliteClinics 32 9 

Table2. Mortality andNutrition Indicators, 1990and1995 

1990" 1995 

__.___or _rto Puerto 

Princesa Philippines Princesa Philippines 


Infant 52.7 56.7 44.8 48.9 

Child 71.8 79.6 61.2 66.8 

Maternal 253.1 209.0 215.1 179.7 


Children (083 months old) 

Mild 48.4 41.3 25.6 30.7 

Moderate 16.6 14.2 7.4 8.4 

Severe 1.2 2.1 0.9 1.2 

Total 66.2 57.6 33.9 40.3 

* Malnutrition data arc for 1991. 

Infant mortality: infant deaths per 1,000 live births. 

Child mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5 years of age per 1,000 children 

of the same age range. 

Maternal mortality: number of maternal death_ per 100,000 live births_ 

Sources: Herrin, A. "Beyond 2000: An Assessment of the Health, Nutrition and Education 

Sectors, 1992-1996," 1998 (Unpublished PIDS Paper); National Statistical 

Coordination Board; Department of Health (DOI-I) Nutrition Service. 

The Satellite Clinics Projets 

During the 1992 elections, the then-mayoralty candidate Edward 

Hagedorn was on his way to Barangay Napsan. In one desolate area, 

he saw a small group of people waiting for transport. On his way back, 

he saw the same group crying. He learned that a family member died 

while waiting for transport to bring them to the hospital. He vowed 

to remedy this situation if elected. 

The satellite clinic project is the fulfillment of Mayor Hagedorn's 

promise. Its objectives are: 

1.To provide rural residents access to medical attention and 

medicines; 

2.To reduce the mortality rate in the rural areas; and 

3. To reduce unnecessary suffering due to illness. 

The first satellite clinic was opened on 2 January 1993. At 

present, the city has five such clinics strategically located to serve farflung 

rural barangays with no access to health services. Napsan covers 

the southwest barangays; Cabayugan, the northwest end; San Rafael,

Case Study:Puerto Princesa'sSatellite Clinics 3 3 ] 

Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator. 

Occasionally, the mayor also visits the satellite clinics. 

Impact of the Project 

Before the satellite clinics program was implemented, it used 

to fie difficult for the barangay people to get medical services. This is 

because minimum transport time from the nearest barangay to the 

city proper, where most of the health facilities are located, is one 

hour. Also, the roads are rough and transport to and from a barangay 

averages twice per day. Under these conditions, many people did not 

seek medical attention, resorted to quack medication, or consulted a 

doctor only when their illness had worsened. Others died without 

any medical treatment or while waiting for transport to the hospital. 

The satellite clinics gave the barangay people greater access to 

curative services. They handle emergency cases aside from simple 

illnesses. For more serious and complicated cases, the clinics are 

equipped with ambulances to bring the patients to hospitals. Thus, 

they serve as vital link to the city's referral system. With the satellite 

clinics, emergency cases increased while the number of hospital 

patients with simple illnesses declined. 

From 1993 to 997, the clinics served an average of 47,000 padents 

per year. Table 4 shows the types of services rendered for 1993-1995. 

Most of the cases attended to were respiratory infections and other 

simple illnesses. Without the satellite clinics, these patients would 

have proceeded to hospitals or not have received medical treatment 

at all. By their existence, the satellite clinics enabled the early 

treatment of diseases and decreased the number of padents going to 

Table 4. Satellite Clinics' Services and Number of Patients Served 

Number of patienLs served 

Services 1993 1994 1995 

Consultation 43,665 43,360 37,619 

Confined 890 1,582 898 

Transport 338 400 363 

Delivery 36 76 876 

Medical examination 1O0 15 

Tooth extraction 590 724 1,254 

Others (pre-natal, family 

planning, urine exam) 169 

Total 45,519 46,242 49,744 

Source: Puerto Princesa City Planning and Development Office.


hospitals. They also saved people on time and transportation cost. 

(The reported cost of transporting a patient to and from the city 

proper [special trip] was about P1,000.) 

Key Elements 

for Success 

Leadership 

Realizing the need for health facilities that could handle 

emergency cases and transport patients to hospitals when necessary, 

Mayor Hagedorn acted promptly to meet this requirement. He pushed 

for the satellite clinics project immediately after his election. The 

project is currently being implemented under the city mayor's office. 

Fl_ble hiring policy 

Due to its financial constraint, the city could not hire doctors 

on a regular or permanent basis. Moreover, there was also a shortage 

of doctors. To overcome these problems, the city hired doctors on a 

contractual and part-time basis. 

Availability of facilltie_ and medical personnel 

The barangay people's access to health services has been limited 

due to travelling inconveniences (rough roads) and the length of 

time to reach health facilities in the city. The provision of satellite 

clinics, ambulances, doctors and other health personnel in strategic 

locations brought health services nearer to the barangay people and 

enabled the latter to avail of these services. 

Strategies That Can Be Replicated 

Prm, ision ofcurative services in the barangrtys 

Usually manned by midwives, the BHSs focus on preventive 

health care. The satellite clinics augment the BHS health services by 

providing doctors and curative care. Since patients can proceed to 

the satellite clinic in their area directly, these clinics relieve the 

hospitals of additional workload. They also save time and 

transportation expenses for the barangay people.

Case Study: Puerto Princesa's Satellite Clinics 33 3 

Hiring of doctors on contractual and part-time basis 

The doctors in the satellite clinics are hired on a contractual 

and part-time basis. Each doctor stays for two days per week in the 

satellite clinic assigned to him. For the rest of the week, he is free to 

work in hospitals or engage in private practice. The city government 

pays each doctor a monthly salary of P10,000. 

Synchronized scheduling of doctors 

The schedule of the doctors in the satellite clinics are 

synchronized to maximize their availability. For example, in one 

satellite clinic, a doctor is scheduled on Monday and Tuesday. In the 

other nearest satellite clinic, another doctor's schedule is Thursday 

and Friday. This way, during days when the doctor assigned to a satellite 

clinic is not scheduled to come, the patient can go to another satellite 

clinic and avail of another doctor's services. 

Use of radio communication equipment 

In the absence of telephones, the satellite clinics use radio 

communication equipment. Each barangay and tribal community is 

also provided with hand-held radio (VHF transceivers). Emergencies 

are reported to the barangay chairman, who calls the nearest satellite 

clinic for an ambulance and health personnel. If patients require 

hospitalization, radios enable the satellite clinic to make an adwance 

call to the receiving hospital. This gives the hospital time to prepare 

and have a team of medical personnel ready for the patient coming 

from the rural barangay. 

Provision of an ambulance in the rural barang_ 

During emergencies, time is of utmost importance. Given that 

a few minutes or even seconds of delay could cost a person's life, an 

ambulance in each satellite clinic guarantees a ready response to 

•emergency cases. 

Other cities can follow Puerto Princesa's example of providing 

doctors and curative services in strategically located barangays, ff they 

can afford it, cities can also put up satellite clinics. Puerto Princesa's 

San Ratael Satellite Clinic, which was completed in 1996, was built at 

a cost of P999,996. To save on construction expenses, other cities can 

make use of their existing BHSs and just provide for doctors' services.

Puerto Princesa's Satellite Clinics 3 35 

the same symptoms as other diseases/infections is urinary tract 

infection or UTI.) A medical technologist is therefore needed in the 

satellite clinics so that the doctors can prescribe the exact medicines. 

The satellite clinics program is monitored and evaluated based 

on the monthly reports submitted by each clinic. To further strengthen 

this method, periodic meetings (e.g., every quarter) among the 

doctors, coordinator, mayor, and maybe a people's representative, are 

recommended. The meetings would allow interaction among the 

program participants and provide the venue for sharing experiences, 

problems, and solutions. 

Conclusion 

Satellite clinics were established to fulfill one mayor's 

commitment to give people residing in remote barangays immediate 

access to medical services. Simple illnesses are treated in satellite 

clinics while serious cases are brought to the hospitals. This proved to 

be a good system and promoted the efficient use of health facilities 

and resources. 

Being knowledgeable about their city's condition, Puerto 

Princesa's leaders were able to devise creative ways of dealing with 

deficiencies, such as the use of radio communication equipment to 

overcome the lack of telephone facilities, and the employment of 

part-time doctors to cope with financial constraints and shortage of 

physicians. 

With its satellite clinics, Puerto Princesa City is one local 

government unit that has displayed innovativeness mad responsiveness 

to people's health needs tinder the devolution process. It has shown 

that the delivery of health services could improve, rather than 

deteriorate, under decentralization, as local leaders are in a better 

position to determine and resolve the situation in their area, and the 

problems and needs of their constituents.

C_e 

Study 

EmergencyRescueNaga: 

An LGU-ManagedEmergency 

RescueProject 

Virginia S. Pineda and Rosemarie 

O. Buan 

aga City is located at the center of Camarines Sur, the biggest 

province in the Bicol Region. It is about 377 kilometers south 

of Manila and approximately 100 kilometers north of Legaspi 

City. It is bounded on the north by the municipalities of Canaman 

and Magarao, on the east by Mr. Isarog and the Municipality of Pili, 

the capital town of Camarines Sur, on the south by the Municipality 

of Milaor, and on the west by the Municipality of Camaligan. 

The city has a total land area of 77.5 square kilometers. It is 

composed of 27 barangays, of which 21 are classified as urban and six 

as rural. As of 1995, it has about 23,632 households. 

Naga City's population is placed at 115,329 persons in 1990. By 

1995, it has grown to 126,972 persons or by about 10 percent (National 

Statistics Office Census). Likewise, population density per square 

kilometer increased from 1,488 in 1990 to 1,638 in 1995. Of the total 

population in 1995, 84 percent live in urban areas and 16 percent in 

rural areas. 

Health Facilities, Welfare and Expenditures 

Naga City has five health centers and five barangay health stations 

(BHSs), with an average of five to eight barangays as catchment 

areas. It has two government hospitals, and four private hospitals with 

a combined capacity of 223 beds. One of the government hospitals is 

the Naga City Hospital, which has a capacity of 16 beds. The other is 

a regional hospital, the Bicol Medical Center, which has a capacity of 

250 beds. It serves not only patients from Naga City but those from 

neighboring provinces as well. 

Health indicators show an improvement in health conditions 

in Naga City. Infant, child, and maternal mortality rates declined from 

1990 to 1995 and were even lower than the national averages for the 

same years (Table 1).

338 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramew.Erk 

On nutrition, the percentage of malnourished preschoolers, 

although higher than the national average, also dropped substantially 

from 72 percent in 1990 to 59 percent in 1995. Such decrease can be 

attributed to the intensified nutrition-related activities in the city. 

These activities include food assistance, nutrition education, 

micronutrient supplementation and deworming. 

These trends manifest an improved implementation of preventive 

and curative measures and better manpower and facilities. Bicol 

Medical Center, for instance, has 87 physicians, 28 nurses and other 

medical personnel. At the local level, the city has one physician, five 

nurses, 175 barangay health workers (BHWs) and 120 trained birth 

attendants. There remains, however, a need for additional health 

manpower to serve the population. 

In 1991, prior to devolution of functions, the city's expenditures 

on health was P3.6 million, which was 7 percent of its total expenditures. 

Of this amount, 48 percent was spent on basic health 

and 51 percent on the city hospital. In 1994, after devolution, the 

city's health expenditures increased to P10.5 million but its ratio to 

total expenditures slightly declined to 6 percent. Likewise, the proportion 

of basic health expenditures decreased to 41 percent while 

hospital expenditures rose to 59 percent. In 1995, the share of health 

expenditures in the city's total expenditures increased to 8 percent. 

Of the 13.6 million health expenditures, 42 percent went to basic 

health while 58 percent went to the city hospital. 

Emergency Rescue Naga (ERN) 

Emergency Rescue Naga (ERN) is the city's emergency rescue 

service initiated by the government in 1991 to immediately respond 

to disasters and accidents. Its average response time is 3-5 minutes 

within the city proper and 30 minutes for the farthest mountain 

barangays some 17 kilometers away. it follows an action plan drawn 

up by the City Disaster Control Center. 

Since Naga City is located along the typhoon belt, it is prone to 

tropical storms and typhoons throughout the year. It is also deemed 

vulnerable to floods, earthquakes, fire and other calamities. Before 

the creation of the ERN unit, emergency medical assistance to 

residents of the 27 barangays was seldom given, especially at night 

when transportation to distant barangays was scarce. This contributed 

to the high mortality and morbidity rates in these areas.

Case Study: Emergency Rescue Naga 339 


1990 1995 

Indicator Naga City Philippines Naga City Phih'pplnes 


Infant 49.5 56.7 42.2 48.9 

Child 66.6 79.6 56.2 56.8 

Maternal 150.7 209.0 128.1 179.7 


Children (0-83 months old) 

Mild 45_3 41.3 36.2 30.7 

Moderate 23.7 15.5 21.1 8.4 

Severe 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.2 

Total 71.7 59.1 59.1 40.3 




Maternal mortality: number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. 

Sources: Herrin, A. "Beyond 2000: An Assessment of the Health, Nutrition, and Education 

Sectors, 1992-1995," 1998. Unpublished PIDS paper; National Statistical Coordination 

Board; Naga City Nutrition Office; DOH Nutrition Service. 

The ERN was therefore created "to serve so that others may 

live." Its objectives are: 

1.To minimize mortality and morbidity in cases of natural and 

manmade disasters, and 

2.To establish protective measures at the earliest possible time 

to mitigate damages to lives and properties. 

ERN Structure, Functions and Responsibilities 

Housed at the LGU-owned Nagra City Hospital, the ERN Unit 

staffis directly under the supervision of the Chief of Hospital (Figure 

1). Its core staff includes one paramedic personnel, a driver, and 

volunteers. Regular hospital staff, numbering 40, are on call. 

Aside from the medical personnel/paramedics, ERN also has 

400 trained first responders and emergency medical technician 

volunteers who serve without pay because the ERN is for a _ood cause.

340 nizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the Emergency 

Rescue Naga 

1 

Emergency Rescue] 

" Naga _-'- 

Chiefof Hospital 

l 

l 

Unit 

Transport 

Services Services Services 

1 

concerned local officials, the role of the evacuation centers, and the 

action plans that will be implemented. 

ERN has the following mandated fianctions: 

1. Training of volunteers as First Responders and Emergency 

Medical Technicians, as well as training in conducting Water 

Rescue and Survival; 

2. Advising the city mayor on rescue operations and evacuation 

plans and options prior to the expected disaster; 

3. Coordinating with the City Engineer's Office (CEO), Bureau 

of Fire Protection (BFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), 

City Social Welfare and Development Office (CSWDO), and 

Office of the City Mayor on all disaster operations; 

4. Coordinating with the Camarines Sur Medical Society; and 

5. Checking "allmedical emergency kits of BHS as well as vehicle 

and equipment to be used in emergency situation. 

ERNs' standard operating procedures for emergency and rescue 

The usual procedure isto ask for the patient's name, address 

and case once a call is received. An ambulance is sent to the patient 

with the assigned personnel taking note of the patient's vital signs, 

providing eme,gency treatment, assessing the patient's condition and 

transporting him to the nearest or desired hospital. Vohmteers are 

notified, in cases of big operations, through their beepers and 

handheld radios.

Case Study: EmergencyRescueNaga 34] 

ERN's notable accompllshnwnts 

In 1994, ERN earned the Galing Pook Award as one of the 

country's 20 most outstanding local government programs. In 1995, 

it won the National Disaster Coordinating Council's Recognition 

Award as Bicol's and the country's best institutional outfit on disaster 

preparedness and mitigation. Among its notable achievements are: 

1.Rescue operations of stranded mountaineers in Mt. Isarog; 

2.Rescue operations of residents trapped by floodwater at the 

height of super typhoons Monang and Rosing; 

3.Rescue operation for a barangay during a tornado; 

4.Transfer of patients across the Bicol River after the collapse of 

the Mabulo Bridge in Naga City; 

5. Medical assistance during the PalarongPambansa held in Bicol 

in April 1997; and 

6. Conduct of regular trainings on Disaster Preparedness and 

Management to ERN volunteers, civic and religious groups. 

Supporters of the project take note of ERN's quick response to 

an average of 6.2 emergency calls pe r day in 1996 from only a third of 

this total in 1991. For 1996, the ERN responded to a total of 2,259 

emergency and transport cases. 

Prob/ems 

encountered 

The ERN problems relate to inadequate facilities such as lack 

of training area for emergency medical technicians and storage room 

for supplies. To address these needs, additional funding will be 

obtained from the city government. 

The ERN also receives prank calls. The ambulance crew finds 

out when they go to the location specified that no accident or 

emergency actually took place. False calls may be discouraged by 

asking for the telephone number and calling the same number after 

a few moments to check if it really exists. Calls may also be coursed 

through the barangay captains or BHWs who can confirm the need 

for emergency and transport assistance. The city could also 

disseminate more information to instill proper regard for ERN and 

devise ways to catch prank callers and penalize them. 

Except for occasions or events when volunteers are enjoined 

to assist, the ERN stafffinds it difficult to gather most of the volunteers.


TO solve this problem, the ERN Volunteers Group has drawn up a 

program of activities meant to sustain active membership. 

Key Elements 


Spirit of volunteerism 

The ERN's noble cause and the recruiters' motivation draw in 

more volunteers. A clear indication of popular support for the ERN is 

its 400 volunteers consisting of students and youth, nurses and other 

medical personnel. This means substantial manpower supply at 

minimal cost since the city does not give compensation to volunteers. 

It only provides them food (while on duty), uniform and group 

insurance. 

ERN volunteers have also organized themselves. They have their 

own set of officers who draw up a program of activities to sustain 

membership and who conduct training sessions. 

Capability-building 

Under the leadership of the chief of the Naga City Hospital, Dr. 

Vito Borja, the ERN staff and volunteers were trained on areas such 

as Emergency Case Management, First Aid, and Disaster Management 

Workshop for Water Rescue. Informal trainings actually took off from 

the initiative of a vacationing overseas contract worker who 

volunteered to conduct emergency management trainings for the 

ERN staff. These were followed up by Dr. Borja, who has been trained 

on Rescue 911 's Operation Medical Technician Course. News of such 

trainings spread to other municipalities and various groups, which in 

turn volunteered to be trained by ERN. These groups included 

government and private organizations, the Bureau of Fire Protection 

(BFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), BAYANTEL, youth 

associations, people from the mass media (CARE), and ambulance 

staffand medical personnel from neighboring municipalities. A total 

of 827 individuals have been reportedly trained. 

Administrative mobilization by the City Government of Naga 

The ERN is the fulfillment of Mayor Jesse M. Robredo's vision 

of having Naga's own emergency rescue services. It became 

operational as funds were allocated for its operation. The ERN group 

also persisted despite the limited resources at the start.


At present, the ERN has spawned the Metro Naga Emergency 

Rescue Network, with the institutionalization of a partnership among 

the rescue and disaster services of Naga City and its neighboring 

municipalities. Hence, municipalities under Metro Naga share their 

ambulances, fire trucks, and other facilities. 

supportfrom other 

o,izaions (N6Os) 

ent/t/esandnong 

The ERN enjoys the support of other government entities such 

as the PNP, BFP, City Disaster Coordinating Council (CDCC), 

Camarines Sur II Electric Cooperative (CASURECO II), Metro Naga 

Water District, CSWD and CEO, At the barangay level, ERN also has 

the support of the B_trangay Emergency Disaster Brigade. 

NGOs and service organizations, civic organizations, and business 

establishments also offer services in kind or cash during rescue 

operations and big events through the ERN. 

Effectivewnmmnica6onchannelsand networking 

The ERN has two telephone hodines. Bayantel's 168 and 

Digitel's 169. These are complemented by two VHF controls (148.5 

and 147.90). Volunteers are equipped with beepers. Calls to ERN come 

not only from Naga City but also from neighboring municipalities 

owing to ERN's lead role (as a control center) in the Metro Naga 

Emergency Rescue Network. Within Metro Naga, an extensive radio 

network was set up linking all offices of the mayor, the ambulances, 

and the police and fire stations. Handheld radios were also distributed 

to key personnel of each LGU. Of the 15 LGUs comprising Metro 

Naga, only four have fire protection bureaus and five have ambulances. 

Therefore, making the ERN metrowide enabled sharing of 

these limited facilities and magnified their benefits. 

Applicability and Replication 

The ERN is applicable to cities that are prone to disasters and 

accidents and where emergency rescue and medical assistance are 

lacking or inadequate. It facilitates health service delivery and serves 

as referral of patients to hospitals. More importandy, it saves lives and 

stops or minimizes deterioration of patients' condition. Any city intending 

to have its own emergency rescue and medical services can 

follow Naga City's example, as discussed in the following subsections:


Facili_ 

Just like Naga, other cities can start even with one ambulance. 

They may be able to request a unit fi_om donor agencies such as the 

Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) or the Philippine 

Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). One or more 

telephone hodines may be used for emergency calls. These can be 

supplemented by VHF radios distributed to key LGU officials and to 

police and fire stations involved as participating partners. Beepers 

may be supplied by the city or by the volunteers themselves. 

Volunteers and trainings 

Cities would need recruiters who can present emergency and 

rescue services as worthy undertaking as well as inspire volunteerism 

among the people. Initially, they may request Naga's assistance in 

training recruiters and volunteers. They may also ask help from the 

Emergency Rescue Unit Foundation (Philippines) Inc. or ERUE an 

NGO based in Cebu City. This organization is willing to share its 

experiences in planning and running an emergency rescue program 

to interested LGUs and NGOs. 

Guidelines on disaster preparedness, management 

and rehabilitation 

To ensure orderly implementation of activities on disaster 

preparedness, management and rehabilitation, other cities could 

prepare guidelines specifying the duties and responsibilities of the 

concerned local officials, the evacuation centers, and the action plans 

that will be implemented during emergencies or disasters. They may 

also adopt the guidelines of Naga City, modifying such accordingly to 

suit their own conditions and facilities. 

Naga City provides free emergency rescue and medical services 

to the people but such services have costs. For 1997, it spent P150,000 

for the ERN. To recover costs, even partially, Naga and other cities 

could charge service fee to persons servedwho can afford to pay. They 

can also generate funds by conducting trainings and seminars to 

organizations for a fee. Financing from such sources may enable the 

cities to increase and improve their emergency facilities and services.


Conclusion 

Frorh a mere vision, the ERN has become a reality as a result of 

the city leaders' and health personnel's drive to proceed with the 

project even with very limited resources, together with the people's 

readiness to give voluntary services for a worthy cause. Following Naga 

City's example, other cities can also provide emergency rescue services 

to their constituents. 

The ERN is a good model not only _br cities but for metropolitan 

arrangements as well. Just like in Metro Naga, other metropolitan 

arrangements can also pool their resources and jointly provide 

emergency rescue services on a metro-wide basis so as to extend the 

benefits to more people.


expenditures dropped to 6 percent. Since the city does not own a 

hospital, its health expenditures are mainly on basic health. 

Surigao City's budget for the CHO was P10.4 million in 1995, 

P10 million in 1996, and P10.9 million in 1997. The city health budget 

constituted about 5 percent of the total city budget. 

Health 


From 1990 to 1995, Surigao City's infant mortality rate declined 

•44.3 to 36.3 while child mortality rate dropped from 61.8 to 50.8 

le 1). These were lower than the national average for the same 

years. In contrast, the city's maternal mortality rates were higher than 

the average for the country. However, the reduction in maternal 

mortality rates in Surigao City (42.8) was greater than that for the 

whole Philippines (29.3) between 1990 and 1995. 

In 1990, Surigao's malnutrition rate at 69 percent was higher 

than the national average of 59 percent. It fell significantly to 38 

percent in •1995, which was even lower than the average of 40 percent 

for the whole Philippines. 

Table 1. Mortalityand Nutrition Indicators, 1990 and 1995 

.1990 1995 

Indicator Surigao Surigao 

City Philippines City Philippines 


Infant 44.B 56.7 36.3 48.9 

Child 61.8 79.6 50.8 66.8 

Maternal 237.7 209.0 194.9 179.7 



Mild 47.0 41.3 29.9 30.7 

Moderate 19.2 15.5 7.1 8.4 

Severe 3.1 2.B 0.9 1.2 

Total 69.3 59.1 37.9 40.3 

infant mortality: infant deaths per 1,000 live births. 

3hild mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5 years of age per ] ,000 children 

)f the same age range. 

Vlaternal mortality: number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. 

_ottrces: Herrin (1998); National Statistical Coordination Board: Surigao City Health Office; 

Department of Health Nutrition Service.

Case Study:SurigaoCity'sPHC FederatedWomen's Club 349 

The PHC-City Government Partnership 1 

Health service delivery has always been a challenge to the city 

because of limited resources. For example, in 1987, it only has 16 

BHSs and four hospitals. Considering the city population of 94,453 

persons at that time, the ratio of health facilities is one BHS for 5,903 

persons. While the hospitals are physically situated in Surigao City, 

they also served areas outside the city. 

Another problem with health service delivery is the 

inaccessibility of some barangays. Thirty-two barangays are in the 

mainland while 22 are island-barangays separated from the mainland 

by the Surigao Strait. There are barangays that are inaccessible during 

the typhoon months from November to January and are difficult to 

reach by public transportation. 

To overcome the constraints to efficient health service delivery, 

Surigao City put into practice the Department of Health's vision of 

placing health in the hands of the people. It mobilized mothers, and 

later, whole families in health care service and delivery. This was made 

possible through the Primary Health Care (PHC) Women's Club, a 

people's organization initiated by a CHO midwife. 

The PHC's stated objective is to develop skills among mothers, 

their families and other individuals in the community and enable 

them to achieve an acceptable level of health and well-being in a selfreliant 

way. With membership covering all the barangays, the PHC 

enabled delivery of health care services even in the socially and 

geographically disadvantaged areas of the city. 

The Primary Health Care Women's Club 

The PHC began in 1986 in Barangay Taft as a project of Mrs. 

Zenaida Arana, the midwife assigned to the barangay. Mrs. Arana's 

workload was heavy since aside from being in-charge of Barangay Taft's 

population of more than 18,000 persons, she was also assigned to 

Barangays Washington and San Juan. Realizing the difficulty of 

delivering health services to three barangays without assistance, she 

turned to mothers. Initially, several mothers helped in scheduling 

the children or bringing them to the center for immunization. The 

opportunity to serve their community inspired them to move on to 

Information and data on the PHC were sourced from interviews with its members and 

,from a paper by Asis (1994).


other tasks. Mrs. Arana trained this core group of volunteers and 

reached out to other mothers in Barangay Taft and her other assigned 

barangays. She conducted three-day seminars on health and healthrelated 

matters and formed the PHC Women's Club. Those who 

completed the seminar became members of the Organization. Given 

definite roles in the program, the members gained a sense of 

responsibility and became committed to support and promote health 

in the communities. 

The CHO noticed Mrs. Arana's work in Barangay Taft. At the 

same time, it also realized the need to strengthen the primary health 

care strategy by implementing it on a large scale. Hence, in 1988, it 

established a PHC office in the City and appointed Mrs. Arana as 

PHC coordinator. Her task was to launch similar clubs in the city. In 

1991, the PHC was registered with the Securities and Exchange 

Commission (SEC) so it can have legal personality. 

The CHO adapted and expanded the program all over the city. 

It provides the training package and resource persons for PHC classes. 

Classes cover family life, the roles of men and women in the home 

and in the community, responsible parenthood, nutrition, sanitation, 

and topics related to primary health care. Some of the participants 

can eventually become barangay health workers or barangay nutrition 

scholars. Upon completing the course, participants form a PHC 

chapter and elect a set of officers. 

The PHC has mobilized all family members in working for health 

and other programs in the community. It gave rise to other 

organizations, namely, the Barangay Environmental and Sanitation 

Implementation Group or BESIG for the menfolk in 1989, the PHC 

Youth (12-21 years old), and the Mini-Youth (7-12 years old) in 1990- 

1991. From 300 mothers in 1986, the PHC and its offspring 

organizations' membership has grown to over 12,000 members in 

1996, representing about 63 percent of the city's total households. 

All the members work on a voluntary basis. For the CHO, this means 

considerable savings on salaries as well as having a pool of thousands 

of health workers. 

The scope of PHC activities has already gone beyond purely 

health concerns and into livelihood and community development, 

particularly after winning the HAMIS (Health and Management 

Information System) Gold Award and Diamond Award in 1992 and 

1993, respectively.

Case Study: Surigao City's PHC Federated Women's Club 35 ] 

PHC Health Activities 

The PHC actively participates in the implementation of 

programs of the Department of Health (DOH) and the local 

government unit. These programs include maternal and child health 

care, expanded program of immunization, nutrition, family planning, 

environmental sanitation, national tuberculosis program, disease 

surveillance, and disaster management. As health volunteers, the PHC 

members are involved in the operation and maintenance of the main 

health center and 45 BHSs as well as 140 feeding centers. They handle 

recording of immunization, bring the pregnant women for pre-natal 

checkup, and assist in feeding the children. They conduct health 

education activities by giving speeches and encouraging mothers to 

attend trainings and seminars, handling the PHC radio program, and 

organizing and mobilizing other people in the community. Because 

of these health education activities, the mothers who used to hide 

their children to avoid immunization now bring them to the health 

station. 

The PHC also helps generate health information data and 

monitor health status through the community data board system. Its 

members assist the barangay health workers in conducting the survey 

and in processing the data. The PHC mothers also do the necessary 

followups, such as on those whose homes do not have toilets and on 

children who have not been immunized. They encourage and teach 

plant propagation to those who do not have herbal or vegetable 

gardens. 

The CHO supervises and monitors the activities of the PHC, its 

officers and members. Every quarter, it conducts a formal evaluation 

of PHC chapters. CHO representatives do not need to go to the 

barangays because PHC members themselves go to the PHC office to 

submit reports, and sometimes, just to meet and mingle with other 

PHC members. 

As the mothers and other volunteer health workers focus on 

preventive health care, demands on the curative aspects of health 

care are lessened. This can be seen in the lower bed capacity of private 

hospitals, from 150 in 1986 to 65 in 1995, which reflects a reduction 

in hospital admissions. The strategy that focuses on promotive and 

preventive health care has been proven to be relatively cost-effective. 

Existing estimates of cost-effectiveness of alternative types of health 

interventions indicate that cost per life saved is much higher (at least


two to five times as much) in curative care than in preventive care 

(The World Bank 1987 as cited in Manasan et al. 1996). 

PHC souca_ and funding 

The basic unit of the organization is the PHC Chapter, which is 

organized at the purok level. The next higher level is the PHC 

Integrated Club at the barangay level. The barangays are further 

grouped into seven districts. Each district has a board of directors. At 

the top of the PHC organizational chart is the city-level Federated 

Women's Club, the umbrella organization. Each PHC level has its 

own set of officers and representative to the higher levels. The PHC 

is under the Surigao City Health Office, which supervises, monitors 

and evaluates the former's activities. 

Financial sources for PHC activities include membership dues 

(each member pays a yearly membership fee of P10.00), the mortuary 

fund (contributions used for funeral expenses), fund raising 

campaigns for special projects, the cash award (a total of P450,000) 

from HAMIS, and interest on income generating project (IGP) loans 

and medical health loans. 

The city government provides support to the federation in the 

form of honorarium for health workers. It helped set up the mortuary" 

fund by giving a counterpart contribution. The city also pays for the 

services of the PHC bookkeeper. At the chapter levels, it finances 

the construction of health and feeding centers and other 

infrastructure projects. The local PHC/BESIG chapters' counterpart 

consists of materials or labor. 

For the construction of the federation's concrete two-storey 

Primary Health Care Training Center, the city government has 

allocated P1.5 million while a senator committed another P1.5 million 

from his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). 

Some prob/ems encountered 

Whenever a club is formed, the differences in the members' 

educational attainment constrain participation. That is, those with 

low-level education feel inferior. The PHC experience shows that such 

attitude can be overcome by leadership trainings that enable the 

mothers to be confident and more active. This is an indication that 

leadership trainings should really be an integral part of the training 

package.

Case Study: Surigao City's PHC Federated Women's Club 353 

The wives' involvement in PHC and community activities caused 

conflicts with their husbands. However, the PHC turned such problem 

into an opportunity by forming the BESIG, enabling husbands to have 

their own tasks and thus contribute to PHC activities. 

The PHC used to contend with delinquent borrowers. In 1991, 

it ri_corded a low repayment rate of about 30 percent. As a solution, 

the PHC required the chapter president to act as guarantor of 

members' loans. Moreover, if one barangay member has an unpaid 

loan, other members from the same barangay will not be allowed to 

borrow. With these strategies, repayment rate rose to more than 80 

percent. 

PHC Health 

Initiatives 

Aside from its implementation of DOH impact programs, the 

PHC has made the following health initiatives. 

Setting up of heodth _ fund 

Members can borrow from this fund for their hospitalization or 

medical expenses. With a contribution of P10 per year, a member 

can avail of a P500 loan without interest for hospitalization or a PS00 

loan with 2 percent monthly interest for outpatient consultations. 

The loans are payable in three months. Additional financing for the 

health fund comes from the mortuary fund. In the mortuary fund 

scheme, members pay an annual due of P30. In the event of death, 

the member's family will be given P1,000. Any unused money from 

the mortuary fund at yearend automatically goes to the organization's 

health emergency fund. 

Mobilization of men for environment and sanitation activities 

In 1989, the PHC BESIG for the adult males in the community 

was organized. With BESIG, the men became active partners of the 

PHC. Members set up the feeding center while the PHC women take 

care of feeding the children. The PHC women survey the households 

in the community and encourage them to install toilets while BESIG 

men offer labor in installing toilets. These are some examples of PHC- 

BESIG cooperation. 

Dissemination of health infornmaon 

The PHC provides health updates, PHC-related news, and 

interviews with resource persons through a weekly radio program


("PHC on the Air") and a weekly TV show ("AKO: Ang Katawang 

Okay"). 

Promotion of herbal medicines 

The PHC has a wide collection of herbal plants and extensive 

experience on herbal medicines. Each chapter has herbal gardens. 

Mothers make herbal medicines such as LSKsyrup (luya, sambong or 

sampalok, and kalamansi for cough) and liniments. These 

medications are distributed either directly to the people or through 

the herbal clinic or Botika sa BinhL Currently, a big herbal garden 

project is being planned by the Surigao City Rotary Club and the 

Makad Rotary Club. Under their memorandum ofagreeement signed 

in 1997, the Makati Rotary will buy a five-hectare land in Surigao City 

and convert such into a herbal garden while the Surigao City Rotary 

will monitor the project. 

Key Elements for PHC Success 

Women are often too preoccupied with attending to both their 

household chores and the family's needs while their husbands are 

equally busy ekking out a living. Any spare time they may have is 

expected to be spent for rest or recreation. Nevertheless, the PHC 

was able to mobilize men and women to contributing their time and 

labor to the community. How then did the PHC get such commitment 

and ensure their continued cooperation 

The members attribute the success of the PHC to Jesus Christ. 

Their slogan is '_esus Christ + PHC." Before they proceedwith any of 

their activity, they first spend 30 minutes to one hour for praying and 

Bible sharing. They believe that this will guide them in everything 

they do. 

On the other hand, in the context of local governance, the key 

success elements of the PHC in empowering people are as follows: 

Giving importance to people and equipping them 

with the necessary skills 

In organizing the PHC chapters, the resource persons motivate, 

exhort and challenge the mothers..As a result, mothers feel that they 

are needed and that they have a crucial role in improving the standard 

of life in the community. Through trainings and seminars (leadership 

topics included), the CHO gives them the capability to perform healthcare 

related tasks.

Case Study:Surigao City'sPHC Federated Women's Club 35 5 

The city government likewise provides support by funding PHC/ 

BESIG projects. 

The PHC transformed women from plain housewives to 

community leaders. With their acquired knowledge and skills, mothers 

have become more active in the community. They give speeches and 

even handle radio programs. Several of them were even elected as 

kagawads or barangay officials. The mayor likewise recognizes the 

mothers' crucial role to the community by occasionally attending PHC 

meetings. 

Promotion of cama_ and sense of belonging 

PHC strengthens friendship and unity among members through 

the celebration of important milestones in the organization's life (e.g., 

graduations, inductions, anniversaries and recognition days) and 

holding of various contests (such as choral singing competition on 

PHC activities). 

Encouraging people participation in planning 

and decisionmaking 

One way to enable people participation is through the sustaitaed 

implementation of the community data board (Figure 1). Here, the 

health status of each household is known and their needs identified 

through a quarterly survey. The smwey tackles the community's health 

concerns such as pregnancies (pre/post-natal), immunization and 

nutrition status of children, garbage disposal, water source, occurrence 

of diseases, PHC health insurance membership, and availability of 

toilet and herbal or vegetable garden. 

In the community data board, each household is graphically 

represented by a small hut. For exampie, if there are 60 households 

in the pur0k (subvillage), there will be 60 huts. The hut shows the 

house number, the name of the family head, the health concerns, 

and the period covered (i.e., first to fourth quarter). For comparison 

purposes, the previous year's quarterly performance is included as 

baseline datum. 

For each health concern, the health worker and the assisting 

mothers assign a colored circle to indicate health status. The colors, 

their meanings, and some examples of their application in different 

health concerns are as follows:

356 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework " 

Figure 1. The Community Data Board 

House 

Name 

No. 

of household 

Pre/Post-natal 

Family planning 

Nutrition 

Immunization 

Garbage 

disposal 

Water source 

Herbal/Vegetable 

garden 

Toilet 

Disease 

Health 

Current 

Previous 

insurance 

year 

year 

- -- __1 

Quarter Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Case Study:SurigaoCity'sPHC FederatedWomen's Club 3 57 


Blue Not applicable Nobody is pregnant in the household. 

Yellow Improving Malnutrition changed from severe to mild. 

Green Safe Children are fully immunized. 

Red Danger No PHC health insurance. 

By looking at the red circles, the health personnel are alerted 

on the needs of each household. The concerns of the purok can also 

be prioritized according to the number of red circles. The top problem 

is that of health concern with the most number of red circles. 

Comparison with the previous quarter will also show where 

performance has improved or deteriorated. 

The community boards of the different pur0ks are consolidated 

at the barangay level. A small hut is also used to represent a pur0k. 

For each health concern, the applicable numbers are entered for 

each purok (such as how many children were not immunized, how 

many households do not have toilets). These are then aggregated at 

the barangay level. Again, comparison of data with those of the 

previous quarter indicates in which area and health concern 

performance has become better or worse off. 

The PHC chapter monthly meetings provide the venue for 

further identification and discussion of community needs and 

problems, solutions, development projects, and plans at the purok 

level. To ensure prompt action and accountability at the 

implementation stage, the PHC uses a monitoring chart on the 

problems or needs, the steps required, the persons responsible for 

each step, the target completion date and what has been accomplish. 

During monthly meeting with larger units, chapter presidents 

report the activities and discuss the plans of their respective units. 

The meetings also serve as fora for sharing experiences, including 

problems and innovative strategies adopted by local chapters. The 

chapter presidents then report back to their members what had been 

discussed in these meetings. Thus, there is two-way communication 

between the small and the larger units. Even as the local chapters 

have the flexibility to make their own decisions, they also benefit from 

the monitoring and supervision provided by the larger units.


Recognition of outstanding perfornmnce 

Members look forward to August (designated as the PHC 

month) and September for the PHC Annual General Assembly. 

During this period, annual evaluation of each chapter is done. 

Outstanding performances are recognized based on how the chapters 

or members conduct healthcare-related programs, projects and 

activities such as: 

1. most number of babies immunized; 

2. most number of sanitary toilets constructed and maintained; 

3. least number of malnourished children; 

4. community data board; 

5. submission of reports; 

6. participation in the radio program; 

7. success of livelihood and income-generating projects; 

8. attendance to meetings and related activities; 

9. fund raising; and 

10. other community development projects. 

Among the highlights of the September convention are the 

recognition of the Ten OutstandingPHC Chapters, Most Outstanding 

President/Member, Five Outstanding Workers, and Outstanding 

Couple. The awardees receive prizes in cash and in kind, 

In_lenwntation of b_ projects 

The PHC continues to flourish because it benefits people. It 

enabled greater access to health services and medications. With many 

health services provided within the barangay level, people do not 

need to go to Surigao City. In addition, mothers have also learned to 

treat common illnesses and make herbal cough preparations and 

liniments. To reduce the cost of medicines, the PHC has put up several 

barangay pharmacies and buys direct from drug manufacturers. As a 

result, the medicines in PHC boticas are 30 percent cheaper than 

commercial pharmacies. 

Other benefits the PHC provides its members include medical 

loans, mortuary assistance, 10 percent discount on drugs bought from 

Botika sa Binhi, and 2-10 percent discount from participating 

coinmercial establishments for PHC cardholders. Members can also 

avail of loans for income-generating projects (such as retail stores, 

credit financing, poultry/piggery, food catering).

Case Study: SurigaoCity'sPHC.FederatedWomen's Club 359 

The health awareness activities of PHC and BESIG members 

resulted in better sanitation and nutrition in the barangays. Houses 

are kept clean, with most having individual toilets. There are vegetable 

and herbal gardens. Garbage is disposed of properly. Because of such 

improvements in the living conditions in the community, the PHC 

has gained the support and cooperation of the people. 

Still, the PHC members continue to explore other possibilities. 

They are now preparing to open a banking institution that will cater 

to the credit needs not only of the members but also of the rest of the 

city population. 

How to Replicate 

Many strategies can be replicated from the PHC program. 

Foremost of these is the organization of mothers' and fathers' clubs. 

Prior to organizing, the city or any other local government unit should 

identify or select the following: 

O_ganir.,erlcoordinator 

This could be an individual or a group that has the ability to 

motivate and mobilize people and is involved in health activities. The 

services of nongovemment organizations (NGOs) may be tapped since 

they pioneered people participation. The Surigao PHC coordinator, 

Mrs. Arana, may be invited to give pointers or suggestions. 

Remu_e persons to conduct c/o_es 

City personnel involved in health education may be assigned 

to teach specific clams. If this is not possible, the city can select other 

health personnel or recruit other persons who can be trained to 

eventually conduct health classes. Initially, the city may also invite 

resource persons from the DOH or Surigao City. 

Training package 

The city may be able to get training materials from the DOH 

or request Surigao City to share its own training package. In addition 

to health concerns, the training should include leadership topics, 

implementation of the community data board, orientation on the 

PHC program and the important role of mothers, and the plan to 

adopt the program in the city. Aside from basic trainings, 

enhancement trainings should be a continuing activity of the CHO.

CaseStudy:Surigao City's PHC Federated Women's Club 361 

Botika 

sa Binhi 

The members set up a main pharmacy and buy medicines 

directly from manufacturers. Smaller pharmacies may also be put up 

in barangays or even in pur0ks. 

Mortuary fund and reed/ca//oan fund 

Members pay a fixed annual contribution. In return, they can 

avail of mortuary assistance and borrow for hospitalization and 

outpatient needs. Any excess from the mortuary fund at yearend would 

be added to the medical loan fund. 

Annual awards for outstanding clubs and members 

The criteria used by the Surigao PHC may be adopted while 

prizes would depend on the city's financial capability. 

A replicating city should guard the program against any form 

of politics. This is another lesson from the Surigao City experience. 

When the city first organized a mothers' club in 1976, it was meant to 

help promote proper health practices at the barangay level. 

Unfortunately, the CHO lost its control over the program when some 

politicians started using it for their own political agenda. 

Conclusion 

"Health in the hands of the people" is the PHC members' 

battlecry. They believe that the health of the people and of the nation 

is possible onlywhen everybody works for it. Thus, through the PHC, 

Surigao City succeeded in making health everybody's concern. Starting 

initially with an activity that involved mothers only, the PHC now taps 

the contribution of all members of the family. In turn, it benefits not 

only its members but the whole population of Surigao City as well. 

The Federated Primary Health Care project of Surigao City is 

something that the Surigaonons are proud of. According to the PHC 

members, the program has been adopted in Quezon province, La 

Union, and neighboring provinces in Region 10. A similar project in 

the province of Surigao Norte called the Partnership for Community 

Health Development (PCHD) was also started in 1991. All these prove 

that the PHC program can indeed be replicated in other cities and 

LGUs.


References 

Asis, M. 1994. Community-Based Initiatives in Health: Development, 

Growth and Transformation. Department of' Health (DOH)- 

Health and Management Information System (HAMIS) 

Occasional Paper No. 8. Manila: DOH-HAMIS. 


and Education Sectors, 1992-1996. Paper submitted to the 

Philippine Institute for Development Studies. Unpublished. 

Manasan, R., G. Llanto and W. Nuqui. 1996. Financing Social Programs 

in the Philippines. Makati City: Philippine Institute for 

Development Studies.

Case Study 5 

Financingand Delivery of 

Health and Sanitation Services: 

A CaseStudy of Cotabato City 

Virginia S. Pineda and Ma. Lourdes D. Lim 

he city of Cotabato, located at the northwest portion of 

Maguindanao Province in Central Mindanao, was created 

under Republic Act No. 2364 on June 20, 1959. Under this 

charter, the city covered a total land area of 17,599 hectares and was 

politically subdivided into five barangays. At present, 32 more 

barangays have been created, giving the city a total of 37 barangays. 

The city is around 689.9 nautical miles southeast of Manila and 

is more or less 220 kilometers from Davao City. On its north is the 

municipality of Sultan Kudarat, with the Rio Grande de Mindanao as 

the boundary; on the east, it is bounded by the municipality of 

Kabuntalan; on the south by the municipality of Dinaig (all 

municipalities of Maguindanao Province); and on the west by Illana 

Bay. Presently, Cotabato City is the seat of two regional governments: 

Region XII and Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 

Vital Facts and Figures 

Between 1990 and 1995, Cotabato City's population increased 

from 127,065 to 146,779 persons or by 16 percent. Likewise, population 

density per square kilometer rose from 722 in 1990 to 834 in 1995. Of 

its 37 barangays, 29 are urban and eight are rural. The city has about 

26,900 households. 

Currently, about 60 percent of the population live within the 

poverty level (i.e., with average gross family income of P6,000 and 

below per month). The middle-income group, earning an average 

gross family income of P6,001 to P40,000 monthly, constitutes 30 

percent while the high-income group (over P40,000 monthly) makes 

up the remaining 10 percent.


The city's health facilities consist of one main health center, 37 

barangay health stations (BHSs) with seven extensions, one 

government hospital, and four private hospitals. The Cotabato 

Regional and Medical Center (CRMC) has a capacity of 240 beds while 

the private hospitals have a combined capacity of 474 beds. As a 

regional hospital, the CRMC serves not only Cotabato City but the 

provinces of Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat as well. 

In 1991, before the devolution, the city's health expenditure 

was P3.0 million, which was 7 percent of its total expenditures. Of 

this amount, 75 percent was for basic health services and the rest for 

hospital expenditures. In 1994, after the devolution of functions, 

health expenditures rose to P8.5 million, which was 5 percent of the 

city's total expenditures. About 98 percent of the amount was spent 

for basic health and nutrition while the rest was for other health 

expenditures such as operation and maintenance of facilities. 

In 1996, the budget for health services oecame P7.5 million. Of 

this amount, 90 percent was for primary health and 10 percent for 

curative services. City health budget constituted 8 percent of the total 

budget. For 1997, the city health budget was 6.5 million, about 9 

percent of the total city budget. 

Problems/Constraints to Effective Health Service Delivery 

The implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code 

(LGC) in 1992 provided the impetus for local government units 

(LGUs) to assume greater roles and responsibilities in bringing about 

socioeconomic development. This is in view of the devolution in the 

provision of basic services such as health, social welfare, socialized 

housing, agricultural extension and tourism development, from the 

national to local governments. 

The devolution of health services from the Department of 

Health (DOH) to LGUs was in consonance with the national goal of 

"Health for All" by the year 2000 and the "Health in the Hands of the 

People" goal by the year 2020. The national vision signals local 

constituents to actively participate in the delivery of basic health 

services in their communities and also provides an opportunity for 

the LGUs to manage their respective health services eflectively and 

efficiently: However, despite these meritorious national objectives, the 

devolution process also posed problems for the DOH and the LGUs 

particularly because of inadequate financial resources to undertake 

vigorous health service delivery programs.

Case Study: Financing and Delivery of Services in Cotabato City 365 

In Cotabato City, the insufficiency of budgetary resources was 

only one of the problems faced by the LGU. Other problems 

encountered included adverse geographic location of its barangays, 

low economic status of its population, and inadequate health 

manpower and facilities. 

Economic status of the population 

People of various ethnic origins coming from as far as Aparri to 

Tawi-tawi populate the city of Cotabato. Majority are from the 

Maguindanaoan tribe and the Visayan regions. 

About 60 percent of the population is composed of marginal 

farmers and fisherfolk, seasonal job workers, unskilled laborers, and 

jobless individuals. Those belonging to this group live within the 

poverty threshold level, earning an average gross family income of 

P6,000 and below per month. Tile remaining 40 percent accounts 

for the middle- and high-income groups. This implies that majority 

of the city's population are poor and disadvantaged and, therefore, 

most wanting of health care and other basic services from the 

government. 

Accessibility and tran.vportation constraints 

The city's geographical feature makes delivery of health services 

a major challenge to the local government. Brooks, rivulets and creeks 

of various sizes criss-cross and traverse the city in all directions. Eight 

barangays can only be reached by water vessels. Three other barangays 

are not easily accessible by public transportation. 

Before its special project on health and sanitation (see next 

section), the city has been providing health care at the main health 

center and 11 satellite stations. However, people in remote areas could 

not avail of these services because of transportation problems. 

Inadequate financial and budgetary resources 

The Office of Health Services (OHS) had very limited financial 

resources. Its regular budget (P4.5 million in 1992) was just sufficient 

to cover personal services, and maintenance and operating expenses. 

Inadequate health manpower and facilities 

Due to its financial constraints, the OHS could not put up 

additional health facilities and employ additional health personnel.


Prior to its special project on health and sanitation, the city had only 

11 health stations while the OHS had only 39 regular personnel. The 

OHS staff consisted of four doctors, six nurses, 11 midwives, one 

dentist, one medical technologist, eight sanitary inspectors, and eight 

nontechnical and administrative personnel. Such health fhcilities and 

manpower have been inadequate to cover all the households in the 

city. 

Adverse We-implementation health situation 

Until 1993, major health statistics and conditions showed that 

there was a need to focus more on the delivery of basic preventive 

health services, particularly to the disadvantaged groups living in the 

remote barangays. Based on the National Statistical Coordination 

Board (NSCB) data for 1990, the city's infant mortality rate was 44.0 

per 1,000 live births while maternal mortality rate was 182.8 per 

100,000 live births. 

The Special Project on Health and Sanitation 

The Special Project on Health and Sanitation proposed to make 

basic health services accessible to people in the far-flung barangays 

of Cotabato City. Its main objective was to improve and sustain the 

yearly delivmy of basic health services to all the barangays in the city. 

It developed into a P3 million peso project, which was financed from 

the 20-percent Community Development Fund of the Cotabato city 

governmen t. 

The project was conceived in 1992 during the conduct of the 

City Planning Workshop. This OHS initiative, with support of the 

private sector, later became the initial response to Cotabato's health 

care problem. It has two components, namely: (1) establishment of 

at least one health station for each of the 37 barangays of the city as 

well as the hiring of casual personnel to man the health stations all 

year round and (2) provision of minimal but highly significant funding 

support to health-focused activities such as advocacy to national and 

special locally implemented programs and projects. 

Project ma_t and organization 

The main health center under the City Health Office exercises 

the overall supervision of the Barangay Health Services Extension 

component of the project through the area/cluster supervisors while 

one BHS was established in each of the 37 barangays in the city. Seven

Case Study; Financing and Delivery of Services in Cotabato City 367 

other extensions were set up for catchment areas in larger or heavily 

populated barangays. 

For more effective supervision and monitoring, the BHSs are 

grouped into seven clusters. These clusters are in accordance with 

the subcity clusters or barangay groupings organized for facilitating 

administrative concerns of th e city government. A coordinator, who 

is a permanent nurse or midwife with extensive training and 

experience in city health programs, heads each cluster. 

All barangay health midwives (BHMs), now barangay health 

aides (BHAs), are directly under the supervision of the coordinators. 

The barangay chairpersons assist in the monitoring of the 

administrative performance functions of the BHAs. 

Addressing constraints to effec6ve health service delivery 

_£_BHS and midwife in each barangay 

While affluent cities could easily provide their respective 

barangay with its own health station and midwife, it is a formidable 

task to those that lack financial resources. Cotabato City serves as a 

model for cities that intend to provide a BHS and midwife for each 

barangay despite the lack of fun&s. 

In the city's experience, the building cost of a concrete BHS 

structure is about P100,000. At most, the city could construct only 

three concrete BHS per year. The OHS managed to overcome the 

lack of permanent BHS structures by utilizing barangay halls, and 

rooms or spaces in private homes of concerned citizens as health 

stations free-of-charge. 

Although the plan was to provide one BHS per barangay, the 

city went beyor, d the standard. Recognizing the differences in each 

barangay's size and population, the OHS also set up seven other 

stations for catchment areas in larger or heavily populated barangays. 

As of 1996, the city has 37 BHS and seven BHS extensions. Of these, 

23 are permanent structures constructed by the citywhile the rest are 

temporarily located in barangay halls or private homes. 

Another target of the OHS was to provide one midwife in every 

barangay. However, the OHS regular budget could not meet the salary 

requirements for additional permanent personnel. To solve this 

problem, the strategy was to hire casual midwives and finance their 

salary from the 20-percent Community Development Fund.


Mo_bilizati.on__le..J'e sou rce s 

Unable to hire health workers, the OHS identified the 

alternative manpower resources that can be tapped for delivery of 

health services. It sought out some 100 volunteers, mosdy trained 

hil_ts (traditional midwives), to assist the midwives in the BHS. These 

volunteers provide maternal delivery services and promote other basic 

health care services at the purok levels. In appreciation of their 

volunteerism, the city gives each of them a cash gift of P500 every 

December. 

The city likewise mobilized health services-related educational 

institutions, nongovernmental organizations, private companies, and 

civic-minded citizens. These groups provide volunteers, medicines, 

refreshment, vehicles, and financial support during advocacy activities. 

The OHS also obtained support from barangay officials. Funds 

for medicines come from the barangays. In case of problems, the 

midwives coordinate with the barangay officials and discuss any 

proposals or recommendadons. Health concerns are among the topics 

discussed during the pulongpulongor barangay meetings that are held 

about once a month. Barangay captains also help in advocacy programs 

by presiding over meedngs to plan the activities and mobilize the 

support and participation of local residents. 

Barangay clustering 

For more effective supervision and monitoring, the OHS 

grouped the 37 barangays into seven clusters. This is in accordance 

with the subcity cluster system adopted by the city government for 

facilitating local administration and management. A cluster coordinator 

supervises and monitors the activities of his/her BHS and the 

barangay midwives. 

Dividing the work of supervision and monitoring of the 37 

barangays among seven coordinators facilitated these tasks. Focusing 

on only a few barangays enabled the coordinators to immediately 

respond to the problems and needs of the barangays within their 

clusters. 

Activities under the special project on health and sanitation 

Project activities fall under three categories: (i) DOH regular 

programs implemented at the barangay level; (ii) locally initiated 

health activities; and (iii) advocacy activities for periodic national and 

global health programs.

Case Study:Financingand DeliveringServices in CotabatoCity 371 

the OHS radio program and distribution of IEC materials; 

and holding of the yearly "healthy baby contest" with the 

support of NGOs, drug companies, and other government 

agencies. Cotabato City was also commended for its 

achievements during the nutrition months. 

With funds from the project, the OHS was able to provide 

free dental services, toothpastes and toothbrushes during the 

National Dental Health Week (February), medical testing 

services during the Women's Health Month (March) and STD- 

AIDS Awareness Month (December). It also conducted 

information campaigns through slogan and poster-making 

contests, parades and symposia. All these advocacy activities 

were done in collaboration with NGOs and other government 

agencies such as the Cotabato Regional and Medical Center, 

Philippine National Red Cross, and City Social Welfare and 

Development Office. 

Imp oft p,w'oa 

In 1992, Cotabato City has been reported as one of the areas in 

the country with the highest incidence of denguema total of 213 cases. 

Dengue incidence dropped significantly to 39 cases in 1996. Since 

the project's implementation, no epidemic has occurred in the city. 

While the city's adjacent municipalities and provinces suffered 

from measles epidemic in 1996, Cotabato City was able to control the 

spread of the disease. Its measles cases during the year were at a 

manageable count of 214. 

The prevention of epidemics is attributed to the presence in 

each barangay ofa BHS midwife and volunteer workers who conduct 

disease surveillance and information campaign on proper health care 

and sanitation. The project also enabled the OHS to intensify its 

environmental sanitation drive with the hiring of utility personnel to 

handle fogging and spraying operations. 

With the implementation of the project, health conditions in 

the city have improved as reflected in the reduction from 1990 to 

1995 of infant mortality rate from 44 to 36 (per 1,000 live births); 

child mortality rate from 61 to 50 (per 1,000 children below age 5); 

and maternal mortality rate from 183 to 150 (per 100,000 live births). 

These were even lower than the average for the Philippines (Table 

1).

• 372 

ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

Table 1. Comparative MortalityRates, 1990 and 1995 

1990 1995 

Mortality rates Cotabato City Philippines Cotabato City Philippines 

Infant 44.0 56_7 36.1 48.9 

Child 60.9 79.6 50_0 66.8 

Maternal 182.8 209.0 149.9 179.7 


Child mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5 years of age per 1,000 

children of the same age range. 

Maternal mortality: number of maternal deaths per 1O0,00O live births. 

Sources: Herrin, A. 1998 - "Beyond 2000: An Assessment of Health, Nutrition and 

Education Sectors, 1992-1996" (Unpublished PIDS Report); National Statistical 

Coordination Board. 

Key Contributors to the Project's Success 

Interg_ernmenta/coordinat/on and co//aborat/on 

The city government, through the OHS, successfully established 

strong coordinative and collaboration linkages with the executive and 

legislative branches of the local government though the City 

Development Council. This was manifested in the support provided 

by the barangay officials, NGOs, and the private sector in the 

conceptualization, development, •and implementation stages of the 

project. The ability of the city government to provide these basic health 

services to the disadvantaged people in the far-flung areas by 

harnessing the support of various development actors shows the extent 

of its coordination and collaboration efforts. This is illustrated by the 

government's success story in providing a BHS in each barangay and 

additional seven BHS extensions. Barangay officials and concerned 

private citizens supported the project by allowing the free use of 

barangay halls and private homes as health stations. 

Mobillxaaon of local financial resources 

The city government was able to overcome its limited financial 

resources by resorting to its 20-percent Community Development 

Fund in financing its health care projects. Had the OHS depended 

on the regular budgetary source alone and did not explore other 

sources of funds, the delivery of effective and efficient health services 

may not have been brought down to the barangay level. The ingenious 

approach to the health service delivery problem, particularly in its

Financing and DeliveringServices in Cotabato City 373 

financing, aftbrded the implementation of a meaningful project 

attuned to the needs of the population. 

Presence of health facilities and personal in the barangays 

Since there is a health station serving each barangay, people 

have a place to go for their immediate health needs. Health conditions 

also improved because there is enough manpower to deliver health 

care services. There are midwife and volunteers in every barangay 

who implement regular health and sanitation programs, advocacy 

activities for periodic health-focused programs, and locally initiated 

health activities. Through their house-to-house visits and community 

classes, they promote health awareness, proper nutrition, and 

sanitation. By monitoring any outbreak of a disease, they prevent 

epidemics. The availability of a utility worker to handle spraying and 

fogging operations also helps reduce dengue cases. 

Mobilization of people for volunteer work 

The mobilization of approximately 100 volunteers in assisting 

the 37 midwives facilitated the delivery of health services to more 

people at minimum cost. The city in turn recognizes the outstanding 

performance of BHWs through annual awards and token gifts. For 

the government, these volunteer workers are one of the key 

contributors to the remarkable performance of the city in the 

implementation and advocacy of annual health programs. 

Barang_y e/uaer/ng 

Clustering the barangays into seven subcity areas facilitated the 

implementation and monitoring of the project. Moreover, the 

designation of a cluster coordinator for each area provided focus in 

the supervision and monitoring of health activities in the barangays. 

Clear goals/plans/programs 

Because primary health was one of the local administration's 

priorities, the city leaders have set a specific goal: to provide a BHS 

and midwife in every barangay. Accordingly, they devised plans and 

financing scheme to achieve this goal. The OHS then prepared a 

project proposal, which was discussed thoroughly in the Annual City 

Planning Workshop participated by government agencies and 

nongovernment organizations. With its concrete measures, the


proposal was subsequently implemented as the Special Project on 

Health and Sanitation. 

Strategies That Can Be Replicated by Other Cities 

Given the experiences and lessons from Cotabato City's 

financing and delivery of health and sanitation services, the following 

strategies may be replicated by other cities. 

Use of barangay halls and private homes as BHS 

Cotabato City's experience shows that there is a need for a 

physical structure or facility to house a BHS so that the people will 

know where to go for their health needs. In addition, it presents 

possibilities of substitution or sharing in the use of facilities. A certain 

venue does not have to be utilized solely for the BHS. It can serve as 

BHS on certain days of the week and have other uses during other 

days. 

Another important lesson that can be derived from the Cotabato 

City experience is its persistence in pursuing its goal of providing a 

BHS for each barangay despite the budgetary support. Through 

effective coordination and collaboration with barangay officials and 

private citizens, the city government was able to set up the health 

stations using barangay halls and private homes for free. Since the 

barangay residents directly benefit from the BHS, it is enough 

incentive for them to help the city government through free 

accommodation in their respective barangay halls or private homes. 

Of course, other government units may also consider renting these 

facilities instead. 

Provision of midwife for each barangay 

Without the health personnel, the presence of health facilities 

in the barangays does not guarantee the delivery of health services to 

the community at any given time. This is the rationale for the provision 

of barangay health midwives for each BHS who were hired even on a 

casual basis. 

Intensive planning and coordination 

The case of the Cotabato OHS imparts to other LGUs that to be 

able to implement meaningful projects, thorough planning and 

extensive coordination work must be done. The LGU attained its 

objectives for its development projects because its planning staff was

Case Study: Financing and Delivering Services in CotabatoCity 375 

able to articulate these needs, identify viable measures to address the 

problems, coordinate with beneficiaries, local officials and NGOs, 

and explore local financial resources. 

Mobi_ of local resources 

Based on Cotabato City's example, other cities can also tap 

trained hilots to assist midwives in the health stations. The barangay 

officials and midwives may approach the trained h//0ts individually or 

organize a meeting meant to encourage the latter's participation in 

health service delivery. 

Other cities could also request the assistance of health servicerelated 

educational institutions, NGOs, private companies, and civicminded 

citizens in conducting health-related activities for periodic 

advocacy programs as well as during the celebration of the cities' 

respective foundation days. City officials or representatives may 

approach them directly or call a meeting with them to plan the 

activities and specify their participation or contribution (such as 

manpower, refreshments, and financial support). 

Bam_ry clmt_ng 

In Cotabato City, the clusters matched the delineation of the 

subcities identified by the city government for its administration. 

Other cities could also follow their own government's delineation as 

basis for the barangay grouping or they could devise other schemes 

such as grouping the barangays based on their proximity with each 

other. 

Anmud program rev/ew and evahaz6on 

Other cities could also conduct an annual workshop or general 

meeting among their health workers, as being practiced by Cotabato 

City, to serve as a forum for assessment of perfolTnance, exchange of 

information, and social interaction. In this activity, health workers 

can provide information on their respective projects, share ideas and 

interact with one another, thereby promoting camaraderie and 

smooth working relationships.


Conclusion 

Cotabato City is a good example for other cities to follow. If the 

OHS just relied on the regular budget for the construction of the 

BHS, it would not have accomplished its objective of providing one 

BHS per barangay. At present, the city has only 23 concrete BHS. 

Based on the construction rate of three BHS per year, it will take 

about five more years to build additional 14 concrete BHS to complete 

its target of 37 BHS (or one BHS for each barangay). Likewise, 

if the OHS depended only on its regular budget, it would not have 

been able to provide a midwife for each barangay. Its resourcefulness 

and initiative in looking for funds and alternative setups for BHS and 

hiring of midwives enabled the city to bring health services to each 

barangay starting 1993. 

The same arrangement may be explored to facilitate the immediate 

realization of another OHS goal--the establishment of seven 

subcity District Heakh Offices (DHO), each manned by one doctor 

and one nurse. This project is planned for implementation in 2003- 

20O8. 

The city government may also hire the DHO personnel on temporary 

basis. To reduce costs further, it could allow doctors to work on 

a part-time basis. This is based on Puerto Princesa City's example. 

The city was able to provide doctors to satellite clinics on part-timearrangement. 

Puerto Princesa City has five strategic satellite clinics, 

each with a catchment area of four to eight barangays. Doctors (one 

for each clinic), who are hired on contractual basis, attend to the 

patients for two days a week and in the remaining days, engage in 

private practice. The city pays each doctor a monthly salary of P10,000. 

Cotabato City can explore the arrangement made by Puerto 

Princesa City in the provision of doctors and other health personnel 

in the subcity clusters. The city and barangay governments may share 

in the payment of salaries to these health personnel. 

In the final analysis, the implementation of the 1991 Local 

Government Code provided the LGUs the opportunity to examine 

the mandate given to them as well as their human and physical resources 

in the delivery of basic services to their respective constituents. 

The decentralized local governance policy encouraged LGUs 

to be resourceful and to take the initiative in planning, developing, 

and implementing programs and projects in their localities. The Special 

Project on Health and Sanitation of Cotabato City has exemplified 

that with creativity, political will and determination, and dedication 

to public welfare, the delivery of health services to the people 

can be ensured and sustained.

Case Study 6 

Lapu-lapu City's 

Partnership,for Health 

Virginla S.Pi_d.a 

apu-lapu City, the prime tourist destination in Cebu, is located 

in Mactan Island, about 13 kilometers away from the Port of 

Cebu. It is bounded on the north and west by Mactan Channel, 

on the east by Bohol Strait, and on the south by the Municipality 

of Cordova and Bohol Strait. 


composed of 30 barangays and has about 30,838 households. 

Lapu-lapu City has 100 percent urban population. In just 15 

years, its population almost doubled. From 98,723 persons in 1980, 

its population increased to 146,194 in 1990 and 173,744 in 199.5. 

Accordingly, population density per square kilometer rose from 1,699 

in 1980 to 2,459 in 1990 and 2,933 in 1995. 

Health 

Facilities 

The city has 41 barangay health centers/stations (BHCs/BHSs), 

one government primary (community) hospital, two private primary 

hospitals, and one private tertiary hospital. The hospitals have a 

combined capacity of 130 beds, consisting of 10 beds in the 

government community hospital and 120 beds in private hospitals. 

The BHCs and BHSs are clustered into eight health districts. These 

hospitals and the health districts cover certain barangays and 

population, as presented in Table 1. 

Health Expenditures/Budget 

In 1991, prior to devolution, Lapu-lapu City's health 

expenditures totaled 2.8 million (7 percent of its total expenditures). 

After devolution, health expenditure rose to P6.1 million in 1994 

and 8.9 million in 1995 but its ratio to total expenditures declined to 

4 percent for both years. These amounts were spent for basic health 

services and other health-related expenditures such as construction 

and maintenance/operation of facilities.


Table 1. Catchment Areas of Hospitals and BarangayHealth Stations,in 

Lapu-lapu City 

Hospital/Health Districts No. of Beds/BHSs No. of Barangays Poptdation 

Sta. Rosa Community l 0-beds 8 island 18,796 

]:tospital 

barangays 

22 mainland 127,398 

Our Lady of Rule Maternity 

Tojong }General 

and General 

Matemity Hospital 

Hospital 

Clinic and 10 

16 

beds 

beds 

) 

barangays 

Mactan Community Hospital 94 beds 

District 1 5 BHSs 4 24,423 








Note: Population data corresponding to the catchment area of the hospitals were based on 

the 1990 Census of the National Statistics Office while data at health district level were 

based 

on 1997 population. 

Sources: Lapuqapu City Health Office; National Statistics Office. 

Lapu-lapu City's budget for health for 1997 was P14.6 million. 

About 25 percent of this was for the city government's counterpart 

for Urban Health Nutrition Project (UHNP)-initiated activities while 

the remaining 75 percent was for the City Health Office (CHO). The 

percentage of the health budget to total city budget is 5 percent. For 

1998, the city allocated P4.3 million as counterpart for UHNP 

programs and P13.3 million for the CHO. Its health budget amounted 

to P17.6 million and constituted 6 percent of the total city budget. 

Lapu-lapu City provides flee services and medicines in its BHCs/BHSs. 

Health 


Lapu-lapu City used to perform poorlyin the Expanded Program 

of Immunization (EPI). In 1988, it ranked second lowest among the 

provinces and cities in the Philippines as the proportion of its Fully 

Immunized Children (FIC) to the target population was only 30 

percent. Its FIC rate increased substantially in the subsequent years: 

80 percent in 1989 and 90 percent in 1990. In 1991, Lapu-lapu City

Case Study:Lapu-lapuCity'sPartnershipfor Health 379 

even won the Most Accelerated City in EPI Award as its FIC reached 

95 percent. As of 1995, its FIC rate was 104.5 percent of the target 

population. 

With better EPI performance, the city's infant and child 

mortality rates as well as maternal mortality rates declined from 1990 

to 1995 and were even lower than the average for the whole country 

(Table 2). Lapu-lapu City was also performing very well in nutrition. 

In 1990, its malnutrition rate at 59 percentwas the same as the national 

average. By 1995, it was able to decrease substantially its malnutrition 

rate to 22 percent, which was much lower than the average rate of 40 

percent for the Philippines. 

Strategies to Promote Health 

To promote efficient delivery of health services, the Lapu-lapu 

CHO employed the following strategies: 

Regular barangay visitation and assembly 

When the city health officer assumed office in 1989, he toured 

all the barangays for one month to know the people's health needs 

and identify ways of improving their access to health and sanitation. 

He traced the low EPI performance to the absence of a specific 

schedule for immunization and the people's lack of interest or 

awareness. Access to other health services has also been limited since 

doctors did not have a fixed schedule of visits to the barangays. The 

city health officer therefore set a permanent schedule for EPI every 

week and ensured that a doctor will visit a barangay at least once a 

month on a specific date. At that time, there were only two doctors. 

Now, there are 10 doctors, each of whom is assigned to four barangays. 

As the city health officer went around all the barangays, he encouraged 

the people to go to the health centers. He goes to the barangays three 

to four times a week to check on the status of programs being 

implemented. The mayor would also come along with the city health 

officer three to four times a month. 

Every quarter, the CHO conducts barangay assembly to present 

the current health programs and projects of the government and to 

solicit feedback on the community's health problems and priorities. 

The community also participates in drawing up solutions to their 

problems.


Table 2. Mortafity and Nutrition Indicators, 1990 and 1995 

Indicator 1990 1995 

Lapu-lapu Philippines Lapu-lapu Philippines 


Infant 42.0 56.7 32.8 48.9 

Child 55.1 79.6 43.0 66_8 

Maternal 167_7 209_0 130 _8 179 _7 



Mild 32.1 41.3 19.5 30.7 

Moderate 23.9 15_5 2_8 8.4 

Severe 3.4 2.3 0.1 1.2 

Total 59.4 59.1 22.4 40.3 



of" the same age range. 


Sources: "Beyond 2000: An Assessment of the Health, Nutrition and Education Sectors, 1992- 

1996", 1998 (Unpublished PIDS paper); National Statistical Coordination Board; 

1996 Department of Health (DOH) Annual Accomplishment Report; DOH 

Nutrition Service; 1997 Lapudapu City CHO Statistical Report. 

Regular interaction with officials, concerned groups and staff 

Aside from submitting reports, the city health officer gives 

feedback to the mayor every morning concerning the past day's 

activities. He joins the Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) 

meedngs once a month. During the meedngs, the city health officer 

is able to promote health concerns such as the importance of having 

a BHS in every barangay. In 1989, there were only five BHCs/BHSs. 

Currendy, there are 41 BHCs/BHSs for the city's 30 barangays. 

Recognizing the usefulness of an integrated approach in 

addressing needs, the city health officer formed an interagency 

committee composed of"government, nongovernment, and civic and 

religious groups. The committee meets every first Thursday of the 

month to discuss health, education, and social welfare issues and 

concerns. One example where the involvement of the religious sector 

proved beneficial relates to the tetanus toxoid controversy. A parish 

priest opposed the immunization of pregnant women with tetanus 

toxoid because it allegedly caused abortion. The committee's member 

from the religious sector helped to convince the parish priest on the 

effectiveness of tetanus toxoid as a preventive medicine and corrected 

the latter's misconception.

Case Study: Lapu-lapu City's Partnership for Health 381 

Ever), Monday, the city health officer conducts staff meetings 

with all health personnel to discuss issues and concerns related to 

delivery of t/ealth services as well as CHO operations. In addition, 

there is also a monthly meeting per district among the health 

personnel and workers. These meetings provide a venue for 

identifying problems and solutions, and other strategies for further 

improving performance in the health sector. 

Adopt,.a-Barangay Program for private companies 

Under this program, private companies and educational 

institutions adopt barangays and assist on health needs. They help 

through their doctors (retainers) who conduct regular monthly free 

clinic in the adopted barangays and by donating facilities or supplies 

such as used toilets. At present, 10 private companies and five 

educational institutions have adopted eight barangays. On top of the 

health assistance, the institutions and firms also plant trees to maintain 

the greener areas of the adopted barangays. 

Private companies and congressmen also contribute for the milk 

feeding of preschoolers and Grade I pupils while a food manufacturer 

regularly donates noodles to feed children. One company even 

handled the fogging activities for the entire Lapu-lapu City. 

Mobilization of pr_vate medical practltione_ and other groups 

For the immunization program, the CHO has involved 50 private 

medical practitioners from the Mactan Doctors Organization, a civic 

organization, and nurse-volunteers from the Mactan Community 

Hospital. It provides vaccines for the group during their collaborated 

immunization program. Moreover, it also requests the group to set 

aside time for rendering free services to the barangays. At presents, 

50 doctors and 100 nurse-volunteers give free services to the barangay 

people. 

The hilots and midwives who are private practitioners are 

considered as part of the CHO even if they are not employed by the 

government. The CHO provides them trainings and asks them to 

participate in meetings so they could enhance their skills and service 

to their clients. The h//ots and trained birth attendants (TBAs) are 

required to report to the CHO every last Monday of the month to 

discuss health issues and concerns. 

To encourage entertainment club owners and managers to 

monitor the health status of their club workers, the CHO organized


the Lapu-lapu City Club Owners and Managers Association 

(LACOMA). The club owners and managers are responsible for 

ensuring that their workers undergo hygiene checkup everyweek and 

conduct peer counseling sessions on sexually transmitted diseases/ 

human immunodeficiency virus monitoring, detection and 

surveillance (STD/HIV/MDS), fertility and birth control. 

The CHO also formed mothers' support groups to assist the 

health workers. The mothers do information-educationcommunication 

(IEC) dissemination in their respective barangays. 

They help health personnel during advocacy activities such as in 

feeding the children during the nutrition month. The groups 

currently have 410 members. 

Funding from the barang_s 

Allowances given to barangay health workers (BHWs) come from 

the barangays. This arrangement encourages barangay officials to be 

more involved in health matters and to monitor the activities of BHWs. 

Depending on the barangay budget, the allowances range from P400 

to P!,500 per month. The city, on the other hand, provides free 

hospitalization to the BHWs and their families. 

Use of biological toilet for barangays short of water 

Lapu-lapu City has nine biological toilets in two barangays. 

These toilets are useful in areas experiencing shortage of water. 

Instead of utilizing water for waste disposal, ash is used to cover the 

waste. The toilets are made of hollow blocks and cement. Galvanized 

iron is installed to facilitate the drying up of the waste matter via the 

heat of the sun. The dried waste matter has been tested to be free of 

coliform and is used as fertilizer after one year. A biological toilet 

costs P10,000 and is good for five to 10 households. 

Key Elements 


Leadership and i_ of the city health officer 

To know the people's health needs, the city health officer went 

to the barangays regularly. After studying the causes of Lapu-lapu City's 

low performance in EPI, he implemented corrective measures that 

helped turn the city from the second lowest performer in 1989 to the 

most accelerated city in EPI implementation in 1991. The solutions

Case Study:Lapu-lapu City'sPartnershipforHealth 383 

were quite simple: fixing a schedule for EPI, encouraging the people 

to go to the BHSs and ensuring that there are health personnel who 

will attend to them. He initiated the organization of an interagency 

committee that discusses health and other concerns and instituted 

regular meetings among health personnel and workers. His regular 

presence and monitoring work in the barangays encouraged health 

personnel and workers to do their tasks well. 

Interaction with the mayor and baranguy captains 

The city health officer was able to push for health concerns 

during his interactions with the mayor and the barangay captains. 

He always stressed the need for health to be a priority inasmuch as 

their constituents will not be productive if they are not healthy. By 

communicating to the city/barangay leaders the health problems and 

needs in the barangays, he was able to get financing for the 

construction of BHSs and funds from the barangays for the health 

workers' allowances. 

Good networking, proper linkages and coordina6_ 

Through networking and identifying specific ways by which 

private companies, medical practitioners and mothers can assist in 

health service delivery, the CHO was able to get the involvement and 

support of these groups. 


Lapu-lapu City's health-promoting strategies that other cities 

may replicate are the following: 

Regular barangtty visitation and assembly 

The city health officer could schedule regular visits to the 

barangays to see actual implementation of health activities and 

interactwith the people concerning their health needs and problems. 

He could also conduct barangay assembly meetings every quarter to 

present health programs and projects and discuss with the community 

its health priorities, problems, and solutions. 

Interaction with city/barangay officials, concerned groups and 

staff. Besides submitting reports, a dialogue or meeting with the mayor 

may be done regularly. To interact with barang_ay captains and promote 

health concerns, the city health officer may also attend ABC meetings.


He may also initiate the creation of an interagency committee to 

discuss health and other concerns. Regular meetings (e.g., monthly 

or weekly) among the health personnel/workers may be conducted 

as part of the planning, monitoring and evaluation process. 

Adop_-Baran_y program for pr/vate cannpan/es 

Similar to Lapu-lapu City, other cities could also ask private 

companies to adopt barangays. The city health officer may present 

the needs of the barangays and identify the specific assistance the 

companies could provide such as holding of regular free medical 

clinics or milk or food contributions to the nutrition program. 

Mobitixaaionofpra,at, pmeation 

and mothers 

The CHO may request private practitioners (doctors, nurses, 

midwives) in the barangays to render free services regularly (e.g., 

once or twice a month). The BHWs can assist by identifying the private 

practitioners who may be able to give such services. 

Health personnel could organize mothers' support groups in 

cities where these are nonexistent. Following such groups' 

organization, CHO resource persons can train mothers on health and 

sanitation concerns and identify specific ways by which they can assist, 

in health service delivery. 

Bara_ funding 

Just like in Lapu-lapu City, the barangays could give BHWs an 

allowance. The amount may depend on their financial capability. If 

the barangays can _afl_ordit, the allowance may be standardized. 

Cities that lack water or would like to save on water can try using 

biological toilets. They can request Norfil Foundation, a 

nongovernmental organization that handled the setting up of 

biological toilets in Lapudapu City, to construct a similar facility or to 

teach how these units are made and maintained. 

Conclusion 

Having been awarded as the most accelerated city in EPI 

implementation in 1991, Lapu-lapu City is a good example to follow 

for low-ranking EPI performers. Like the former, they could examine

Case Study: Lapu-lapu City's Partnership for Health 385 

the causes of their low performance and apply corrective measures. 

In the case of Lapu-lapu City, it fixed a regular schedule for EPI and 

doctors' visits, and encouraged the people to go to the BHSs. Causes 

of low performance may differ per locality but the first step is to 

identify them so that appropriate actions can be taken. 

Following Lapu-lapu City's example, health officers in other 

cities and local government units could achieve efficient and effective 

delivery of health services at minimum cost by knowing the people's 

needs through their interaction with them, as well as by 

communicating these needs to concerned city and barangay officials 

and by mobilizing various groups to provide material and manpower 

resources,

Case 

Study7 


Virginia S. Pineda and Aurora M.Joson 

,Zambales. It is about 127 kilometers north of Metro Manila. 

O It longapo is bordered City isonlocated the north at the by southernmost Municipalityportion of Subic of 

(Zambales), on the south by Dinalupihan (Bataan), on the southeast 

by Morong (Bataan), and on the southwest by Subic Bay. 


composed of 17 barangays, all of which are urban. As of 1995, it has 

about 38,983 households. 

The population decreased from 193,327 in 1990 to 179,754 in 

1995 or by 7 percent. Accordingly, population density per square 

kilometer fell from 1,872 persons in 1990 to 1,740 persons in 1995. 

The population decline may be due to out-migration resulting from 

the US Navy's withdrawal from Subic and the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. 

As of 1994, about 28 percent of the population lived below the poverty 

threshold level. 


The city has one main health center, one government hospital, 

and eight private hospitals. It has 18 barangay health stadons (BHSs): 

two for Sta. Rita and one each for the remaining 16 barangays. Each 

barangay has a doctor, nurse and midwife. Large barangays even have 

three midwives. A dentist comes to the barangays once a week. 

The city government owns and operates the James Gordon 

Memorial Hospital (formerly the Olongapo City General Hospital). 

It has a capacity of 155 beds and serves not only patients from the city 

but also those from the neighboring municipalities and provinces. 

The private hospitals have a combined capacity of 156 beds. 

All services and medicines are free in the health center and 

stations. For those who want to give contribution, a donation box is 

placed in each site. in the hospital, most of the patients are service 

(charity) patients. Of the 7,438 patients admitted in 1995, the service 

patients comprised 76 percent, while medicare and pay patients 

constituted 11 and 13 percent, respectively.

Case Study: Olongapo - A Health City 389 


1990 1-_5 

Indicator Olon_apo Pbillpplne_ Olongapo Philippines 


Infant 41.2 56.7 30.9 48.9 

Child 54.0 79.6 40.2 66.8 

Maternal 184.0 209.0 138.0 179.7 



Mild 33.9 41.3 28.1 30.7 

Moderate 9.9 15.5 8.3 8.4 

Severe 1.1 2.3 1.4 1.2 

Total 44.9 59.1 37.8 40.3 


Child mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5years of age per 1,000 children 



Sources: Herrin, A. "Beyond 2000: An Assessment of the Health, Nutrition and Education 

Sectors, 1992-1996," 1998 ('Unpublished PIDS Paper); National Statistical 

Coordination Board; Olongapo City Health Office; Department of Health Nutrition 

Service. 

Disease prevention through cleanliness 

Olongapo's city leaders believe that diseases can be avoided or 

minimized through cleanliness. After the city launched its solid waste 

management project in September 1989, sanitation-related diseases 

were remarkably reduced. For instance, morbidity rates (per 100,000 

population) for typhoid, paratyphoid and other salmonella infections 

declined from 75.2 in 1988 to 59.8 in 1990 and 9.3 in 1995, and for 

malaria from 345.3 in 1988 to 183.9 in 1990 and 68.5 in 1995. 

Olongapo City's solid waste management project is discussed 

in more detail as a case study in the environmental management 

sector. Briefly, it involves enforcement of the tbllowing: putting 

garbage in plastic bags, strict collection schedule, service fee for 

garbage collection, incorporation of said fee in the electricity bill, 

and imposition of fines for violators of sanitation ordinances. Plastic 

bags are required to make garbage collection faster and neater. 

Likewise, the inclusion of a garbage fee in the electricity bill facilitates 

and ensures garbage collection. 

The. CHO plays a major role in the solid waste management 

project. Its sanitary inspectors regularly inspect their assigned areas 

and issue citation tickets to residents and owners of business 

establishments who violate sanitation ordinances (such as having


unclean premises and putting out garbage outside of the scheduled 

collection time). The tickets impose fmes ranging from PS00 to P5,000 

(or imprisonment), depending on the number of offenses or 

violations. 

Olongapo has a city ordinance, passed on 24 January 1996, 

requiting barangays to allocate 5 percent of their internal revenue 

allotment (IRA) to health and welfare. Drug allocation to the 

barangays are sourced from this fund, thus reducing the financial 

burden on the city. This arrangement also increases the involvement 

of barangay leaders in health service delivery. 

Mobilization of volunteers 

Olongapo is known for the volunteerism of its people. It even 

won a Galing Pook Award in 1997 (Top Twenty) for its volunteer 

program. One of the city's volunteer groups is the Balikatan Ladies 

of Olongapo Movement (BLOOM), which was organized by Mayor 

Kate Gordon in 1980. BLOOM is composed mosdyof housewives in 

the community. At present, it has more than 6,000 members. It 

participates in the city's cleanliness drive and undertakes various 

barangay projects. Its members who also serve as health volunteers 

work without pay as nursing aides in the city hospital, assist the health 

workers in immunization drive and in organizing and conducting 

health classes. Olongapo City's health volunteers, including non- 

BLOOM members, are about 300. They do not receive allowance but 

are provided with hospitalization benefits. 

Perforn_nce monitoring through meetings 

In addition to reports, monthly staffmeetings and semi-annual 

review of accomplishments are conducted to monitor and evaluate 

the barangays' performance. Here, causes of low accomplishments 

and appropriate solutions are identified. For example, if a barangay 

has many dropouts in immunization, follow-ups through letters or 

house visits are recommended. 

Baran_uy con.ridtat/on w/th the mayor and department heads 

Mayor Kate Gordon does not spend most of her time in her 

office because she believes that not all people can go to the city hall. 

To actually see their situation and needs, the mayor goes to the

Case Study:Olongapo- A Health City 3 91 

harangays with all the department heads. All the 17 barangays are 

visited within one quarter. During the barangay consultations, the 

people tell the mayor their problems and needs. The department 

head concerned is then tasked to take action and start working on 

these issues the following day: The people then report back to the 

mayor in case the problems remain unsolved. 

Key Elements 


Effea/veten.t/on anataw 

The barangays' financial contribution to health (5 percent of 

their IRA) was made compulsory through a city ordinance. The city 

government also enacted sanitation ordinances and used both 

negative and positive reinforcements to ensure the people's 

compliance with its regulations. To promote cleanliness, sanitary 

inspectors do their rounds everyday and impose fines on violators of 

sanitation ordinances. Garbage is not coUected unless iris putin plastic 

hags. Payment of garbage fees is guaranteed by incorporating them 

in the electricity bill. Positive reinforcements include posting of _Keep 

Olongapo City Clean" slogans and implementation of a regular, fixed 

garbage collection schedule. 

0r/p's $or po#U's 

Volunteerism is encouraged by giving the volunteers (or their 

qualified relatives) priority in job placement. To a large extent, the 

city officials were able to gain the people's cooperation as well as 

know their needs and problems by reaching out to them--through 

regular barangay visitations and interaction. 

I_ among concerned of[w/a/s and staff 

Monthly and semi-annual meetings to review and compare 

accomplishments among the barangays enable them to identify low 

performers, discuss and analyze problems, and devise solutions and 

strategies. 


Disease prevention through cleanliness 

Specific practices of Olongapo City that can be emulated by 

other cities include requiring residents to put their garbage in plastic


bags, incorporating the garbage fee in the electricity bill, regular 

monitoring of residential and business premises by sanitary inspectors, 

and imposing fines for violators of"sanitation ordinances. 

Barangay funds for health 

Other cities may also require barangays to allocate a certain 

percentage of their IRA for health and welfare concerns. The 

percentage may be set in consultation with the barangays. 

Performance monitoring and evaluation 

Regular monthly and semi-annual meetings may be scheduled 

to review and compare accomplishments among the barangays and 

the whole city. Meetings, in addition to submission of reports, have 

benefits. Through them, the officials and staff concerned could 

analyze the problems, exchange views, generate ideas, and devise 

solutions and strategies to further improve performance. 

Mobilization of health volunteers 

If there are no existing health volunteer groups, the cities could 

form an organization similar to Olongapo's BLOOM. They could 

assign people who can motivate and undertake the recruitment and 

training of health volunteers. 

Barangay consultation with city officials 

The mayor and other city officials could make it their policy to 

visit each barangay regularly. During the visits, they could discuss with 

the people the latter's problems and needs. The mayor can then assign 

the officials concerned to take appropriate action or work out with 

the people the solution to the problems. 

Conclusion 

Olongapo City made the link between health and sanitation 

stronger by integrating its environmental program with health 

activities. It hasbecome a healthy city as a result of its leaders' political 

will and commitment to good health and sanitation, the dedication 

of its staff, and the cooperation of its people. Its health-promoting 

strategies also serve as lessons on good governance that other cities 

could follow. These include the need for city leaders to interact 

regularly with their constituents, the use of positive and negative 

reinforcements to instill discipline and proper values to people, and 

regular monitoring and evaluation to ensure sustained and successful 

implementation of programs and activities.

Case Study 8 

Butuan City: A Consistent 

Regional Outstanding 

Winner in Nutrition 

Virginia S. Pineda andJazmin 

D. Berido 

uman City is located at the central portion of the province o: 

Agusan del Norte in northern Mindanao. It is bounded oi 

the north by the Butuan Bay and the municipality o 

Cabadbaran, on the east by the municipality of Sibagat, on the wes 

by Buenavista and on the south by Las Nieves. 

The city has a total land area of 526.3 square kilometers. It i.. 

composed of 86 barangays, of which 27 are urban and 59 are rural. P_ 

of 1995, it has about 46,596 households. 

In 1990, the city population was estimated at 227,829 persons 

Of these, 40 percent live in the urban areas while 60 percent resid_ 

in the rural barangays. By 1995, the population increased to 247,07_ 

persons orby 8 percent (National Statistics Office Census). Populatioi 

density per square kilometer also went up from 433 in 1990 to 470 il 

1995. The proportion of population living in urban areas decreasec 

slightly to 38 percent while that in rural areas rose to 62 percent. 


Butuan City has three main health centers, 27 urban baranga, 

health stations (BHSs) and 59 rural BHSs. It has two governmen 

hospitals and six private hospitals. The city owns and operates thq 

City General Hospital and Medical Center, which has a capacity o 

150 beds. The other government hospital, the Provincial Hospital o 

Agusan del Norte, has a capacity of 100 beds. In addition, the city'.. 

six private hospitals have a combined capacity of 521 beds. Th_ 

hospitals serve not only patients from Butuan City but also those fron 

other municipalities. 

In 1991, prior to devolution, Butuan City's health expenditure_ 

amounted to P12.3 million, which constituted 10 percent of its tom 

expenditures. Of this, about 34 percent was spent for basic healtt


and 66 percent ibr hospital. In 1994, after the devolution of functions, 

health expenditures increased to P27.5 million, which was 10 percent 

of the city's total expenditures. The proportion spent for basic health 

increased to 43 percent while that for hospital declined to 55 percent. 

The city government's budget for health in 1995 was P29.1 

million (or 8 percent of the total city budget). About 54 percent of 

the health budget was allocated for hospital and 46 percent for basic 

health, nutrition, and miscellaneous health services. 

Health 


Butuan City's infant and child mortality rates have been 

declining and are lower than the average for the whole country in 

1990 and 1995. Its maternal mortality rates, although decreasing, have 

been higher than the national average for the same years (Table 1). 

Nevertheless, the reduction in the city's maternal mortality rates (50 

per 100,000 live births) was greater than the average for the 

Philippines (29 per 100,000 live births) from 1990 to 1995. Similarly, 

the percentage of the city's malnourished children fell significantly 

from 58 percent in 1990 to 32 percent in 1995, both lower than the 

national average for the same years. 

Table 1. Mortalityand Nutrition indicators, 1990 and 1995 

1990 1995 

Indicator 

Butuan City Philippines Butuan City Philippines 


Infant 45.9 56.7 36.7 48.9 

Child 65.0 79.6 52.2 66,8 

Maternal 251.3 209.0 201.0 179.7 


Children (0-83 years old) 

Mild 43.6 41.3 26.5 30.7 

Moderate 13.7 15.5 5.0 8.4 

Severe 1.1 2.3 0.4 1.2 

Total 58.4 59.1 31.9 40.3 


Child mortality: number of deaths among children less than 5 years of age per 1,0OOchildren 



Sources: Herrin, A. 1998. Beyond 2000: An Assessment of the Health, Nutritional and Education 

Sectors, 1992-1996 (Unpublished PIDS paper); National Statistical Coordination 

Board; Butuan City Nutrition Office; Department of Health Nutrition Service.

Case Study:Butuan City- A ConsistentWinner in Nutrition 395 

Nutrition 

Activities 

The Philippine government's measures to address the malnutrition 

problem include food assistance, micronutrient supplementation 

and ibrtification, growth monitoring and promotion, nutrition 

education, home and community food production, and credit assistance 

for livelihood. Butuan's Nutrition Committee is in-charge of 

these activities for the city. It is chaired by the mayor and members 

meet once every quarter. Its composition and the tasks per member 

are presented in Table 2. 

Table 2. Composition of the Butuan City Nutrition Committee 

Agency 

Activlty/responsibillty 

Department of Interior and Reactivation of Barangay Nutrition Committees (the 

Local Government (DILG) Committees are funded by the barangays) 

City Health Office (CHO) Rehabilitation of malnourished children; In-charge of 

micronuu_ient supplementation 

City Social Welfare and Livelihood funding for family with malnourished 

Development child/children (poverty cases) ; Supplemental feeding 

Office of the City Agriculturist Food production/food security 

Department of Education, Nutrition education using TCP (Teacher, Child, 

Culture and Sports (DECS) Parent) approach. The teacher imparts nutrition 

information in class, which the children echo to the 

parents. 

Food assistance program for children, e.g., hot lunch 

Food production in schools 

City Budget Office Allocation of funding for nutrition 

Philippine Information Assistance in nutrition information dissemination 

Agency through the tri-media 

City Population Office Population control and population education 

Butuan Host Lions Club Food assistance through feeding in the bm-angays and 

distribution of food commodities 

Responsible for training the Barangay Nutrition 

Scholars in Vitamin A deficiency and eye cataract 

detection 

Catholic Women's League Feeding activities for disabled persons, prisoners and 

hospitalized children 

Source; Butuan City Nutrition Office.


Butuan City has a separate City Nutrition Office (CNO). Headed 

by the City Nutrition Officer, the CNO acts as the Secretariat to the 

Butuan Nutrition Committee and serves as the coordinating office 

for all nutrition program activities. The CNO has two assistant 

nutritionists, each of whom is assigned to 43 barangays. In every 

barangay, there is a feeding center and a barangay nutrition scholar 

(BNS). Each BNS receives a monthly amount of P400 from the city 

plus allowance from the barangay (the amount varies per barangay). 

The barangays are grouped into 10 clusters. Each cluster's members 

meet once a month. All 10 clusters also hold a monthly general 

meeting wherein the BNSs discuss plans, problems, and program 

implementation. 

The BNSs serve as contact persons for almost all city activities 

on nutrition, agriculture, social welfare, health, education, and 

population. The CNO and the Department of Interior and Local 

Government (DILG) provide at least two training/seminars per year 

to BNSs to equip them with necessary skills in program management 

and basic information on nutrition program planning and 

implementation in the barangays. 

With the supervision of Barangay Nutrition Committee 

members, the BNSs hold nutrition seminars in the barangays. Aside 

from teaching proper nutrition, the seminars also deal with 

responsible parenthood. Because malnutrition is most likely present 

when there are many children to feed and family income is low, the 

parents are advised to limit the number of their children. Otherwise, 

the share of each child in the food and other provisions gets smaller 

as the number of children increases. Mothers of malnourished 

children are required to attend nutrition seminars at least twice a 

year. If they fail to do so, their children are not given milk. 

Every month, the BNSs weigh the children. Simultaneously, they 

provide information on proper nutrition to mothers. The BNS also 

conduct regular home visits once a month. During their visits, they 

hold a dialogue with residents regarding the different programs and 

projects offered by the city government. 

The BNSs campaign fbr food production through barangay 

assemblies, meetings and mothers' classes. They encourage backyard 

gardening or even planting in the mountains if backyard space is not 

available. In every barangay, an agricultural officer is assigned to assist 

farmers. To enable farmers to buy pre- and post-harvest equipment 

(power tillers and threshers), the mayor provides interest-free loans.

Case Study:ButuanCity- A ConsistentWinnerin Nutrition 397 

Table $. Malnutrition in Butuan City and in the Philippines 

Percentage of Malnou_dled 1_6 1997 

Children 

(0-83 months old) Butmm City Philippics Butuau Phifipplnes 

cat,/ 

Mild 24.0 28.5 22.5 26.2 

Moderate 4.4 8.3 3.6 6.6 

Severe 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.9 

Total 28.8 38.1 26.4 35.7 

Sources: Butuan City Nutrition Office and Department of Health Nutrition Office 

To monitor performance, the BNSs use a spot map and 

nutritional status table. The spot map indicates which barangays have 

many moderately, mildly, or severely malnourished children. The 

nutritional status table presents a yearly comparison of the number 

and percentage of children with severe, mild, and moderate 

malnutrition. 

Butuan City was a CROWN (Consistent Regional Outstanding 

Winner in Nutrition) Awardee in 1996 and 1997. The city showed 

outstanding performance, having lowered the malnutrition incidence 

among children from 29 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 1997 as 

compared with the national averages of 38 and 34 percent, respectively 

(Table 3). 

Butuan City's budget for nutrition (including milk) amounted 

to P2.3 million in 1997, which constituted 0.46 percent of the total 

city budget. 

For its livelihood program, Butuan City has allotted P4 million. 

Furthermore, its P50,000 CROWN prize was loaned to 25 families 

coming from the top 20 barangays with the highest malnutrition 

incidence and from the top five nutrition program implementors. 

The loans are used for livelihood projects, such as sari-sari stores and 

mushroom/bromeliad growing. These loans are interest-free and 

payable after two years. 

Strategies to Overcome Malnutrition 

The city is actively implementing the government's :holistic 

approach to the malnutrition problem. In addition, it has its own 

local strategies that contributed to its outstanding performance in 

nutrition:

398 ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGoverna_ 

Use of fresh 

milk 

Butuan City uses milk instead of Nutripak for feeding. According 

to the city nutrition officer, milk is more convenient since it is ready 

to drink and can be taken on-site. In contrast, Nutripak, which contains 

mongo and d//_ (anchovies), has to be cooked at home. It is also 

hard to monitor if Nutripak was fed to the malnourished child only 

or served as food for the whole family. 

Malnourished children are weighed every month and fed milk 

everyday until the normal weights are achieved. The BNSs distribute 

to pur0h leaders a specified quantity of milk based on the number of 

malnourished children. As a control measure, the parents' signatures 

are required to certify that their children drank the milk. 

Butuan City began to use fresh milk for feeding in 1993 after 

the phase out of the United States' food commodity provision under 

Public Law 480. Initially, it sourced fresh milk from a farmers' 

cooperative in another city. However, there were problems 

encountered in this arrangement. The milk had to be consumed 

immediately to avoid spoilage. Storing it in the freezer extended its 

shelf life but many complained that it was too cold to drink. Children 

also got diarrhea from drinking the milk. The city nutrition office 

was able to solve this problem by shifting to liquid milk from Australia. 

Such milk can be stored up to nine months and was cheaper than 

local milk by 10 percent. 

The city spent P1.4 million for milk in 1997. For 1998, its 

approved budget for milk was P1.5 million. But since milk provision 

was a temporary project, the BNSs told mothers not to depend on it. 

Rather, the mothers were reminded to apply what they have learned 

from nutrition seminars on the right kind of food to feed their 

children. 

Barangay Nutrition Committee program planning seminars 

Butuan City Nutrition personnel and DILG staff conduct 

nutrition program planning seminars with barangay leaders. They 

compare the nutritional status of the purok in the barangay and guide 

the leaders in making their own plans for each quarter by asking them 

to identify problems, think of solutions, look for funding sources if 

needed, assign people to handle problems, and make a timetable of 

activities.

Case Study:ButuanCity -.A ConsistentWinnerinNutrition 399 

Searchfor Bulawanong (Golden) Bamngay 

Butuan City conducts an annual "Search for Bulawanong 

(Golden) Barangay." Every quarter, the performance of the barangays 

is evaluated using the following criteria: food production, clean and 

green, barangay record keeping, decrease in malnutrition, presence 

of herbal and communal garden, livelihood program, primary health 

care activities, barangay nutrition projects, presence of garbage 

receptacles, sports facilities, availability of a drug abuse prevention 

program, parents-teachers assembly, maintenance of barangay 

facilities (such as health stations), and awards and citations for the 

past two years. Awards for each winner (an urban barangay and a 

rural barangay for each prize) amount to P100,000 for the first prize, 

P75,000 for the second prize, and P50,000 for the third prize. 

and 

ofworst 

The barangays are ranked based on the number of malnourished 

children. During Association of Barangay Captains meetings, the 

names of the barangays that topped the list in terms of malnutrition 

are announced. The problems of these worst-performing barangays 

and appropriate actions to deal with them are discussed accordingly. 

_are-Food Project 

Under the Share-Food Project of Barangay Golden Ribbon, welloff 

families sponsor malnourished children by feeding the latter for 

three months. As a result, the problem of severe malnutrition was 

eradicated. At present, the project concentrates on moderately and 

mildly malnourished children. The other four barangays in the city 

are likewise replicating the project to help overcome their own 

malnutrition problems. 

Key Elements 


A_l_ of holistic apprm_h 

The city nutrition office realizes that the feeding project 

provides only immediate and temporary solution to malnutrition. The 

problem will remain and even worsen if its underlying causes are not 

addressed. Butuan City has identified the root causes as poverty/ 

unemployment, mothers' lack of knowledge, and the large number 

of children per family. It addressed these problems through livelihood 

projects, food production, nutrition seminars, and dissemination of


the advantages of responsible parenthood. Furthermore, its "Search 

for the Golden Barangay" covers a wide range of concerns, thereby 

promoting cooperation from barangay leaders and their constituents 

in the implementation of nutrition, health, cleanliness programs, and 

other projects. 

Planning 

During program planning seminars and meetings between 

nutrition personnel and barangay leaders, problems and causes of 

low performance are identified. Thereafter, specific plans and 

measures to deal with such problems are brought up to help improve 

the barangay performance for succeeding periods. 

o/te 

f00al.g 

When food for malnourished children has to be cooked at home, 

as in the case of Nutripak, it is possible that the food is not. taken 

exclusively by the malnourished children but instead, is shared with 

other family members with no nutrition problems. Use of ready-todrink 

milk enables on-site feeding, which ensures that the target 

beneficiaries are the ones fed. 

Rg,,iti 

ofout nding ,,ndwontp,-fonn 

Competition for the Golden BarangayAward motivates barangay 

leaders and constituents to give their best performance. Likewise, 

because ranking and announcing the names of worst performers are 

embarrassing, leaders and their constituents are prompted to do better 

next time. 

_hip and _ of city officials 

The leadership provided by the mayor and the rest of the Butuan 

City Nutrition Committee, together with the active and sustained 

implementation of activities by the officials and staff of the City Nutrition 

Office, resulted in the city's outstanding nutrition performance. 

The city officials' commitment to overcome the malnutrition problem 

is likewise reflected in the funds allocated for nutrition-related 

activities, such as milk feeding and livelihood projects.

Case Study:ButuanCity- A ConsistentWinnerinNutrition 401 

Strategies 

That Can Be Replicated 

Barangccy Nutrition Progrmn planning seminars 

The Nutrition Office and DILG personnel could initiate 

nutrition program planning seminars in every barangay. Initially, they 

could assist the barangay leaders in making quarterly nutrition plans 

and reviewing the accomplishments. This may be done by asking the 

leaders to.identify problems, devise solutions, specify funding sources 

if necessary, assign people to handle the problems, and make a 

timetable for accomplishing tasks. 

I_ of outstanding performers and worst performers 

Other cities may also launch their own contest for the most 

outstanding barangay. Cash prizes for winners will have to depend 

on the financial capability of the city. Buman City's criteria for "Golden 

Barangay" may also be used or modified by these cities. 

Barangays with the most number of malnourished children may 

also be identified and ranked. Meetings with these barangays may be 

set up to discuss problems, identify solutions, and come up with ways 

to improve their performance. 

Share-Food Project 

Barangay officials can request well-off families to sponsor the 

meals of malnourished children for a certain period. 

Useof or food 

On-site feeding may be done using milk or other ready-to-eat 

food. Instead of allowing the food to be taken home, the barangay 

can opt to cook the food collectively in feeding centers, with mothers 

taking turns in cooking. 

Some cities may not have the resources to provide credit for 

livelihood projects. They could search for possible loan sources such 

as nongovernment organizations (e.g., Tulay sa Pag-Unlad, Technology 

and Livelihood Resource Center or TLRC conduits) and disseminate 

these information to the people. Moreover, they could also encourage 

people interested in livelihood projects to pool their resources 

together: In such system called "paluwagan," the participants regularly

402. ManagingUrbanizationUndera DecentralizedGovernanceFramework 

contribute money into a common fund, and then take turns receiving 

the total collection for a specified period. To discourage delinquency 

and fund misuse, initiators could impose a punishment to members 

who remissed on their payment or used the money for other purposes. 

Conclusion 

In dealing with the malnutrition problem, the Philippine 

government has adopted a holisdc approach through food assistance, 

micronutrien t supplementation and fortification, nutrition education, 

food production, and credit assistance for livelihood programs. The 

extent of the implementation of such method, however, differs for 

each local government unit (LGU). Butuan City can be considered a 

model city as it actively applied the holistic approach and even 

initiated additional strategies to address its own malnutrition problem. 

Its CROWN Award is proof of its outstanding nutrition performance. 

Following Butuan City's example and replicating its relevant strategies 

would help improve the nutrition performance of other cities and 

LGUs in the country.

About theAuthors 

Raul S.Anlocotan is Supervising Economic Development Specialist of 

National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Regional Office 

VI (Western Visayas). Amaster's degree holder in business management 

from the University of the Philippines, his expertise is project 

development. He is also a faculty member of the Graduate School of the 

University of San Agustin in Iloilo City where he teaches economics, 

business administration and strategic planning. 

Casimira V. Balandra is the Regional Director of NEDA Regional OfriceX 

(Northern Mindanao). She holds a master's degree in Economics 

from the Notre Dame University and a Graduate Diploma in Integrated 

Regional/Rural Development Planning from the Development Study 

Center, Israel. She has written guides on population development integration 

in land use planning and on the integration of gender concerns 

in regional and local planning. She has likewise authored a number of 

papers on the competitiveness of Cagayan de Oro City. 

Jazmin D. Berido is Economic Development Specialist II of NEDA Regional 

Office XIII (Caraga). She is especially involved in information 

and advocacy activities, being her office's information officer-designate. 

She has a bachelor's degree in Development Communication from Xavier 

University, Ateneo de Cagayan. 

Rosemarie O. Buan is Supervising Economic Development Specialist 

of NEDA Regional Office V (Bicol). She finished AB Sociology from the 

University of the Philippines. Her interests include social development 

planning including population/women and development, and social 

mob'dization work. 

Carmel P. Chammag is Senior Economic Development Specialist of 

NEDA-CAR (Cordillera Administrative Region) office. She has a 

bachelor's degree in Economics from the University of the Philippines 

(UP) School of Economics and a master's degree in Social and Development 

Studies from UP CoUege-Baguio. She spedalizes in socioeconomic 

and physical planning.

Clark Y. Clarete is formerly the regional development coordinator of 

the health subsector for Region X (Northern Mindanao). H_efinished 

Master of Engineering in Natural Resources DeVelopment and Management 

at the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok. Currently, he is the 

Chief Economic Development Specialist of the Macro Inter-sectoral 

Coordination and Assistance Division of NEDA Regional Office X. 

Aurora M. Joson is Chief Economic Development Specialist of NEDA 

Regional Office III (Central Luzon) where she heads the Social Development 

Division. She has a master's degree in Urban and Regional Planning 

from the University of the Philippines. Her expertise is regional 

planning. 

John ny T. Lim is the Chief of the Technical Division of NEDA Regional 

Office XIII (Caraga). He holds a master's degree in Economics from 

the University of Wales, United Kingdom. He specializes in social planning 

and epidemiology. 

Mal Lourdes (Sittie Mariam) D. Lira, A1Haj is the Regional Director of 

NEDA Regional Office XII (Southern Mindanao). She is a Ph.D. candidate 

in Economics at the University of the Philippines. She has been 

involved in regional socioeconomic development as well as in physical 

planning, investment programming, monitoring and eyaluation, and in 

peace and development efforts in conflict areas of Southern Philippines. 

She is the Vice-Chairperson of the Regional Development Council for 

Southern Mindanao. 

Rosario G. Manasan is a Senior Research Fellow at the Philippine Institute 

for Development Studies (PIDS). She holds a Ph.D. in Economics 

from the UP School of Economics and pursued postdoctoral studies at 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She specializes in public finance 

and fiscal policy and has written and published numerous studies 

on these areas. She has also served as adviser andconsultant to many 

government, international and private institutions. 

Ruben G. Mercado, a Research Associate at PIDS, has written and published 

studies on regional and urban development, public ,finance, and 

population and development. He has a master's degree in Policy Analysis 

from Saitama University, Japan, as well as in Demography from the 

University of the Philippines. He also received a Post-Graduate Diploma 

in Development Economics at the Institute of Developing Economies 

Advanced Schoc

Virginia S. Pineda was formerly a Research Associate at PIDS. She has a 

master's degree in Economics from the UP School of Economics. She 

has written studies on international trade, health economics, public finance 

and governance. 

Ross O_ Quisao ¢urrendy works with the International Labor Affairs 

Service, Department of Labor and Employment as Senior Labor and 

Employment Officer. Previously, he worked as Research Analyst at PIDS. 

His research interests include the role of the Catholic Church and other 

nongovernment organizations in Philippine society, decentralization and 

Philippine foreign policy. He has masteral units in Philippine Studies 

(major in Development Studies) from the College of Liberal Arts, De La 

Salle University-Taft. 

Anicia C. Sagos was formerly Senior Research Specialist at PIDS. Currendy, 

she works at the Asian Development Bank as Technical ConsultanL 

She finished BS Social Science at the University of the Philippines 

and also took up the Program in Development Economics at the UP 

School of Economics. She is finishing her M.A in Urban and Regional 

Planning also at UP. 

Victor R. Ubaldo, a licensed engineer, is Chief Economic Development 

Specialist at NEDA Regional Office III (Central Luzon) and formerly at 

NEDA Regional Office V (Bicol). He has a master's degree in Rural Resources 

and Environmental Policy from the University of London, and a 

bachelor's degree in Agricultural Engineering from the University of 

the Philippines-Los Bafios. His areas of expertise include environmental 

impact assessments, strategic planning, and physical and land use 

planning.

Metropolitan Arrangements - Philippine Institute for Development ...

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