The Ardingly College Journal of History & International Relations

Timeline
Volume 1: 2011-12
The Middle East
The Ardingly College Journal of
History & International Relations
Featuring articles by Major General P. Cordingley, Dr H. Kissinger and Professor J. Ralph

Timeline
The Ardingly College Journal of History & International Relations
Volume 1: The Middle East
11th Century Cottoniana or Anglo-Saxon Map of the Middle East
Staff Editor: Mr M. Jennings
Student Editor: Charles Ward (U6th)
Copy Editor: Bethany Reyniers (L6th)
Ardingly Student Contributors: Jenny Elwin, Axel Fithen, Gustav Fithen, Thomas Gibbens,
John Gibson, Amy Haines, Anastasia Harrington, Thomas O’Dell, Abidine Sakande, Kaan Tuncell,
Charles Ward and Johannes Wullenweber
Other Contributors are:
Mr R. Alston, former Chair of Governors, Ardingly College & former UK Ambassador to the Oman
Major General P. Cordingley, former commander of 7th Armoured Brigade during 1st Gulf War
Tobias Chesser (Student of Hawthorns Prep School)
Mr M. Jennings, Head of History, Ardingly College
Mr A. Kendry, Theologian
Mr D. Maclean, Head of Divinity, Ardingly College
Professor J. Ralph, Professor of International Relations at Leeds University
And Dr H. Kissinger, former US Secretary of State
Images from the front cover are of Jerusalem, a NATO airstrike on Gadaffi’s forces near Benghazi,
Sultan Mehmet II and Colonel Gadaffi.

Contents
Editorials
Staff – Mr M. Jennings, Head of Department
Student – Charles Ward (U6th)
history articles
Tel Megiddo and the Politics of the Middle East, by Mr D. McLean Page 1
Holy, Holy, Holy: A theological history of Jerusalem in 3 Faiths by Mr A. Kendry Page 3
The 1st Crusade and the Capture of Jerusalem, 1099 by Axel Fithen Page 7
Was the ability of Jerusalem’s rulers the main reason for the survival of the Page 10
estates during the twelfth century By Anastasia Harrington
1187, The Battle of Hattin and The Capture of Jerusalem by John Gibson Page 14
Profile of Saladin by Charles Ward Page 17
Profile of Richard ‘the Lionheart’ by Tobias Chesser Page 19
The Great Siege of Constantinople in 1453 by Mr M. Jennings Page 21
Photomontage of civil strife in Syria by Thomas Gibbens Page 46
What does Turkey’s relationship with Syria mean to the region, Page 47
the West and to itself By Kaan Tuncel
Where to now Israel Israel’s foreign policy challenges by Mr M. Jennings Page 49
Photomontage of recent events in Iran by Thomas Gibbens Page 52
American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East 2011 Page 53
by Professor J. Ralph, Leeds University
Defining a U.S. role in the Arab Spring by Dr H. Kissinger Page 56
The Last Word Page 58
The First Three Afghan Wars by Mr R. Alston CMG, QSO, DL Page 26
The Arab Revolt 1916-18 by Gustav Fithen Page 29
Reflections on the First Gulf War by Major General P. Cordingley DSO, DSc, FRGS Page 31
International Relations articles
Map & commentary of Dictatorial Leaders in the Middle East of 2011 Page 35
by Abidine Sakande & Johannes Wullenweber
Photomontage of the Tunisian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens Page 37
Tunisia, the first of the Arab Spring revolutions by Thomas O’Dell Page 38
Photomontage of the Egyptian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens Page 40
1001 Egyptian Knights: A Drama in Three Acts – Page 41
Egypt and the on-going revolution by Amy Haines
The Libyan Revolution by Jenny Elwin Page 43

Staff Editorial...
Welcome to
the first issue of
Timeline, the
Ardingly College
Journal of History
and International
Relations. Timeline
combines these
two important
and popular
subjects into one
publication so that
current and historical themes can be explored and their
significance over time more fully understood. That explains
why the Journal is called Timeline. So why choose the
Middle East as Timeline’s first theme Well, since work on
this began back in the summer of 2011 and this journal’s
purpose is to examine the relationship between the past
and the present, I could think of no more appropriate and
relevant case study to our time than the Middle East.
Over the last 18 months, the attention of the world has
been captivated by civil wars in Libya and Syria and by
revolutions and other popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt
and elsewhere. Consequently, a number of the articles by
Ardingly students in the second half of the journal reflect
this. However, last year the West took more than just an
interest in the Middle East. In the case of Libya, NATO’s
military intervention raised the paradigm of the often
stormy relationship between the West and the Middle
East. Professor Ralph’s article explores how the West’s
method of legitimising its use of force may cause it further
problems with other countries on the UN security council
as well as the Middle East in the future should the need
for intervention arise again. With the conflict in Syria
unresolved that situation is more than just a possibility.
With the grim spectre of the West’s lengthy and costly
involvement in Afghanistan, Dr Henry Kissinger’s article
explores how one western country, the U.S. is reaching for
a new role during this prolonged Arab Spring. He explains
what challenges and choices the U.S. government is facing.
These themes and tough choices are echoed throughout
the West. Israel too has had to seriously rethink its foreign
relations not just with its former allies but also Iran and
Palestine. Much of the future of the region (and potentially
the world) hangs upon how successfully Israel is in
maintaining peace with these two volatile neighbours.
Furthermore, the problem of determining foreign policy
towards the Middle East is not new. Over the last few
millennia, the West’s relationship with the Middle East
has been plagued with ambitious power struggles that
have erupted into war. Timeline’s first few articles explore
these in relation to the strategically significant locations of
Megiddo, Jerusalem and Constantinople. They have formed
the backdrop for much of the history of the region and it is
not hard to see why. Articles from Mr Mclean, Mr Kendry
and myself, illustrate that at different times, these places
have been centres and cross roads of civilisation, culture,
economic strength and religious zeal. Altogether, ownership
of them has brought prestige and power; thus explaining
why they have been so regularly contested. Indeed, so has
much of the Middle East at one time or another. Timeline
charts a number of these conflicts from the Crusades right
the way through to the First Gulf War of 1991. In particular,
articles by Mr Alston and Major General Cordingley
explore many of the interesting and indeed controversial
aspects of these conflicts including the reasons for Britain’s
involvement in them. Both authors have considerable
experience of working in the Middle East in their respective
diplomatic and military roles and we are very fortunate to be
able to view these conflicts through their experienced eyes.
But what of the architects of these wars, the warrior kings,
sultans and generals Articles by Tobias Chesser,
Charles Ward and Gustav Fithen, explore the significance of
the role of the individual in shaping the outcomes of major
historical change. This issue examines two of the Middle
Ages’ most iconic leaders, Richard the Lionheart and
Saladin, and how their destinies and the fate of the Middle
East became inextricably linked. Similarly, a further article
explores the Arab Revolt and the important part played by
T. E. Lawrence. After all, the study of History should also be
about significant people as well as events and themes.
On that subject, I want to thank my fellow editor and
6th form medieval history student, Charles Ward whose
calm manner and conscientious dedication to this project
made it happen. His persistence in pursuing articles from
fellow students was invaluable. I also want to thank all the
other contributors from their many different backgrounds.
They are an eclectic lot and so are their submissions.
Consequently, this journal is all the richer for them. To
them, I am very grateful for their labours. Do please write
in to respond to the views expressed in their articles or even
to contribute an article yourself to our next issue. For more
on how to do that please visit the inside back page.
Mr M. Jennings, Summer 2012
Editor
Student Editorial...
As a student of Ardingly College, I feel especially proud and privileged to be
able to say I have had the opportunity to contribute something of significant
value to the College. Timeline is a brand new publication with a unique
angle organised by the Head of History, Mr Jennings, and myself. The
magazine successfully integrates the rich and fascinating world of History
with current international affairs which so populate the news today. Our aim
is to involve the students of Ardingly College in Timeline by encouraging
them to contribute pieces about areas of history or current happenings which
particularly interest them. We wish to nurture an interest in the broader
subject of History which we hope will not only be passed on to the readers but
also encourage them to think and explore further about the issues arising from
their articles. I am pleased to report that within the up and coming pages, a
plethora of eclectic contributions (modern and medieval alike) from around
the world have been submitted. These range from the likes of the Siege of
Jerusalem, to dynamic maps plotting the rise of the Arab Spring. Ladies and
gentleman, I present to you, Ardingly College’s History and International
Relations Journal, Timeline!
Charles Ward (U6th)

“And they assembled them
at the place that in Hebrew
is called Harmaggedon.”
Tel Megiddo and the Politics of the Middle East
The word ‘Armageddon’ conjures images of
destruction, judgement and terror. Indeed,
the quotation in the title is from the Book of
Revelation, describing the last battle before God’s
judgement. Yet the name appears to be the
anglicisation of a quiet little hill in Israel – Har (or
Tel) Megiddo. How has this quiet backwater of
the Jezreel Valley come to be associated with the
eschaton and with divine judgement The answer
lies in its strategic position. This has made it a
very important staging post for approximately nine
thousand years and may continue to symbolise
the importance of the area to this day.
Megiddo was first occupied in approximately
7000 BC for reasons that ensured its survival for
several thousand years. The great civilisations
of Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) needed a
route to the Mediterranean in order to engage
in trade. However, as the crow flies, they are
divided from the sea by desert, making a short
journey impossible. Therefore, in order to reach
the ports they were compelled to travel northwest
before turning south into the relatively
lush lands of Israel and Judah; Megiddo stood
at the head of this trade route, the strategically
important ‘Derekh ha-Yam’, or ‘The Way of the
Sea’. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has
been the site of at least three decisive battles in
history; it continues to play a symbolic role in the
relationship between the east and west.
Mr D. McLean
The first battle took place in April 1457 BC
between Pharaoh Thutmose III of Egypt and
the combined rebel forces of the Mitanni people
of Kadesh, and the Canaanites of Megiddo. A
decisive Egyptian victory on the battlefield led
to a seven month siege of the city. Consequently
the engagement led directly to the expansion
of the Egyptian empire to its greatest ever
extent, spreading north until it bordered on the
lands of the Hittite empire (modern Turkey and
Syria). Thankfully Thutmose did not destroy the
city and it lived on, but it appears that the site
has not been occupied since the Babylonian
invasion of 586 BC. Even so, its importance
continued. The second battle, approximately
850 years after the first, in 609 BC, was equally
significant and indeed is recorded twice in the
Bible; King Josiah of Judah refused Pharaoh
Necho II of Egypt permission to travel through
his country to fight the Babylonians further
north in Syria. In response Necho attacked the
assembled Judahite forces, his archers killing
Josiah in the process. This was the beginning
of the downfall of the independent state of
Judah. It spelled the end of an independent
Jewish state as on his return from Syria Necho
also deposed Josiah’s son and imposed his
own candidate as King. Megiddo thus again
played an important part in the socio-political
development of the ancient world.
The third battle is surprisingly modern;
Megiddo was the place at which the British
Army, under General Edmund Allenby, defeated
the Turkish Ottoman troops under the command
of the German General Liman Von Sanders in
September 1918. It was this battle that broke
the stalemate that had emerged after the British
capture of Jerusalem late in 1917. Yet again,
though it had been uninhabited for over 2500
years, Megiddo played a pivotal role in the
development of the Middle East. It contributed
immensely to the downfall of the Ottoman
Empire and affected the lives of millions of people.
This significance continues to be recognised
to the present day and Megiddo was the site
of Pope Paul VI’s talks in 1964 with the Israeli
President and Prime Minister. Though the
Derekh ha-Yam fell into disuse as a trade route
long ago, the strategic importance of a little hill
a few miles south-west of Nazareth means that
it is not hard to see why John the Evangelist,
when writing the Book of Revelation, chose
Megiddo as the site of his last battle in which
the returned Christ would defeat the Devil.
We might not all be expecting an impending
apocalypse but we can certainly agree that a
place so vitally important over many thousands
of years of history could very possibly be so
again in the future. Indeed, it might well be
thought of as an unfortunate symbol of the
unsettling and unresolved religious and political
tensions of the Levant.
Dan McLean is Head of Divinity and
Philosophy at Ardingly College. Before
arriving at Michaelmas 2011 he read
Theology at Oriel College, Oxford and prior
to that he served for five years as an officer
in the Royal Navy.
Megiddo
Viscount Allenby of Megiddo
Left: Egyptian War Chariot
1 2

Holy, Holy, Holy:
A Theological History of Jerusalem in Three Faiths
Jerusalem seems to have existed
from the very earliest times of
human settlement in the Near East.
The first references to it come from
the second millennium BC when
it might best be termed a small,
independent city-state within a
loose confederation of Caananite
settlements. It was to grow in
significance, both politically and
religiously, until it can lay claim
today to being the undisputed
religious capital of the world: sacred
to, and fought over by, the great
religions of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam. This status brings with
it a blessing and a curse for an
historian. On the one hand we have
a wealth of written and physical
material – probably unparalleled for
any other city – with which to help
us reconstruct its past. On the other
hand, perhaps equally unparalleled
is the level of agenda that these
sources demonstrate.
Mr. A.D. Kendry
“Glorious things of thee are spoken,
Zion, city of our God;
He whose word cannot be broken
formed thee for His own abode;
on the Rock of Ages founded,
what can shake thy sure repose
With salvation’s walls surrounded,
thou may’st smile at all thy foes.”
John Newton (1779)
No one is neutral about Jerusalem.
The city rose to prominence in
the tenth century BC. A relatively
insignificant town prior to this,
it was chosen by the first king
of Israel, David, as his capital.
The choice was an odd one.
Jerusalem, although in possession
of several natural springs, is not
obviously well-provided for in
terms of natural resources and
is only moderately-defensible in
terms of topography. Its chief
recommendation seems to be
that it was fairly central in terms
of the territory controlled by the
House of David. To support the
innovation of monarchy and its
new capital, David also relocated
the Ark of the Covenant – the
preeminent cult-object of Yahweh,
the Israelite high god – to the
city. This meant that Jerusalem
was also to become the primary
cultic centre in ancient Israel and
created a powerful political link
between the kingship and religious
worship. The following centuries
saw the gradual suppression of
other religious sites and of the cults
of rival gods, centralizing all power
– sacred and profane – within the
‘Holy City’, whose fortunes were
often directly equated with those of
the Jewish people. Jerusalem, put
simply, is where God dwelt among
His people.
Arguably the greatest calamity in
Jerusalem’s history was the city’s
destruction in AD 70. The four
year revolt of the Roman province
of Judaea culminated in a savage
assault on the city that is described
in unremittingly-horrific detail by
Flavius Josephus in his Jewish War.
Internal conflict and severe food
shortages, with the consequent
starvation and disease, led to the
city falling to the forces of Titus
after an eight month siege. The final
battle took place in the precincts
of the Temple itself where the
defenders expected the imminent
intervention of the Messiah on
their behalf and to save the
Temple. His non-appearance
led to the Temple and city being
almost completely destroyed; its
population crucified or enslaved.
By this time, Jerusalem was the
third largest city of the Roman
Empire and the Temple – recently
totally rebuilt by Herod the Great
– was considered a wonder of the
world. Judaea was an economically
and politically significant province
– the primary source of date and
olive oil production in the Empire,
with a military-strategic location
bordering Rome’s only real rival for
world domination. Its destruction
sent ripples throughout the Empire:
the city ruins were garrisoned and
a large standing army remained
for several decades as a desecrating
presence on the Temple Mount.
Following a second bloody revolt
under Simeon bar Kochba in AD
132-135, who re-took Jerusalem as
his messianic capital, the Roman’s
razed the city and rebuilt it as a
Roman town, Aelia Capitolina.
Relief from the Arch of Titus
The Jews were banished from
setting foot within its precincts
on pain of death. The Temple
Mount became a Temple to Jupiter
Capitolinus.
After the Peace of the Church in
AD 313 and Constantine’s official
favouring of Christianity, the
fledgling Christian community
increased in size but Jerusalem still
remained a small Roman town, far
from the trade routes with political
– and Christian – influence in
Judaea still concentrated on
the Mediterranean ports to the
west. It was the pilgrimage of
the Emperor’s mother, Helena,
to the city in AD 325 and her
apparent rediscovery of the True
Cross that inspired a renewed
devotion to the city, this time
amongst the Christian population
of the Empire. Jerusalem was
rebuilt with grand churches over
the sites of the Lord’s life and
Passion and the city thrived. The
old Temple Mount remained
abandoned as a deliberate sign
of the supersession of the Jewish
religion. However, Jerusalem still
remained a fraction of its former
self in terms of population and
size. It had no political power and
evolution in international politics
downplayed the significance of the
frontier province. What the city
had regained was its theological
significance: even for the exiled
Jews, the longing for a return to
Jerusalem became codified in their
liturgy which looked for an end
to their exile from their spiritual
home and the restoration of
Temple worship.
In the mid-seventh century, the
rapid military successes of early
Islam led to the capturing of the
city in AD 638, only six years
after the death of Muhammad.
The city had, by now, regained
some of its commercial and
strategic significance. Nevertheless
the capture of Jerusalem had,
more importantly, a religious
significance for the early Muslims
for two reasons. Firstly, the Prophet
explicitly saw his revelation as a
continuation and fulfilment of the
Jewish and Christian narrative and
thus recognised Jerusalem as a city
especially sacred to God. The ‘Rock’
on which the Holy of Holies of the
Jerusalem Temple had stood was in
Islam – as in Judaism – recognised
as the foundation stone and centre
of the world and the burial place of
View of Jerusalem
3 4

Adam. Indeed, in the early years of
Muhammad’s movement the qibla
– the direction of prayer – was
not the Kaaba in Mecca but rather
the abandoned Temple Mount in
Jerusalem to the north. Despite
the change within Muhammad’s
lifetime, one of the earliest acts of
the Muslim occupiers was to erect
the Dome of the Rock on this
site. This was a conspicuous and
ever-visible reminder to Christians
of the Islamic ownership of the
Holy City – the Dome being in
direct line of site for Christians
upon leaving the Church of the
Holy Sepulchre after
Mass. The second
reason was the early
identification of the
site of the destination
of the mysterious
‘Night Journey’ of
the ‘Night of Power’
of Muhammad with
the Temple Mount.
According to this tradition alluded
to in the Qur’an, the Prophet
had journeyed spiritually on a
horse-like cryptid to ‘the farther
sanctuary’, whence he had leaped
up to heaven to commune with
the company of former prophets.
The site of the former Temple thus
became the third-holiest site of
Islam in its own right – an accolade
it retains today.
Unbroken Muslim occupation of
the Holy City lasted nearly five
centuries until the First Crusade
when Pope Urban II’s call for
a recapturing of the Holy Sites
associated with the life of Christ
met with a genuinely popular
response across Europe.
The Crusaders, many inspired
with deep religious fervour and
devotion, succeeded in expelling
the Muslim occupiers in AD 1099
and proclaimed the Kingdom of
Jerusalem. A victory Mass was
duly celebrated at the Church of
the Holy Sepulchre and the Relic
of the True Cross –which the
Crusaders had taken their symbol
– venerated and triumphantly
processed around the city. The
Dome of the Rock and the other
mosques within the city limits
were converted into churches. This
Crusader state lasted a century
“The Palestinian people … desire an
independent Muslim state with East Jerusalem
as its capital. The Jewish state of Israel is
unwilling, both on religious and strategic
grounds, to countenance any division
of the city.”
before a Muslim reconquest
lost the lands of the Christians
– apparently conclusively. After
the sacking of the city by Saladin
in 1187, most of the Christians
were expelled and Jews and
Muslims encouraged to return.
The Dome of the Rock became a
mosque once more, though the
Holy Sepulchre, whilst partially
demolished, remained a church.
Over the following five centuries
the city’s fortunes, size, and
political significance waxed and
waned. By the beginning of the
twentieth century Jerusalem was
a small town forming part of the
British mandate of Palestine. The
population was predominantly
Muslim, with small Jewish
and Christian minorities. Jews
remained barred from stepping
foot on the Temple Mount, where
the Western Wall was all that
remained of the Second Temple
of Jesus’ time. The Christian holy
sites were mostly administered by
a small community of Franciscan
friars, although fights – often
physical – broke out sporadically
between the different Christian
communities remaining in the city.
The modern period of Jerusalem
is especially complex. After the
expiring of the British mandate
in 1948, it was intended that
the city become an
autonomous political
entity. However,
the plan was not
implemented before
the British withdrawal
and the war that
ensued after the
Declaration of the
State of Israel led to
the city being partitioned, with the
eastern half becoming Jordanian
territory. During this period access
to Jewish and Christian sites was
severely curtailed to members of
those communities and many sites
allegedly desecrated. Jordan joined
the Arab alliance against Israel
in the 1967 Six Day War, which
ended in an impressive Israeli
victory. East Jerusalem was captured
and the united city declared the
capital of greater Israel. To date,
only the USA has moved its
embassy from Tel Aviv to the city
and the former is still recognised as
the ‘official’ capital of the State of
Israel by the United Nations. This
divisive situation remains one of
the major points of conflict in the
Israeli-Palestinian relationship. The
Israeli Parade in 1968 after 6 day war
Palestinian people, the majority
of whom are citizens of Israel,
desire an independent Muslim
state with East Jerusalem as its
capital. The Jewish state of Israel
is unwilling, both on religious and
strategic grounds, to countenance
any division of the city.
Whilst access to the
Western Wall is now
open to Jews, the Temple
Mount remains a Muslim
holy place and any plans
by the Jewish orthodox
to restore sacrificial
worship on the site seems
unlikely to be fulfilled
in any conceivable
future. The Christian
presence, based around
different sites, remains stable but
small and politically insignificant.
Since Bethlehem found itself in
Palestinian-administrated territory,
its Christian population has
decreased significantly and this
trend seems likely to continue.
Today, Jerusalem lives in a tense
peace, a secular capital as well
as a Holy City. It has grown
considerably in terms of size and
population since the establishment
of the State of Israel. For many of
its citizens, the religious claims to
the city function as an annoyance
and a barrier to a lasting political
peace. Yet for the religious its
stones bear the footprints of priests,
prophets, and kings. For them,
Jerusalem is not any other city,
and never could be. The Mount of
Olives, outside the old walled city,
is covered with separate cemeteries
belonging to the Jewish, Christian,
and Islamic faiths. The graves are
orientated to the east, the direction
from which the Messiah will enter
the City at the end of days.
For the three faiths for whom
Jerusalem is sacred, its history is
not yet complete. Just as the Rock
Palestinian and Israeli Protestors protest outside Hebrew University
“The most holy spot on earth is Syria; the
most holy spot in Syria is Palestine; the most
holy spot in Palestine is Jerusalem; the most
holy spot in Jerusalem is the Mountain; the
most holy spot in Jerusalem is the place of
worship, and the most holy spot in the place
of worship is the Dome.”
Thawr ibn Yazid, c770AD
of Mount Zion came to be believed
to be the place where God had laid
the foundations of the world, so to
Jerusalem is the place where this
story will reach fulfilment. Despite
the fractured, bloody, and violent
history of the city it is Jerusalem
that is looked to
as an analogue
of Heaven itself.
The conclusion
of the Bible sees
the renewal of the
world pouring forth
from a transfigured
Zion, “prepared as
a bride, adorned for
her husband” (Rev.
21: 2b). Amidst the
religious strife of the
city, and the attempts to resolve it,
it is vital to recall that it is this New
Jerusalem that is being fought over.
Adam Kendry read Theology at
Oxford University and has taught
at Ampleforth before becoming
Head of Divinity and Philosophy
at Ardingly College. He is an
Anglican theologian and Sub-
Lieutenant (RN) and about to
join the Submarine Operations
and Strategy Branch.
5 6

The Capture of
Jerusalem, July 1099
Axel Fithen
This article tells the end of an incredible story and
what was also an extraordinary journey. It all began
in November 1095. Pope Urban II held a council of
the Church at Clermont in France where he discussed
ordinary papal matters such as corruption within
the church as well as the consequences of the King
of France’s adultery. However, on the last day, Urban
addressed thousands in the fields outside the town, to
make an extraordinary speech. It sparked one of the
greatest conflicts of the entire medieval period which
saw its conclusion in the city of Jerusalem.
“A grave report has come ...that a race absolutely
alien to God...has invaded the land of the
Christians...They have either razed the churches
of God to the ground or enslaved them to their
own rites...They cut open the navels of those they
choose to torment...drag them around and flog
them before killing them as they lie on the ground
with all their entrails out...What can I say of the
appalling violation of women On whom does the
task lie of avenging this, if not on you...Take the
road to the Holy Sepulchre, rescue that land and
....Take this road for the remission of your sins,
assured of the unfading glory of the kingdom
of heaven.”
When Pope Urban came to a close the crowd erupted
into a religious frenzy chanting “Deus vult! Deus
vult!” (“God wills it! God wills it!”)
In this powerful speech, Pope Urban II launched what
would become the First Crusade. Four years later
having marched through Europe to Constantinople,
the capital of the Byzantine empire and then on
through Anatolia into the holy land, fighting hard
battles at Nicaea (May 1097,) Dorylaeum (June
1097,) Edessa (mid-1097 to early 1098) and Antioch
(1097-98,) the crusader contingents of approximately
1,300 knights and 12,500 footmen, reached Jerusalem
on 7th of June 1099. These men had travelled to
the centre of their world under the Papal promise of
remission for all their sins. They reached the sacred
city, where Christ had been crucified, and indeed for
many of these warrior pilgrims, it was a moment of
extreme piety. Tancred, the nephew of the founder
of the principality of Antioch, Bohemond, saw
Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives and sank to his
knees saying he would gladly sacrifice his life for the
opportunity to kiss the church of the Holy Sepulchre,
the site of Christ’s crucifixion.
On nearing the city the Crusader force surrounded
it, concentrating their forces on two main sections.
Raymond of Saint-Gilles took a force to the southwestern
corner, while the remaining force, under
Godfrey of Bouillon and Tancred, laid siege to the
north-western district of the city. Early attacks were
unsuccessful, especially in the north-western district
which was defended by a double wall of colossal
height. An attack on the 13th June failed due to
a shortage of wooden ladders to scale the city walls.
However, just as the Crusaders’ journey appeared
to have fatally stalled, deliverance was at hand, just
as it had been so many times over the previous four
years. Firstly, two Genoese ships arrived at the port
of Jaffa supplying timber and other materials to
build siege engines. Tancred himself is credited with
solving the problem of the lack of other supplies. It
seems while searching for a place to seek relief as a
result of suffering from a case of terrible diarrhoea,
he discovered a cave filled with timber. This was of
course seen as divine intervention and a sign of
God’s will that the city should fall to the Christians
and the atrocities committed by the Muslims should
be avenged.
Top: 1st Crusade
Above top: siege of Jerusalem during the first crusade
Bottom: 1st Crusaders - show the crusaders the way to the Jerusalem
Above: 1099 Siege of Jerusalem
7 8

Meanwhile the Crusaders were becoming increasingly
restless for a resolution to this siege. Hunger,
exhaustion and more importantly, news had arrived
that an army of muslim reinforcements had been sent
to break the siege. The Crusaders desperately needed
a swift conclusion to the siege and on the night of
the 13th of July an answer was found. Under cover
of darkness Duke Godfrey ordered his siege tower to
be taken apart and reconstructed a mile to the east
of its current position. Godfrey had discovered a less
well defended section of the city’s walls with a flatter
approach for the siege tower. It was perfect.
Was the ability of Jerusalem’s
rulers the main reason for the
survival of the estates during
the twelfth century
Anastasia Harrington
Map of Jerusalem from 1099
Route of the First Crusaders’
Two mighty siege towers were constructed by the
crusaders, each about fifty feet tall and built on
wheeled platforms complete with a mighty battering
ram. During their construction, one man was said to
have had a vision of the spiritual leader of the crusade,
Adhemar of Le Puy, who had died at Antioch the
previous year. In the vision Adhemar had advised the
warriors of Christendom to stage a procession to the
Mount of Olives, the place where Christ ascended
into heaven. The leaders of the crusading contingents,
fearful of disobeying God’s wishes, duely obliged.
Barefoot, taking crosses and relics, thousands of
crusaders ventured down the valley of Jehoshaphat
praying and seeking God’s favour.
At dawn the following morning Godfrey launched
his attack. The crusaders managed to breach the wall,
however they encountered fierce resistance from
the besieged army who may have used Greek fire, a
naptha based substance, which cannot be extinguished
by water. Around midday the crusaders managed to
force the Muslim defenders to flee and abandon their
defensive positions on the wall immediately in front
of the siege tower. At this moment Godfrey ordered
his siege tower to lower its bridge onto the wall. As
Crusaders poured into the city, Muslim resistance
quickly collapsed. Thousands of Muslims, Jews,
Christians, men, women and children were massacred.
William of Tyre, writing around the 1180’s described
the slaughter:
‘Everywhere lay fragments of human bodies,
and the very ground was covered with the blood
of the slain. Still more dreadful was it to gaze
upon the victors themselves, dripping with blood
from head to foot’
The Kingdom of Jerusalem was founded through
this barbarity and it would stand for nearly a century
until Saladin’s rise to power and political infighting
among the Crusader kingdoms would see its fall to
the Muslims in 1187. The events of that siege have
lived long in the consciousness of Muslims and
Christians ever since. But they have taken on a greater
importance still. They have shaped more than just the
heritage of those that continue to live there. They have
become part of the complicated political tapestry that
is Jerusalem, Israel and the Middle East.
It can be argued that the survival of the
Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem during the
twelfth century was due to the ability of its
rulers; however there were other factors that
enabled its survival. These included the relative
disunity and weakness of real and potential
enemies, the support from western powers,
and the Crusaders’ military capabilities.
In July 1099 Jerusalem was conquered by
the Crusaders and established as a Crusader
Kingdom. Between 1101 and 1110 the Crusader
estates in the region were extended as the
Principality of Antioch and the County of Tripoli;
these extended the geographical area under
Crusader control in to a continuous line along
the eastern coast of the Mediterranean from
south of Jerusalem. Even so, the Crusader
states were a long way from potential western
allies, with long and uncertain supply lines.
This meant that the rulers had to be able
administrators and diplomats to ensure that
they could marshal limited resources and create
alliances to counter these problems, as well as
being effective military leaders to repel enemy
attacks, expand and consolidate territorial
gains. This required exceptional leadership and
as Fulcher of Chartres noted when Baldwin I
was crowned, “the King would need energy to
conquer the Muslims in battle, or...compel them
to make peace.” The ability of Baldwin I shows
how an effective ruler was able to ensure the
survival of the Kingdom of Jerusalem during the
early part of the twelfth century.
King Baldwin II
During his reign, Baldwin I (1100-1118)
continued the process of consolidating territorial
gains and securing supply routes across the
Mediterranean Sea with the taking of coastal
cities; with Acre falling to the Christians in 1104
and Beirut and Sidon were taken in 1110, (with
help from a large force of Norwegian Crusaders
under King Sigurd). The armies of the Kingdom
of Jerusalem fought annual battles against the
Egyptians in the South and the Damascenes,
9 10

when the Damascenes were not allied with
the Frankish Crusaders against the Muslims of
Northern Syria, who were a common enemy.
Additionally, Baldwin I’s reputation as a ruler
was enhanced by his construction of Montreal
Castle in Transjordan, and by extending Crusader
command of the region east of the River Jordan
and the Dead Sea, down to the Red Sea port
of Eilat. This resulted in a valuable increase
in revenue as traders between Damascus to
Egypt had to pay taxes to traverse the area.
As a monarch he held his nobles in close
control for much of his reign until he died in
April 1118. Such successful military action, with
the resulting increase in revenue, the ability
to establish a working relationship with new
allies and an enemy against a common enemy
required great skill. Together with establishing
a more cohesive Kingdom and improving the
supply routes to Jerusalem via the ports, may be
why Baldwin I’s rule is regarded as successful.
The reputation of strong Crusader leadership
by the Kings of Jerusalem was reinforced by
Baldwin II when he restored control and order in
Antioch after the Field of Blood 1119, although
this reduced Crusader resources. This reputation
for strong and successful military leadership
may have inspired continued support from
European powers and individuals to continue
on a Crusade. Baldwin II also continued a policy
of local alliances and diplomacy to reinforce
regional support.
This shows that the early Crusaders may
have followed a pragmatic social practice
that reinforced the ability of the Kingdom to
survive. Although the Franks dominated the
regions they conquered, imposing hierarchies
of power with themselves at the top, the
societies they initiated depended on employing
the local population. Lack of manpower and
military resources in the early days did not
make segregation or discrimination a practical
decision, rather integration proved crucial to
survival. Frankish authorities tolerated racial
and religious diversity in the ports of Acre,
Tripoli and Tyre because the value of the
indigenous population to the political economy
was understood. Baldwin II’s marriage created
a union with the Armenian Church’s patriarchs.
While Baldwin’s example may have been a
diplomatic success and set an example to
others, following the Field of Blood, relations
between the religious communities’ hardened
and integrated marriages were banned. A church
council at Nablus early in 1120 forbade sexual
relations between Christians and Muslims, so
undermining the example set by Baldwin II
and potentially reducing the influence of future
rulers. Such divisions in society probably robbed
the Crusader states of a potential workforce,
which in turn meant it was not economically
self-sufficient and became dependent on
external supplies.
Within the Crusader States, the early leaders
of each estate showed strong allegiance to
the ruler of Jerusalem and support for new
campaigns, so that they were able to make
up for the shortage of manpower by acting as
a unified force. For example, despite having
conquered Jerusalem and Caesarea, a new
Crusade was summoned to conquer Antioch,
300 miles away. Many deserters of the first
Crusade, such as Stephen de Blois, came
back on this Crusade, reaching its destination
in 1102. This Crusade shows the importance
that the rulers gave to keeping state to state
communication secure and protect the physical
route between Jerusalem and other Crusader
states to allow swift movement between them.
Nonetheless, this seems to have often been a
local responsibility as each estate had its own
defences to keep overland communication
routes open with its neighbours and defend its
borders. Successful, mutual support from the
rulers of Jerusalem reinforced their reputation
and may have strengthened the internal
allegiances, so enabling more effective rule.
The death of Baldwin II in August 1131 marked
the end of the first generation of Crusader
rulers and the initial passion that first drove
the Crusaders. Without a male heir this gave
rise to different factions jostling for power
and increasing disunity within the Crusader
states. To try to prevent this, Baldwin II named
his successor, Count Fulk V of Anjou, and his
acceptance demonstrated the desire to maintain
Kerak Castle
a strong continuous line of leaders within the
main kingdom itself and an ongoing loyalty to
protect the Holy City from the ‘infidel’.
Although early Muslim weakness and disunity
meant that enemy threats were not too
problematic, frequent skirmishes, and border
raids meant that the Crusader kingdoms had
to develop from a politically based society to
a military one. Additionally, the Muslim enemy
was becoming increasingly unified under the
concept of jihad, so that by August 1st 1119 the
forces of the first Crusade were defeated at the
battle of Sarmada, in the ‘Field of Blood’ by Turks
under Tel-Danith. However, the Crusaders under
Baldwin II were able to defeat the advancing
Turks two weeks later thus indicating that the
King’s leadership and tactics were still strong
enough to fight off the enemy despite the
previous losses against the other estate leaders.
The defeat of Roger of Antioch and the wiping
out of the Frankish army at the Field of Blood
in 1119 forced the Crusader states to realise
the necessity of developing stronger, more
effective military defences against the Muslim
fighters. As a counter to this threat, new military
orders were founded, under the radical new
concept of warrior monks, and castles, built
as strategic outposts, grew in importance
throughout the twelfth century, paralleling the
rise of Muslim threat. The warrior monks eased
the drastic lack of manpower but did not solve
the problem completely. These castles were
primarily defensive and designed to strike fear
and caution into the enemy, but due to the lack
of manpower they were not of great military
value. They were often built in remote areas and
lack of manpower meant that commanders were
faced with either abandoning the castles to
fight the enemy or withdrawing into the castles
and facing a less than promising siege. Muslim
defences however were urban which made
their cities difficult to breach. However, the
castles did help to secure trade routes, provided
centres of administration and a concentration of
warriors that could launch raids or attacks when
necessary. Jonathan Philips believed they had
a significant advantage, “...key to holding onto
territory was the control of castles and fortified
sites...” This shows that the military order played
another vital role alongside the previous one
of links to the west, showing that there were
other reasons for the survival of the kingdom of
Jerusalem besides its rulers.
Despite the support that the Crusaders were
willing to give to the leaders in Jerusalem,
the struggling kingdom was also dependent
on vital western support from the beginning.
This support was sometimes conditional upon
achieving the objectives of other rulers and may
have served to undermine the survival of the
Kingdom of Jerusalem. The 1108 campaign
created a major development in the crusading
idea of a Holy War against the supposed infidel
and this weakened support from the Byzantines
to the Crusaders. As the battle to overtake
the Byzantines in Durazzo failed, Bohemond
became an imperial vassal to Emperor Alexius.
This crusade again demonstrates how help
from the west was valued by the Kingdom of
Jerusalem in upholding their Holy City; however
it also demonstrates the uneven and distrustful
relationship between some Crusaders and the
Byzantines that undermined the effectiveness
of the rulers of Jerusalem to make and enforce
11 12

obust alliances which could not be undone by
western powers or other Crusaders following
their own agendas.
Support often came at a price that meant that
some areas were outside the authority of the
rulers of Jerusalem. For example, when Venetian
fleets assisted with the capture of Sidon and
Syrian coastal cities, the Venetians demanded as
payment for their assistance to be the virtually
autonomous owners of parts of the Holy Land
and this was granted through the Pactum
Warmundi. By having to surrender authority to a
‘foreign power’ within the state suggests that the
Crusaders were dependent on external support
to maintain and expand their territory and
their limited options available may have forced
them to part with valuable prizes to secure that
support. The development of these coastal cities
opened up trade routes, strengthening links to
the West and the Byzantine Empire, establishing
thriving markets dependent on the Italian city
state trade, e.g. the Venetians owned one third
of Tyre. Arguably, the success of these trade
cities helped the survival of the Kingdom of
Jerusalem by increasing economic activity, but
by representing a ‘foreign power’ within its state,
it may be argued that the kingdom was further
fragmented and left the rulers of Jerusalem with
another powerful group within its borders whose
demands they had to consider.
Having regional, individual authorities ruling
areas within the Crusader states meant that the
Crusaders were not always united. Consequently,
the rulers of Jerusalem were often faced with
dealing with internal issues as well as external
threats. Indeed civil war threatened or broke out
four times after 1130.
This shows that the Crusader states were
dependent on external supplies and support for
their survival and it was not always within their
power to control it. This also suggests that the
Crusaders were too small and fragmented a
force to ensure the survival of the Kingdom.
While economic success may have created trade
links with Italian city states, there is no evidence
that this wealth enabled the Crusader states to
develop economic independence. However, the
effective military leadership and ability to inspire
further action seems to have ensured the early
survival of the Kingdom. Although it is apparent
that the leader of Jerusalem had a vital impact
and contribution to the survival of the kingdom
during the twelfth century it is also clear that the
other factors such as the support from the west
and initial weakness of the enemy played a vital
part, suggesting that the leaders were not the
only reason.
Map of the Frankish states
Sources
T. Asbridge, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land, Simon & Schuster Ltd (2012)
J. Phillips, A Modern History of the Crusades, Vintage (2010)
Just short of ninety years
after the crusading force of
Pope Urban II’s iconic first
crusade captured the Holy
City of Jerusalem from the
Islamic forces that occupied
it, Saladin, the Islamic ‘Holy
warrior’, was to re-take the
city that was the centre of the
medieval religious world.
1187,
The Battle of Hattin and
the Capture of Jerusalem
Saladin had previously
attempted to attack the
Kingdom of Jerusalem in the
autumn of 1177, however due
to the efforts of Baldwin IV,
its famous Leper King, he had
been defeated ignominiously
at the battle of Mont Gisard.
On this return attack ten years
later, Saladin had with him
over 42,000 men, described
by a contemporary eyewitness
as a pack of ‘old wolves [and]
rending lions’. The opposition
that Saladin faced was a broken
and disjointed kingdom. With
the death of the former king
Baldwin IV in 1185 clear lines
of leadership had broken down
and the significantly weakened
John Gibson
state was rallied under the
previous regent and newly
crowned, Guy of Lusignan.
Odds had shifted decidedly
in favour of the Islamic forces.
Saladin had only to defeat the
crusader army and the Holy City
was his. Or so it seemed…
The decisive battle in the
re-capture of Jerusalem was
not fought at, or particularly
near to, the Holy City itself.
Saladin instead drew out the
Crusader army to Hattin where
the final blow to the crusader
kingdoms was to be delivered.
Taking the fortress of Tiberias,
Count Raymond of Tripoli’s
personal fortress, on the 2nd of
July Saladin had ‘laid his trap’
(Asbridge) for the crusaders, as
Raymond’s wife was trapped at
Tiberias at the time. Raymond
remained, despite the potential
‘The devil seduced [Guy] into doing the
opposite of what he had in mind and made
to seem good to him what was not his real
wish and intention. So he left the water
and set out towards Tiberias… through
pride and arrogance’.
for his loss, calm, and advised
Guy to refrain from engaging
the Islamic force claiming, it
would break apart like so many
before it. It was to be Reynald
of Châtillon and the Templar
master Gerard of Ridefort
13 14

who offered up an opposing
view. Reynald advised Guy to
disregard the count’s advice
and take the battle to Saladin.
Asbridge suggests that despite
the council of those around
him it most likely Guy’s own
experience four years earlier
that informed his decision that
night. Guy had been presented
with a near identical decision in
1183 and had eschewed battle
with Saladin, granting him only
derision and demotion. The
decision, however, to advance
toward Tiberias was believed
fatal by even Saladin, as he
wrote in a letter immediately
after the battle:
‘The devil seduced [Guy] into
doing the opposite of what
he had in mind and made to
seem good to him what was
not his real wish and intention.
So he left the water and set
out towards Tiberias… through
pride and arrogance’.
The Crusaders marched forth
from Saffuriya on the morning
of 3rd July and left behind them
there a sure supply of water,
which was to be the downfall of
the army in the battle to come.
The army would have been a
menacing sight in full march,
as one eye witness states ‘they
came, wave after wave… the
air stank, the light was dimmed
[and] the desert was stunned
by their advance’. By noon the
army had reached the small
village of Turan, where they
attempted to replenish their
supplies of water. However
the small village spring was
not sufficient for the many
thousands assembled and the
army was forced to continue
towards the sea of Galilee
during the remaining heat of
the day. At day’s end, Guy
made the decision to make
camp in an entirely waterless,
indefensible position; a move
that played directly into the
hands of Saladin.
On the following day, 4th of
July, the Battle of Hattin took
place. The Crusaders had been
surrounded by the Islamic forces
overnight and were at the mercy
of Saladin. The Islamic Holy
Warrior ordered his troops to set
fire to the scrubs surrounding
the crusaders, exacerbating the
immense dehydration already
suffered by the Crusaders.
This, of course, was not an
issue for the well supplied
Islamic troops. In the following
hours, the Islamic archers and
horsemen tore the Crusaders
apart, culminating in Guy’s
final heroic stand at the Horns
of Hattin with the relic of the
True Cross. Guy’s plan was to
strike at the heart of the Islamic
force, Saladin himself, with his
heavier and more powerful
force of knights. However,
despite twice charging over the
Horns of Hattin the crusaders
were overrun by Islamic forces
and day was won by Saladin.
The army of the kingdom of
Jerusalem was destroyed and
the King and their main relic,
the true cross, captured.
Having crushed the
accumulated crusader forces
at the battle of Hattin very few
were left to defend the Holy
Land, one eyewitness claimed
that only two knights and their
retainers were left in defence
of the Holy City when Saladin
arrived. Almost immediately
after the battle the citadel at
Tiberius surrendered and a
week later the coastal city of
Acre followed suit. Over the
following weeks and months
Saladin focused on claiming
the remainder of Palestine’s
coastal settlements. By
September 1187 Saladin had
only one intention, the capture
of the Holy City itself.
Saladin took the Holy City
formally on 2nd of October,
mirroring the actions of the
Islamic prophet Mohamed. In
contrast to the actions of the
crusaders some ninety years
previously Saladin allowed
Christians to buy their freedom
for up to a month after the
capture of the city, ten dinars
for a man, five for a woman and
one for a child. After the month
had ended the remainder of
Christians were to be rounded
up and enslaved, however
this course of action seems
charitable in contrast to the
‘bloodbath’ which the original
crusaders brought to the city
in 1099. And thus, in reality,
ended the era of the Kingdom
of Jerusalem although it’s King
and his few remaining citadels
would hold out for many years
to come. Nonetheless, Christian
domination and control of
Jerusalem was at an end and
this fateful year, 1187, witnessed
the sudden collapse of Christian
(and certainly catholic) power in
the Middle East.
This double arm gold reliquary cross was
made in 12th century Jerusalem. According
to the inscription, it contains a splinter of
the ‘True Cross.’ A larger part was carried
in to battle by the Army of the Jerusalem
butwas captured at the Battle of Hattin
Battle of Hattin
King Guy laying down his weapons before Saladin
The Army of Jerusalem from the film, Kingdom of Heaven
Sources
T. Asbridge, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land, Simon & Schuster Ltd (2012)
J. Phillips, A Modern History of the Crusades, Vintage (2010)
15 16

A Profile of
Saladin
Saladin was the son of Shirkuh who had consolidated
his grip on Egypt from 1169-74, and is responsible
for uniting the previously fractured and disorganised
peoples of Islam. In October 1174 Saladin took
control of Damascus, proclaiming himself champion
of the Sunni-Orthodox religious element, thereby
strengthening Muslim confidence of a unified Muslim
world. Saladin had, by that time, gained enough
respectability so that the Caliph of Baghdad invested
him with the governance of Egypt, Yemen and Syria.
The only aspect missing was his lack of kinship to the
previous ruler, Nur ad-Din. However this was soon
rectified in 1175 when Saladin married Nur ad-Din’s
widow. This helped him generate a spiritual link with
the previous ruler. With that, Saladin could turn his
attention to expansion.
However, at the battle of Montisgard in 1177 Saladin’s
confidence received a harsh blow. Whilst attempting
to attack the kingdom a crusader army led by Baldwin
IV surprised him and he only narrowly escaped.
Strengthened by their recent successes, the crusaders
decided to build a huge castle at a place called Jacob’s
ford just 55 miles away from Damascus as a direct
challenge to the Muslims. Saladin most certainly
answers this call in 1179 with an attack on Jacob’s
Ford, which subsequently falls in an astonishingly
short period of just four days. From victory to
consolidation, this is followed by a two-year peace
deal, as Saladin did not yet have the required amount
of strength to fight the crusaders and take back
Jerusalem. This break, therefore, is an astute military
move as during this time he makes a crucial alliance
with the Byzantines from 1184-5.
Charles Ward
Arguably Saladin is the most famous medieval leader of the Muslim world. But who was he,
where did he come from, and why is he so famous, especially here in the West
What follows next in the Saladin story is what
catapults his fame in to the West’s consciousness;
the highly significant battle of Hattin in July 1187
which resulted in a decisive victory for the Muslims.
The army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was all but
destroyed and Saladin was left for a time with only
small pockets of static opposition. He moved swiftly
and as a result of this, Saladin continued his success
taking all of the coastal towns with the exception of
Tyre, Antioch and Tripoli. By October 1187, the
Muslims had taken Jerusalem. However, as J. Philips
has written, ‘Saladin’s rise to power was by no means
an easy one and should be by no means disregarded.’
Gaining dominance over the Muslim world and
gathering the resources needed to defeat the Franks
proved difficult for Saladin, as he was not without his
Muslim enemies. As guardian of the Sunni orthodoxy,
he was the target of two assassination attempts by the
Shia assassins in 1175 and from then on he only ever
slept in a wooden tower for protection. Saladin’s role
also sat uneasily with the Seljuk Turks in Anatolia and
with the Seljuk’s of Iran. Many saw him as a threat
as he expanded outwards from his base in Egypt
into Syria. His use of the Jihad was seen as a tool for
political and military ends. For example the two-year
truce with the crusaders was considered by his rivals
to have been created as an opportunity for Saladin to
deal with his co-religionist rivalries.
Although the Third Crusade proved unsuccessful,
Saladin still suffered blows to his reputation also
due to the several small successes of King Richard
I such as the Christian forces successfully securing
the coastline from Jaffa to Tyre (excluding Ascalon.)
Despite the two attempts made by the Christians
to take Jerusalem, they were unsuccessful on both
accounts. This was partly due to the logistics of taking
Jerusalem and the fact that it would be impossible to
hold and defend for long once taken. Furthermore,
Saladin’s disruption to the crusader’s efforts was the
last nail in the coffin for the Crusaders’ and especially
Richard the Lionheart’s hopes of entering Jerusalem
in triumph. Under Saladin, the forces of Islam had
weathered the storm.
So what made Saladin so successful His personal and
military skills were exceptional. However, the Jihad
became a political and military tool, skilfully used by
both Muslim leaders to create a semblance of unity
at least in the holy land. Nur ad-Din achieved much,
laying the foundations for Saladin to capitalise on,
who used the Jihad and his vast resources to attack
and to destroy the Crusader Kingdom when it was
at its weakest in 1187. But this does not explain
his fame. It is as the largely successful opponent of
Richard that is why we in the West are familiar with
Saladin. For many centuries afterwards, stories of
their rivalry were told and legends abounded of their
personal bravery and mutual respect as leaders and
adversaries. This is not surprising, since it is as true
then as it is now; being vanquished by a gallant and
formidable foe lessens the pain of failure.
Saladin’s army before Hattin from the film, Kingdom of Heaven
Bibliography
• Crusades: 1095-1197 – Jonathan Phillips
• The First Crusade and the Crusader States
1073-1130 – Toby Purser
17 18

Richard I was the King of England, Duke of
Normandy, Duke of Aquitaine, Duke of Gascony,
Lord of Cyprus, Count of Anjou, Count of Maine,
Count of Nantes and overlord of Brittany at various
times towards the end of the twelfth century. He lived
from 1157-1199 and was Henry II’s third legitimate
son. He did not expect to ascend to the throne but, as
you can see, he ruled over a large kingdom. However,
the question is begged, did he rule it well
Many have claimed Richard was a bad son. One of
the reasons for this must be how in 1173-1174 he
and his brothers decided to abandon their father
and seek the refuge of Louis VII, the King of
France. This rebellion ended up completely failing,
although Henry, Richard’s father, forgave him after he
apologized. However, when Richard became heir to
the throne he carried on fighting with his father.
Another claim about Richard is that he was a bad
husband. He certainly had trouble finding a wife.
His father tried to find him a good wife so as to
make a strong alliance between England and another
strong country. After much searching, Henry found
him a suitable wife; Alys, the daughter of Louis VII.
“
‘He was a bad
son, a bad
husband and a bad
king, but a gallant
and splendid
soldier.’
Is this a fair assessment of King Richard the Lionheart
Tobias Chesser
Unfortunately, this betrothal ended sooner rather
than later, and he ended up marrying Berengaria of
Navarre, the first-born daughter of King Sancho VI
of Navarre. Richard only had one child, Philip of
Cognac, but he was illegitimate. Indeed, there have
been many allegations that he had sexual relationships
with local women in his campaigns.
Another claim is that Richard was a bad King. If
looking after your kingdom personally is the sort of
thing that is thought to make a good King, it is right.
Richard ended up only spending six months of his
reign in England. He also wasn’t very tolerant; when
Richard was officially crowned on 3rd September
1189, he barred all Jews and Women from the
ceremony. However, when some Jewish leaders
turned up with gifts for the new King, he stripped
and flogged them. Having spent such little time in
England, he used all of its resources (including the
full treasury he inherited from his father,) to fund
his crusades. As William Stubbs said, ‘He was a bad
King… his ambition was that of a true soldier: he
would fight for anything whatever, but he would sell
everything that was worth fighting for. The glory he
sought was of victory rather than conquest.’
This leads us on to the final point, namely that
Richard ‘was a gallant and splendid soldier’. He
spent a lot of his life fighting. He is perhaps most
well known for his extraordinarily determined
participation and eventual leadership of the third
crusade. He never actually conquered Jerusalem, but
he came close, and conquered many surrounding
places that became Christian strongholds for a
long time to come. He didn’t seem to have much
compassion, just like a warrior, as on his crusade,
he ordered that all 2700 of his Muslim prisoners at
Acre should be executed. Richard spent most of his
life fighting, as that is what he liked to do. Yet, while
retaining his fame as a competent military leader
and individual fighter, he soon acquired a different
reputation, namely as a gallant and chivalrous
Christian hero. Many share this view now. He was
known as Richard the Lionheart even before he
became king, because of his reputation as a great
military leader and warrior. According to the military
historian, Allen Brown, he also built, and some say
he even designed one of the best castles in Europe
at the time, Chateau Gaillard. He certainly spent a
small fortune on it, twice as much (£15-20,000) as he
spent on repairing all his other castles in England put
together (£7000.)
When Richard was hit in the neck by a crossbowman
during a siege, his surgeon did a very bad job pulling
out the arrow. The wound became infected and
Richard died. However, before he died, he performed
a final act of mercy, he forgave the boy who had shot
him and sent him free with 100 shillings, £5 (a lot of
money in those days.) This is showing the qualities of
a kind and compassionate king. He may have been a
pretty bad son to his father, but he was very loyal to
his Mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine. When he rebelled
against his father he stayed loyal to her. In fact, some
historians even say that it was her who manipulated
the sons to rebel. Richard died in her arms. Richard
showed other qualities of being a good king when he
was fighting. He was a very good military commander,
and in those days, that was basically what a good king
needed to be. He also never let England be invaded.
After his death he was known as courageous and
generous, a view shared by many now. But you could
also say with good justification that he was not a
good soldier because on his crusade (which he spent
so much money on,) he authorised a massacre, he
never actually conquered Jerusalem and bankrupted
England because of his constant warring leading to his
successors’ future problems.
Overall, I think that Richard was a bad son to one
parent, but a good one to the other. He was a bad
husband and while not a bad king he was not a good
one either. Finally, he was a gallant and splendid
soldier and that is probably what we remember him for.
Map of the 3rd Crusade
3rd Crusade massacre at Acre
19 20

The Great Siege of
Constantinople, 1453
Mr M. Jennings
Across the Middle East, many
uprisings and even regime changes
have taken place in 2011. The
dates of these will live long in the
memory and pass on into History.
May 29th, 1453 is not a date
many people will recognise today.
At the time, news of the fate of
Constantinople spread throughout
Christendom and many thought
it heralded the end of the world
or at least the beginning of the
end. Conversely, throughout the
Muslim world, it became the
date for feasting, on a par with
the four holiest days. Seemingly,
nothing now stood between Islam
and a conquest of South-eastern
Europe. Christendom lacked the
leadership as well as the moral
force to undertake a counterattack
and within two generations,
it would be plunged in to the
religious and dynastic turmoil of
the Reformation. Within a hundred
years, all the remaining Christian
territories of South-Eastern Europe
would be under Ottoman control
and central Europe itself would
soon be fighting for its survival
on land and at sea. The relations
between the Greek and Turkish
peoples would be forever marked
by the events of that day. Yet, this
date’s real significance is that the
balance of power shifted eastwards
from Europe to the Middle East.
But what had made Constantinople
such an important city and its
capture so vital to Ottoman
progress Moreover, how had such
a strategically vital city become so
vulnerable Constantinople was the
capital of the old, Eastern Roman
Empire. Through its advantageous
geographical position, it bridged
Europe and Asia and had become
the vital trading base for links to
both continents. This had made it
extraordinarily wealthy and attracted
so many people that by 1100, it
had become the largest city in the
world with a population estimated
at half a million inhabitants. In
contrast, other contemporary
cities were barely a fiftieth of its
size. Under the leadership of great
emperors such as Constantine and
Justinian (4th and 6th centuries,)
it had expanded and conquered its
rivals, lasted a thousand years and
consolidated an Orthodox branch
of Christian worship that remains
strong to this day.
However, by 1453 Constantinople
was a shadow of its former glorious
self. Once, the epi-centre of the
Byzantine Empire’s grandeur, of
Greek and Roman civilisation, of
sophistication and culture, it now
held very few of its former many
treasures. Decline through inept
leadership, continual in-fighting
and court intrigues was hastened
by catastrophic military defeats at
the hands of the Muslim Seljuk
Turks at Manzikert in 1071 and
a Crusading force of catholic
Europeans in 1204. The latter
campaign saw the capture and
sacking of Constantinople by
Christian crusaders manipulated
by a vengeful Venetian Doge,
Enrico Dandolo! These defeats were
inflicted by two military forces that
had both cast envious eyes on the
bustling and wealthy metropolis of
Constantinople and its strategically
valuable trading concessions
throughout the Mediterranean
Sea as well as the Balkans and
Asia Minor. For the Ottomans,
Constantinople had become an
emblem of their previous military
failures. Yet, due to a prophecy
from the Prophet Mohammed, it
was a symbol of future ambitions
(the ‘Golden Apple’) to whichever
ruler could capture it and above
all, the best place for commerce
and communication between
its twin imperial spheres. For
the Crusaders, Constantinople
epitomised Greek duplicity and
venality, which in the eyes of many
in the West, had hindered rather
than helped the crusading wars
against the Infidel. Prejudice and
greed were as strong motivating
forces then as they are now.
Despite a brief Byzantine
resurgence of good fortune through
the recapture of Constantinople
in 1261, the city remained badly
damaged by the effects of previous
conquest and the brutal interim
Latin governorship. Over the next
two centuries, further catastrophes
would follow with earthquakes,
fires and yet more in-fighting. But
the people suffered most from the
disastrous Black Death epidemics
of 1346-9 that also ravaged the rest
of Europe; over half the population
died and with them went many of
the key trading concessions that
had been so vital to Byzantine
liquidity. By 1453, the city was
exhausted, poor and in considerable
disrepair. The great walls built in
the 5th century by the Emperor
Theodosius were unsound in a
number of places although they had
been repaired by former Emperor
Sultan Mehmet II
John VIII. The empire had long
since abandoned retaining a large
fleet or army to defend itself and
relied upon mercenaries. Even
the great chain, which had to be
dragged across the Golden Horn
(a side tributary to the Bosporus
itself) to protect one side of the
city’s unusual triangular shape,
had been lost. Fortunately for
the exceptionally superstitious
inhabitants, it was rediscovered
in time. The city also lacked
influential and powerful friends.
Constantine XI, the new and
determined emperor, appealed to
the West but mostly in vain. Even
overtures of spiritual union between
the Orthodox and Catholic
Churches failed to induce a large
military flotilla of Catholics to sail
to Constantinople’s aid. While
some significant contributions of
military support did come from
21
22

North Italian city states, these
were pitifully small compared to
the hefty alliance of European and
Middle Eastern mostly Muslim
forces facing Constantinople. The
City could count on but a few
thousand committed followers and
professional troops to defend it
against the tens of thousands that
would be hurled against it. So thin
were their numbers that they could
not even defend all the stretches of
the 20km walls. Constantinople
was more than weak: it was
vulnerable.
Muslim rulers had tried in the
past to seize Constantinople. All
had failed. Even in 1453, with so
favourable a set of circumstances,
many influential Ottoman
leaders still doubted that the city
could be captured. Much would
depend upon the leadership of
the Ottoman war machine. Its
new Sultan, Mehmet II, had been
reigning for only two years, but
even in that short time this twenty
one year old dour and despotic
ruler had displayed a high level of
military ability. The sea and land
routes were systematically cut and
new fortifications, like the castle of
Rumeli Hisari, were constructed
to encircle Constantinople. All
dependencies of the Ottoman
leader were ordered to provide
troops, equipment and supplies.
But capturing the city would be
no easy task despite its weakened
defences. Its sea wall was hard
to access but more importantly,
its hefty land walls had proved
superior to all attacking forces for
over a thousand years. Something
new was needed. For Mehmet to
imitate Joshua and bring down the
walls of this Jericho, he would need
the fifteenth century equivalent
of the Old Testament’s trumpet
and the Ark. Mehmet found
it, or rather who; a Hungarian
engineer called Orban showed him
the way. One wonders whether
Constantinople’s refusal to employ
Orban had anything to do with
his offer to provide his services to
Mehmet. This costly mistake would
lead to the construction of wonder
weapons, huge cannons, some as
long as 27 feet capable of firing a
1200 lb (544 kg) cannon ball up
to a mile! These weapons could
and indeed did bring down the
great walls in as little as two weeks.
Constantinople’s Muslim enemies
had never been stronger. More
importantly, they had never been
so well led.
The fifty-three day siege was
punctuated with numerous, bitterly
contested battles on sea and land
(see map.) Mehmet’s naval forces
could not sweep away the small
Byzantine defensive fleet and nor
could it breach the sea wall. On the
other side of the city it similarly
failed to break through the great
Chain blocking access to the
Golden Horn. So, extraordinarily,
Mehmet ordered his ships to be
transported across land over many
miles to enable an attack on the
wall from the North. Meanwhile,
his artillerymen blasted sections
along the land wall only for the
gaps to be filled in with earth
by desperate defenders who also
supported the rear section of the
outer walls with more earthen
ramparts. Cannons could blast
stone walls but not earthen
mounds. Mehmet even turned to
the ancient craft of tunnelling and
employed Serbians under Zaganos
Pasha to burrow beneath the outer
walls with the aim of firing them
and bringing down a large enough
section to make a practical breach.
Map of Constantinople
However, the Greeks, probably
led by a Scotsman John Grant,
counter-tunnelled beneath each
of these Ottoman works and in
these darkened confines beneath
the Theodosian walls, vicious
hand-to-hand fighting ensued.
This claustrophobic, subterranean
mining world of dirt and sweat
would suddenly erupt with battle
and occasionally by the terrifying
use of Greek fire. As the weeks
passed, no progress was made here
either and so no easy routes under
or round the walls could be found.
The attackers would have to go over
them and at great cost.
Both sides had expected this with
the bulk of their forces deployed
along the northern land walls
and especially along a vulnerable
section called the Mesoteichion.
Giovanni Giustiniani and his
700 well-armed and experienced
Genoese volunteers formed the
core of the Byzantine defence
and were sent to this sector where
Mehmet’s forces concentrated their
attack. It was just as well for this
Genoese commander was an expert
in modern siege warfare and had
to use every ounce of his military
ingenuity to counter the Ottomans’
greater numbers. More significantly
though, the arrival of these
volunteers gave hope to the Greeks
that Christendom would not
abandon them, and if the defenders
could resist for a few weeks longer
further reinforcements would surely
arrive or some disaster might befall
their enemies. While the first hope
was quite optimistic, although a
Venetian fleet did set sail in April,
albeit too late, the latter was closer
than they realised. Dissension in
the Muslim high command grew
with each unsuccessful assault
and undermined their faith in
Mehmet’s leadership. By continuing
his assault on Constantinople, he
was risking more than just his own
soldiers’ lives. Failure could have
been fatal for him too.
The first assault on the Northern
walls was launched at midnight
on May 28th by poorly-equipped,
mostly Christian auxiliary
troops from Ottoman-controlled
Europe. Their assault was not well
conducted and in the crucial area
of the breach, their greater numbers
hindered rather than helped
their attack. As their casualties
mounted and their forward troops
failed to break through the main
outer wall, Greek hopes rose and
Muslim spirits sank in to the moat.
The second Ottoman assault was
Theodosian Walls of Constantinople
initiated by Turkish Anatolians.
They were better quality troops
and thoroughly committed to
defeating their Infidel opponents.
They succeeded in forcing a breach
through the walls but once inside
the outer wall their forward troops
were surrounded due to inner
defences cleverly constructed and
manned by Giustiniani and his
skilful Genoese. The Anatolians
could not advance any further
due to further stubborn Greek
resistance. Once again, sheer
weight of numbers had failed
to help the attackers. Despite
prolonged fighting and very heavy
casualties, Ottoman hopes of a
victory were fading fast. Mehmet
came under pressure to withdraw.
His naval forces could not defeat
the fewer but well-armed ships of
the defenders who lurked close
enough to their own walls to receive
sufficient supporting fire to drive
away the Ottoman vessels. The
miners had failed to open up a new
route for attack. The bulk of the
Ottoman assaulting force had failed
to take the Theodosian walls. At
this point, not only was Mehmet
not winning, he was running out
of options fast.
23
24

What he needed was an elite
force to batter its way up the
bloodied slopes of the mound and
carry the day. To achieve that he
desperately needed some luck.
He got both. The third and final
assault was led by the Janissaries,
his elite household troops. The
good fortune came in two phases.
Firstly, a doorway through the
Kerkoporta gate appears to have
been left open or perhaps opened
from the inside During the thickest
fighting, Ottoman flags were seen
on its tower and nearby defenders,
fearing being encircled and cut off
from the city, withdrew in panic.
Simultaneously, the heroic defender
of the Mesoteichion, Giustiniani,
was badly wounded and his
Genoese forces pulled back to
withdraw him and themselves from
the fighting. The pressure from the
front of the Janissaries eased and
sensing an opportunity redoubled
their efforts and swarmed over the
defences. This was the moment that
Constantinople fell. It was also a
moment of great tragedy when the
Byzantine Emperor, Constantine
XI, seeing the flight of some of his
forces rallied some and personally
led a charge at the attacking
Janissaries. It failed and he was
never seen again.
What followed was as bad as could
be imagined. Bloodthirsty Ottoman
forces burst in to the ancient city
and looted, pillaged, burned, raped
and murdered their way through
it. From across the Golden Horn
in the neutral township of Galata,
witnesses saw, heard and recorded in
vivid and terrifying detail the sights
of butchery and the screams of
agony from the terrified inhabitants
of Constantinople. Quickly, many
parts of the city caught fire and this
consumed large parts of it. Fleeing
citizens took to the few remaining
boats, some of which capsized,
while others in vain tried to swim.
Approximately ten thousand
inhabitants of this former bastion of
Christendom perished in the next
few hours. For the rest, ignominy
lay ahead as they were enslaved
and taken away from their beloved
city to be sold and shipped across
the Mediterranean, their fates in
the hands of their new masters.
Some Greeks did reach safety and
took with them the tales of the last
few days and hours of the once
mighty city. Significantly, it has
been claimed that through their
exodus, the fall of the Byzantine
Empire contributed to the start of
the Renaissance as ancient learning
from the East was combined with
a vibrant spirit of enquiry now
emerging in Central Europe.
There may be some truth to this.
Nonetheless, it was also a vital stage
in the Ottoman conquest of Southeastern
Europe.
So why did Constantinople fall
Why was the Ottoman besieging
army successful when so many other
enemies of Byzantium had failed in
the past It would be misleading to
blame the defenders or even their
allies, although both contributed to
Constantinople’s fate. Ultimately,
Fall of Constantinople
battles need to be won even if
the other side can lose them. The
Prophet Mohammed allegedly said
“Constantinople will be conquered
by a blessed man and a blessed
army.” Blessed they may have been,
but lucky the Ottomans certainly
were, eventually.
Arguably Mehmet deserved his good
fortune. For such a young ruler, he
was imaginative, tactically astute and
above all, determined when older
and wiser ‘supporters’ counselled
withdrawal. Constantinople fell then
largely due to his leadership and
this event signalled yet another
shift in the balance of power in
the Middle East.
Matthew Jennings is Head of
History at Ardingly College.
Educated at Manchester Grammar
School and University College
London where he received a Law
Degree. In 1995, he was awarded
a Masters in War Studies at
Kings College, London. Since
then he has been a member of
the International Institute of
Strategic Studies.
Further Reading
• Crowley R, Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453, Faber & Faber 2006
• Eaglestone C. R, The Siege of Constantinople, 1453: An Historical Romance (1878), Kessinger Publishing 2009
• Turnbull S, The Walls of Constantinople AD 324-1453, Osprey Publishing 2004
Britain’s First Three
Afghan Wars
The world headlines of 2012 are regularly
dominated by a swathe of countries between
North Africa and the Indian Sub-Continent. In a
Headmaster’s Lecture in 2010 I summarised how
deep and often decisive has been the British
involvement during the 19th and 20th Century
histories in many of these nations – Egypt,
Palestine, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, the nations of
the Gulf, Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the
end of the conflict in Iraq, it is what is happening
in Afghanistan, which is most central to British
foreign and defence policy in 2012. The ‘war’
in Afghanistan is not solely a British operation.
British forces are engaged there as part of a
multi-national operation coordinated by NATO.
Nonetheless this is, in effect, the British Army’s
Fourth Afghan War, and the RAF’s second. But
what were the main features of the First, Second
and Third Afghan Wars When and why were
they fought and how did they turn out
Afghanistan is not a natural geographical
entity; more a rugged tangle of mountains and
deserts which has acted over the centuries as
a crossroads between India, Persia (now Iran),
and Central Asia. Many historical figures have
travelled this ‘highway of conquest’, usually
in the direction of the riches of India; Darius,
Alexander, the Mongols, and Tamberlane among
them. Britain is merely the most recent foreign
power from the 17th century to be drawn to
those riches. The difference though is that British
traders and then governments came by sea,
and became involved in Afghanistan not as a
transit route on to further glory, but as a line of
defence. In other words, Britain chose to fight in
Afghanistan to avoid a war in its Indian colonies.
Mr R. Alston CMG, QSO, DL
The First Afghan War took place before the
Punjab and the North West Frontier were part of
British India. It was a muddled and misconceived
response to what was seen as a Russian threat to
Britain’s role in India. It took the form of a military
operation designed to restore to the Afghan
throne a ruler seen as less pro-Russian than
the current incumbent. In 1839 a British army
marched from India via Quetta and Kandahar to
Kabul under a very sickly Lord Elphinstone. The
restoration was straightforwardly achieved, and
the army thinned out. Within a year both the ruler
and the British officials who kept him in power
were deeply unpopular with the Pathan tribes
of which the population of eastern Afghanistan
is made up. By 1840 the Government of British
India should either have withdrawn or reinforced
it, but did neither.
The result was one of the most infamous
bloodbaths of British military history. Supporters
of both Afghan claimants and the other tribes
united. First the key British political officers were
murdered, one by a mob the other by being lured
to his death. Then, when the British and Indian
army (around 700 of the former and 3700 of
the latter), with its families and camp-followers
(numbering at least 10,000), started to withdraw
by agreement and at 6000 feet in January 1841,
they were repeatedly ambushed and slaughtered
by tribesmen under no political control. Famously
just one man supposedly made it to Jalalabad,
half way between Kabul and the Khyber Pass. In
fact, several hundred soldiers and families, mainly
British, survived, most of whom were captured
and later released. Nevertheless, another army
was despatched on a mission of revenge and
repression late in 1841, but the humiliation was
25 26

First Afghanistan War - last stand of the survivors
of the 44th Foot at Gandamak
total. British and Indian losses over the whole
campaign were well over 10,000. Consequently,
no Imperial Government for nearly 40 more years
would dare venture on a ‘forward policy’ of direct
military involvement in Afghanistan again.
From the late 1860s fears of growing Russian
influence in Afghanistan once again surfaced in
India. This eventually lured the British authorities
in India to get involved in Afghanistan’s internal
affairs. Russia had been extending her hold over
much of Central Asia, and in 1878 Britain had
taken the Turkish side when Russia attacked
her. Reports reached India of a Russian mission
to the Afghan ruler and a British mission was
despatched to counter its influence. (In fact it
never arrived). The British mission was turned
back on the orders of the Afghan ruler and the
British response was to despatch two armies
across the Afghan border. Under this pressure
the ruler agreed to the British mission under
Louis Cavagnari travelling to Kabul. Within
months the events of 1840-41 seemed to be
repeating themselves when Cavagnari and his
staff and escort were murdered in July 1879 by
disaffected Afghan soldiers.
This led to the despatch of an army to Kabul
under General Frederick Roberts (later Lord
Roberts of Kandahar). Roberts practised what
many call a reign of terror. In the absence of
an effective Afghan partner through whom to
rule, tribal resentment rose dangerously. A new
Government in London replaced the Viceroy in
India, who was seen as responsible for getting
into a dangerous and unacceptable situation.
Before final withdrawal could be engineered
however another famous episode in British
military annals took place.
In response to Roberts’ activities an Afghan army
from Herat in western Afghanistan marched
on Kandahar where a second British army was
located. As it marched through Helmand towards
Kandahar it clashed with the British force under
General Burrows at Maiwand in July 1880. It
was one of the few occasions where an Afghan
army bettered a British one on the battlefield.
When Burrows force retreated to Kandahar it had
lost half of its 2500 men. The British response
was the famous march of Roberts, with a force
of 10,000 men, over 300 miles from Kabul to
Kandahar in 22 days in mid-summer. Shortly
afterwards the profitless war was abandoned
with the evacuation of both Kabul and Kandahar.
It had cost 3000 British and Indian casualties.
As with the first Afghan War, the outcome was
a reduced not enhanced British position, a
weakening of central government to the benefit
of the influence of the tribes, the slowing down
of development, and increased xenophobia and
religious fanaticism.
First Afghan War - sole escapee of the retreat from Kabul
What lessons were to be drawn from these wars
(and indeed from the experience of the Soviet
Union 100 years later) Embroil yourselves
at your peril unless you are prepared both
to commit overwhelming force and be ready
for the long haul and heavy casualties which
will follow. Afghanistan was and is a fractious
and ethnically divided land. Afghans are brave
and resourceful guerrilla fighters and adept at
exploiting the foreigner to serve their own ends.
They are deeply conservative, stubborn in their
Islamic adherence, and even more resentful
of being coerced by foreigners than by fellow
Afghans. The risk is high that foreign decision
makers will find themselves sooner or later faced
with uncomfortable decisions as to how to
disengage while retaining some pride and sense
of achievement.
The Third Afghan war in 1919 was on a smaller
scale and, unlike the others, fought not in the
heartlands of the country but along the border
with British India. The deal struck in 1880 was
that British India would have no diplomatic or
political presence in Afghanistan, but that the
Afghan ruler would leave foreign relations in
British hands and deal with no one else. By 1919
this situation was widely and deeply resented
in Afghanistan. A new ruler saw a chance to
exploit British and Indian exhaustion at the end
of World War One, and widespread discontent
among Indian Muslims, to assert ‘independence’
and test the potential for bringing north-western
India under Afghan influence. The British
authorities saw the need to react at once to
Afghan mobilisation on the border, declared war,
and sent small British forces into Afghan territory.
Fighting was brisk and quite bloody but British
units, the losses of the war notwithstanding, were
too well organised for the Afghans. Raids by the
RAF on Jalalabad and, on one occasion, Kabul,
also had a strong effect. The ruler soon put out
peace feelers, and, though he gained no territory
was rewarded by British Indian acceptance of his
Second Afghan War – 1879, Battle of Chardeh Valley
right in future to conduct the foreign policy of his
country himself.
Taliban Fighters
I served as a young diplomat in Kabul in the early
1960s. At that time, 15 years after the granting
of independence to India and Pakistan in 1947,
the prediction that 50 years later there would
again be 10,000 British troops in Afghanistan
would have been laughable. The reasons they are
there are, of course, very different from those of
1840, 1880 or 1920. We actively want a resilient
Afghan state capable of looking after itself and
capable of ensuring that its territory does not
harbour or support extremist and terrorist groups.
In the global village of today it is the potential
direct effect on security here in Britain, rather
than the defence of a crucial component of the
British Empire, which is at the root of a policy
supported by both Labour and Conservative led
Governments. However different the reasons our
forces are there, there is nonetheless a haunting
sense that some of those lessons of earlier wars
will prove distressingly relevant still.
Robert Alston, CMG, QSO, DL is a
distinguished, retired British diplomat
and was formerly Chairman of Governors
at Ardingly College. He was educated
at Ardingly and New College, Oxford.
He served as British Ambassador to
Oman (1986-1990) and as British High
Commissioner to New Zealand
and elsewhere.
27 28

The Arab Revolt
& T. E. Lawrence
The Arab revolt started during the First World War,
on the 5th June 1916 in Hejaz (in modern day, Saudi
Arabia.). This happened because the Arab peoples
had become increasingly resentful of the Ottoman-
German alliance which had extended its grip on
power across the Middle East. In Damascus, Syria
and Beirut, Lebanon many Arab nationalist figures
were arrested then tortured. They and many other
Arabs wanted this to stop and so they rose up in revolt
against their Turkish rulers. Mark Sykes designed the
flag of the resistance to create a feeling of Arab-ness in
order to fuel the revolt.
Because of the Ottoman Empire’s repression of the
Arabs, Grand Sharif Hussein, the guardian of the
Holy City of Mecca, formed an
alliance with Great Britain and
France. This alliance was facilitated
by the services of a mysterious
young Arab officer in the Ottoman
army named Muhammed Sharif
al-Faruqi. Grand Sharif Hussein had
about 50,000 men but fewer than
10,000 had rifles. He was too weak
to take on the full might of the
Ottoman forces alone. Nevertheless,
evidence that the Ottoman
government were going to kill Hussein at the end
of the war led him to correspond with the British
High Commissioner, Henry McMahon. The latter
convinced Grand Sharif Hussein that his assistance
to the Triple Entente would be assisted by the Allies
and eventually rewarded by a new Arab Empire. This
would span the entire territory between Egypt and
Persia with imperial possessions such as Kuwait, Aden,
and the Syrian coast. This was an enticing promise but
also one that would not be kept.
Gustav Fithen
T.E. Lawrence
On the June 5th, 1916, the conflict started when two
of Husseins’ sons, Ali and Faisal, attacked an Ottoman
garrison in Medina but were fiercely beaten by the
Turkish troops stationed there. The revolt properly
got started on the June 10th when Hussein ordered
his supporters to attack the Ottomans in Mecca.
Egyptian troops were sent by the British to help with
the bloody conflict by providing artillery support. On
July 9th they finally took the Holy City of Mecca.
Early in the war French and British naval forces had
cleared the Red Sea of Ottoman warships. Now that
the Arab revolt had finally been proclaimed in the
North, the focus of operations shifted southwards
to the further extremities of the Ottoman Empire,
the ports on the southern Saudi
peninsula and modern day Yemen.
The port of Jidda was successfully
attacked by 3500 Arabs on June
10th with more help from British
artillery and aeroplanes. This Arab
victory demonstrated to the British
the value of their new erstwhile
allies. Furthermore, the capture of
these Red Sea ports meant that the
British could now help in other
ways too such as by sending over
a force of 700 Arab soldiers (and former Ottoman
POWs.) Indeed, Britain sent out a number of officials
to help their new allies in the conflict in Hejaz,
including a young officer named Thomas Edward
Lawrence. He was born in 1888 in a small welsh
village called Tremadog in Caenarvonshire. Lawrence
was extremely bright; he could read at the age of four
and read Latin at the age of six. Later, Lawrence won
a scholarship to Oxford University to read history.
When World War One was declared Lawrence tried
to join the army but at under the 5’5” height limit,
he was classified as too small. Eventually Lawrence
got into the army because he could read Arabic so
he joined the Arab desk at General Headquarters.
Indeed, when war had broken out, Lawrence had
been charting Crusader and Byzantine fortifications
across the Middle East under his own steam and at his
own expense. This was no ordinary young man and
his extraordinary resourcefulness and empathy with
Arab peoples quickly drew the eye of his superiors in
Military Intelligence.
Meanwhile, the Ottomans still held important
strategic centres like Medina. Lawrence helped Amir
Feisal attack the only railway line Between Medina
and Damascus. This meant the Ottomans could
not get equipment to these and other important
destinations where the fighting was taking place.
Lawrence was a tough fighter; with only 3000 men
Lawrence and his Arabs took on 50,000 Ottomans
in a successful guerilla campaign over several months.
Later on July 6th 1917, Lawrence and the Arab force
defeated a whole Ottoman battalion in a frontal
assault when they captured Aqaba, a key port.
More and more Arabs joined the revolt because of
Lawrence’s success. The Arabs loved Lawrence because
he respected them and their culture. He spoke their
language, dressed in the same style of clothes they
did, lived in the same conditions and ate their food.
A sheikh who fought with Lawrence said: “Of all the
men I have ever met, Al Auruns (Lawrence) was the
greatest prince”.
In September 1918, Lawrence and Feisal took control
of the area around Medina from the Ottomans.
Allied assistance increased and the fighting stopped.
At the end of the war, the Anglo-Egyptian force led
by British general, Allenby, had seized Palestine,
Transjordan, Lebanon, large parts of the Arabian
Peninsula and southern Syria. Though Medina, cut off
from the Ottoman Empire, would not surrender until
January 1919.
The British and French forces took advantage of the
deteriorating situation for the Ottomans and took
control of the land the Arabs had just captured. The
French and British broke their promise that the Arabs
should have a huge empire. Instead, as a result of an
agreement reached in Paris and sealed at the Treaty
of Versailles in June 1919, the British and French
divided the land between themselves and called them
Mandates or Protectorates.
Lawrence was disgusted that the allies had broken
their promises to the Arabs; he quit the army and
hid from his fame. He joined the Royal Air Force
under the false name of J.M.Ross but the newspapers
found him. Lawrence left the R.A.F and joined the
Tank corps under the name of Edward Thomas Shaw.
Lawrence then rejoined the R.A.F in 1925 and finally
left in 1935. Lawrence was killed in a motorbike
accident trying to avoid two boys; he was traveling
at 90mph on a tuned Brough Superior 1000cc.
Nonetheless, Lawrence’s legacy can still be seen today
in place names across the Middle East and the British
lasting fascination with this iconic and enigmatic
leader. However, amongst the Arabs, the outcome of
their revolt has left a different legacy that remains like
an unhealed wound. The British and French failure
to honor their promise to the Arabs has remained a
serious obstacle to trust thereafter.
So what is the significance of the Arab Revolt to the
Arabs themselves Here is the view from King Hussein
of Jordan:
“Much of the trauma and dislocation suffered
by the peoples of the Middle East during
the 20th century can be traced to the events
surrounding World War I. During the conflict,
the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central
Powers against the Allies. Seeing an opportunity
to liberate Arab lands from Turkish oppression,
and trusting the honor of British officials who
promised their support for a unified kingdom
for the Arab lands, Sharif Hussein bin Ali,
Emir of Mecca and King of the Arabs (and
great grandfather of King Hussein), launched
the Great Arab Revolt. After the conclusion
of the war, however, the victors reneged on
their promises to the Arabs, carving from the
dismembered Ottoman lands a patchwork
system of mandates and protectorates. While the
colonial powers denied the Arabs their promised
single unified Arab state, it is nevertheless
testimony to the effectiveness of the Great
Arab Revolt that the Hashemite family was
able to secure Arab rule over Transjordan, Iraq
and Arabia. ...”
29 30

The Ceasefire
We had stopped some twenty
miles north of Kuwait City,
astride the highway leading
to Basra. Black smoke from
the oil wells hung over us; the
scene was one of darkness and
foreboding. Vehicles, bodies
and other military wreckage lay
strewn around in every direction.
This dampened our euphoria,
as did the uncertainty of a
temporary cease-fire and a lack
of sleep.
Orders then arrived for our
engineers to clear a route
through the Muttla Pass, only
a few miles south of our new
position, and for the rest of us
to help bury the Iraqi dead. It
was far from the ideal note to
finish on. But we had been
warned of the carnage caused
when the American air force
Burning Kuwaiti oil wells and
a destroyed Iraqi tank
Iraqi causualties
and the 2nd US Marine Division
had caught the retreating Iraqi
army leaving Kuwait City on
the road to Basra. There were
not thousands of bodies, as the
Reflections
on the First
Gulf War
Major-General P. Cordingley
The Desert Rats, the UK’s 7th Armoured
Brigade, during the First Gulf War were initially
part of the 1st US Marine Corps. Later they
were moved to join the VII US Corps, the
largest and most powerful corps in history. In
February 1991 the British tanks led the attack
into Iraq from Saudi Arabia. Their Commander
now reflects on the aftermath of four hectic
days and nights of fighting.
media had claimed, but certainly
hundreds; it was a reminder to
us all of the horror of war.
Initial Problems
Small problems surfaced almost
immediately the next morning
to catch us by surprise. Having
spent months preparing the
soldiers for the most unpleasant
of wars, preparing them to cope
with violence and death, we
had not thought through the
immediate effects of the ceasefire.
Some were clearly still
spoiling for a fight, some were
disturbed by what they had
seen or done, some felt cheated
that they had not met the
enemy; fortunately the majority
were just relieved to be alive
and delighted by the result. But,
whatever, it was clearly going
to be a time when we needed
the comfort of each other’s
company – I as much
as anybody else.
Then there was the problem of
loot. The understandable desire
to return from the war with a
souvenir was an overwhelming
one and, as we could have
predicted, the soldiers were
as imaginative as ever in
what they hoped to smuggle
home. Putting aside the legal
requirements, the danger of
collecting the spoils of war was
immense. The area was strewn
with unexploded mines and
bomblets, and the deserted
bunkers and even some dead
bodies were booby-trapped.
The control measures we
applied were not popular but
very necessary.
Correct Decisions
It was then time to sleep and,
if that was not possible, think.
Irrespective of the disaster Iraq
is today, my views have changed
little on what happened to us
and whether we got it right.
I remain convinced that the
cease-fire was called at the
optimum moment. From the
brigade’s point of view we
had defeated the enemy and
stopped before his destruction
was complete. This seemed to
us to be honourable; enough
people had already died.
Practically, we would have had
some difficulty in pushing on to
Basra without at least a day’s
break. We were extremely tired
and making mistakes, we had
very little water and there was
none available in the immediate
area. Our field hospitals were a
long way behind us.
Political Conundrums
Also by 28th February it
was clear that General
Schwarzkopf’s plan to annihilate
the Republican Guard with
a left hook through Iraq had
failed. The expectation that
the American Marines and
Arab Coalition Forces would
take days to fight through
the defences in Kuwait and
perhaps draw in Iraqi reserves
as well never materialised. They
were proud and determined
– nothing was going to stop
them reaching the city gates.
Saddam Hussein had no time to
dispatch his Republican Guard
as reinforcements, even if he
ever intended to. VII US Corps’
target was a will-o’-the-wisp by
27th February. The majority of
the Iraqi soldiers were already
on their way back to Baghdad.
President Bush had another
awkward problem, presented
by the media’s reporting of
the ‘turkey shoot’ at the Muttla
Pass. It seemed that he would
almost certainly lose support
from the Muslim world if he
allowed another such incident to
happen. The political conundrum
as to whether Saddam Hussein
should have been removed from
power is perhaps more difficult
to comment on without the
interference of hindsight, but I
remember thinking at the time
that no-one wanted a vacuum
in the Middle East, nor did the
Americans want to be seen
as king-makers. Militarily and
politically the cease-fire called
on 28th February was therefore
inevitable.
Road to Basra
Re-subordination
I also remain firm in my view
that our re-subordination from
the American marines to the
VII US Corps was regrettable.
Politically, we would have
gained most glory if we had
been involved in the liberation
of Kuwait City itself. Militarily,
we joined what the Americans
termed ‘the main point of effort’
and, despite being involved in
some of the hardest fighting, we
were seen after the war as the
troops who held open the door
for the American Army in its
pursuit of the Republican Guard.
That was not what our planners
had envisaged.
The Media
I worry now, as I did then,
about the effects of the
media on modern warfare.
I detected, during the initial
settling-in period, the belief
among reporters that they
should encourage emotion. If
an interview could be turned
to probe fear or shock, this
seemed to win favour at home.
The intrusion, if challenged, was
justified as caring and in the
31 32

public interest. But don’t the
public, and indeed the armed
forces, shape their behaviour
to the media’s demands
Did we not confess in the
Gulf, under this examination,
to being frightened Well, of
course we were – but was it
not unpatriotic to ask us to say
so And then the reporting
of the very clinical nature of
modern weapon systems, and
their effects on the bunkers and
buildings in Baghdad, led the
public, particularly the American
public, to lose touch with the
reality of war; a grim, ghastly
and bloody affair. Such reporting
also heightened the public
concern over casualties. This is
also a dangerous preoccupation.
I wonder if commanders can
now be ruthless enough, in a
television age, to pursue the
enemy to the limit, if the stakes
are anything less than national
survival.
Iraqi Tactics
During January 1991, Saddam
Hussein and his generals
were much criticised over
their tactical handling of their
forces in Kuwait and Iraq. ‘Their
defences are similar to those
used on the Western Front in
1916’ was a common cry. I felt,
even at the time, this was a
little disingenuous. There were,
after all, very few options open
to them. The defensive strategy
was centred on Basra and
consisted of three layers or lines.
The front, manned by the ragtag
conscripts, was nevertheless
well prepared on the Kuwaiti-
Saudi Arabian border. Behind
this came the regulars, and
then in reserve the Republican
Guard. The Iraqi engineers had
built an elaborate network of
interconnecting roads, allowing
for easy redeployment and
logistic supply.
But that was their problem.
Once a single vehicle moved,
the sophisticated American
surveillance systems spotted
it and the resultant onslaught
from the air was devastating.
But it was only later that I came
to the conclusion that Saddam
Hussein probably did not care
what happened to any of his
forces except the elite. His
aim was all but achieved the
moment his troops entered
Kuwait and then refused to
withdraw. He had demonstrated
to the Muslim world, by standing
up to the Americans, that he
was their natural leader. Most
of his huge conscript army
was expendable. It was, after
all, too large; he was having
trouble feeding and paying
it. The loss of one hundred
thousand was but a small price
to pay to achieve his misguided
ambitions. The Republican
Guard, on the other hand, was
essential to his survival.
Saddam Hussain
Political Negotiations
I turn to the subject of political
negotiations between the
belligerents. There was hardly
a single one of us in the desert
who did not pray for a peaceful
solution to the crisis, despite
the fact that we recognised that
the quickest route home lay
through the defeat of the Iraqi
forces. This hope was probably
British Armoured Fighting Vehicles
naive. Once the Coalition was
ready to fight, the temptation for
the politicians to find a military
solution to the problem must
have been overwhelming.
Decision Making and the
Passage of Information
I continue with observations
on decision making and the
passage of information and how
we made our plans. The formal
decision making process, the
estimate, was time consuming.
In our fast moving war of
manoeuvre the decision point
had to be reached as quickly
as possible so an opportunity
to outwit the enemy was not
missed. The debate is now
whether or not an intuitive
decision should be taken in
the interests of speed without
testing it against the long and
more formal process of the
estimate or appreciation.
In the desert we learnt once
again the value of issuing clear
and unambiguous orders. In our
peacetime exercising, particularly
when training without troops
on the ground, we had tended
to send out overcomplicated
instructions. Messages and
orders must be simply stated
and entirely clear. This becomes
even more essential when lack
of sleep distorts the mind, which
happened to us after two days
of fighting. All our soldiers were
briefed in minute detail about the
plan and their part in it. This has
to have been one of the keys to
our swift advance.
Logistics
The logistic support was
Herculean. Thirty-five thousand
British soldiers were deployed
to the Gulf with four hundred
thousand tons of equipment,
munitions and freight, and
thirteen thousand five hundred
vehicles. From Al Jubayl, when
the decision to move west was
taken, twenty-three thousand
tons of ammunition, six hundred
and fifty tons of rations and
nearly two million litres of petrol
were moved over two hundred
miles to a logistics base called
Alpha in only nineteen days.
During the ground war the
logisticians were prepared to
cope with a daily consumption
of one thousand tons of
ammunition, half a million
litres of fuel and three-quarters
of a million litres of water. They
also delivered to us half a million
parcels and nine million letters.
The Unequal Contest
The Desert Rats were involved
in an international coalition
pitted against a moderately
sized regional state. It now
appears to have been a
ridiculously unequal contest,
with the Iraqi strength probably
over-estimated. But we had
studied their success in a
different sort of war against
Iran and then focused on
the quantities of manpower,
artillery and tanks rather
than on an investigation into
human qualities. We had lived
in harsh conditions through a
long preparatory period and
expected, when we went into
the attack, to meet all sorts of
horrors which didn’t materialise.
And so we must be careful
about the lessons we take from
a war where we defeated a
technologically inferior enemy
on featureless terrain and met
very few reverses.
British artillery
7th Armoured gather in Iraqi POWs
However, it must be of immense
value for the future that a new
generation of soldiers now
understands the realities of war.
We won’t, I hope, pretend that
for us it was violent. We had,
after all, complete air supremacy
and almost total domination on
the ground, with our superior
equipment and with the enemy
having been bombed by the
Coalition air forces for over
six weeks.
But we won the land war so
quickly because we were
aggressive and used to full
advantage the staggering
artillery firepower available to
us. Also our outstanding tanks
could pick off the enemy at
three thousand yards’ range;
our infantry was well equipped
and trained; we could, and did,
fight at night. We moved with
remarkable speed, covering
some two hundred miles in
four days. We destroyed three
hundred enemy tanks and
armoured personnel carriers
and took eight thousand
prisoners of war. I believe that
even if the enemy had been
more resolute we would still
have been unstoppable.
Major-General Cordingley,
educated at Sherborne
and RMA Sandhurst has a
distinguished military career
including command of the
famous 7th Armoured Brigade
(the ‘Desert Rats’) throughout
the Gulf War. He was awarded
the Distinguished Service
Order for leadership and
bravery. He has held several
notable appointments and is
closely connected to the Help
for Heroes and Macmillan
Cancer Support charities.
He is also a published
author, scholar and is in
much demand as a lecturer
on leadership, team-building
and decision-making, as well
as a media commentator on
international affairs.
33 34

Countries and Leaders
affected by the Arab Spring
Abidine Sakande and Johannes Wullenweber
35 36

Left: Photomontage of the Tunisian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens
The Tunisian
o
Thomas O’Dell
o
How did the Revolution start
The Tunisian Revolution officially started on the
18th December 2010, although the event that caused
it, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, took
place on 17th December. Bouazizi was the sole source
of income in his family of eight, and was treated
unfairly and illegally by a female police officer, as
many street vendors in his position were used to.
However, Bouazizi decided that he had had enough
of this treatment and decided to do something
about the corruption in the government. Without
informing any friends or family, he went to the police
headquarters, covered himself in a flammable liquid,
and set himself on fire.
This action provided the spark – pardon the pun
– that lit the gunpowder; this gunpowder being
the 23 years of oppression brought on Tunisia by
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Initially the
people sought change by peaceful marches, but, after
the police violently attacked the marchers, (reminds
me of a particular event in the USA in 1963...) riots
broke out, firstly across Sidi Bouzid, the city where
Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself, but then spread
throughout Tunisia. Those protesting did now no
longer want reform – they were calling for the end of
President Ben Ali’s regime.
How did the Revolution end
The main revolution ended with the ousting of
President Ben Ali on 14th January. However, many
protests continued afterwards, as people were
unhappy with the new government. Following Ben
Ali’s departure from office, the army took control of
Tunisia, with Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi
taking over as acting President for a short while.
Some rioters used the occasion to continue stealing
and vandalising, but some were displeased with
Ghannouchi’s cabinet reshuffles, and wanted more
change and a better chance of liberty. Ghannouchi
was a high-ranking official in President Ben Ali’s
government, and the people of Tunisia wanted a
whole new beginning.
What were the significant events of the Revolution
After Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, riots
and protests started in Sidi Bouzid and then spread.
By 27th December, protests had reached Tunis, the
capital of Tunisia. On 6th January, strikes started,
with 96% of Tunisia’s lawyers refusing to work in
protest about unprovoked beatings. Teachers also
joined this strike as they had been victim to the same
treatment.
On the 14th January, the military finally ousted
President Ben Ali as he fled to Malta. However, several
members of his party, the Constitutional Democratic
Rally (RCD in French) remained in the government.
Protests continued over this as the people wanted a
completely new government. The army pledged its
allegiance to the revolution, strengthening the cause
of the rebels, and weakening the position of the RCD.
To meet the demands of the protesters, Mohammed
Ghannouchi removed six of the former members
of Ben Ali’s government. This meant that aside
from Ghannouchi himself, only two former Ben
Ali government members remained in the interim
37
38

Right: Photomontage of the Egyptian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens
government – and these two ministers had not been a
key part of the RCD, meaning that the revolutionary
demands had been met.
However, on the 28th January, another protest
started, because Ghannouchi was still in government.
Protesters claimed that he was still propping up the
old regime, and that they wanted an entirely new
government, with no remnants from the Ben Ali era.
Naim Garbousi, a protester from the central town of
Gefsa, summed up the attitude, “The new line-up is
a theatre. The symbols of the old regime are left, like
Ghannouchi. Why is he insisting on staying We are
10 million people, there will surely be someone who
can replace him.”
Even after elections were announced for July, protests
demanding Ghannouchi still continued. Eventually,
after a protest of over 100,000 people on 27th
January, Ghannouchi resigned, and was replaced by
Beji Caid el Sebsi. Two other ministers resigned, but
protestors called for the whole interim government
to go. Eventually, on 9th March, the RCD was
closed down after a court case. Ben Ali’s secret police
were also dissolved. However, elections were delayed
because of internal elections in the new government.
What were the outcomes of the Revolution
The outcomes of the Tunisian Revolution reached
both a national and international level. Tunisia
managed to secure itself a brand new government and
President, with much of the oppression by President
Ben Ali’s regime removed.
on the 20th October. Syria is still, at the time of this
publication, in civil war, with the military retaining all
the advantages over the protesters
Why is this Revolution important
This revolution is important because of the actions
of one man the whole Arab world has been turned
upside down. Tunisia was the first Arab nation
to successfully overthrow its dictator, setting an
example to other nations – a message of hope, that
freedom was possible. If Tunisia had failed, as the
forerunner of the Arab Spring, it would have looked
weak, and other Arab peoples that had followed the
Tunisian people’s example would have lost morale and
hesitated. If the Tunisian revolutionaries had failed to
overthrow President Ben Ali, the dictators in Egypt,
Yemen, Libya and countless other countries would
still be in power, and would no doubt be exacting
some form of twisted punishment upon those who
dared to oppose them. However, they succeeded, and
so the Arab world, and indeed the whole world, will
never be the same again.
However, the impacts of the Tunisian Revolution
were felt across the Arab world. After Mohammed
Bouazizi’s self-immolation, many people in similar
dictatorships copied his actions. The Egyptian
people managed to overthrow their President, Hosni
Mubarak, as their situation was very similar to the
Tunisian one, and so did the people of Yemen with
their President, Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, not all
countries managed to achieve Tunisia’s easy success.
Both the Libyan people and Syrian people have
been faced by ruthless military opposition – unlike
Tunisia, where the military supported the protestors.
The Libyan Civil War lasted from 15th February to
23rd February, with Muammar Gaddafi being killed
39
40

1001
Egyptian Knights:
A Drama in Three Acts
After over four thousand years in the shadows
of the pyramids of Giza, Cairo emerged in the
world’s headlines throughout last year. This
article will explore the historic acts that occurred
in Egypt in 2011, the unrest that currently
occupies its capital and the pressing questions
that its population now faces.
ARAB BROKEN SPRING
After years of oppressive rule and poor leadership,
Egyptians felt little hope concerning their future.
However, Tunisia’s fall provided the spark which
resulted in wide spread protests from January 25th,
2011. After a short period of protests, Mubarak
stepped down from office leaving Egypt on
February 11th without a leader. The Ministry of
Defence, advised by senior military figures, took
his place as president.
The ensuing nine months witnessed a struggle
between the increasingly visible Muslim
brotherhood and the military, the former of the two
wishing a rapid transition to civilian rule and the
latter seeking to safeguard their privileged position.
Protests broke out sporadically, cumulating in an
enormous peaceful protest on November 18th,
which, unfortunately, degenerated into violence
throughout the following days with evermore
strident demands for an end to military rule.
Nevertheless, on 28th November, elections for the
new People’s Assembly began peacefully, proving
immensely popular but delivered a surprisingly
strong showing for the Muslim brotherhood and a
shock result for the hard-line Salafis who received
around a quarter of the vote.
IN de NILE
The revolution raised huge expectations of rapid
change for the better. However, Egyptians are now
confronted with the reality of transforming ideals
into practical changes. Ongoing changes represent
an impatience for quick results and an absence of
the fear that previously inhibited expressions of
dissatisfaction. Not a day passes now without a
strike or protest in favour of higher wages, improved
conditions and more jobs. At the same time,
following the elections a new government has still
not been formed as this is the prerogative of the
president who will not be elected until May or June
2012. This means that important economic and civil
issues are not being dealt with. One manifestation
of this is sadly a general disregard for law and order.
Oppressive fear of the police, which existed before
the revolution, has now vanished with both trivial
and serious results; street vendors operate where they
wish with no fear of being removed and a significant
increase in violent crime.
In this atmosphere of thwarted aspirations, most anger
is now focusing on the military, who are still in overall
control and an immediate transition to civil rule is still
regarded as somewhat of a panacea.
NOW FOR THE HARD PART...
A number of fundamental questions now present
themselves to Egypt.
Will the military give up their power Their complete
withdrawal from politics seems hard to imagine given
their extensive economic and social authority (they
currently control many factories and their influence
through conscription is vast). However, popular
demands for real power to civilian administrations will
be hard to ignore. It is likely the military will attempt
to retain reserved rights in some areas, for example,
over the military budget.
The Muslim brotherhood won the election and is
expected to be dominant in the new government.
Another question is whether they will use this power
to turn Egypt into a Sharia state. There is no question
that the Salafis, who are the second largest group in
parliament, would want this but the implications for
Egyptian society and its impressive tourist industry
would be profound. Finally, strong individuals have
traditionally governed Egypt, whether he or she be
sultan, king or president. The country must now wait
until May or June for a new leader. Logically, given
the success of the People’s Assembly Elections, the
new president will be an Islamist.
Initially, the brotherhood had said they would not
put forward a presidential candidate but have recently
changed their policy. So who then, will govern
Egypt has been through a remarkable twelve months
and the expectations of change are high. However,
the country now faces the most difficult stages in its
struggle for a better future.
Article and some photography by Amy Haines
Graffiti of an Army General
41 42

The Libyan Revolution
& the Overthrow of Gaddafi
Last year, the news became filled with stories of
uprisings in the Middle East that has been termed
the ‘Arab Spring.’ Although an oversimplification, it
could be said that these uprisings were routed in the
people’s dissatisfaction with their totalitarian regimes
and a contingent desire for greater democracy. In
Libya, an oil rich country in North Africa, one such
revolution took place and NATO’s involvement in
the conflict increased the world’s attention towards
it. The motives behind this intervention have been
called in to question especially due to the presence
of large oil reserves in Libya. Indeed, Britain’s
relations with the Libya (especially its government
and leader, Colonel Gaddafi,) prior to the start of
the Revolution, were already controversial. Former
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s, decision to
initiate talks with Colonel Gaddafi had been the
subject of considerable criticism and that had
intensified following the Scottish government’s
decision to release the Lockerbie bomber on
compassionate grounds.
The Libyan revolution was driven to an extent by
the workers, the youth and the poor. But it was
also fuelled by local and tribal loyalties, creating a
disjointed ‘revolutionary coalition’. The situation in
the country made the headlines in February 2011
when conflict broke out in Benghazi, and remained
Jenny Elwin
at the forefront of media attention till its culmination
in August, when the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi
was overthrown. Prior to being supplanted, and
subsequently killed, Gaddafi had been in control for
more than 40 years. He came to power in September
1969 after leading a coup against King Idris, in
a rather less bloody struggle than the one which
resulted in his own downfall.
The Libyan revolution was the result of a
combination of factors, but primarily, it resulted
from the desire for new leadership and an end to
the corruption that existed under Gaddafi. The
hope for change stems from the youthful age of the
population (with 2/3 being under 30) and the lack
of opportunities afforded to them by the regime. In
recent years, high unemployment (30%), the lack
of a political voice, and the increased cost of living
amplified the atmosphere of despondency about the
future. One of the most interesting contributory
factors to the revolution was the role played by
modern technology, and especially the internet.
Today’s society, with its emphasis on social media,
allowed Libyans to hear news of revolutions in other
Middle-eastern countries and additionally made it
possible for news to be communicated to people
outside of Libya once the conflict began.
The Revolution began in February, with protests
in Benghazi, Libya’s second biggest city. The
protests quickly spread to other important cities
and throughout the rest of the country including
the capital Tripoli where thousands of civilians
gathered to voice their opinions. (In contrast, the
media controlled by the state was filled with images
of Libyans waving support flags and shouting in
support of Gaddafi.) The Libyan leadership responded
violently to the demonstrations, using the air force
to bomb protestors. Throughout his period in
power, Gaddafi had kept the Libyan military weak
and internally divided, fearing it would become
strong enough to pose a challenge to his authority.
Consequently, he enlisted the help of mercenaries
(roughly 2500) from other countries including Chad,
Sudan and Niger to tackle the demonstrators.
In March, following scenes of Libyan forces bombing
and shelling their own citizens in rebel held areas,
the West decided to intervene. Under a UN mandate
to use force only to prevent the military force being
used to the detriment of the Libyan civilians, NATO
quickly interpreted this to empower their intervention
on the rebel side. Both American and European air
forces did so with missile strikes, beginning on March
19th. A large coalition of NATO forces mustered in
Italy or out at sea and under American leadership
ensured that no Libyan government air force could
target rebel held areas. Furthermore, NATO air
forces successfully destroyed large numbers of Libyan
government heavy weaponry such as tanks, artillery
guns and rocket systems. Consequently, by late May
the NATO strikes had helped the rebels, who had
gained territory in both the east and the west of the
country. Indeed, evidence appears to be emerging of
the rebels receiving more than just the mandated air
protection for its civilians. Reports so far suggest that
Western governments have helped the rebels in other
ways too. For example, weapons were air dropped in
by the French, the US offered rendition of prisoners
and NATO as a whole has provided technical and
intelligence support. On the 21st of August rebels
poured into Tripoli, for the most part, greeted by
celebration and little resistance. It took just a few days
to end the fighting that had been waged indecisively
for the previous six months. After two days of street
fighting, subsequent to entering the capital, the
rebels established control. On the 23rd August, they
reportedly infiltrated Gaddafi’s fortified compound,
although by that time he had gone into hiding, and
various members of his family had fled to Algeria.
Two months later, on the 20th October, his death was
reported. Originally it was alleged that he was killed
in the cross fire, but videos from mobiles subsequently
emerged of Gaddafi apparently begging for mercy
before he was shot in the head.
Retired German General Egon Ramms, has stated
that NATO’s role in toppling Gaddafi’s rule was
a ‘decisive one’. To an extent, General Ramms is
correct. At the beginning of the conflict it seemed a
civil war would ensue, in which the rebels would be
outnumbered. The United Nations Security Council’s
decision for military action, helped tip the balance in
the rebels’ favour. In part, this was because the pro-
Gaddafi forces were better equipped than the rebels,
whose efforts were hampered by internal conflict and
insufficient training. Within a week of the air strikes
commencing, a ‘no fly’ zone had been established over
Libya. However ultimately, it was the rebels on the
ground that were the driving force of the revolution.
Allegedly, there was a certain amount of debate in
America as to whether the use of cyber warfare might
43 44

Right: Photomontage of civil strife in Syria by Thomas Gibbens
be permitted to tackle Gaddafi. However, this idea
was ultimately rejected, due to fear that it would
set a precedent for other countries, China and Russia
in particular, to follow suit. Nevertheless, the action
which was taken was not without its flaws; the air
strikes were intended to protect civilians, but they
caused the deaths of civilians too. Indeed, many
observers noted how NATO’s airpower arrived
when the rebels’ ground forces were prevented
from advancing.
After the rebels took over, a provisional government,
the Transitional National Council, was put in place
under the Prime Minister Abdel Rahim el-Keeb. El-
Keeb had previously worked as an electronics engineer
and was a known critic of Gaddafi prior to the leader’s
death. At present, Libya’s future remains uncertain,
however plans are being made for a constituent
assembly to be decided by June of this year. The
Constituent Assembly will have the ability to create
a government whilst a new constitution is being
written. This is hopeful progression, but some of the
problems of Gaddafi’s regime are still in existence.
For instance, Amnesty International has reported
that torture is still being used on prisoners.
The task, which faces the new leadership, is
undoubtedly a hard one. This is exacerbated by
widespread expectations that Gaddafi’s overthrow
would bring an immediate increase in Libya’s
prosperity. Initially, instability was caused by tribal
divisions and fear of the permeating influence of
Islamists. Moreover, divisions between the rebels
that existed before the revolution’s success, has
widened since Gaddafi’s death, as it eradicated the
negative cohesion which existed between them.
For instance, there have been clashes between
rebel forces in January of this year, fuelled by
their dissatisfaction at the rapidity and character
of the change occurring. Despite the transitional
government’s request, few have disarmed to any
noticeable extent. But whilst there has much debate
as to the type of government and society which
would replace Gaddafi’s autocracy, normality has
been able to resume in some areas. By mid November
oil production, the country’s most significant
industry, had restarted. However, reports suggest
that this production is 40% of what it was before
the conflict began.
Nevertheless, damage done to this industry is not as
detrimental as it could have been; Libyan officials
have reported that no serious harm was done to 40 of
the most important oil and gas fields.
Therefore, the current situation in Libya is an unstable
one and the future uncertain. It should be noted that
the fate of the country is being given less prominence
in the news now, than when the conflict began. One
must also question the responsibility the West has
towards the citizens of Libya due to the decisive role
they played in Gaddafi’s overthrow. Because of our
active involvement in the conflict, I believe we have
a moral duty to assist with rebuilding the country
too. Unfortunately, it seems likely (as it has happened
before) that the media find something new to print in
their pages. Consequently, it is very likely that we will
forget about the people of Libya whose fate the West
decided when NATO intervened in 2011; or at least,
until the Media’s attention is drawn back to Libya by
a further crisis that affects the West.
Fighting outside Gaddafi’s Compound
Rebel fighters stomp on Gaddafis head
45 46

What does Turkey’s relationship
with Syria mean to the region,
the West and to itself
As this article is being written,
historic events have come to pass
in the region. The Arab spring was
a shot in the arm for democracy in
the world. The peaceful nature of
the Egyptian and Tunisian protests
showed that the much-recited call
to arms by terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda was wrong. In particular,
the people in those countries now
see Turkey as the shining example
for a Muslim democracy. However,
Turkey’s greatest test now is that
posed by Syria: what should it do
about its close neighbour’s civil war
and the problems spilling over the
border in to Turkey
At the turn of the century Turkey
was viewed very differently
from how it is today. It was
very politically unstable (from
its creation in 1923 there have
been four coups d’états: in 1960,
1971, 1980 and 1997). It was
seen in the Middle East as too
western orientated, as it has been
traditionally close to America
since the end of World War II.
Arabian nationalists regarded it
with suspicion because of Ottoman
domination of the Middle East,
while Islamists regarded its
secularism with disgust. Turkey kept
to itself in the region and was more
occupied with its internal problems,
Kaan Tuncel
and so was generally neutral towards
the disputes in other countries in
the region, all except one…
Turkey has had more than its
fair share of troubles with Syria.
Although there are minor disputes,
such as local dam projects and
the region of Hatay, the greatest
point of tension has been Syria’s
support of the PKK. The PKK
(Kurdistan Workers Party,) is a
Kurdish organisation that aims
to achieve greater rights for the
Kurdish population in Turkey. It
has been recognised as a terrorist
organisation by Turkey, the US,
the UK and the EU. The PKK
regularly plants bombs in Turkey
(such as the bomb attack in
Central Ankara on 20th September
2011 which killed 3) and attacks
the military with guerrilla tactics.
For this reason, Turkey has been
very confrontational with Syria
over its support of the PKK.
Examples of Syrian support for
the PKK range from allowing
them to have safe heavens in the
Baqaa valley to giving its leader
Abdullah Ocalan residence in
Damascus. This has led to Turkey’s
government claiming it would
take any steps necessary to destroy
the PKK’s bases in Syria, strongly
hinting at military action.
1
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13737946 viewed on the 1st of November 2011
As Syria started to change its
approach to the PKK, a thawing of
relations between the two countries
started. In 2004 the Turkish Prime
Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
visited Syria to sign a free trade
agreement; trade between the two
countries has flourished, growing
from $730 MN to $2,270 MN
in 2010 1 . This has not been an
isolated case and indeed, this
Turkish-led thaw has led to it
gaining more credibility throughout
the Middle East. The previous
American-appeasing view has been
challenged, as many in the region
were delighted in 2003 when
Turkey refused to allow American
forces to invade Iraq through its
border. The election of the mildly
Islamic AK party in 2003, coupled
with the booming economy (which
is now the 17th largest in the
world) has made Turkey a shining
example around the Arab world of
a successful Islamic government.
However, the Arab Spring caught
Turkey by surprise. Despite
reluctant support for the Libyan
and Egyptian revolutions, Turkey
now has to decide what approach
to take with its other important
neighbour. The consequences of any
action will be significant and far
reaching. Turkey shares an 822km
border with Syria, and so far there
have been around 24,000 refugees
who have fled into Turkey because
of the violence 2 . Turkey could risk
further destabilising the country if
it starts to support the opposition
outright, but the situation might
also do that if nothing is done.
The foreign minister was quick
to point out that Syria is a more
complicated situation than Egypt
or Libya, and there is a big risk of
sectarian conflict 3 in the Ba’ath
party ruled country 4 . This risk of a
second insurgency war in the region
(and the second one with a border
with Turkey), is a big one.
This is perhaps the reason why
many of Turkey’s western allies are
accepting that Mr Erdogan keeps
his line with Syria’s President,
Bashar Assad, open. Mr Erdogan
is insisting that Mr Assad starts
to introduce democratic reforms
to help stabilise the country. This
is currently seen in Turkey as the
most viable option, as there is little
evidence of an alternative to Assad
who could keep control in such an
unstable country. Turkey does not
just want to give democracy to the
people, it wants to create a strong
regional partner that will both help
it promote further stability and
create strong economic ties.
That being said, it is becoming
obvious that the Turkish
government is losing its patience.
Mr Erdogan has said that when
he talked with Bashar Assad about
removing emergency power, the
president agreed with him but
has failed to implement this 5 . Mr
Erdogan later on went on to say
the head of Syrian forces, who
is Bashar Assad’s brother, was
“chasing after savagery” 6 and that
Turkey would have no choice but
to support a UN resolution to
intervene in Syria. Nonetheless, it
is important to note that Turkey
also shelters in the province of
Hatay the main armed wing of
the Syrian opposition, namely the
Free Syrian Army. However, Mr
Erdogan has also stated that the
government does not supply the
movement nor allows anyone else
from doing so either.
This is not an attempt to shift
its policy, but rather adopt a
contingency. Turkey will still try
to achieve the best outcome for
itself and the region with the least
amount of intervention as possible,
because of Arab views opposing
breaches of another country’s
sovereignty. (But it reserves the
means of upping its involvement
should it feel the need to do so.)
This inevitably means working
with the local Syrian government
as much as possible, and Turkey
will always try to take the path
of least resistance. To outside
observers, this approach might
seem weak but such a view would
overlook the complex nature of
the situation both currently on the
border as well as the ramifications
that would most certainly arise in
the region should Turkey flex its
military muscle.
Rather, it is important to see the
complexity of the state of affairs
which faces Turkey. The Middle
East is a region plagued with
factional violence, worsened by two
countries (Iran and Saudi Arabia)
that manipulate the region to suit
their own needs. Turkey is a country
that has had a rich history of leading
the Muslim world, as the seat of
the last Caliphate and in recent
years has been making something
of a comeback. Neither Iran, nor
Syria will want to see a strong and
democratic Turkey with ties to the
West. Syria will be Turkey’s first real
test of how it will try and prevent
a further outbreak of cross-border
violence, which has erupted in
this ancient region so many times
before. This is an exciting prospect
for everyone interested in its long
overdue democracy.
2
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/04/09/syrian-uprising-ceasefire-turkey-shooting-refugee_n_1411743.htmlref=middle-east viewed on the
12th of April 2012
3
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13737946 Paragraph 3, under “Exploring Alternatives” viewed 11th November 2011
4
http://www.baath-party.org/eng/constitution.htm viewed on 11th November 2011
5
http://www.dunyatimes.com/en/p=12662 viewed 11th November 2011
6
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-246848-turkish-pm-erdogan-calls-ongoing-syrian-crackdown-savagery.html viewed 11th November 2011
47 48

Where to now,
Israel
Israel’s Foreign Policy Challenges
The Arab Spring of 2011 has posed Israel a real
foreign policy problem. Despite being the oldest
democracy in the region, Israel has not welcomed the
pro-democracy changes in its near neighbours with
the same ringing endorsements heard from around
Europe. Indeed the silence from Tel Aviv, at these
extraordinary developments especially in Egypt,
has caused its diplomatic corps some considerable
embarrassment. Part of the reason for this is that prior
to the Arab Spring, Israel was enjoying a prolonged
period of peace and strength, hitherto not experienced
since its birth in 1948. Its neighbouring governments
in Turkey, Jordan and Egypt were on personal friendly
terms with Israel’s military and political leaders. Its
Palestinian political opponents were divided internally
and lacking key friends within the region and beyond.
All of these factors have changed to some extent and
now cause considerable unease within Israel’s viper’s
nest of political factions. Moreover, in the last year,
Iran has continued the development of its nuclear
programme which has resulted in more than just
voices of caution in Israel and elsewhere. Together,
these events have led to a series of foreign policy
blunders by Israel which has not endeared them to the
new regimes of their neighbours. This threatens the
peace in this already volatile region.
The close personal relationships between Mubarak’s
Egyptian regime and Israel had been the cornerstone
of peace for the region. With both states having
ties to opposing blocks throughout the region and
beyond, this alliance had cemented a peace since the
Arab-Israeli wars of 1948-1973. Mubarak himself
Mr M. Jennings
had been the perpetual link in this chain of peace.
That is why he was so popular in the West and
why the US in particular did not welcome news
of his regime’s crumbling. The new, military led
government is a caretaker and Israel has no choice
but to be patient, wait and hope that it can forge
links with its successor. Israel does not do patience
well. That patience could be strained to breaking
point if a radical Islamist individual, as is likely,
succeeds in their quest to become the new President
of Egypt. Then, an Islamist, anti-Israel government
would be formed and who knows what the future for
both countries would be
Israel has also become concerned by events to the
north. The secular state of Turkey has been a close
supporter of Israel over many years. It has suited
not just the economies of both countries to remain
allies but this alliance has helped open doors for both
countries in many other ways. For example, Turkey’s
alliance with Israel has helped bring closer ties to the
EU. However, the relatively new, pro-Islamist and
popular Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is
pursuing a different agenda. Following the diplomatic
gaff by Israel when its commandos stormed the
Turkish aid ship and killed ten aid workers on its
way to Gaza in May 2010, Turkey’s government
has sought not only to pursue a non-Israeli aligned
foreign policy but also stake a claim for leadership
of other Arab states such as Jordan. It is seeking to
be the dominant power in the region and so far, is
having considerable success at Israel’s expense.
Turkish success owes much not just to changes in
personnel across the Middle East following the
Arab Spring but also to its strategically important,
geo-political location bridging Asia and Europe as
well as the physical link between the Black Sea and
the Mediterranean. More than just oil has to be
shipped through the Dardanelles. Nonetheless, the
oil-dependent West can not afford to make enemies of
Turkey, especially given the volatile nature of Russia,
the other key petro-chemical exporter from Eastern
Europe. So Turkey’s diplomatic strength is Israel’s
current weakness.
Iran has made no secret of its progress towards
manufacturing nuclear fuel cells, which, it claims are
for civilian purposes only. This energy programme is
very popular in Iran but has caused alarm around the
world. This is because the manufacturing techniques
to make nuclear fuel can easily be transformed to
create nuclear weapons-grade material. Intelligence
reports published by the International Institute of
Strategic Studies, here in London, reveal that Iran
has been creating the right nuclear weapons-making
equipment and collecting appropriate nuclear
material for many years over a large number of
inaccessible locations, such as beneath mountains
and in deep mines shafts. In other words, Iran not
only is probably making nuclear weapons at this
very moment but is almost certainly trying to hide
it and prevent it from being sabotaged. This has not
fooled Israel or its Intelligence forces. It surely can be
no coincidence that 5 Iranian top nuclear scientists
have been murdered within the last 18 months and
many believe that they have been despatched by
Mossad-led teams. Of more concern is what Iran
intends to do with its nuclear capacity when it comes
on-line in 2013. Since Iran’s regime under President
Ahmadinejad has openly expressed its hatred of
Israel (its continued existence), and its allies, more
countries than just Israel have good reasons to fear
Iranian nuclear power. Consequently, the UN has
extended its sanctions for Iran’s continued violation
of International law, in having an unsanctioned
nuclear energy programme. Meanwhile, President
Obama and his government have worked hard
(during this Presidential election year, another
coincidence) to patch up their relationship with
Israel’s government, much to the benefit of both
regime’s poll ratings. But domestic support and the
backing of the USA will not be enough to protect
Israel should Iran chose to use its nuclear weapons.
Only diplomacy with Iran or regime change in
Tehran can seemingly avoid these two countries
creating a Middle Eastern nuclear Cold War.
The last and most problematic cause for Israel’s
troubles has been the brave and clever change in
tactics by the Palestinian government. Despite
being internally divided between Fatah and Hamas
(the much more militant Islamist organisation)
the Palestinian cause has long been associated with
terrorism and anti-Semitism. These features have
held back their attempts to seek not only a viable
agreement with Israel that would play well amongst
their own people but also have hindered their own
efforts to seek support from other states. With talks
between Israel and Palestine halted and deadlocked
over Israel’s continued building of settlements in
the West Bank, the Palestinian government changed
tack in the summer of 2011. Rather than repeat
well worn arguments in the foreign ministries and
media around the world about Israel’s negotiating
tactics or even table further motions at the UN
seeking condemnation of Israeli occupations, actions
in Gaza or the building of further settlements
in the West Bank, the Palestinians began the
process of seeking international recognition of
a Palestinian state. On 31st October 2011, they
achieved their first and arguably most crucial victory
in persuading UNESCO (the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization,)
a very important and influential part of the UN.
Only Israel and the US voted against the proposal.
Consequently, Israel and the US are increasingly
isolated from world opinion, which favours a two
state solution to the Israel-Palestine question anyway.
49
50

Right: Photomontage of recent events in Iran by Thomas Gibbens
Mubarak, Netanyahu and Obama
inducements probably in trade than it does at present.
Regarding Iran, a stark and clearer although much
less palatable choice faces Israel. Either employ a
pre-emptive military strike against all the key nuclear
targets and hope that such action is a) successful and
b) will not lead to war or, engage diplomatically with
Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s government. This
government has been a key ally of Hamas, the radical
Islamist Palestinian party and authority in Gaza. What
price for peace would Iran seek and, more relevantly,
can Israel afford to pay it So, Israel’s negotiations
with Iran will inevitably have consequences at home
that few Israelis want. Arguably though, the most
important issue for Israel’s future stability concerns its
relationship with Egypt.
Israel will have to step much more carefully with the
new pro-Islamist regime in Cairo. If Israel and Egypt
fail to re-establish a peaceful alliance, then what
will replace, if anything, the cornerstone of peace in
the Middle East And if nothing replaces that, will
internal conflicts boil up and expand out of the Arab
states with Israel becoming a target again for Arab
pan-Nationalism
With Israel so far isolated what can now stop
this process of Palestinian statehood becoming a
legal reality
So, where to now, Israel How shall it approach the
revitalised Palestine government and its claim for
statehood Much may depend upon the outcome
of the 2012 US Presidential election. Should a
strong, pro-Israel, Republican candidate win the
election, then Israel will feel less pressured to reach
an accommodation with the Palestinian government.
Similarly, the Israeli Netanyahu government simply
may not be willing or even able to reach an agreement
with President Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) of the
Palestinians on any of the key issues preventing a
long term peace. If that is the case, how long will
the Palestinian people remain docile before another
outburst of cross-border incidents and reprisals
Furthermore, Israel cannot ignore the growing
strength of Turkey nor can it continue to make so
many gaffes with its neighbours. It will have to reengage
with its northern neighbour and offer it greater
Matthew Jennings is Head of History at Ardingly
College. Educated at Manchester Grammar School
and University College London where he received a
Law Degree. In 1995, he was awarded a Masters in
War Studies at Kings College, London. Since then
he has been a member of the International Institute
of Strategic Studies.
51 52

The Arab Spring and the
Question of Military Intervention
Professor J. Ralph
Academics like to draw parallels.
A year on from the start of the Arab Spring it is
tempting to compare these events to the 1989
revolutions. These swept away the communist
regimes that had held Eastern Europe in their
grip for almost half a century. Most of these
revolutions were, thankfully, peaceful; and this
time last year many were celebrating what
seemed to be peaceful transitions in Tunisia and
Egypt. As in 1989, however, spring turned to
winter and the hopes that a regional revolution
could remain peaceful gave way to the reality
of civil war. The international politics of 1990’s
Europe, was in many ways, dominated by the
violence in the Balkans. After the Arab Spring
of 2011, the international politics of the Middle
East looks set to be dominated (the question of
Iranian nuclear capabilities aside) by the violence
in Syria. Further parallels exist in the fact that the
United Nations Security Council is not always
certain about how to respond. The Russian and
Chinese veto of the resolution proposed early
this year illustrates this.
These kinds of crises prompt much discussion
about the responsibility of “outsiders”. Should
they intervene to prevent or ease humanitarian
emergencies Do humanitarian principles and
national interests merge as Tony Blair insisted,
or is the appeal to humanity a rhetorical veil
that disguises the selfish interests of outsiders
Can ‘humanitarian intervention’ remain politically
neutral or does outside interference inevitably
alter politics in a way that denies national selfdetermination
And, most fundamentally, who
decides the answers to the questions Should a
state that answers these questions in favour of
intervention press ahead against the objections
of other states
Can that state really claim to be acting on
behalf of the “international community” when
other states think the common interest is best
pursued through a policy of non-interference
When drawing their comparisons academics
should acknowledge that historical lines never
run precisely in parallel. This is because lessons
are learned and applied in ways that alter
the course of contemporary events. Take the
Balkans for instance. Western governments
were initially reluctant to intervene. The national
interest was defined narrowly. The Balkans
was considered to have its own history which
implied that outsiders should not interfere.
Finally, the consensus at the Security Council
did not stretch beyond support for neutral
peacekeeping missions. Then we had the
massacres at Srebrenica and elsewhere. The
outrage prompted shifts in the answers to the
key questions.
The UK shift was facilitated by a change in
government. New Labour had promised to put
‘ethics’ at the centre of its foreign policy. This
prompted a greater willingness to intervene
forcefully on behalf of human rights and led to
Tony Blair’s 1999 insistence that it was right
for NATO to intervene to stop the violence
in Kosovo. From his perspective the national
interest did merge with the humanitarian impulse
to ‘do something’. The Balkans certainly had its
own history but it was also part of a “European”
and even “global” history and its people
were part of a “European” and “international
community”. Foreign governments did have “a
responsibility to protect” and the lesson from
Bosnia was that NATO had to intervene early.
The problem was that the Russians in particular
didn’t agree. Its threat to veto a Security Council
resolution authorizing the use of force meant
NATO had to construct original legal arguments
to square its actions with the UN Charter.
Essentially, Russia’s position on Kosovo was
presented as being unreasonable in the face of
previous resolutions, which had identified the
humanitarian situation as a threat to international
peace and security. These previous resolutions,
it was claimed, ‘implicitly authorized’ NATO to
use force.
In this respect, the mood of western governments
was shifting. They were less willing to let the lack
of consensus at the Security Council paralyse
their response to humanitarian emergencies.
The question that remained, however, was this:
could NATO still claim to be acting on behalf
of the ‘international community’ when it had
seemingly by-passed the UN If not, was NATO’s
intervention an example of liberal imperialism
Not everyone is concerned by the charge of
liberal imperialism. If NATOs intervention helped
ease or prevent a humanitarian emergency in
Kosovo then that might, by itself, be enough for it
to claim legitimacy. Yet there are potentially costs
to adopting this approach.
The first is illustrated by the diplomacy leading
up to the Iraq War. When the French threatened
to veto a resolution authorizing the use of force
Blair dismissed it as ‘unreasonable’. The invasion
was legitimate, he argued, because previous
resolutions “implicitly revived” the authority to use
force against Iraq that had existed since the first
Gulf War in 1991. The US and UK again pressed
ahead without UN support. Unlike NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo, however, the Americanled
invasion of Iraq did not turn out well for
Blair. Supporters of the invasion have since
acknowledged that Security Council deliberations
got it right. Had the US and the UK accepted
that they alone could not decide the best policy
then, the critics argue, they would have avoided
making a mistake.
A reason for listening to the Security Council
therefore might be that the discussions there
deliver better outcomes. But that doesn’t
necessarily hold. One might also argue that the
Kosovo intervention delivered a good outcome
and had NATO listened to the Security Council
the outcome would have been much worse.
There is no easy way of determining when a veto
is unreasonable.
53 54

It does seem that the present governments
of the UK and the US are reluctant to act
outside of a clear Security Council mandate.
Of course, if a nation decides to act without
UN support it cannot easily call on others for
assistance. It has to bear the burden itself.
This was the lesson that President Obama and
Prime Minister Cameron drew from Iraq. Security
Council support then is not simply a question of
legitimacy; it is a means of sharing the burden.
This very much informed the approach toward
the 2011 crisis in Libya.
There was no doubt in this case that Resolution
1973 (2011) authorized the use of force. The
Russians and others (e.g. Brazil, India, China
and South Africa) still had concerns, however.
Their fear was that the NATO-led coalition
was using force to pursue a political agenda
(regime change) rather than a humanitarian
one (protection of civilians). As noted, it is
difficult to see how an external intervention
for humanitarian reasons can maintain political
neutrality, and there is an argument to suggest
that regime change was the only proper way to
protect the Libyan people.
Regime change, in other words, was implicit in
the “protection of civilians mandate”. The idea of
“implying” a mandate from a resolution however
does not reassure the Russians – it sounds too
much like Kosovo and Iraq. By vetoing resolutions
on Syria, Russia and China seemed to be saying
they had had enough. They were not going to
allow NATO or anyone else to use the same
arguments again. The concern that western
governments are implying mandates from
resolutions and using humanitarian interventions
to push political agendas is not new. It has,
as I’ve illustrated here, a recent history that
stretches back to the 1990’s. This has raised
concerns about the legitimacy of western-led
interventions. On the other side of the coin,
there are reasonable concerns about the use of
the veto and this has raised doubts about the
legitimacy of Security Council deliberations. It is
a difficult issue to resolve. We are at a situation
now, however, where it is more difficult for
western governments to convince their domestic
constituencies to support the use force for
humanitarian reasons without Security Council
backing. They do not want to bear another burden
like Iraq or Afghanistan. This increases the
political significance of objections at the Security
Council, which in turn reduces the likelihood of
future interventions.
Jason Ralph is Professor of International
Relations at the University of Leeds and a
British Academy Mid-Career Fellow. He is
author of Defending the Society of States.
Why America opposes the International Criminal
Court and its vision of World Society (Oxford
University Press, 2007).
Further Reading
• Blair, T (1999) Doctrine of the International Community, 24 April 1999.
Available from http://tna.europarchive.org/20081210084625/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297
• Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2011) ‘The new politics of protection Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the
responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 87 (4) 825-50.
• Jason Ralph (2011) ‘After Chilcot: ‘The doctrine of international community’ and the UK decision
to invade Iraq’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13 (3): 304-25.
• Wheeler, NJ (2002) Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Defining a U.S. Role
in the Arab Spring
Not the least significant aspect of
the Arab Spring is the redefinition
of heretofore prevalent principles of
foreign policy. As the United States
is withdrawing from military efforts
in Iraq and Afghanistan undertaken
on the basis (however disputed)
of U.S. national security, it is reengaging
in several other states in
the region (albeit uncertainly) in the
name of humanitarian intervention.
Will democratic reconstruction
replace national interest as the
lodestar of Middle East policy Is
democratic reconstruction what
the Arab Spring in fact represents
What are its criteria
The evolving consensus is that the
United States is morally obliged
to align itself with revolutionary
movements in the Middle East
as a kind of compensation for
its Cold War policies (invariably
described as “misguided”), in which
it cooperated with nondemocratic
governments for security objectives.
Then, it is alleged, supporting
fragile governments in the name
of international stability generated
long-term instability. Even granting
that some of the Cold War policies
were continued beyond their utility,
the Cold War structure lasted 30
years and induced decisive strategic
transformations, such as Egypt’s
abandonment of its alliance with
the Soviet Union and the signing
of the Camp David Accords. The
pattern now emerging, if it fails to
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
establish an appropriate relationship
to its proclaimed goals, risks being
inherently unstable from its very
inception, and could submerge the
values it proclaimed.
The Arab Spring is widely presented
as a regional, youth-led revolution
on behalf of liberal democratic
principles. Yet Libya is not ruled
by such forces; it hardly continues
as a state. Nor is Egypt, whose
electoral majority is overwhelmingly
Islamist; nor do democrats seem
to predominate in the Syrian
opposition. The Arab League
consensus on Syria is not shaped by
countries previously distinguished
by the practice or advocacy of
democracy. Rather it reflects, in
large part, the millennium-old
conflict between Shia and Sunni
and an attempt to reclaim Sunni
dominance from a Shiite minority.
It is also precisely why so many
minority groups like Druzes, Kurds
and Christians are uneasy about
regime change in Syria.
The confluence of many disparate
grievances avowing general slogans
is not yet a democratic outcome.
The more sweeping the destruction
of the existing order, the more
difficult the establishment of
domestic authority is likely to prove,
and the more likely is the resort
to force or to impose a universal
ideology. And the more fragmented
the society grows, the greater the
temptation to foster unity by
appeals to a vision of a merged
nationalism and Islamism targeting
Western values or social goals.
We must take care lest revolutions
turn, for the outside world, into
a transitory Internet experience
– watched intently for a few key
moments, then tuned out once
the main event is deemed to be
done. The revolution will have to
be judged by its outcome, not its
proclamations.
Humanitarian concerns do not
abolish the need to relate national
interest to a concept of world order.
For the U.S., a doctrine of general
humanitarian intervention in
Middle East revolutions will prove
unsustainable unless linked to a
concept of U.S. national security.
Intervention needs to consider the
strategic significance and social
cohesion of a country (including the
possibility of fracturing its complex
sectarian makeup) and evaluate
what can plausibly be constructed
in place of the old regime.
American public opinion has
already recoiled from the scope of
the efforts required to transform
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Do we believe that a less explicitly
strategic U.S. involvement
disclaiming an American national
interest will make nation-building
less complex Do we have a
55 56

preference as to which groups
come to power Or are we agnostic
so long as the mechanisms
are electoral If so, how do we
avoid the risk of fostering a new
absolutism legitimized by managed
plebiscites What outcomes are
compatible with America’s core
strategic interests Will it be
possible to combine strategic
withdrawal from key countries and
reduced military expenditures with
doctrines of universal humanitarian
intervention A discussion of these
issues has been largely absent from
the debate over U.S. foreign policy
regarding the Arab Spring.
Whether the Arab Spring in
fact enhances the scope of
individual freedom or instead
replaces feudal authoritarianism
with a new era of absolute rule
based on sect-based permanent
majorities will not be disclosed
by the initial proclamations of
the revolutionaries. Traditional
fundamentalist political forces,
reinforced by alliance with radical
revolutionaries, threaten to
dominate the process while the
social network elements which
shaped the beginning are being
marginalized.
America should encourage regional
aspirations for political change. But
it is not wise to seek an equivalent
result in every country at the same
pace. America will serve its values
as well by offering quiet counsel
as by issuing public declarations,
which are likely to produce a sense
of siege. It is not an abdication of
principle to tailor the U.S. position
on a country-by-country basis and
attune it to other relevant factors,
including national security; indeed,
this is the essence of a creative
foreign policy.
For over half a century, American
policy in the Middle East has been
guided by several core security
objectives: preventing any power
in the region from emerging as a
hegemon; ensuring the free flow of
energy resources, still vital to the
operation of the world economy;
and attempting to broker a durable
peace between Israel and its
neighbours, including a settlement
with the Palestinian Arabs. In the
past decade, Iran has emerged as
the principal challenge to all three
of these objectives. These interests
have not been abolished by the Arab
Spring; their implementation has
grown more urgent. A process that
ends with regional governments
either too weak or too anti-Western
in their orientation to lend support
to these outcomes, and in which
American partnerships are no longer
welcomed, must evoke American
strategic concerns – regardless of
the electoral mechanisms by which
these governments come to power.
Within the framework of these
general limits, American policy
has significant scope for creativity
in promoting humanitarian and
democratic values.
The United States should
be prepared to deal with
democratically-elected Islamist
governments. But it is also free
to pursue a standard principle
of traditional foreign policy
to condition its stance on the
alignment of its interests with
the actions of the government
in question. The U.S. conduct
during the Arab upheavals has so
far been successful in avoiding
placing America as an obstacle to
the revolutionary transformations.
This is not a minor achievement.
But it is just one component of a
successful approach. U.S. policy
will, in the end, also be judged by
whether what emerges from the
Arab Spring improves the reformed
states’ responsibility towards the
international order and humane
institutions.
Dr. Kissinger served in the Army
and graduated summa cum
laude from Harvard College
later receiving M.A. and Ph.D.
degrees in 1952 and 1954. From
1954 until 1969 he was a faculty
member of Harvard University,
in both the Department of
Government and the Center
for International Affairs.
Subsequently, Dr. Kissinger
served as National Security adviser
and as Secretary of State under
Presidents Nixon and Ford.
In 1973, he received the Nobel
Peace Prize. Dr. Kissinger is the
author of numerous books and
articles on United States foreign
policy, international affairs and
diplomatic history.
This work originally appeared in
the International Herald Tribune,
April 2, 2012 and we are grateful
to both IHT and Dr Kissinger for
permission to republish.
The Last Word...
The articles in the first issue of Timeline have explored the Middle
East and have illustrated numerous constants, from the importance
of Jerusalem to the domination of the region by aggressive rulers.
These remain as true today as they did back in the eleventh century.
In addition, the Middle East is the lynchpin of three continents
with three separate religions of Islam, Judaism and Christianity. At
the heart of many of the conflicts between rulers from each region
has been their religious differences and competition over Holy sites.
Indeed, many of the earlier articles have highlighted this. These
religious differences live with us to this day.
The Middle East has held a special attraction for many in the West since Christianity settled in Europe. Prior
to that time, the region of modern day Israel was still vital to trading links between Europe, North Africa and
Central Asia. Nowadays, oil is the economic imperative that prompts outside interest and on occasions even
Western involvement in the region. Yet, while the Middle East sits astride the richest natural resources in the
world, much of that wealth is held by a few super-elite often from the same family or tribe. Events across the
region over the last two years have illustrated how the people living under the firm rule of these elites have
become unwilling to do so. Not only have Tunisians and others wanted greater protection of their civil rights but
also tangible economic opportunities especially for the ordinary working man and woman. These desires, albeit
not particularly new, have brought them in to conflict with their own governments time and time again. Yet
something different happened in 2011. These complaints grew in number and did so courtesy of the powerful
media used by the protestors. This was the new dimension that transformed protests in to rebellions. This process
was vividly brought to the attention of many in the West by digital technology and social networking sites.
Protests and brutal suppression were beamed around the world within minutes of it happening by an empowered
ordinary class of activist; a true Peasant’s Revolt. In most countries of the Middle East this power struggle has yet
to be resolved. For example, it remains unclear whether Egypt is evolving into a democracy or whether another
form of authoritarian control will supplant the previous regime. Libya has yet to proceed as far as that and has
far greater divisions to deal with. Those may well hinder its path towards a peaceful multi-party democratic state.
Syria holds elections while simultaneously fighting a civil war in a dozen cities. Other states too, such as Yemen,
Bahrain and Palestine have yet to resolve their own civil disorders. Consequently, the Arab Spring is not only still
alive, it is ever-changing. And so are the methods of protest. The battle lines remain with the authoritarian forces
of government, police and army on the one side verses the protesting masses armed with banners, BlackBerries
and iPhones on the other. Similarly, the aims of the protestors from Bahrain to Egypt have changed a lot since
the first few months. The more militant groups have resisted calls to accept moderate reforms by placating
leaders. These protestors have ceased just demanding jobs and civil rights. They are now calling for root and
branch constitutional reforms and holding their oppressors accountable before their own courts. Across the
Middle East it will be some time yet before we can say with certainty that the rebellions of the Arab Spring have
become revolutions for a new Arab world. While western governments hope that strong, pro-western democracies
will emerge in the Middle East, many fear that these dreams are unrealistic. Already ultra-Nationalist and
Islamist groups have gained considerable political support in Egypt, Libya and Syria. Some have demonstrated
a willingness to bypass democratic niceties to achieve their aims especially in Libya and Syria. Furthermore, an
Islamist President has been elected in Egypt and more may follow in the Arab Spring’s fledgling republics. It
remains unclear at this stage how these new regimes will change the previous dynamic of stable relations between
the previous Arab dictatorships and the West as well as with Israel. So will the Arab Spring turn in to an Islamic
Winter Only time will tell….
Mr M. Jennings
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Next Issue of Timeline
Volume 2: The Americas: A New World
We are now taking submissions for our next issue of ‘Timeline!’ As well as receiving articles we also
want to hear your views about what you have read in this issue. So why not send in a letter to the
editor for publication in the next issue
The theme for the next issue of ‘Timeline’ is the Americas. This region has shaped world events
over recent years but also has an extraordinarily rich cultural heritage. There are fascinating stories
to be told and questions to be answered. Perhaps YOU might want to submit an article on one of
the following: the ancient civilisations and indigenous peoples of the Americas, the era of European
entanglement with them from 1492 onwards, the quest for Independence in the North and Latin
American countries, the American Civil War, the growth of the USA, the building of the Panama
Canal, the 1920s, Gangsters and the Mafia, the Wall Street Crash and Depression, the New Deal,
America’s involvement in two Worlds Wars, McCarthyism, the Space Race, the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Civil Rights Movement, the Falklands War, Hollywood,
9/11, America’s foreign (and domestic) policy challenges, President Obama’s first term and the 2012
US Presidential elections. These are just some of the possible topics that could feature in the next
issue of ‘Timeline.’
If you are interested in submitting an article please make sure it is in word.doc format, 12 point and
between 750 and 1500 words in length unless by prior arrangement with the Editor. We are happy
to publish submissions from current Students, Parents of Students, Staff and indeed OAs. Please
send all queries, letters, requests or submissions to:
The World Trade Centre Twin Towers 9 11
matthew.jennings@ardingly.com
Copy Deadline is Easter 2013
Matthew Jennings
Head of History and Editor of Timeline
Back Page: Egyptian Protestors in 2011
Dr Martin Luther King Jnr. 1963
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