The Ardingly College Journal of History & International Relations
The Ardingly College Journal of History & International Relations
The Ardingly College Journal of History & International Relations
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Timeline<br />
Volume 1: 2011-12<br />
<strong>The</strong> Middle East<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong> <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>History</strong> & <strong>International</strong> <strong>Relations</strong><br />
Featuring articles by Major General P. Cordingley, Dr H. Kissinger and Pr<strong>of</strong>essor J. Ralph
Timeline<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong> <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong> & <strong>International</strong> <strong>Relations</strong><br />
Volume 1: <strong>The</strong> Middle East<br />
11th Century Cottoniana or Anglo-Saxon Map <strong>of</strong> the Middle East<br />
Staff Editor: Mr M. Jennings<br />
Student Editor: Charles Ward (U6th)<br />
Copy Editor: Bethany Reyniers (L6th)<br />
<strong>Ardingly</strong> Student Contributors: Jenny Elwin, Axel Fithen, Gustav Fithen, Thomas Gibbens,<br />
John Gibson, Amy Haines, Anastasia Harrington, Thomas O’Dell, Abidine Sakande, Kaan Tuncell,<br />
Charles Ward and Johannes Wullenweber<br />
Other Contributors are:<br />
Mr R. Alston, former Chair <strong>of</strong> Governors, <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong> & former UK Ambassador to the Oman<br />
Major General P. Cordingley, former commander <strong>of</strong> 7th Armoured Brigade during 1st Gulf War<br />
Tobias Chesser (Student <strong>of</strong> Hawthorns Prep School)<br />
Mr M. Jennings, Head <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong>, <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong><br />
Mr A. Kendry, <strong>The</strong>ologian<br />
Mr D. Maclean, Head <strong>of</strong> Divinity, <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong><br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>essor J. Ralph, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>International</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> at Leeds University<br />
And Dr H. Kissinger, former US Secretary <strong>of</strong> State<br />
Images from the front cover are <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem, a NATO airstrike on Gadaffi’s forces near Benghazi,<br />
Sultan Mehmet II and Colonel Gadaffi.
Contents<br />
Editorials<br />
Staff – Mr M. Jennings, Head <strong>of</strong> Department<br />
Student – Charles Ward (U6th)<br />
history articles<br />
Tel Megiddo and the Politics <strong>of</strong> the Middle East, by Mr D. McLean Page 1<br />
Holy, Holy, Holy: A theological history <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem in 3 Faiths by Mr A. Kendry Page 3<br />
<strong>The</strong> 1st Crusade and the Capture <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem, 1099 by Axel Fithen Page 7<br />
Was the ability <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem’s rulers the main reason for the survival <strong>of</strong> the Page 10<br />
estates during the twelfth century By Anastasia Harrington<br />
1187, <strong>The</strong> Battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin and <strong>The</strong> Capture <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem by John Gibson Page 14<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> Saladin by Charles Ward Page 17<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> Richard ‘the Lionheart’ by Tobias Chesser Page 19<br />
<strong>The</strong> Great Siege <strong>of</strong> Constantinople in 1453 by Mr M. Jennings Page 21<br />
Photomontage <strong>of</strong> civil strife in Syria by Thomas Gibbens Page 46<br />
What does Turkey’s relationship with Syria mean to the region, Page 47<br />
the West and to itself By Kaan Tuncel<br />
Where to now Israel Israel’s foreign policy challenges by Mr M. Jennings Page 49<br />
Photomontage <strong>of</strong> recent events in Iran by Thomas Gibbens Page 52<br />
American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East 2011 Page 53<br />
by Pr<strong>of</strong>essor J. Ralph, Leeds University<br />
Defining a U.S. role in the Arab Spring by Dr H. Kissinger Page 56<br />
<strong>The</strong> Last Word Page 58<br />
<strong>The</strong> First Three Afghan Wars by Mr R. Alston CMG, QSO, DL Page 26<br />
<strong>The</strong> Arab Revolt 1916-18 by Gustav Fithen Page 29<br />
Reflections on the First Gulf War by Major General P. Cordingley DSO, DSc, FRGS Page 31<br />
<strong>International</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> articles<br />
Map & commentary <strong>of</strong> Dictatorial Leaders in the Middle East <strong>of</strong> 2011 Page 35<br />
by Abidine Sakande & Johannes Wullenweber<br />
Photomontage <strong>of</strong> the Tunisian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens Page 37<br />
Tunisia, the first <strong>of</strong> the Arab Spring revolutions by Thomas O’Dell Page 38<br />
Photomontage <strong>of</strong> the Egyptian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens Page 40<br />
1001 Egyptian Knights: A Drama in Three Acts – Page 41<br />
Egypt and the on-going revolution by Amy Haines<br />
<strong>The</strong> Libyan Revolution by Jenny Elwin Page 43
Staff Editorial...<br />
Welcome to<br />
the first issue <strong>of</strong><br />
Timeline, the<br />
<strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong><br />
<strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong><br />
and <strong>International</strong><br />
<strong>Relations</strong>. Timeline<br />
combines these<br />
two important<br />
and popular<br />
subjects into one<br />
publication so that<br />
current and historical themes can be explored and their<br />
significance over time more fully understood. That explains<br />
why the <strong>Journal</strong> is called Timeline. So why choose the<br />
Middle East as Timeline’s first theme Well, since work on<br />
this began back in the summer <strong>of</strong> 2011 and this journal’s<br />
purpose is to examine the relationship between the past<br />
and the present, I could think <strong>of</strong> no more appropriate and<br />
relevant case study to our time than the Middle East.<br />
Over the last 18 months, the attention <strong>of</strong> the world has<br />
been captivated by civil wars in Libya and Syria and by<br />
revolutions and other popular protests in Tunisia, Egypt<br />
and elsewhere. Consequently, a number <strong>of</strong> the articles by<br />
<strong>Ardingly</strong> students in the second half <strong>of</strong> the journal reflect<br />
this. However, last year the West took more than just an<br />
interest in the Middle East. In the case <strong>of</strong> Libya, NATO’s<br />
military intervention raised the paradigm <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
stormy relationship between the West and the Middle<br />
East. Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Ralph’s article explores how the West’s<br />
method <strong>of</strong> legitimising its use <strong>of</strong> force may cause it further<br />
problems with other countries on the UN security council<br />
as well as the Middle East in the future should the need<br />
for intervention arise again. With the conflict in Syria<br />
unresolved that situation is more than just a possibility.<br />
With the grim spectre <strong>of</strong> the West’s lengthy and costly<br />
involvement in Afghanistan, Dr Henry Kissinger’s article<br />
explores how one western country, the U.S. is reaching for<br />
a new role during this prolonged Arab Spring. He explains<br />
what challenges and choices the U.S. government is facing.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se themes and tough choices are echoed throughout<br />
the West. Israel too has had to seriously rethink its foreign<br />
relations not just with its former allies but also Iran and<br />
Palestine. Much <strong>of</strong> the future <strong>of</strong> the region (and potentially<br />
the world) hangs upon how successfully Israel is in<br />
maintaining peace with these two volatile neighbours.<br />
Furthermore, the problem <strong>of</strong> determining foreign policy<br />
towards the Middle East is not new. Over the last few<br />
millennia, the West’s relationship with the Middle East<br />
has been plagued with ambitious power struggles that<br />
have erupted into war. Timeline’s first few articles explore<br />
these in relation to the strategically significant locations <strong>of</strong><br />
Megiddo, Jerusalem and Constantinople. <strong>The</strong>y have formed<br />
the backdrop for much <strong>of</strong> the history <strong>of</strong> the region and it is<br />
not hard to see why. Articles from Mr Mclean, Mr Kendry<br />
and myself, illustrate that at different times, these places<br />
have been centres and cross roads <strong>of</strong> civilisation, culture,<br />
economic strength and religious zeal. Altogether, ownership<br />
<strong>of</strong> them has brought prestige and power; thus explaining<br />
why they have been so regularly contested. Indeed, so has<br />
much <strong>of</strong> the Middle East at one time or another. Timeline<br />
charts a number <strong>of</strong> these conflicts from the Crusades right<br />
the way through to the First Gulf War <strong>of</strong> 1991. In particular,<br />
articles by Mr Alston and Major General Cordingley<br />
explore many <strong>of</strong> the interesting and indeed controversial<br />
aspects <strong>of</strong> these conflicts including the reasons for Britain’s<br />
involvement in them. Both authors have considerable<br />
experience <strong>of</strong> working in the Middle East in their respective<br />
diplomatic and military roles and we are very fortunate to be<br />
able to view these conflicts through their experienced eyes.<br />
But what <strong>of</strong> the architects <strong>of</strong> these wars, the warrior kings,<br />
sultans and generals Articles by Tobias Chesser,<br />
Charles Ward and Gustav Fithen, explore the significance <strong>of</strong><br />
the role <strong>of</strong> the individual in shaping the outcomes <strong>of</strong> major<br />
historical change. This issue examines two <strong>of</strong> the Middle<br />
Ages’ most iconic leaders, Richard the Lionheart and<br />
Saladin, and how their destinies and the fate <strong>of</strong> the Middle<br />
East became inextricably linked. Similarly, a further article<br />
explores the Arab Revolt and the important part played by<br />
T. E. Lawrence. After all, the study <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong> should also be<br />
about significant people as well as events and themes.<br />
On that subject, I want to thank my fellow editor and<br />
6th form medieval history student, Charles Ward whose<br />
calm manner and conscientious dedication to this project<br />
made it happen. His persistence in pursuing articles from<br />
fellow students was invaluable. I also want to thank all the<br />
other contributors from their many different backgrounds.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y are an eclectic lot and so are their submissions.<br />
Consequently, this journal is all the richer for them. To<br />
them, I am very grateful for their labours. Do please write<br />
in to respond to the views expressed in their articles or even<br />
to contribute an article yourself to our next issue. For more<br />
on how to do that please visit the inside back page.<br />
Mr M. Jennings, Summer 2012<br />
Editor<br />
Student Editorial...<br />
As a student <strong>of</strong> <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong>, I feel especially proud and privileged to be<br />
able to say I have had the opportunity to contribute something <strong>of</strong> significant<br />
value to the <strong>College</strong>. Timeline is a brand new publication with a unique<br />
angle organised by the Head <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong>, Mr Jennings, and myself. <strong>The</strong><br />
magazine successfully integrates the rich and fascinating world <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong><br />
with current international affairs which so populate the news today. Our aim<br />
is to involve the students <strong>of</strong> <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong> in Timeline by encouraging<br />
them to contribute pieces about areas <strong>of</strong> history or current happenings which<br />
particularly interest them. We wish to nurture an interest in the broader<br />
subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong> which we hope will not only be passed on to the readers but<br />
also encourage them to think and explore further about the issues arising from<br />
their articles. I am pleased to report that within the up and coming pages, a<br />
plethora <strong>of</strong> eclectic contributions (modern and medieval alike) from around<br />
the world have been submitted. <strong>The</strong>se range from the likes <strong>of</strong> the Siege <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem, to dynamic maps plotting the rise <strong>of</strong> the Arab Spring. Ladies and<br />
gentleman, I present to you, <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong>’s <strong>History</strong> and <strong>International</strong><br />
<strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Journal</strong>, Timeline!<br />
Charles Ward (U6th)
“And they assembled them<br />
at the place that in Hebrew<br />
is called Harmaggedon.”<br />
Tel Megiddo and the Politics <strong>of</strong> the Middle East<br />
<strong>The</strong> word ‘Armageddon’ conjures images <strong>of</strong><br />
destruction, judgement and terror. Indeed,<br />
the quotation in the title is from the Book <strong>of</strong><br />
Revelation, describing the last battle before God’s<br />
judgement. Yet the name appears to be the<br />
anglicisation <strong>of</strong> a quiet little hill in Israel – Har (or<br />
Tel) Megiddo. How has this quiet backwater <strong>of</strong><br />
the Jezreel Valley come to be associated with the<br />
eschaton and with divine judgement <strong>The</strong> answer<br />
lies in its strategic position. This has made it a<br />
very important staging post for approximately nine<br />
thousand years and may continue to symbolise<br />
the importance <strong>of</strong> the area to this day.<br />
Megiddo was first occupied in approximately<br />
7000 BC for reasons that ensured its survival for<br />
several thousand years. <strong>The</strong> great civilisations<br />
<strong>of</strong> Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) needed a<br />
route to the Mediterranean in order to engage<br />
in trade. However, as the crow flies, they are<br />
divided from the sea by desert, making a short<br />
journey impossible. <strong>The</strong>refore, in order to reach<br />
the ports they were compelled to travel northwest<br />
before turning south into the relatively<br />
lush lands <strong>of</strong> Israel and Judah; Megiddo stood<br />
at the head <strong>of</strong> this trade route, the strategically<br />
important ‘Derekh ha-Yam’, or ‘<strong>The</strong> Way <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Sea’. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has<br />
been the site <strong>of</strong> at least three decisive battles in<br />
history; it continues to play a symbolic role in the<br />
relationship between the east and west.<br />
Mr D. McLean<br />
<strong>The</strong> first battle took place in April 1457 BC<br />
between Pharaoh Thutmose III <strong>of</strong> Egypt and<br />
the combined rebel forces <strong>of</strong> the Mitanni people<br />
<strong>of</strong> Kadesh, and the Canaanites <strong>of</strong> Megiddo. A<br />
decisive Egyptian victory on the battlefield led<br />
to a seven month siege <strong>of</strong> the city. Consequently<br />
the engagement led directly to the expansion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Egyptian empire to its greatest ever<br />
extent, spreading north until it bordered on the<br />
lands <strong>of</strong> the Hittite empire (modern Turkey and<br />
Syria). Thankfully Thutmose did not destroy the<br />
city and it lived on, but it appears that the site<br />
has not been occupied since the Babylonian<br />
invasion <strong>of</strong> 586 BC. Even so, its importance<br />
continued. <strong>The</strong> second battle, approximately<br />
850 years after the first, in 609 BC, was equally<br />
significant and indeed is recorded twice in the<br />
Bible; King Josiah <strong>of</strong> Judah refused Pharaoh<br />
Necho II <strong>of</strong> Egypt permission to travel through<br />
his country to fight the Babylonians further<br />
north in Syria. In response Necho attacked the<br />
assembled Judahite forces, his archers killing<br />
Josiah in the process. This was the beginning<br />
<strong>of</strong> the downfall <strong>of</strong> the independent state <strong>of</strong><br />
Judah. It spelled the end <strong>of</strong> an independent<br />
Jewish state as on his return from Syria Necho<br />
also deposed Josiah’s son and imposed his<br />
own candidate as King. Megiddo thus again<br />
played an important part in the socio-political<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the ancient world.<br />
<strong>The</strong> third battle is surprisingly modern;<br />
Megiddo was the place at which the British<br />
Army, under General Edmund Allenby, defeated<br />
the Turkish Ottoman troops under the command<br />
<strong>of</strong> the German General Liman Von Sanders in<br />
September 1918. It was this battle that broke<br />
the stalemate that had emerged after the British<br />
capture <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem late in 1917. Yet again,<br />
though it had been uninhabited for over 2500<br />
years, Megiddo played a pivotal role in the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the Middle East. It contributed<br />
immensely to the downfall <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman<br />
Empire and affected the lives <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> people.<br />
This significance continues to be recognised<br />
to the present day and Megiddo was the site<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pope Paul VI’s talks in 1964 with the Israeli<br />
President and Prime Minister. Though the<br />
Derekh ha-Yam fell into disuse as a trade route<br />
long ago, the strategic importance <strong>of</strong> a little hill<br />
a few miles south-west <strong>of</strong> Nazareth means that<br />
it is not hard to see why John the Evangelist,<br />
when writing the Book <strong>of</strong> Revelation, chose<br />
Megiddo as the site <strong>of</strong> his last battle in which<br />
the returned Christ would defeat the Devil.<br />
We might not all be expecting an impending<br />
apocalypse but we can certainly agree that a<br />
place so vitally important over many thousands<br />
<strong>of</strong> years <strong>of</strong> history could very possibly be so<br />
again in the future. Indeed, it might well be<br />
thought <strong>of</strong> as an unfortunate symbol <strong>of</strong> the<br />
unsettling and unresolved religious and political<br />
tensions <strong>of</strong> the Levant.<br />
Dan McLean is Head <strong>of</strong> Divinity and<br />
Philosophy at <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong>. Before<br />
arriving at Michaelmas 2011 he read<br />
<strong>The</strong>ology at Oriel <strong>College</strong>, Oxford and prior<br />
to that he served for five years as an <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
in the Royal Navy.<br />
Megiddo<br />
Viscount Allenby <strong>of</strong> Megiddo<br />
Left: Egyptian War Chariot<br />
1 2
Holy, Holy, Holy:<br />
A <strong>The</strong>ological <strong>History</strong> <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem in Three Faiths<br />
Jerusalem seems to have existed<br />
from the very earliest times <strong>of</strong><br />
human settlement in the Near East.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first references to it come from<br />
the second millennium BC when<br />
it might best be termed a small,<br />
independent city-state within a<br />
loose confederation <strong>of</strong> Caananite<br />
settlements. It was to grow in<br />
significance, both politically and<br />
religiously, until it can lay claim<br />
today to being the undisputed<br />
religious capital <strong>of</strong> the world: sacred<br />
to, and fought over by, the great<br />
religions <strong>of</strong> Judaism, Christianity,<br />
and Islam. This status brings with<br />
it a blessing and a curse for an<br />
historian. On the one hand we have<br />
a wealth <strong>of</strong> written and physical<br />
material – probably unparalleled for<br />
any other city – with which to help<br />
us reconstruct its past. On the other<br />
hand, perhaps equally unparalleled<br />
is the level <strong>of</strong> agenda that these<br />
sources demonstrate.<br />
Mr. A.D. Kendry<br />
“Glorious things <strong>of</strong> thee are spoken,<br />
Zion, city <strong>of</strong> our God;<br />
He whose word cannot be broken<br />
formed thee for His own abode;<br />
on the Rock <strong>of</strong> Ages founded,<br />
what can shake thy sure repose<br />
With salvation’s walls surrounded,<br />
thou may’st smile at all thy foes.”<br />
John Newton (1779)<br />
No one is neutral about Jerusalem.<br />
<strong>The</strong> city rose to prominence in<br />
the tenth century BC. A relatively<br />
insignificant town prior to this,<br />
it was chosen by the first king<br />
<strong>of</strong> Israel, David, as his capital.<br />
<strong>The</strong> choice was an odd one.<br />
Jerusalem, although in possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> several natural springs, is not<br />
obviously well-provided for in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> natural resources and<br />
is only moderately-defensible in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> topography. Its chief<br />
recommendation seems to be<br />
that it was fairly central in terms<br />
<strong>of</strong> the territory controlled by the<br />
House <strong>of</strong> David. To support the<br />
innovation <strong>of</strong> monarchy and its<br />
new capital, David also relocated<br />
the Ark <strong>of</strong> the Covenant – the<br />
preeminent cult-object <strong>of</strong> Yahweh,<br />
the Israelite high god – to the<br />
city. This meant that Jerusalem<br />
was also to become the primary<br />
cultic centre in ancient Israel and<br />
created a powerful political link<br />
between the kingship and religious<br />
worship. <strong>The</strong> following centuries<br />
saw the gradual suppression <strong>of</strong><br />
other religious sites and <strong>of</strong> the cults<br />
<strong>of</strong> rival gods, centralizing all power<br />
– sacred and pr<strong>of</strong>ane – within the<br />
‘Holy City’, whose fortunes were<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten directly equated with those <strong>of</strong><br />
the Jewish people. Jerusalem, put<br />
simply, is where God dwelt among<br />
His people.<br />
Arguably the greatest calamity in<br />
Jerusalem’s history was the city’s<br />
destruction in AD 70. <strong>The</strong> four<br />
year revolt <strong>of</strong> the Roman province<br />
<strong>of</strong> Judaea culminated in a savage<br />
assault on the city that is described<br />
in unremittingly-horrific detail by<br />
Flavius Josephus in his Jewish War.<br />
Internal conflict and severe food<br />
shortages, with the consequent<br />
starvation and disease, led to the<br />
city falling to the forces <strong>of</strong> Titus<br />
after an eight month siege. <strong>The</strong> final<br />
battle took place in the precincts<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Temple itself where the<br />
defenders expected the imminent<br />
intervention <strong>of</strong> the Messiah on<br />
their behalf and to save the<br />
Temple. His non-appearance<br />
led to the Temple and city being<br />
almost completely destroyed; its<br />
population crucified or enslaved.<br />
By this time, Jerusalem was the<br />
third largest city <strong>of</strong> the Roman<br />
Empire and the Temple – recently<br />
totally rebuilt by Herod the Great<br />
– was considered a wonder <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world. Judaea was an economically<br />
and politically significant province<br />
– the primary source <strong>of</strong> date and<br />
olive oil production in the Empire,<br />
with a military-strategic location<br />
bordering Rome’s only real rival for<br />
world domination. Its destruction<br />
sent ripples throughout the Empire:<br />
the city ruins were garrisoned and<br />
a large standing army remained<br />
for several decades as a desecrating<br />
presence on the Temple Mount.<br />
Following a second bloody revolt<br />
under Simeon bar Kochba in AD<br />
132-135, who re-took Jerusalem as<br />
his messianic capital, the Roman’s<br />
razed the city and rebuilt it as a<br />
Roman town, Aelia Capitolina.<br />
Relief from the Arch <strong>of</strong> Titus<br />
<strong>The</strong> Jews were banished from<br />
setting foot within its precincts<br />
on pain <strong>of</strong> death. <strong>The</strong> Temple<br />
Mount became a Temple to Jupiter<br />
Capitolinus.<br />
After the Peace <strong>of</strong> the Church in<br />
AD 313 and Constantine’s <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
favouring <strong>of</strong> Christianity, the<br />
fledgling Christian community<br />
increased in size but Jerusalem still<br />
remained a small Roman town, far<br />
from the trade routes with political<br />
– and Christian – influence in<br />
Judaea still concentrated on<br />
the Mediterranean ports to the<br />
west. It was the pilgrimage <strong>of</strong><br />
the Emperor’s mother, Helena,<br />
to the city in AD 325 and her<br />
apparent rediscovery <strong>of</strong> the True<br />
Cross that inspired a renewed<br />
devotion to the city, this time<br />
amongst the Christian population<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Empire. Jerusalem was<br />
rebuilt with grand churches over<br />
the sites <strong>of</strong> the Lord’s life and<br />
Passion and the city thrived. <strong>The</strong><br />
old Temple Mount remained<br />
abandoned as a deliberate sign<br />
<strong>of</strong> the supersession <strong>of</strong> the Jewish<br />
religion. However, Jerusalem still<br />
remained a fraction <strong>of</strong> its former<br />
self in terms <strong>of</strong> population and<br />
size. It had no political power and<br />
evolution in international politics<br />
downplayed the significance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
frontier province. What the city<br />
had regained was its theological<br />
significance: even for the exiled<br />
Jews, the longing for a return to<br />
Jerusalem became codified in their<br />
liturgy which looked for an end<br />
to their exile from their spiritual<br />
home and the restoration <strong>of</strong><br />
Temple worship.<br />
In the mid-seventh century, the<br />
rapid military successes <strong>of</strong> early<br />
Islam led to the capturing <strong>of</strong> the<br />
city in AD 638, only six years<br />
after the death <strong>of</strong> Muhammad.<br />
<strong>The</strong> city had, by now, regained<br />
some <strong>of</strong> its commercial and<br />
strategic significance. Nevertheless<br />
the capture <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem had,<br />
more importantly, a religious<br />
significance for the early Muslims<br />
for two reasons. Firstly, the Prophet<br />
explicitly saw his revelation as a<br />
continuation and fulfilment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Jewish and Christian narrative and<br />
thus recognised Jerusalem as a city<br />
especially sacred to God. <strong>The</strong> ‘Rock’<br />
on which the Holy <strong>of</strong> Holies <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Jerusalem Temple had stood was in<br />
Islam – as in Judaism – recognised<br />
as the foundation stone and centre<br />
<strong>of</strong> the world and the burial place <strong>of</strong><br />
View <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem<br />
3 4
Adam. Indeed, in the early years <strong>of</strong><br />
Muhammad’s movement the qibla<br />
– the direction <strong>of</strong> prayer – was<br />
not the Kaaba in Mecca but rather<br />
the abandoned Temple Mount in<br />
Jerusalem to the north. Despite<br />
the change within Muhammad’s<br />
lifetime, one <strong>of</strong> the earliest acts <strong>of</strong><br />
the Muslim occupiers was to erect<br />
the Dome <strong>of</strong> the Rock on this<br />
site. This was a conspicuous and<br />
ever-visible reminder to Christians<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Islamic ownership <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Holy City – the Dome being in<br />
direct line <strong>of</strong> site for Christians<br />
upon leaving the Church <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Holy Sepulchre after<br />
Mass. <strong>The</strong> second<br />
reason was the early<br />
identification <strong>of</strong> the<br />
site <strong>of</strong> the destination<br />
<strong>of</strong> the mysterious<br />
‘Night Journey’ <strong>of</strong><br />
the ‘Night <strong>of</strong> Power’<br />
<strong>of</strong> Muhammad with<br />
the Temple Mount.<br />
According to this tradition alluded<br />
to in the Qur’an, the Prophet<br />
had journeyed spiritually on a<br />
horse-like cryptid to ‘the farther<br />
sanctuary’, whence he had leaped<br />
up to heaven to commune with<br />
the company <strong>of</strong> former prophets.<br />
<strong>The</strong> site <strong>of</strong> the former Temple thus<br />
became the third-holiest site <strong>of</strong><br />
Islam in its own right – an accolade<br />
it retains today.<br />
Unbroken Muslim occupation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Holy City lasted nearly five<br />
centuries until the First Crusade<br />
when Pope Urban II’s call for<br />
a recapturing <strong>of</strong> the Holy Sites<br />
associated with the life <strong>of</strong> Christ<br />
met with a genuinely popular<br />
response across Europe.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Crusaders, many inspired<br />
with deep religious fervour and<br />
devotion, succeeded in expelling<br />
the Muslim occupiers in AD 1099<br />
and proclaimed the Kingdom <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem. A victory Mass was<br />
duly celebrated at the Church <strong>of</strong><br />
the Holy Sepulchre and the Relic<br />
<strong>of</strong> the True Cross –which the<br />
Crusaders had taken their symbol<br />
– venerated and triumphantly<br />
processed around the city. <strong>The</strong><br />
Dome <strong>of</strong> the Rock and the other<br />
mosques within the city limits<br />
were converted into churches. This<br />
Crusader state lasted a century<br />
“<strong>The</strong> Palestinian people … desire an<br />
independent Muslim state with East Jerusalem<br />
as its capital. <strong>The</strong> Jewish state <strong>of</strong> Israel is<br />
unwilling, both on religious and strategic<br />
grounds, to countenance any division<br />
<strong>of</strong> the city.”<br />
before a Muslim reconquest<br />
lost the lands <strong>of</strong> the Christians<br />
– apparently conclusively. After<br />
the sacking <strong>of</strong> the city by Saladin<br />
in 1187, most <strong>of</strong> the Christians<br />
were expelled and Jews and<br />
Muslims encouraged to return.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Dome <strong>of</strong> the Rock became a<br />
mosque once more, though the<br />
Holy Sepulchre, whilst partially<br />
demolished, remained a church.<br />
Over the following five centuries<br />
the city’s fortunes, size, and<br />
political significance waxed and<br />
waned. By the beginning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
twentieth century Jerusalem was<br />
a small town forming part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
British mandate <strong>of</strong> Palestine. <strong>The</strong><br />
population was predominantly<br />
Muslim, with small Jewish<br />
and Christian minorities. Jews<br />
remained barred from stepping<br />
foot on the Temple Mount, where<br />
the Western Wall was all that<br />
remained <strong>of</strong> the Second Temple<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jesus’ time. <strong>The</strong> Christian holy<br />
sites were mostly administered by<br />
a small community <strong>of</strong> Franciscan<br />
friars, although fights – <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
physical – broke out sporadically<br />
between the different Christian<br />
communities remaining in the city.<br />
<strong>The</strong> modern period <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem<br />
is especially complex. After the<br />
expiring <strong>of</strong> the British mandate<br />
in 1948, it was intended that<br />
the city become an<br />
autonomous political<br />
entity. However,<br />
the plan was not<br />
implemented before<br />
the British withdrawal<br />
and the war that<br />
ensued after the<br />
Declaration <strong>of</strong> the<br />
State <strong>of</strong> Israel led to<br />
the city being partitioned, with the<br />
eastern half becoming Jordanian<br />
territory. During this period access<br />
to Jewish and Christian sites was<br />
severely curtailed to members <strong>of</strong><br />
those communities and many sites<br />
allegedly desecrated. Jordan joined<br />
the Arab alliance against Israel<br />
in the 1967 Six Day War, which<br />
ended in an impressive Israeli<br />
victory. East Jerusalem was captured<br />
and the united city declared the<br />
capital <strong>of</strong> greater Israel. To date,<br />
only the USA has moved its<br />
embassy from Tel Aviv to the city<br />
and the former is still recognised as<br />
the ‘<strong>of</strong>ficial’ capital <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong><br />
Israel by the United Nations. This<br />
divisive situation remains one <strong>of</strong><br />
the major points <strong>of</strong> conflict in the<br />
Israeli-Palestinian relationship. <strong>The</strong><br />
Israeli Parade in 1968 after 6 day war<br />
Palestinian people, the majority<br />
<strong>of</strong> whom are citizens <strong>of</strong> Israel,<br />
desire an independent Muslim<br />
state with East Jerusalem as its<br />
capital. <strong>The</strong> Jewish state <strong>of</strong> Israel<br />
is unwilling, both on religious and<br />
strategic grounds, to countenance<br />
any division <strong>of</strong> the city.<br />
Whilst access to the<br />
Western Wall is now<br />
open to Jews, the Temple<br />
Mount remains a Muslim<br />
holy place and any plans<br />
by the Jewish orthodox<br />
to restore sacrificial<br />
worship on the site seems<br />
unlikely to be fulfilled<br />
in any conceivable<br />
future. <strong>The</strong> Christian<br />
presence, based around<br />
different sites, remains stable but<br />
small and politically insignificant.<br />
Since Bethlehem found itself in<br />
Palestinian-administrated territory,<br />
its Christian population has<br />
decreased significantly and this<br />
trend seems likely to continue.<br />
Today, Jerusalem lives in a tense<br />
peace, a secular capital as well<br />
as a Holy City. It has grown<br />
considerably in terms <strong>of</strong> size and<br />
population since the establishment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> Israel. For many <strong>of</strong><br />
its citizens, the religious claims to<br />
the city function as an annoyance<br />
and a barrier to a lasting political<br />
peace. Yet for the religious its<br />
stones bear the footprints <strong>of</strong> priests,<br />
prophets, and kings. For them,<br />
Jerusalem is not any other city,<br />
and never could be. <strong>The</strong> Mount <strong>of</strong><br />
Olives, outside the old walled city,<br />
is covered with separate cemeteries<br />
belonging to the Jewish, Christian,<br />
and Islamic faiths. <strong>The</strong> graves are<br />
orientated to the east, the direction<br />
from which the Messiah will enter<br />
the City at the end <strong>of</strong> days.<br />
For the three faiths for whom<br />
Jerusalem is sacred, its history is<br />
not yet complete. Just as the Rock<br />
Palestinian and Israeli Protestors protest outside Hebrew University<br />
“<strong>The</strong> most holy spot on earth is Syria; the<br />
most holy spot in Syria is Palestine; the most<br />
holy spot in Palestine is Jerusalem; the most<br />
holy spot in Jerusalem is the Mountain; the<br />
most holy spot in Jerusalem is the place <strong>of</strong><br />
worship, and the most holy spot in the place<br />
<strong>of</strong> worship is the Dome.”<br />
Thawr ibn Yazid, c770AD<br />
<strong>of</strong> Mount Zion came to be believed<br />
to be the place where God had laid<br />
the foundations <strong>of</strong> the world, so to<br />
Jerusalem is the place where this<br />
story will reach fulfilment. Despite<br />
the fractured, bloody, and violent<br />
history <strong>of</strong> the city it is Jerusalem<br />
that is looked to<br />
as an analogue<br />
<strong>of</strong> Heaven itself.<br />
<strong>The</strong> conclusion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Bible sees<br />
the renewal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world pouring forth<br />
from a transfigured<br />
Zion, “prepared as<br />
a bride, adorned for<br />
her husband” (Rev.<br />
21: 2b). Amidst the<br />
religious strife <strong>of</strong> the<br />
city, and the attempts to resolve it,<br />
it is vital to recall that it is this New<br />
Jerusalem that is being fought over.<br />
Adam Kendry read <strong>The</strong>ology at<br />
Oxford University and has taught<br />
at Ampleforth before becoming<br />
Head <strong>of</strong> Divinity and Philosophy<br />
at <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong>. He is an<br />
Anglican theologian and Sub-<br />
Lieutenant (RN) and about to<br />
join the Submarine Operations<br />
and Strategy Branch.<br />
5 6
<strong>The</strong> Capture <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem, July 1099<br />
Axel Fithen<br />
This article tells the end <strong>of</strong> an incredible story and<br />
what was also an extraordinary journey. It all began<br />
in November 1095. Pope Urban II held a council <strong>of</strong><br />
the Church at Clermont in France where he discussed<br />
ordinary papal matters such as corruption within<br />
the church as well as the consequences <strong>of</strong> the King<br />
<strong>of</strong> France’s adultery. However, on the last day, Urban<br />
addressed thousands in the fields outside the town, to<br />
make an extraordinary speech. It sparked one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
greatest conflicts <strong>of</strong> the entire medieval period which<br />
saw its conclusion in the city <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem.<br />
“A grave report has come ...that a race absolutely<br />
alien to God...has invaded the land <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Christians...<strong>The</strong>y have either razed the churches<br />
<strong>of</strong> God to the ground or enslaved them to their<br />
own rites...<strong>The</strong>y cut open the navels <strong>of</strong> those they<br />
choose to torment...drag them around and flog<br />
them before killing them as they lie on the ground<br />
with all their entrails out...What can I say <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appalling violation <strong>of</strong> women On whom does the<br />
task lie <strong>of</strong> avenging this, if not on you...Take the<br />
road to the Holy Sepulchre, rescue that land and<br />
....Take this road for the remission <strong>of</strong> your sins,<br />
assured <strong>of</strong> the unfading glory <strong>of</strong> the kingdom<br />
<strong>of</strong> heaven.”<br />
When Pope Urban came to a close the crowd erupted<br />
into a religious frenzy chanting “Deus vult! Deus<br />
vult!” (“God wills it! God wills it!”)<br />
In this powerful speech, Pope Urban II launched what<br />
would become the First Crusade. Four years later<br />
having marched through Europe to Constantinople,<br />
the capital <strong>of</strong> the Byzantine empire and then on<br />
through Anatolia into the holy land, fighting hard<br />
battles at Nicaea (May 1097,) Dorylaeum (June<br />
1097,) Edessa (mid-1097 to early 1098) and Antioch<br />
(1097-98,) the crusader contingents <strong>of</strong> approximately<br />
1,300 knights and 12,500 footmen, reached Jerusalem<br />
on 7th <strong>of</strong> June 1099. <strong>The</strong>se men had travelled to<br />
the centre <strong>of</strong> their world under the Papal promise <strong>of</strong><br />
remission for all their sins. <strong>The</strong>y reached the sacred<br />
city, where Christ had been crucified, and indeed for<br />
many <strong>of</strong> these warrior pilgrims, it was a moment <strong>of</strong><br />
extreme piety. Tancred, the nephew <strong>of</strong> the founder<br />
<strong>of</strong> the principality <strong>of</strong> Antioch, Bohemond, saw<br />
Jerusalem from the Mount <strong>of</strong> Olives and sank to his<br />
knees saying he would gladly sacrifice his life for the<br />
opportunity to kiss the church <strong>of</strong> the Holy Sepulchre,<br />
the site <strong>of</strong> Christ’s crucifixion.<br />
On nearing the city the Crusader force surrounded<br />
it, concentrating their forces on two main sections.<br />
Raymond <strong>of</strong> Saint-Gilles took a force to the southwestern<br />
corner, while the remaining force, under<br />
Godfrey <strong>of</strong> Bouillon and Tancred, laid siege to the<br />
north-western district <strong>of</strong> the city. Early attacks were<br />
unsuccessful, especially in the north-western district<br />
which was defended by a double wall <strong>of</strong> colossal<br />
height. An attack on the 13th June failed due to<br />
a shortage <strong>of</strong> wooden ladders to scale the city walls.<br />
However, just as the Crusaders’ journey appeared<br />
to have fatally stalled, deliverance was at hand, just<br />
as it had been so many times over the previous four<br />
years. Firstly, two Genoese ships arrived at the port<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jaffa supplying timber and other materials to<br />
build siege engines. Tancred himself is credited with<br />
solving the problem <strong>of</strong> the lack <strong>of</strong> other supplies. It<br />
seems while searching for a place to seek relief as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> suffering from a case <strong>of</strong> terrible diarrhoea,<br />
he discovered a cave filled with timber. This was <strong>of</strong><br />
course seen as divine intervention and a sign <strong>of</strong><br />
God’s will that the city should fall to the Christians<br />
and the atrocities committed by the Muslims should<br />
be avenged.<br />
Top: 1st Crusade<br />
Above top: siege <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem during the first crusade<br />
Bottom: 1st Crusaders - show the crusaders the way to the Jerusalem<br />
Above: 1099 Siege <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem<br />
7 8
Meanwhile the Crusaders were becoming increasingly<br />
restless for a resolution to this siege. Hunger,<br />
exhaustion and more importantly, news had arrived<br />
that an army <strong>of</strong> muslim reinforcements had been sent<br />
to break the siege. <strong>The</strong> Crusaders desperately needed<br />
a swift conclusion to the siege and on the night <strong>of</strong><br />
the 13th <strong>of</strong> July an answer was found. Under cover<br />
<strong>of</strong> darkness Duke Godfrey ordered his siege tower to<br />
be taken apart and reconstructed a mile to the east<br />
<strong>of</strong> its current position. Godfrey had discovered a less<br />
well defended section <strong>of</strong> the city’s walls with a flatter<br />
approach for the siege tower. It was perfect.<br />
<br />
Was the ability <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem’s<br />
rulers the main reason for the<br />
survival <strong>of</strong> the estates during<br />
the twelfth century<br />
Anastasia Harrington<br />
Map <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem from 1099<br />
Route <strong>of</strong> the First Crusaders’<br />
Two mighty siege towers were constructed by the<br />
crusaders, each about fifty feet tall and built on<br />
wheeled platforms complete with a mighty battering<br />
ram. During their construction, one man was said to<br />
have had a vision <strong>of</strong> the spiritual leader <strong>of</strong> the crusade,<br />
Adhemar <strong>of</strong> Le Puy, who had died at Antioch the<br />
previous year. In the vision Adhemar had advised the<br />
warriors <strong>of</strong> Christendom to stage a procession to the<br />
Mount <strong>of</strong> Olives, the place where Christ ascended<br />
into heaven. <strong>The</strong> leaders <strong>of</strong> the crusading contingents,<br />
fearful <strong>of</strong> disobeying God’s wishes, duely obliged.<br />
Barefoot, taking crosses and relics, thousands <strong>of</strong><br />
crusaders ventured down the valley <strong>of</strong> Jehoshaphat<br />
praying and seeking God’s favour.<br />
At dawn the following morning Godfrey launched<br />
his attack. <strong>The</strong> crusaders managed to breach the wall,<br />
however they encountered fierce resistance from<br />
the besieged army who may have used Greek fire, a<br />
naptha based substance, which cannot be extinguished<br />
by water. Around midday the crusaders managed to<br />
force the Muslim defenders to flee and abandon their<br />
defensive positions on the wall immediately in front<br />
<strong>of</strong> the siege tower. At this moment Godfrey ordered<br />
his siege tower to lower its bridge onto the wall. As<br />
Crusaders poured into the city, Muslim resistance<br />
quickly collapsed. Thousands <strong>of</strong> Muslims, Jews,<br />
Christians, men, women and children were massacred.<br />
William <strong>of</strong> Tyre, writing around the 1180’s described<br />
the slaughter:<br />
‘Everywhere lay fragments <strong>of</strong> human bodies,<br />
and the very ground was covered with the blood<br />
<strong>of</strong> the slain. Still more dreadful was it to gaze<br />
upon the victors themselves, dripping with blood<br />
from head to foot’<br />
<strong>The</strong> Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem was founded through<br />
this barbarity and it would stand for nearly a century<br />
until Saladin’s rise to power and political infighting<br />
among the Crusader kingdoms would see its fall to<br />
the Muslims in 1187. <strong>The</strong> events <strong>of</strong> that siege have<br />
lived long in the consciousness <strong>of</strong> Muslims and<br />
Christians ever since. But they have taken on a greater<br />
importance still. <strong>The</strong>y have shaped more than just the<br />
heritage <strong>of</strong> those that continue to live there. <strong>The</strong>y have<br />
become part <strong>of</strong> the complicated political tapestry that<br />
is Jerusalem, Israel and the Middle East.<br />
It can be argued that the survival <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Crusader Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem during the<br />
twelfth century was due to the ability <strong>of</strong> its<br />
rulers; however there were other factors that<br />
enabled its survival. <strong>The</strong>se included the relative<br />
disunity and weakness <strong>of</strong> real and potential<br />
enemies, the support from western powers,<br />
and the Crusaders’ military capabilities.<br />
In July 1099 Jerusalem was conquered by<br />
the Crusaders and established as a Crusader<br />
Kingdom. Between 1101 and 1110 the Crusader<br />
estates in the region were extended as the<br />
Principality <strong>of</strong> Antioch and the County <strong>of</strong> Tripoli;<br />
these extended the geographical area under<br />
Crusader control in to a continuous line along<br />
the eastern coast <strong>of</strong> the Mediterranean from<br />
south <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem. Even so, the Crusader<br />
states were a long way from potential western<br />
allies, with long and uncertain supply lines.<br />
This meant that the rulers had to be able<br />
administrators and diplomats to ensure that<br />
they could marshal limited resources and create<br />
alliances to counter these problems, as well as<br />
being effective military leaders to repel enemy<br />
attacks, expand and consolidate territorial<br />
gains. This required exceptional leadership and<br />
as Fulcher <strong>of</strong> Chartres noted when Baldwin I<br />
was crowned, “the King would need energy to<br />
conquer the Muslims in battle, or...compel them<br />
to make peace.” <strong>The</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> Baldwin I shows<br />
how an effective ruler was able to ensure the<br />
survival <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem during the<br />
early part <strong>of</strong> the twelfth century.<br />
King Baldwin II<br />
During his reign, Baldwin I (1100-1118)<br />
continued the process <strong>of</strong> consolidating territorial<br />
gains and securing supply routes across the<br />
Mediterranean Sea with the taking <strong>of</strong> coastal<br />
cities; with Acre falling to the Christians in 1104<br />
and Beirut and Sidon were taken in 1110, (with<br />
help from a large force <strong>of</strong> Norwegian Crusaders<br />
under King Sigurd). <strong>The</strong> armies <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jerusalem fought annual battles against the<br />
Egyptians in the South and the Damascenes,<br />
9 10
when the Damascenes were not allied with<br />
the Frankish Crusaders against the Muslims <strong>of</strong><br />
Northern Syria, who were a common enemy.<br />
Additionally, Baldwin I’s reputation as a ruler<br />
was enhanced by his construction <strong>of</strong> Montreal<br />
Castle in Transjordan, and by extending Crusader<br />
command <strong>of</strong> the region east <strong>of</strong> the River Jordan<br />
and the Dead Sea, down to the Red Sea port<br />
<strong>of</strong> Eilat. This resulted in a valuable increase<br />
in revenue as traders between Damascus to<br />
Egypt had to pay taxes to traverse the area.<br />
As a monarch he held his nobles in close<br />
control for much <strong>of</strong> his reign until he died in<br />
April 1118. Such successful military action, with<br />
the resulting increase in revenue, the ability<br />
to establish a working relationship with new<br />
allies and an enemy against a common enemy<br />
required great skill. Together with establishing<br />
a more cohesive Kingdom and improving the<br />
supply routes to Jerusalem via the ports, may be<br />
why Baldwin I’s rule is regarded as successful.<br />
<strong>The</strong> reputation <strong>of</strong> strong Crusader leadership<br />
by the Kings <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem was reinforced by<br />
Baldwin II when he restored control and order in<br />
Antioch after the Field <strong>of</strong> Blood 1119, although<br />
this reduced Crusader resources. This reputation<br />
for strong and successful military leadership<br />
may have inspired continued support from<br />
European powers and individuals to continue<br />
on a Crusade. Baldwin II also continued a policy<br />
<strong>of</strong> local alliances and diplomacy to reinforce<br />
regional support.<br />
This shows that the early Crusaders may<br />
have followed a pragmatic social practice<br />
that reinforced the ability <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom to<br />
survive. Although the Franks dominated the<br />
regions they conquered, imposing hierarchies<br />
<strong>of</strong> power with themselves at the top, the<br />
societies they initiated depended on employing<br />
the local population. Lack <strong>of</strong> manpower and<br />
military resources in the early days did not<br />
make segregation or discrimination a practical<br />
decision, rather integration proved crucial to<br />
survival. Frankish authorities tolerated racial<br />
and religious diversity in the ports <strong>of</strong> Acre,<br />
Tripoli and Tyre because the value <strong>of</strong> the<br />
indigenous population to the political economy<br />
was understood. Baldwin II’s marriage created<br />
a union with the Armenian Church’s patriarchs.<br />
While Baldwin’s example may have been a<br />
diplomatic success and set an example to<br />
others, following the Field <strong>of</strong> Blood, relations<br />
between the religious communities’ hardened<br />
and integrated marriages were banned. A church<br />
council at Nablus early in 1120 forbade sexual<br />
relations between Christians and Muslims, so<br />
undermining the example set by Baldwin II<br />
and potentially reducing the influence <strong>of</strong> future<br />
rulers. Such divisions in society probably robbed<br />
the Crusader states <strong>of</strong> a potential workforce,<br />
which in turn meant it was not economically<br />
self-sufficient and became dependent on<br />
external supplies.<br />
Within the Crusader States, the early leaders<br />
<strong>of</strong> each estate showed strong allegiance to<br />
the ruler <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem and support for new<br />
campaigns, so that they were able to make<br />
up for the shortage <strong>of</strong> manpower by acting as<br />
a unified force. For example, despite having<br />
conquered Jerusalem and Caesarea, a new<br />
Crusade was summoned to conquer Antioch,<br />
300 miles away. Many deserters <strong>of</strong> the first<br />
Crusade, such as Stephen de Blois, came<br />
back on this Crusade, reaching its destination<br />
in 1102. This Crusade shows the importance<br />
that the rulers gave to keeping state to state<br />
communication secure and protect the physical<br />
route between Jerusalem and other Crusader<br />
states to allow swift movement between them.<br />
Nonetheless, this seems to have <strong>of</strong>ten been a<br />
local responsibility as each estate had its own<br />
defences to keep overland communication<br />
routes open with its neighbours and defend its<br />
borders. Successful, mutual support from the<br />
rulers <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem reinforced their reputation<br />
and may have strengthened the internal<br />
allegiances, so enabling more effective rule.<br />
<strong>The</strong> death <strong>of</strong> Baldwin II in August 1131 marked<br />
the end <strong>of</strong> the first generation <strong>of</strong> Crusader<br />
rulers and the initial passion that first drove<br />
the Crusaders. Without a male heir this gave<br />
rise to different factions jostling for power<br />
and increasing disunity within the Crusader<br />
states. To try to prevent this, Baldwin II named<br />
his successor, Count Fulk V <strong>of</strong> Anjou, and his<br />
acceptance demonstrated the desire to maintain<br />
Kerak Castle<br />
a strong continuous line <strong>of</strong> leaders within the<br />
main kingdom itself and an ongoing loyalty to<br />
protect the Holy City from the ‘infidel’.<br />
Although early Muslim weakness and disunity<br />
meant that enemy threats were not too<br />
problematic, frequent skirmishes, and border<br />
raids meant that the Crusader kingdoms had<br />
to develop from a politically based society to<br />
a military one. Additionally, the Muslim enemy<br />
was becoming increasingly unified under the<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> jihad, so that by August 1st 1119 the<br />
forces <strong>of</strong> the first Crusade were defeated at the<br />
battle <strong>of</strong> Sarmada, in the ‘Field <strong>of</strong> Blood’ by Turks<br />
under Tel-Danith. However, the Crusaders under<br />
Baldwin II were able to defeat the advancing<br />
Turks two weeks later thus indicating that the<br />
King’s leadership and tactics were still strong<br />
enough to fight <strong>of</strong>f the enemy despite the<br />
previous losses against the other estate leaders.<br />
<strong>The</strong> defeat <strong>of</strong> Roger <strong>of</strong> Antioch and the wiping<br />
out <strong>of</strong> the Frankish army at the Field <strong>of</strong> Blood<br />
in 1119 forced the Crusader states to realise<br />
the necessity <strong>of</strong> developing stronger, more<br />
effective military defences against the Muslim<br />
fighters. As a counter to this threat, new military<br />
orders were founded, under the radical new<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> warrior monks, and castles, built<br />
as strategic outposts, grew in importance<br />
throughout the twelfth century, paralleling the<br />
rise <strong>of</strong> Muslim threat. <strong>The</strong> warrior monks eased<br />
the drastic lack <strong>of</strong> manpower but did not solve<br />
the problem completely. <strong>The</strong>se castles were<br />
primarily defensive and designed to strike fear<br />
and caution into the enemy, but due to the lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> manpower they were not <strong>of</strong> great military<br />
value. <strong>The</strong>y were <strong>of</strong>ten built in remote areas and<br />
lack <strong>of</strong> manpower meant that commanders were<br />
faced with either abandoning the castles to<br />
fight the enemy or withdrawing into the castles<br />
and facing a less than promising siege. Muslim<br />
defences however were urban which made<br />
their cities difficult to breach. However, the<br />
castles did help to secure trade routes, provided<br />
centres <strong>of</strong> administration and a concentration <strong>of</strong><br />
warriors that could launch raids or attacks when<br />
necessary. Jonathan Philips believed they had<br />
a significant advantage, “...key to holding onto<br />
territory was the control <strong>of</strong> castles and fortified<br />
sites...” This shows that the military order played<br />
another vital role alongside the previous one<br />
<strong>of</strong> links to the west, showing that there were<br />
other reasons for the survival <strong>of</strong> the kingdom <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem besides its rulers.<br />
Despite the support that the Crusaders were<br />
willing to give to the leaders in Jerusalem,<br />
the struggling kingdom was also dependent<br />
on vital western support from the beginning.<br />
This support was sometimes conditional upon<br />
achieving the objectives <strong>of</strong> other rulers and may<br />
have served to undermine the survival <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem. <strong>The</strong> 1108 campaign<br />
created a major development in the crusading<br />
idea <strong>of</strong> a Holy War against the supposed infidel<br />
and this weakened support from the Byzantines<br />
to the Crusaders. As the battle to overtake<br />
the Byzantines in Durazzo failed, Bohemond<br />
became an imperial vassal to Emperor Alexius.<br />
This crusade again demonstrates how help<br />
from the west was valued by the Kingdom <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem in upholding their Holy City; however<br />
it also demonstrates the uneven and distrustful<br />
relationship between some Crusaders and the<br />
Byzantines that undermined the effectiveness<br />
<strong>of</strong> the rulers <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem to make and enforce<br />
11 12
obust alliances which could not be undone by<br />
western powers or other Crusaders following<br />
their own agendas.<br />
Support <strong>of</strong>ten came at a price that meant that<br />
some areas were outside the authority <strong>of</strong> the<br />
rulers <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem. For example, when Venetian<br />
fleets assisted with the capture <strong>of</strong> Sidon and<br />
Syrian coastal cities, the Venetians demanded as<br />
payment for their assistance to be the virtually<br />
autonomous owners <strong>of</strong> parts <strong>of</strong> the Holy Land<br />
and this was granted through the Pactum<br />
Warmundi. By having to surrender authority to a<br />
‘foreign power’ within the state suggests that the<br />
Crusaders were dependent on external support<br />
to maintain and expand their territory and<br />
their limited options available may have forced<br />
them to part with valuable prizes to secure that<br />
support. <strong>The</strong> development <strong>of</strong> these coastal cities<br />
opened up trade routes, strengthening links to<br />
the West and the Byzantine Empire, establishing<br />
thriving markets dependent on the Italian city<br />
state trade, e.g. the Venetians owned one third<br />
<strong>of</strong> Tyre. Arguably, the success <strong>of</strong> these trade<br />
cities helped the survival <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem by increasing economic activity, but<br />
by representing a ‘foreign power’ within its state,<br />
it may be argued that the kingdom was further<br />
fragmented and left the rulers <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem with<br />
another powerful group within its borders whose<br />
demands they had to consider.<br />
Having regional, individual authorities ruling<br />
areas within the Crusader states meant that the<br />
Crusaders were not always united. Consequently,<br />
the rulers <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem were <strong>of</strong>ten faced with<br />
dealing with internal issues as well as external<br />
threats. Indeed civil war threatened or broke out<br />
four times after 1130.<br />
This shows that the Crusader states were<br />
dependent on external supplies and support for<br />
their survival and it was not always within their<br />
power to control it. This also suggests that the<br />
Crusaders were too small and fragmented a<br />
force to ensure the survival <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom.<br />
While economic success may have created trade<br />
links with Italian city states, there is no evidence<br />
that this wealth enabled the Crusader states to<br />
develop economic independence. However, the<br />
effective military leadership and ability to inspire<br />
further action seems to have ensured the early<br />
survival <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom. Although it is apparent<br />
that the leader <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem had a vital impact<br />
and contribution to the survival <strong>of</strong> the kingdom<br />
during the twelfth century it is also clear that the<br />
other factors such as the support from the west<br />
and initial weakness <strong>of</strong> the enemy played a vital<br />
part, suggesting that the leaders were not the<br />
only reason.<br />
Map <strong>of</strong> the Frankish states<br />
Sources<br />
T. Asbridge, <strong>The</strong> Crusades: <strong>The</strong> War for the Holy Land, Simon & Schuster Ltd (2012)<br />
J. Phillips, A Modern <strong>History</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Crusades, Vintage (2010)<br />
Just short <strong>of</strong> ninety years<br />
after the crusading force <strong>of</strong><br />
Pope Urban II’s iconic first<br />
crusade captured the Holy<br />
City <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem from the<br />
Islamic forces that occupied<br />
it, Saladin, the Islamic ‘Holy<br />
warrior’, was to re-take the<br />
city that was the centre <strong>of</strong> the<br />
medieval religious world.<br />
1187,<br />
<strong>The</strong> Battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin and<br />
the Capture <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem<br />
Saladin had previously<br />
attempted to attack the<br />
Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem in the<br />
autumn <strong>of</strong> 1177, however due<br />
to the efforts <strong>of</strong> Baldwin IV,<br />
its famous Leper King, he had<br />
been defeated ignominiously<br />
at the battle <strong>of</strong> Mont Gisard.<br />
On this return attack ten years<br />
later, Saladin had with him<br />
over 42,000 men, described<br />
by a contemporary eyewitness<br />
as a pack <strong>of</strong> ‘old wolves [and]<br />
rending lions’. <strong>The</strong> opposition<br />
that Saladin faced was a broken<br />
and disjointed kingdom. With<br />
the death <strong>of</strong> the former king<br />
Baldwin IV in 1185 clear lines<br />
<strong>of</strong> leadership had broken down<br />
and the significantly weakened<br />
John Gibson<br />
state was rallied under the<br />
previous regent and newly<br />
crowned, Guy <strong>of</strong> Lusignan.<br />
Odds had shifted decidedly<br />
in favour <strong>of</strong> the Islamic forces.<br />
Saladin had only to defeat the<br />
crusader army and the Holy City<br />
was his. Or so it seemed…<br />
<strong>The</strong> decisive battle in the<br />
re-capture <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem was<br />
not fought at, or particularly<br />
near to, the Holy City itself.<br />
Saladin instead drew out the<br />
Crusader army to Hattin where<br />
the final blow to the crusader<br />
kingdoms was to be delivered.<br />
Taking the fortress <strong>of</strong> Tiberias,<br />
Count Raymond <strong>of</strong> Tripoli’s<br />
personal fortress, on the 2nd <strong>of</strong><br />
July Saladin had ‘laid his trap’<br />
(Asbridge) for the crusaders, as<br />
Raymond’s wife was trapped at<br />
Tiberias at the time. Raymond<br />
remained, despite the potential<br />
‘<strong>The</strong> devil seduced [Guy] into doing the<br />
opposite <strong>of</strong> what he had in mind and made<br />
to seem good to him what was not his real<br />
wish and intention. So he left the water<br />
and set out towards Tiberias… through<br />
pride and arrogance’.<br />
for his loss, calm, and advised<br />
Guy to refrain from engaging<br />
the Islamic force claiming, it<br />
would break apart like so many<br />
before it. It was to be Reynald<br />
<strong>of</strong> Châtillon and the Templar<br />
master Gerard <strong>of</strong> Ridefort<br />
13 14
who <strong>of</strong>fered up an opposing<br />
view. Reynald advised Guy to<br />
disregard the count’s advice<br />
and take the battle to Saladin.<br />
Asbridge suggests that despite<br />
the council <strong>of</strong> those around<br />
him it most likely Guy’s own<br />
experience four years earlier<br />
that informed his decision that<br />
night. Guy had been presented<br />
with a near identical decision in<br />
1183 and had eschewed battle<br />
with Saladin, granting him only<br />
derision and demotion. <strong>The</strong><br />
decision, however, to advance<br />
toward Tiberias was believed<br />
fatal by even Saladin, as he<br />
wrote in a letter immediately<br />
after the battle:<br />
‘<strong>The</strong> devil seduced [Guy] into<br />
doing the opposite <strong>of</strong> what<br />
he had in mind and made to<br />
seem good to him what was<br />
not his real wish and intention.<br />
So he left the water and set<br />
out towards Tiberias… through<br />
pride and arrogance’.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Crusaders marched forth<br />
from Saffuriya on the morning<br />
<strong>of</strong> 3rd July and left behind them<br />
there a sure supply <strong>of</strong> water,<br />
which was to be the downfall <strong>of</strong><br />
the army in the battle to come.<br />
<strong>The</strong> army would have been a<br />
menacing sight in full march,<br />
as one eye witness states ‘they<br />
came, wave after wave… the<br />
air stank, the light was dimmed<br />
[and] the desert was stunned<br />
by their advance’. By noon the<br />
army had reached the small<br />
village <strong>of</strong> Turan, where they<br />
attempted to replenish their<br />
supplies <strong>of</strong> water. However<br />
the small village spring was<br />
not sufficient for the many<br />
thousands assembled and the<br />
army was forced to continue<br />
towards the sea <strong>of</strong> Galilee<br />
during the remaining heat <strong>of</strong><br />
the day. At day’s end, Guy<br />
made the decision to make<br />
camp in an entirely waterless,<br />
indefensible position; a move<br />
that played directly into the<br />
hands <strong>of</strong> Saladin.<br />
On the following day, 4th <strong>of</strong><br />
July, the Battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin took<br />
place. <strong>The</strong> Crusaders had been<br />
surrounded by the Islamic forces<br />
overnight and were at the mercy<br />
<strong>of</strong> Saladin. <strong>The</strong> Islamic Holy<br />
Warrior ordered his troops to set<br />
fire to the scrubs surrounding<br />
the crusaders, exacerbating the<br />
immense dehydration already<br />
suffered by the Crusaders.<br />
This, <strong>of</strong> course, was not an<br />
issue for the well supplied<br />
Islamic troops. In the following<br />
hours, the Islamic archers and<br />
horsemen tore the Crusaders<br />
apart, culminating in Guy’s<br />
final heroic stand at the Horns<br />
<strong>of</strong> Hattin with the relic <strong>of</strong> the<br />
True Cross. Guy’s plan was to<br />
strike at the heart <strong>of</strong> the Islamic<br />
force, Saladin himself, with his<br />
heavier and more powerful<br />
force <strong>of</strong> knights. However,<br />
despite twice charging over the<br />
Horns <strong>of</strong> Hattin the crusaders<br />
were overrun by Islamic forces<br />
and day was won by Saladin.<br />
<strong>The</strong> army <strong>of</strong> the kingdom <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem was destroyed and<br />
the King and their main relic,<br />
the true cross, captured.<br />
Having crushed the<br />
accumulated crusader forces<br />
at the battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin very few<br />
were left to defend the Holy<br />
Land, one eyewitness claimed<br />
that only two knights and their<br />
retainers were left in defence<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Holy City when Saladin<br />
arrived. Almost immediately<br />
after the battle the citadel at<br />
Tiberius surrendered and a<br />
week later the coastal city <strong>of</strong><br />
Acre followed suit. Over the<br />
following weeks and months<br />
Saladin focused on claiming<br />
the remainder <strong>of</strong> Palestine’s<br />
coastal settlements. By<br />
September 1187 Saladin had<br />
only one intention, the capture<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Holy City itself.<br />
Saladin took the Holy City<br />
formally on 2nd <strong>of</strong> October,<br />
mirroring the actions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Islamic prophet Mohamed. In<br />
contrast to the actions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
crusaders some ninety years<br />
previously Saladin allowed<br />
Christians to buy their freedom<br />
for up to a month after the<br />
capture <strong>of</strong> the city, ten dinars<br />
for a man, five for a woman and<br />
one for a child. After the month<br />
had ended the remainder <strong>of</strong><br />
Christians were to be rounded<br />
up and enslaved, however<br />
this course <strong>of</strong> action seems<br />
charitable in contrast to the<br />
‘bloodbath’ which the original<br />
crusaders brought to the city<br />
in 1099. And thus, in reality,<br />
ended the era <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jerusalem although it’s King<br />
and his few remaining citadels<br />
would hold out for many years<br />
to come. Nonetheless, Christian<br />
domination and control <strong>of</strong><br />
Jerusalem was at an end and<br />
this fateful year, 1187, witnessed<br />
the sudden collapse <strong>of</strong> Christian<br />
(and certainly catholic) power in<br />
the Middle East.<br />
This double arm gold reliquary cross was<br />
made in 12th century Jerusalem. According<br />
to the inscription, it contains a splinter <strong>of</strong><br />
the ‘True Cross.’ A larger part was carried<br />
in to battle by the Army <strong>of</strong> the Jerusalem<br />
butwas captured at the Battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin<br />
Battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin<br />
King Guy laying down his weapons before Saladin<br />
<strong>The</strong> Army <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem from the film, Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Heaven<br />
Sources<br />
T. Asbridge, <strong>The</strong> Crusades: <strong>The</strong> War for the Holy Land, Simon & Schuster Ltd (2012)<br />
J. Phillips, A Modern <strong>History</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Crusades, Vintage (2010)<br />
15 16
A Pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong><br />
Saladin<br />
Saladin was the son <strong>of</strong> Shirkuh who had consolidated<br />
his grip on Egypt from 1169-74, and is responsible<br />
for uniting the previously fractured and disorganised<br />
peoples <strong>of</strong> Islam. In October 1174 Saladin took<br />
control <strong>of</strong> Damascus, proclaiming himself champion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Sunni-Orthodox religious element, thereby<br />
strengthening Muslim confidence <strong>of</strong> a unified Muslim<br />
world. Saladin had, by that time, gained enough<br />
respectability so that the Caliph <strong>of</strong> Baghdad invested<br />
him with the governance <strong>of</strong> Egypt, Yemen and Syria.<br />
<strong>The</strong> only aspect missing was his lack <strong>of</strong> kinship to the<br />
previous ruler, Nur ad-Din. However this was soon<br />
rectified in 1175 when Saladin married Nur ad-Din’s<br />
widow. This helped him generate a spiritual link with<br />
the previous ruler. With that, Saladin could turn his<br />
attention to expansion.<br />
However, at the battle <strong>of</strong> Montisgard in 1177 Saladin’s<br />
confidence received a harsh blow. Whilst attempting<br />
to attack the kingdom a crusader army led by Baldwin<br />
IV surprised him and he only narrowly escaped.<br />
Strengthened by their recent successes, the crusaders<br />
decided to build a huge castle at a place called Jacob’s<br />
ford just 55 miles away from Damascus as a direct<br />
challenge to the Muslims. Saladin most certainly<br />
answers this call in 1179 with an attack on Jacob’s<br />
Ford, which subsequently falls in an astonishingly<br />
short period <strong>of</strong> just four days. From victory to<br />
consolidation, this is followed by a two-year peace<br />
deal, as Saladin did not yet have the required amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> strength to fight the crusaders and take back<br />
Jerusalem. This break, therefore, is an astute military<br />
move as during this time he makes a crucial alliance<br />
with the Byzantines from 1184-5.<br />
Charles Ward<br />
Arguably Saladin is the most famous medieval leader <strong>of</strong> the Muslim world. But who was he,<br />
where did he come from, and why is he so famous, especially here in the West<br />
What follows next in the Saladin story is what<br />
catapults his fame in to the West’s consciousness;<br />
the highly significant battle <strong>of</strong> Hattin in July 1187<br />
which resulted in a decisive victory for the Muslims.<br />
<strong>The</strong> army <strong>of</strong> the Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Jerusalem was all but<br />
destroyed and Saladin was left for a time with only<br />
small pockets <strong>of</strong> static opposition. He moved swiftly<br />
and as a result <strong>of</strong> this, Saladin continued his success<br />
taking all <strong>of</strong> the coastal towns with the exception <strong>of</strong><br />
Tyre, Antioch and Tripoli. By October 1187, the<br />
Muslims had taken Jerusalem. However, as J. Philips<br />
has written, ‘Saladin’s rise to power was by no means<br />
an easy one and should be by no means disregarded.’<br />
Gaining dominance over the Muslim world and<br />
gathering the resources needed to defeat the Franks<br />
proved difficult for Saladin, as he was not without his<br />
Muslim enemies. As guardian <strong>of</strong> the Sunni orthodoxy,<br />
he was the target <strong>of</strong> two assassination attempts by the<br />
Shia assassins in 1175 and from then on he only ever<br />
slept in a wooden tower for protection. Saladin’s role<br />
also sat uneasily with the Seljuk Turks in Anatolia and<br />
with the Seljuk’s <strong>of</strong> Iran. Many saw him as a threat<br />
as he expanded outwards from his base in Egypt<br />
into Syria. His use <strong>of</strong> the Jihad was seen as a tool for<br />
political and military ends. For example the two-year<br />
truce with the crusaders was considered by his rivals<br />
to have been created as an opportunity for Saladin to<br />
deal with his co-religionist rivalries.<br />
Although the Third Crusade proved unsuccessful,<br />
Saladin still suffered blows to his reputation also<br />
due to the several small successes <strong>of</strong> King Richard<br />
I such as the Christian forces successfully securing<br />
the coastline from Jaffa to Tyre (excluding Ascalon.)<br />
Despite the two attempts made by the Christians<br />
to take Jerusalem, they were unsuccessful on both<br />
accounts. This was partly due to the logistics <strong>of</strong> taking<br />
Jerusalem and the fact that it would be impossible to<br />
hold and defend for long once taken. Furthermore,<br />
Saladin’s disruption to the crusader’s efforts was the<br />
last nail in the c<strong>of</strong>fin for the Crusaders’ and especially<br />
Richard the Lionheart’s hopes <strong>of</strong> entering Jerusalem<br />
in triumph. Under Saladin, the forces <strong>of</strong> Islam had<br />
weathered the storm.<br />
So what made Saladin so successful His personal and<br />
military skills were exceptional. However, the Jihad<br />
became a political and military tool, skilfully used by<br />
both Muslim leaders to create a semblance <strong>of</strong> unity<br />
at least in the holy land. Nur ad-Din achieved much,<br />
laying the foundations for Saladin to capitalise on,<br />
who used the Jihad and his vast resources to attack<br />
and to destroy the Crusader Kingdom when it was<br />
at its weakest in 1187. But this does not explain<br />
his fame. It is as the largely successful opponent <strong>of</strong><br />
Richard that is why we in the West are familiar with<br />
Saladin. For many centuries afterwards, stories <strong>of</strong><br />
their rivalry were told and legends abounded <strong>of</strong> their<br />
personal bravery and mutual respect as leaders and<br />
adversaries. This is not surprising, since it is as true<br />
then as it is now; being vanquished by a gallant and<br />
formidable foe lessens the pain <strong>of</strong> failure.<br />
Saladin’s army before Hattin from the film, Kingdom <strong>of</strong> Heaven<br />
Bibliography<br />
• Crusades: 1095-1197 – Jonathan Phillips<br />
• <strong>The</strong> First Crusade and the Crusader States<br />
1073-1130 – Toby Purser<br />
17 18
Richard I was the King <strong>of</strong> England, Duke <strong>of</strong><br />
Normandy, Duke <strong>of</strong> Aquitaine, Duke <strong>of</strong> Gascony,<br />
Lord <strong>of</strong> Cyprus, Count <strong>of</strong> Anjou, Count <strong>of</strong> Maine,<br />
Count <strong>of</strong> Nantes and overlord <strong>of</strong> Brittany at various<br />
times towards the end <strong>of</strong> the twelfth century. He lived<br />
from 1157-1199 and was Henry II’s third legitimate<br />
son. He did not expect to ascend to the throne but, as<br />
you can see, he ruled over a large kingdom. However,<br />
the question is begged, did he rule it well<br />
Many have claimed Richard was a bad son. One <strong>of</strong><br />
the reasons for this must be how in 1173-1174 he<br />
and his brothers decided to abandon their father<br />
and seek the refuge <strong>of</strong> Louis VII, the King <strong>of</strong><br />
France. This rebellion ended up completely failing,<br />
although Henry, Richard’s father, forgave him after he<br />
apologized. However, when Richard became heir to<br />
the throne he carried on fighting with his father.<br />
Another claim about Richard is that he was a bad<br />
husband. He certainly had trouble finding a wife.<br />
His father tried to find him a good wife so as to<br />
make a strong alliance between England and another<br />
strong country. After much searching, Henry found<br />
him a suitable wife; Alys, the daughter <strong>of</strong> Louis VII.<br />
“<br />
‘He was a bad<br />
son, a bad<br />
husband and a bad<br />
king, but a gallant<br />
and splendid<br />
soldier.’<br />
Is this a fair assessment <strong>of</strong> King Richard the Lionheart<br />
Tobias Chesser<br />
Unfortunately, this betrothal ended sooner rather<br />
than later, and he ended up marrying Berengaria <strong>of</strong><br />
Navarre, the first-born daughter <strong>of</strong> King Sancho VI<br />
<strong>of</strong> Navarre. Richard only had one child, Philip <strong>of</strong><br />
Cognac, but he was illegitimate. Indeed, there have<br />
been many allegations that he had sexual relationships<br />
with local women in his campaigns.<br />
Another claim is that Richard was a bad King. If<br />
looking after your kingdom personally is the sort <strong>of</strong><br />
thing that is thought to make a good King, it is right.<br />
Richard ended up only spending six months <strong>of</strong> his<br />
reign in England. He also wasn’t very tolerant; when<br />
Richard was <strong>of</strong>ficially crowned on 3rd September<br />
1189, he barred all Jews and Women from the<br />
ceremony. However, when some Jewish leaders<br />
turned up with gifts for the new King, he stripped<br />
and flogged them. Having spent such little time in<br />
England, he used all <strong>of</strong> its resources (including the<br />
full treasury he inherited from his father,) to fund<br />
his crusades. As William Stubbs said, ‘He was a bad<br />
King… his ambition was that <strong>of</strong> a true soldier: he<br />
would fight for anything whatever, but he would sell<br />
everything that was worth fighting for. <strong>The</strong> glory he<br />
sought was <strong>of</strong> victory rather than conquest.’<br />
This leads us on to the final point, namely that<br />
Richard ‘was a gallant and splendid soldier’. He<br />
spent a lot <strong>of</strong> his life fighting. He is perhaps most<br />
well known for his extraordinarily determined<br />
participation and eventual leadership <strong>of</strong> the third<br />
crusade. He never actually conquered Jerusalem, but<br />
he came close, and conquered many surrounding<br />
places that became Christian strongholds for a<br />
long time to come. He didn’t seem to have much<br />
compassion, just like a warrior, as on his crusade,<br />
he ordered that all 2700 <strong>of</strong> his Muslim prisoners at<br />
Acre should be executed. Richard spent most <strong>of</strong> his<br />
life fighting, as that is what he liked to do. Yet, while<br />
retaining his fame as a competent military leader<br />
and individual fighter, he soon acquired a different<br />
reputation, namely as a gallant and chivalrous<br />
Christian hero. Many share this view now. He was<br />
known as Richard the Lionheart even before he<br />
became king, because <strong>of</strong> his reputation as a great<br />
military leader and warrior. According to the military<br />
historian, Allen Brown, he also built, and some say<br />
he even designed one <strong>of</strong> the best castles in Europe<br />
at the time, Chateau Gaillard. He certainly spent a<br />
small fortune on it, twice as much (£15-20,000) as he<br />
spent on repairing all his other castles in England put<br />
together (£7000.)<br />
When Richard was hit in the neck by a crossbowman<br />
during a siege, his surgeon did a very bad job pulling<br />
out the arrow. <strong>The</strong> wound became infected and<br />
Richard died. However, before he died, he performed<br />
a final act <strong>of</strong> mercy, he forgave the boy who had shot<br />
him and sent him free with 100 shillings, £5 (a lot <strong>of</strong><br />
money in those days.) This is showing the qualities <strong>of</strong><br />
a kind and compassionate king. He may have been a<br />
pretty bad son to his father, but he was very loyal to<br />
his Mother, Eleanor <strong>of</strong> Aquitaine. When he rebelled<br />
against his father he stayed loyal to her. In fact, some<br />
historians even say that it was her who manipulated<br />
the sons to rebel. Richard died in her arms. Richard<br />
showed other qualities <strong>of</strong> being a good king when he<br />
was fighting. He was a very good military commander,<br />
and in those days, that was basically what a good king<br />
needed to be. He also never let England be invaded.<br />
After his death he was known as courageous and<br />
generous, a view shared by many now. But you could<br />
also say with good justification that he was not a<br />
good soldier because on his crusade (which he spent<br />
so much money on,) he authorised a massacre, he<br />
never actually conquered Jerusalem and bankrupted<br />
England because <strong>of</strong> his constant warring leading to his<br />
successors’ future problems.<br />
Overall, I think that Richard was a bad son to one<br />
parent, but a good one to the other. He was a bad<br />
husband and while not a bad king he was not a good<br />
one either. Finally, he was a gallant and splendid<br />
soldier and that is probably what we remember him for.<br />
Map <strong>of</strong> the 3rd Crusade<br />
3rd Crusade massacre at Acre<br />
19 20
<strong>The</strong> Great Siege <strong>of</strong><br />
Constantinople, 1453<br />
Mr M. Jennings<br />
Across the Middle East, many<br />
uprisings and even regime changes<br />
have taken place in 2011. <strong>The</strong><br />
dates <strong>of</strong> these will live long in the<br />
memory and pass on into <strong>History</strong>.<br />
May 29th, 1453 is not a date<br />
many people will recognise today.<br />
At the time, news <strong>of</strong> the fate <strong>of</strong><br />
Constantinople spread throughout<br />
Christendom and many thought<br />
it heralded the end <strong>of</strong> the world<br />
or at least the beginning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
end. Conversely, throughout the<br />
Muslim world, it became the<br />
date for feasting, on a par with<br />
the four holiest days. Seemingly,<br />
nothing now stood between Islam<br />
and a conquest <strong>of</strong> South-eastern<br />
Europe. Christendom lacked the<br />
leadership as well as the moral<br />
force to undertake a counterattack<br />
and within two generations,<br />
it would be plunged in to the<br />
religious and dynastic turmoil <strong>of</strong><br />
the Reformation. Within a hundred<br />
years, all the remaining Christian<br />
territories <strong>of</strong> South-Eastern Europe<br />
would be under Ottoman control<br />
and central Europe itself would<br />
soon be fighting for its survival<br />
on land and at sea. <strong>The</strong> relations<br />
between the Greek and Turkish<br />
peoples would be forever marked<br />
by the events <strong>of</strong> that day. Yet, this<br />
date’s real significance is that the<br />
balance <strong>of</strong> power shifted eastwards<br />
from Europe to the Middle East.<br />
But what had made Constantinople<br />
such an important city and its<br />
capture so vital to Ottoman<br />
progress Moreover, how had such<br />
a strategically vital city become so<br />
vulnerable Constantinople was the<br />
capital <strong>of</strong> the old, Eastern Roman<br />
Empire. Through its advantageous<br />
geographical position, it bridged<br />
Europe and Asia and had become<br />
the vital trading base for links to<br />
both continents. This had made it<br />
extraordinarily wealthy and attracted<br />
so many people that by 1100, it<br />
had become the largest city in the<br />
world with a population estimated<br />
at half a million inhabitants. In<br />
contrast, other contemporary<br />
cities were barely a fiftieth <strong>of</strong> its<br />
size. Under the leadership <strong>of</strong> great<br />
emperors such as Constantine and<br />
Justinian (4th and 6th centuries,)<br />
it had expanded and conquered its<br />
rivals, lasted a thousand years and<br />
consolidated an Orthodox branch<br />
<strong>of</strong> Christian worship that remains<br />
strong to this day.<br />
However, by 1453 Constantinople<br />
was a shadow <strong>of</strong> its former glorious<br />
self. Once, the epi-centre <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Byzantine Empire’s grandeur, <strong>of</strong><br />
Greek and Roman civilisation, <strong>of</strong><br />
sophistication and culture, it now<br />
held very few <strong>of</strong> its former many<br />
treasures. Decline through inept<br />
leadership, continual in-fighting<br />
and court intrigues was hastened<br />
by catastrophic military defeats at<br />
the hands <strong>of</strong> the Muslim Seljuk<br />
Turks at Manzikert in 1071 and<br />
a Crusading force <strong>of</strong> catholic<br />
Europeans in 1204. <strong>The</strong> latter<br />
campaign saw the capture and<br />
sacking <strong>of</strong> Constantinople by<br />
Christian crusaders manipulated<br />
by a vengeful Venetian Doge,<br />
Enrico Dandolo! <strong>The</strong>se defeats were<br />
inflicted by two military forces that<br />
had both cast envious eyes on the<br />
bustling and wealthy metropolis <strong>of</strong><br />
Constantinople and its strategically<br />
valuable trading concessions<br />
throughout the Mediterranean<br />
Sea as well as the Balkans and<br />
Asia Minor. For the Ottomans,<br />
Constantinople had become an<br />
emblem <strong>of</strong> their previous military<br />
failures. Yet, due to a prophecy<br />
from the Prophet Mohammed, it<br />
was a symbol <strong>of</strong> future ambitions<br />
(the ‘Golden Apple’) to whichever<br />
ruler could capture it and above<br />
all, the best place for commerce<br />
and communication between<br />
its twin imperial spheres. For<br />
the Crusaders, Constantinople<br />
epitomised Greek duplicity and<br />
venality, which in the eyes <strong>of</strong> many<br />
in the West, had hindered rather<br />
than helped the crusading wars<br />
against the Infidel. Prejudice and<br />
greed were as strong motivating<br />
forces then as they are now.<br />
Despite a brief Byzantine<br />
resurgence <strong>of</strong> good fortune through<br />
the recapture <strong>of</strong> Constantinople<br />
in 1261, the city remained badly<br />
damaged by the effects <strong>of</strong> previous<br />
conquest and the brutal interim<br />
Latin governorship. Over the next<br />
two centuries, further catastrophes<br />
would follow with earthquakes,<br />
fires and yet more in-fighting. But<br />
the people suffered most from the<br />
disastrous Black Death epidemics<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1346-9 that also ravaged the rest<br />
<strong>of</strong> Europe; over half the population<br />
died and with them went many <strong>of</strong><br />
the key trading concessions that<br />
had been so vital to Byzantine<br />
liquidity. By 1453, the city was<br />
exhausted, poor and in considerable<br />
disrepair. <strong>The</strong> great walls built in<br />
the 5th century by the Emperor<br />
<strong>The</strong>odosius were unsound in a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> places although they had<br />
been repaired by former Emperor<br />
Sultan Mehmet II<br />
John VIII. <strong>The</strong> empire had long<br />
since abandoned retaining a large<br />
fleet or army to defend itself and<br />
relied upon mercenaries. Even<br />
the great chain, which had to be<br />
dragged across the Golden Horn<br />
(a side tributary to the Bosporus<br />
itself) to protect one side <strong>of</strong> the<br />
city’s unusual triangular shape,<br />
had been lost. Fortunately for<br />
the exceptionally superstitious<br />
inhabitants, it was rediscovered<br />
in time. <strong>The</strong> city also lacked<br />
influential and powerful friends.<br />
Constantine XI, the new and<br />
determined emperor, appealed to<br />
the West but mostly in vain. Even<br />
overtures <strong>of</strong> spiritual union between<br />
the Orthodox and Catholic<br />
Churches failed to induce a large<br />
military flotilla <strong>of</strong> Catholics to sail<br />
to Constantinople’s aid. While<br />
some significant contributions <strong>of</strong><br />
military support did come from<br />
21<br />
22
North Italian city states, these<br />
were pitifully small compared to<br />
the hefty alliance <strong>of</strong> European and<br />
Middle Eastern mostly Muslim<br />
forces facing Constantinople. <strong>The</strong><br />
City could count on but a few<br />
thousand committed followers and<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional troops to defend it<br />
against the tens <strong>of</strong> thousands that<br />
would be hurled against it. So thin<br />
were their numbers that they could<br />
not even defend all the stretches <strong>of</strong><br />
the 20km walls. Constantinople<br />
was more than weak: it was<br />
vulnerable.<br />
Muslim rulers had tried in the<br />
past to seize Constantinople. All<br />
had failed. Even in 1453, with so<br />
favourable a set <strong>of</strong> circumstances,<br />
many influential Ottoman<br />
leaders still doubted that the city<br />
could be captured. Much would<br />
depend upon the leadership <strong>of</strong><br />
the Ottoman war machine. Its<br />
new Sultan, Mehmet II, had been<br />
reigning for only two years, but<br />
even in that short time this twenty<br />
one year old dour and despotic<br />
ruler had displayed a high level <strong>of</strong><br />
military ability. <strong>The</strong> sea and land<br />
routes were systematically cut and<br />
new fortifications, like the castle <strong>of</strong><br />
Rumeli Hisari, were constructed<br />
to encircle Constantinople. All<br />
dependencies <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman<br />
leader were ordered to provide<br />
troops, equipment and supplies.<br />
But capturing the city would be<br />
no easy task despite its weakened<br />
defences. Its sea wall was hard<br />
to access but more importantly,<br />
its hefty land walls had proved<br />
superior to all attacking forces for<br />
over a thousand years. Something<br />
new was needed. For Mehmet to<br />
imitate Joshua and bring down the<br />
walls <strong>of</strong> this Jericho, he would need<br />
the fifteenth century equivalent<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Old Testament’s trumpet<br />
and the Ark. Mehmet found<br />
it, or rather who; a Hungarian<br />
engineer called Orban showed him<br />
the way. One wonders whether<br />
Constantinople’s refusal to employ<br />
Orban had anything to do with<br />
his <strong>of</strong>fer to provide his services to<br />
Mehmet. This costly mistake would<br />
lead to the construction <strong>of</strong> wonder<br />
weapons, huge cannons, some as<br />
long as 27 feet capable <strong>of</strong> firing a<br />
1200 lb (544 kg) cannon ball up<br />
to a mile! <strong>The</strong>se weapons could<br />
and indeed did bring down the<br />
great walls in as little as two weeks.<br />
Constantinople’s Muslim enemies<br />
had never been stronger. More<br />
importantly, they had never been<br />
so well led.<br />
<strong>The</strong> fifty-three day siege was<br />
punctuated with numerous, bitterly<br />
contested battles on sea and land<br />
(see map.) Mehmet’s naval forces<br />
could not sweep away the small<br />
Byzantine defensive fleet and nor<br />
could it breach the sea wall. On the<br />
other side <strong>of</strong> the city it similarly<br />
failed to break through the great<br />
Chain blocking access to the<br />
Golden Horn. So, extraordinarily,<br />
Mehmet ordered his ships to be<br />
transported across land over many<br />
miles to enable an attack on the<br />
wall from the North. Meanwhile,<br />
his artillerymen blasted sections<br />
along the land wall only for the<br />
gaps to be filled in with earth<br />
by desperate defenders who also<br />
supported the rear section <strong>of</strong> the<br />
outer walls with more earthen<br />
ramparts. Cannons could blast<br />
stone walls but not earthen<br />
mounds. Mehmet even turned to<br />
the ancient craft <strong>of</strong> tunnelling and<br />
employed Serbians under Zaganos<br />
Pasha to burrow beneath the outer<br />
walls with the aim <strong>of</strong> firing them<br />
and bringing down a large enough<br />
section to make a practical breach.<br />
Map <strong>of</strong> Constantinople<br />
However, the Greeks, probably<br />
led by a Scotsman John Grant,<br />
counter-tunnelled beneath each<br />
<strong>of</strong> these Ottoman works and in<br />
these darkened confines beneath<br />
the <strong>The</strong>odosian walls, vicious<br />
hand-to-hand fighting ensued.<br />
This claustrophobic, subterranean<br />
mining world <strong>of</strong> dirt and sweat<br />
would suddenly erupt with battle<br />
and occasionally by the terrifying<br />
use <strong>of</strong> Greek fire. As the weeks<br />
passed, no progress was made here<br />
either and so no easy routes under<br />
or round the walls could be found.<br />
<strong>The</strong> attackers would have to go over<br />
them and at great cost.<br />
Both sides had expected this with<br />
the bulk <strong>of</strong> their forces deployed<br />
along the northern land walls<br />
and especially along a vulnerable<br />
section called the Mesoteichion.<br />
Giovanni Giustiniani and his<br />
700 well-armed and experienced<br />
Genoese volunteers formed the<br />
core <strong>of</strong> the Byzantine defence<br />
and were sent to this sector where<br />
Mehmet’s forces concentrated their<br />
attack. It was just as well for this<br />
Genoese commander was an expert<br />
in modern siege warfare and had<br />
to use every ounce <strong>of</strong> his military<br />
ingenuity to counter the Ottomans’<br />
greater numbers. More significantly<br />
though, the arrival <strong>of</strong> these<br />
volunteers gave hope to the Greeks<br />
that Christendom would not<br />
abandon them, and if the defenders<br />
could resist for a few weeks longer<br />
further reinforcements would surely<br />
arrive or some disaster might befall<br />
their enemies. While the first hope<br />
was quite optimistic, although a<br />
Venetian fleet did set sail in April,<br />
albeit too late, the latter was closer<br />
than they realised. Dissension in<br />
the Muslim high command grew<br />
with each unsuccessful assault<br />
and undermined their faith in<br />
Mehmet’s leadership. By continuing<br />
his assault on Constantinople, he<br />
was risking more than just his own<br />
soldiers’ lives. Failure could have<br />
been fatal for him too.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first assault on the Northern<br />
walls was launched at midnight<br />
on May 28th by poorly-equipped,<br />
mostly Christian auxiliary<br />
troops from Ottoman-controlled<br />
Europe. <strong>The</strong>ir assault was not well<br />
conducted and in the crucial area<br />
<strong>of</strong> the breach, their greater numbers<br />
hindered rather than helped<br />
their attack. As their casualties<br />
mounted and their forward troops<br />
failed to break through the main<br />
outer wall, Greek hopes rose and<br />
Muslim spirits sank in to the moat.<br />
<strong>The</strong> second Ottoman assault was<br />
<strong>The</strong>odosian Walls <strong>of</strong> Constantinople<br />
initiated by Turkish Anatolians.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y were better quality troops<br />
and thoroughly committed to<br />
defeating their Infidel opponents.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y succeeded in forcing a breach<br />
through the walls but once inside<br />
the outer wall their forward troops<br />
were surrounded due to inner<br />
defences cleverly constructed and<br />
manned by Giustiniani and his<br />
skilful Genoese. <strong>The</strong> Anatolians<br />
could not advance any further<br />
due to further stubborn Greek<br />
resistance. Once again, sheer<br />
weight <strong>of</strong> numbers had failed<br />
to help the attackers. Despite<br />
prolonged fighting and very heavy<br />
casualties, Ottoman hopes <strong>of</strong> a<br />
victory were fading fast. Mehmet<br />
came under pressure to withdraw.<br />
His naval forces could not defeat<br />
the fewer but well-armed ships <strong>of</strong><br />
the defenders who lurked close<br />
enough to their own walls to receive<br />
sufficient supporting fire to drive<br />
away the Ottoman vessels. <strong>The</strong><br />
miners had failed to open up a new<br />
route for attack. <strong>The</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Ottoman assaulting force had failed<br />
to take the <strong>The</strong>odosian walls. At<br />
this point, not only was Mehmet<br />
not winning, he was running out<br />
<strong>of</strong> options fast.<br />
23<br />
24
What he needed was an elite<br />
force to batter its way up the<br />
bloodied slopes <strong>of</strong> the mound and<br />
carry the day. To achieve that he<br />
desperately needed some luck.<br />
He got both. <strong>The</strong> third and final<br />
assault was led by the Janissaries,<br />
his elite household troops. <strong>The</strong><br />
good fortune came in two phases.<br />
Firstly, a doorway through the<br />
Kerkoporta gate appears to have<br />
been left open or perhaps opened<br />
from the inside During the thickest<br />
fighting, Ottoman flags were seen<br />
on its tower and nearby defenders,<br />
fearing being encircled and cut <strong>of</strong>f<br />
from the city, withdrew in panic.<br />
Simultaneously, the heroic defender<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Mesoteichion, Giustiniani,<br />
was badly wounded and his<br />
Genoese forces pulled back to<br />
withdraw him and themselves from<br />
the fighting. <strong>The</strong> pressure from the<br />
front <strong>of</strong> the Janissaries eased and<br />
sensing an opportunity redoubled<br />
their efforts and swarmed over the<br />
defences. This was the moment that<br />
Constantinople fell. It was also a<br />
moment <strong>of</strong> great tragedy when the<br />
Byzantine Emperor, Constantine<br />
XI, seeing the flight <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> his<br />
forces rallied some and personally<br />
led a charge at the attacking<br />
Janissaries. It failed and he was<br />
never seen again.<br />
What followed was as bad as could<br />
be imagined. Bloodthirsty Ottoman<br />
forces burst in to the ancient city<br />
and looted, pillaged, burned, raped<br />
and murdered their way through<br />
it. From across the Golden Horn<br />
in the neutral township <strong>of</strong> Galata,<br />
witnesses saw, heard and recorded in<br />
vivid and terrifying detail the sights<br />
<strong>of</strong> butchery and the screams <strong>of</strong><br />
agony from the terrified inhabitants<br />
<strong>of</strong> Constantinople. Quickly, many<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> the city caught fire and this<br />
consumed large parts <strong>of</strong> it. Fleeing<br />
citizens took to the few remaining<br />
boats, some <strong>of</strong> which capsized,<br />
while others in vain tried to swim.<br />
Approximately ten thousand<br />
inhabitants <strong>of</strong> this former bastion <strong>of</strong><br />
Christendom perished in the next<br />
few hours. For the rest, ignominy<br />
lay ahead as they were enslaved<br />
and taken away from their beloved<br />
city to be sold and shipped across<br />
the Mediterranean, their fates in<br />
the hands <strong>of</strong> their new masters.<br />
Some Greeks did reach safety and<br />
took with them the tales <strong>of</strong> the last<br />
few days and hours <strong>of</strong> the once<br />
mighty city. Significantly, it has<br />
been claimed that through their<br />
exodus, the fall <strong>of</strong> the Byzantine<br />
Empire contributed to the start <strong>of</strong><br />
the Renaissance as ancient learning<br />
from the East was combined with<br />
a vibrant spirit <strong>of</strong> enquiry now<br />
emerging in Central Europe.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re may be some truth to this.<br />
Nonetheless, it was also a vital stage<br />
in the Ottoman conquest <strong>of</strong> Southeastern<br />
Europe.<br />
So why did Constantinople fall<br />
Why was the Ottoman besieging<br />
army successful when so many other<br />
enemies <strong>of</strong> Byzantium had failed in<br />
the past It would be misleading to<br />
blame the defenders or even their<br />
allies, although both contributed to<br />
Constantinople’s fate. Ultimately,<br />
Fall <strong>of</strong> Constantinople<br />
battles need to be won even if<br />
the other side can lose them. <strong>The</strong><br />
Prophet Mohammed allegedly said<br />
“Constantinople will be conquered<br />
by a blessed man and a blessed<br />
army.” Blessed they may have been,<br />
but lucky the Ottomans certainly<br />
were, eventually.<br />
Arguably Mehmet deserved his good<br />
fortune. For such a young ruler, he<br />
was imaginative, tactically astute and<br />
above all, determined when older<br />
and wiser ‘supporters’ counselled<br />
withdrawal. Constantinople fell then<br />
largely due to his leadership and<br />
this event signalled yet another<br />
shift in the balance <strong>of</strong> power in<br />
the Middle East.<br />
Matthew Jennings is Head <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>History</strong> at <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong>.<br />
Educated at Manchester Grammar<br />
School and University <strong>College</strong><br />
London where he received a Law<br />
Degree. In 1995, he was awarded<br />
a Masters in War Studies at<br />
Kings <strong>College</strong>, London. Since<br />
then he has been a member <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>International</strong> Institute <strong>of</strong><br />
Strategic Studies.<br />
Further Reading<br />
• Crowley R, Constantinople: <strong>The</strong> Last Great Siege, 1453, Faber & Faber 2006<br />
• Eaglestone C. R, <strong>The</strong> Siege <strong>of</strong> Constantinople, 1453: An Historical Romance (1878), Kessinger Publishing 2009<br />
• Turnbull S, <strong>The</strong> Walls <strong>of</strong> Constantinople AD 324-1453, Osprey Publishing 2004<br />
Britain’s First Three<br />
Afghan Wars<br />
<strong>The</strong> world headlines <strong>of</strong> 2012 are regularly<br />
dominated by a swathe <strong>of</strong> countries between<br />
North Africa and the Indian Sub-Continent. In a<br />
Headmaster’s Lecture in 2010 I summarised how<br />
deep and <strong>of</strong>ten decisive has been the British<br />
involvement during the 19th and 20th Century<br />
histories in many <strong>of</strong> these nations – Egypt,<br />
Palestine, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Iran, the nations <strong>of</strong><br />
the Gulf, Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the conflict in Iraq, it is what is happening<br />
in Afghanistan, which is most central to British<br />
foreign and defence policy in 2012. <strong>The</strong> ‘war’<br />
in Afghanistan is not solely a British operation.<br />
British forces are engaged there as part <strong>of</strong> a<br />
multi-national operation coordinated by NATO.<br />
Nonetheless this is, in effect, the British Army’s<br />
Fourth Afghan War, and the RAF’s second. But<br />
what were the main features <strong>of</strong> the First, Second<br />
and Third Afghan Wars When and why were<br />
they fought and how did they turn out<br />
Afghanistan is not a natural geographical<br />
entity; more a rugged tangle <strong>of</strong> mountains and<br />
deserts which has acted over the centuries as<br />
a crossroads between India, Persia (now Iran),<br />
and Central Asia. Many historical figures have<br />
travelled this ‘highway <strong>of</strong> conquest’, usually<br />
in the direction <strong>of</strong> the riches <strong>of</strong> India; Darius,<br />
Alexander, the Mongols, and Tamberlane among<br />
them. Britain is merely the most recent foreign<br />
power from the 17th century to be drawn to<br />
those riches. <strong>The</strong> difference though is that British<br />
traders and then governments came by sea,<br />
and became involved in Afghanistan not as a<br />
transit route on to further glory, but as a line <strong>of</strong><br />
defence. In other words, Britain chose to fight in<br />
Afghanistan to avoid a war in its Indian colonies.<br />
Mr R. Alston CMG, QSO, DL<br />
<strong>The</strong> First Afghan War took place before the<br />
Punjab and the North West Frontier were part <strong>of</strong><br />
British India. It was a muddled and misconceived<br />
response to what was seen as a Russian threat to<br />
Britain’s role in India. It took the form <strong>of</strong> a military<br />
operation designed to restore to the Afghan<br />
throne a ruler seen as less pro-Russian than<br />
the current incumbent. In 1839 a British army<br />
marched from India via Quetta and Kandahar to<br />
Kabul under a very sickly Lord Elphinstone. <strong>The</strong><br />
restoration was straightforwardly achieved, and<br />
the army thinned out. Within a year both the ruler<br />
and the British <strong>of</strong>ficials who kept him in power<br />
were deeply unpopular with the Pathan tribes<br />
<strong>of</strong> which the population <strong>of</strong> eastern Afghanistan<br />
is made up. By 1840 the Government <strong>of</strong> British<br />
India should either have withdrawn or reinforced<br />
it, but did neither.<br />
<strong>The</strong> result was one <strong>of</strong> the most infamous<br />
bloodbaths <strong>of</strong> British military history. Supporters<br />
<strong>of</strong> both Afghan claimants and the other tribes<br />
united. First the key British political <strong>of</strong>ficers were<br />
murdered, one by a mob the other by being lured<br />
to his death. <strong>The</strong>n, when the British and Indian<br />
army (around 700 <strong>of</strong> the former and 3700 <strong>of</strong><br />
the latter), with its families and camp-followers<br />
(numbering at least 10,000), started to withdraw<br />
by agreement and at 6000 feet in January 1841,<br />
they were repeatedly ambushed and slaughtered<br />
by tribesmen under no political control. Famously<br />
just one man supposedly made it to Jalalabad,<br />
half way between Kabul and the Khyber Pass. In<br />
fact, several hundred soldiers and families, mainly<br />
British, survived, most <strong>of</strong> whom were captured<br />
and later released. Nevertheless, another army<br />
was despatched on a mission <strong>of</strong> revenge and<br />
repression late in 1841, but the humiliation was<br />
25 26
First Afghanistan War - last stand <strong>of</strong> the survivors<br />
<strong>of</strong> the 44th Foot at Gandamak<br />
total. British and Indian losses over the whole<br />
campaign were well over 10,000. Consequently,<br />
no Imperial Government for nearly 40 more years<br />
would dare venture on a ‘forward policy’ <strong>of</strong> direct<br />
military involvement in Afghanistan again.<br />
From the late 1860s fears <strong>of</strong> growing Russian<br />
influence in Afghanistan once again surfaced in<br />
India. This eventually lured the British authorities<br />
in India to get involved in Afghanistan’s internal<br />
affairs. Russia had been extending her hold over<br />
much <strong>of</strong> Central Asia, and in 1878 Britain had<br />
taken the Turkish side when Russia attacked<br />
her. Reports reached India <strong>of</strong> a Russian mission<br />
to the Afghan ruler and a British mission was<br />
despatched to counter its influence. (In fact it<br />
never arrived). <strong>The</strong> British mission was turned<br />
back on the orders <strong>of</strong> the Afghan ruler and the<br />
British response was to despatch two armies<br />
across the Afghan border. Under this pressure<br />
the ruler agreed to the British mission under<br />
Louis Cavagnari travelling to Kabul. Within<br />
months the events <strong>of</strong> 1840-41 seemed to be<br />
repeating themselves when Cavagnari and his<br />
staff and escort were murdered in July 1879 by<br />
disaffected Afghan soldiers.<br />
This led to the despatch <strong>of</strong> an army to Kabul<br />
under General Frederick Roberts (later Lord<br />
Roberts <strong>of</strong> Kandahar). Roberts practised what<br />
many call a reign <strong>of</strong> terror. In the absence <strong>of</strong><br />
an effective Afghan partner through whom to<br />
rule, tribal resentment rose dangerously. A new<br />
Government in London replaced the Viceroy in<br />
India, who was seen as responsible for getting<br />
into a dangerous and unacceptable situation.<br />
Before final withdrawal could be engineered<br />
however another famous episode in British<br />
military annals took place.<br />
In response to Roberts’ activities an Afghan army<br />
from Herat in western Afghanistan marched<br />
on Kandahar where a second British army was<br />
located. As it marched through Helmand towards<br />
Kandahar it clashed with the British force under<br />
General Burrows at Maiwand in July 1880. It<br />
was one <strong>of</strong> the few occasions where an Afghan<br />
army bettered a British one on the battlefield.<br />
When Burrows force retreated to Kandahar it had<br />
lost half <strong>of</strong> its 2500 men. <strong>The</strong> British response<br />
was the famous march <strong>of</strong> Roberts, with a force<br />
<strong>of</strong> 10,000 men, over 300 miles from Kabul to<br />
Kandahar in 22 days in mid-summer. Shortly<br />
afterwards the pr<strong>of</strong>itless war was abandoned<br />
with the evacuation <strong>of</strong> both Kabul and Kandahar.<br />
It had cost 3000 British and Indian casualties.<br />
As with the first Afghan War, the outcome was<br />
a reduced not enhanced British position, a<br />
weakening <strong>of</strong> central government to the benefit<br />
<strong>of</strong> the influence <strong>of</strong> the tribes, the slowing down<br />
<strong>of</strong> development, and increased xenophobia and<br />
religious fanaticism.<br />
First Afghan War - sole escapee <strong>of</strong> the retreat from Kabul<br />
What lessons were to be drawn from these wars<br />
(and indeed from the experience <strong>of</strong> the Soviet<br />
Union 100 years later) Embroil yourselves<br />
at your peril unless you are prepared both<br />
to commit overwhelming force and be ready<br />
for the long haul and heavy casualties which<br />
will follow. Afghanistan was and is a fractious<br />
and ethnically divided land. Afghans are brave<br />
and resourceful guerrilla fighters and adept at<br />
exploiting the foreigner to serve their own ends.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y are deeply conservative, stubborn in their<br />
Islamic adherence, and even more resentful<br />
<strong>of</strong> being coerced by foreigners than by fellow<br />
Afghans. <strong>The</strong> risk is high that foreign decision<br />
makers will find themselves sooner or later faced<br />
with uncomfortable decisions as to how to<br />
disengage while retaining some pride and sense<br />
<strong>of</strong> achievement.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Third Afghan war in 1919 was on a smaller<br />
scale and, unlike the others, fought not in the<br />
heartlands <strong>of</strong> the country but along the border<br />
with British India. <strong>The</strong> deal struck in 1880 was<br />
that British India would have no diplomatic or<br />
political presence in Afghanistan, but that the<br />
Afghan ruler would leave foreign relations in<br />
British hands and deal with no one else. By 1919<br />
this situation was widely and deeply resented<br />
in Afghanistan. A new ruler saw a chance to<br />
exploit British and Indian exhaustion at the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> World War One, and widespread discontent<br />
among Indian Muslims, to assert ‘independence’<br />
and test the potential for bringing north-western<br />
India under Afghan influence. <strong>The</strong> British<br />
authorities saw the need to react at once to<br />
Afghan mobilisation on the border, declared war,<br />
and sent small British forces into Afghan territory.<br />
Fighting was brisk and quite bloody but British<br />
units, the losses <strong>of</strong> the war notwithstanding, were<br />
too well organised for the Afghans. Raids by the<br />
RAF on Jalalabad and, on one occasion, Kabul,<br />
also had a strong effect. <strong>The</strong> ruler soon put out<br />
peace feelers, and, though he gained no territory<br />
was rewarded by British Indian acceptance <strong>of</strong> his<br />
Second Afghan War – 1879, Battle <strong>of</strong> Chardeh Valley<br />
right in future to conduct the foreign policy <strong>of</strong> his<br />
country himself.<br />
Taliban Fighters<br />
I served as a young diplomat in Kabul in the early<br />
1960s. At that time, 15 years after the granting<br />
<strong>of</strong> independence to India and Pakistan in 1947,<br />
the prediction that 50 years later there would<br />
again be 10,000 British troops in Afghanistan<br />
would have been laughable. <strong>The</strong> reasons they are<br />
there are, <strong>of</strong> course, very different from those <strong>of</strong><br />
1840, 1880 or 1920. We actively want a resilient<br />
Afghan state capable <strong>of</strong> looking after itself and<br />
capable <strong>of</strong> ensuring that its territory does not<br />
harbour or support extremist and terrorist groups.<br />
In the global village <strong>of</strong> today it is the potential<br />
direct effect on security here in Britain, rather<br />
than the defence <strong>of</strong> a crucial component <strong>of</strong> the<br />
British Empire, which is at the root <strong>of</strong> a policy<br />
supported by both Labour and Conservative led<br />
Governments. However different the reasons our<br />
forces are there, there is nonetheless a haunting<br />
sense that some <strong>of</strong> those lessons <strong>of</strong> earlier wars<br />
will prove distressingly relevant still.<br />
Robert Alston, CMG, QSO, DL is a<br />
distinguished, retired British diplomat<br />
and was formerly Chairman <strong>of</strong> Governors<br />
at <strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong>. He was educated<br />
at <strong>Ardingly</strong> and New <strong>College</strong>, Oxford.<br />
He served as British Ambassador to<br />
Oman (1986-1990) and as British High<br />
Commissioner to New Zealand<br />
and elsewhere.<br />
27 28
<strong>The</strong> Arab Revolt<br />
& T. E. Lawrence<br />
<strong>The</strong> Arab revolt started during the First World War,<br />
on the 5th June 1916 in Hejaz (in modern day, Saudi<br />
Arabia.). This happened because the Arab peoples<br />
had become increasingly resentful <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman-<br />
German alliance which had extended its grip on<br />
power across the Middle East. In Damascus, Syria<br />
and Beirut, Lebanon many Arab nationalist figures<br />
were arrested then tortured. <strong>The</strong>y and many other<br />
Arabs wanted this to stop and so they rose up in revolt<br />
against their Turkish rulers. Mark Sykes designed the<br />
flag <strong>of</strong> the resistance to create a feeling <strong>of</strong> Arab-ness in<br />
order to fuel the revolt.<br />
Because <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman Empire’s repression <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Arabs, Grand Sharif Hussein, the guardian <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Holy City <strong>of</strong> Mecca, formed an<br />
alliance with Great Britain and<br />
France. This alliance was facilitated<br />
by the services <strong>of</strong> a mysterious<br />
young Arab <strong>of</strong>ficer in the Ottoman<br />
army named Muhammed Sharif<br />
al-Faruqi. Grand Sharif Hussein had<br />
about 50,000 men but fewer than<br />
10,000 had rifles. He was too weak<br />
to take on the full might <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Ottoman forces alone. Nevertheless,<br />
evidence that the Ottoman<br />
government were going to kill Hussein at the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> the war led him to correspond with the British<br />
High Commissioner, Henry McMahon. <strong>The</strong> latter<br />
convinced Grand Sharif Hussein that his assistance<br />
to the Triple Entente would be assisted by the Allies<br />
and eventually rewarded by a new Arab Empire. This<br />
would span the entire territory between Egypt and<br />
Persia with imperial possessions such as Kuwait, Aden,<br />
and the Syrian coast. This was an enticing promise but<br />
also one that would not be kept.<br />
Gustav Fithen<br />
T.E. Lawrence<br />
On the June 5th, 1916, the conflict started when two<br />
<strong>of</strong> Husseins’ sons, Ali and Faisal, attacked an Ottoman<br />
garrison in Medina but were fiercely beaten by the<br />
Turkish troops stationed there. <strong>The</strong> revolt properly<br />
got started on the June 10th when Hussein ordered<br />
his supporters to attack the Ottomans in Mecca.<br />
Egyptian troops were sent by the British to help with<br />
the bloody conflict by providing artillery support. On<br />
July 9th they finally took the Holy City <strong>of</strong> Mecca.<br />
Early in the war French and British naval forces had<br />
cleared the Red Sea <strong>of</strong> Ottoman warships. Now that<br />
the Arab revolt had finally been proclaimed in the<br />
North, the focus <strong>of</strong> operations shifted southwards<br />
to the further extremities <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman Empire,<br />
the ports on the southern Saudi<br />
peninsula and modern day Yemen.<br />
<strong>The</strong> port <strong>of</strong> Jidda was successfully<br />
attacked by 3500 Arabs on June<br />
10th with more help from British<br />
artillery and aeroplanes. This Arab<br />
victory demonstrated to the British<br />
the value <strong>of</strong> their new erstwhile<br />
allies. Furthermore, the capture <strong>of</strong><br />
these Red Sea ports meant that the<br />
British could now help in other<br />
ways too such as by sending over<br />
a force <strong>of</strong> 700 Arab soldiers (and former Ottoman<br />
POWs.) Indeed, Britain sent out a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
to help their new allies in the conflict in Hejaz,<br />
including a young <strong>of</strong>ficer named Thomas Edward<br />
Lawrence. He was born in 1888 in a small welsh<br />
village called Tremadog in Caenarvonshire. Lawrence<br />
was extremely bright; he could read at the age <strong>of</strong> four<br />
and read Latin at the age <strong>of</strong> six. Later, Lawrence won<br />
a scholarship to Oxford University to read history.<br />
When World War One was declared Lawrence tried<br />
to join the army but at under the 5’5” height limit,<br />
he was classified as too small. Eventually Lawrence<br />
got into the army because he could read Arabic so<br />
he joined the Arab desk at General Headquarters.<br />
Indeed, when war had broken out, Lawrence had<br />
been charting Crusader and Byzantine fortifications<br />
across the Middle East under his own steam and at his<br />
own expense. This was no ordinary young man and<br />
his extraordinary resourcefulness and empathy with<br />
Arab peoples quickly drew the eye <strong>of</strong> his superiors in<br />
Military Intelligence.<br />
Meanwhile, the Ottomans still held important<br />
strategic centres like Medina. Lawrence helped Amir<br />
Feisal attack the only railway line Between Medina<br />
and Damascus. This meant the Ottomans could<br />
not get equipment to these and other important<br />
destinations where the fighting was taking place.<br />
Lawrence was a tough fighter; with only 3000 men<br />
Lawrence and his Arabs took on 50,000 Ottomans<br />
in a successful guerilla campaign over several months.<br />
Later on July 6th 1917, Lawrence and the Arab force<br />
defeated a whole Ottoman battalion in a frontal<br />
assault when they captured Aqaba, a key port.<br />
More and more Arabs joined the revolt because <strong>of</strong><br />
Lawrence’s success. <strong>The</strong> Arabs loved Lawrence because<br />
he respected them and their culture. He spoke their<br />
language, dressed in the same style <strong>of</strong> clothes they<br />
did, lived in the same conditions and ate their food.<br />
A sheikh who fought with Lawrence said: “Of all the<br />
men I have ever met, Al Auruns (Lawrence) was the<br />
greatest prince”.<br />
In September 1918, Lawrence and Feisal took control<br />
<strong>of</strong> the area around Medina from the Ottomans.<br />
Allied assistance increased and the fighting stopped.<br />
At the end <strong>of</strong> the war, the Anglo-Egyptian force led<br />
by British general, Allenby, had seized Palestine,<br />
Transjordan, Lebanon, large parts <strong>of</strong> the Arabian<br />
Peninsula and southern Syria. Though Medina, cut <strong>of</strong>f<br />
from the Ottoman Empire, would not surrender until<br />
January 1919.<br />
<strong>The</strong> British and French forces took advantage <strong>of</strong> the<br />
deteriorating situation for the Ottomans and took<br />
control <strong>of</strong> the land the Arabs had just captured. <strong>The</strong><br />
French and British broke their promise that the Arabs<br />
should have a huge empire. Instead, as a result <strong>of</strong> an<br />
agreement reached in Paris and sealed at the Treaty<br />
<strong>of</strong> Versailles in June 1919, the British and French<br />
divided the land between themselves and called them<br />
Mandates or Protectorates.<br />
Lawrence was disgusted that the allies had broken<br />
their promises to the Arabs; he quit the army and<br />
hid from his fame. He joined the Royal Air Force<br />
under the false name <strong>of</strong> J.M.Ross but the newspapers<br />
found him. Lawrence left the R.A.F and joined the<br />
Tank corps under the name <strong>of</strong> Edward Thomas Shaw.<br />
Lawrence then rejoined the R.A.F in 1925 and finally<br />
left in 1935. Lawrence was killed in a motorbike<br />
accident trying to avoid two boys; he was traveling<br />
at 90mph on a tuned Brough Superior 1000cc.<br />
Nonetheless, Lawrence’s legacy can still be seen today<br />
in place names across the Middle East and the British<br />
lasting fascination with this iconic and enigmatic<br />
leader. However, amongst the Arabs, the outcome <strong>of</strong><br />
their revolt has left a different legacy that remains like<br />
an unhealed wound. <strong>The</strong> British and French failure<br />
to honor their promise to the Arabs has remained a<br />
serious obstacle to trust thereafter.<br />
So what is the significance <strong>of</strong> the Arab Revolt to the<br />
Arabs themselves Here is the view from King Hussein<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jordan:<br />
“Much <strong>of</strong> the trauma and dislocation suffered<br />
by the peoples <strong>of</strong> the Middle East during<br />
the 20th century can be traced to the events<br />
surrounding World War I. During the conflict,<br />
the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central<br />
Powers against the Allies. Seeing an opportunity<br />
to liberate Arab lands from Turkish oppression,<br />
and trusting the honor <strong>of</strong> British <strong>of</strong>ficials who<br />
promised their support for a unified kingdom<br />
for the Arab lands, Sharif Hussein bin Ali,<br />
Emir <strong>of</strong> Mecca and King <strong>of</strong> the Arabs (and<br />
great grandfather <strong>of</strong> King Hussein), launched<br />
the Great Arab Revolt. After the conclusion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the war, however, the victors reneged on<br />
their promises to the Arabs, carving from the<br />
dismembered Ottoman lands a patchwork<br />
system <strong>of</strong> mandates and protectorates. While the<br />
colonial powers denied the Arabs their promised<br />
single unified Arab state, it is nevertheless<br />
testimony to the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the Great<br />
Arab Revolt that the Hashemite family was<br />
able to secure Arab rule over Transjordan, Iraq<br />
and Arabia. ...”<br />
29 30
<strong>The</strong> Ceasefire<br />
We had stopped some twenty<br />
miles north <strong>of</strong> Kuwait City,<br />
astride the highway leading<br />
to Basra. Black smoke from<br />
the oil wells hung over us; the<br />
scene was one <strong>of</strong> darkness and<br />
foreboding. Vehicles, bodies<br />
and other military wreckage lay<br />
strewn around in every direction.<br />
This dampened our euphoria,<br />
as did the uncertainty <strong>of</strong> a<br />
temporary cease-fire and a lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> sleep.<br />
Orders then arrived for our<br />
engineers to clear a route<br />
through the Muttla Pass, only<br />
a few miles south <strong>of</strong> our new<br />
position, and for the rest <strong>of</strong> us<br />
to help bury the Iraqi dead. It<br />
was far from the ideal note to<br />
finish on. But we had been<br />
warned <strong>of</strong> the carnage caused<br />
when the American air force<br />
Burning Kuwaiti oil wells and<br />
a destroyed Iraqi tank<br />
Iraqi causualties<br />
and the 2nd US Marine Division<br />
had caught the retreating Iraqi<br />
army leaving Kuwait City on<br />
the road to Basra. <strong>The</strong>re were<br />
not thousands <strong>of</strong> bodies, as the<br />
Reflections<br />
on the First<br />
Gulf War<br />
Major-General P. Cordingley<br />
<strong>The</strong> Desert Rats, the UK’s 7th Armoured<br />
Brigade, during the First Gulf War were initially<br />
part <strong>of</strong> the 1st US Marine Corps. Later they<br />
were moved to join the VII US Corps, the<br />
largest and most powerful corps in history. In<br />
February 1991 the British tanks led the attack<br />
into Iraq from Saudi Arabia. <strong>The</strong>ir Commander<br />
now reflects on the aftermath <strong>of</strong> four hectic<br />
days and nights <strong>of</strong> fighting.<br />
media had claimed, but certainly<br />
hundreds; it was a reminder to<br />
us all <strong>of</strong> the horror <strong>of</strong> war.<br />
Initial Problems<br />
Small problems surfaced almost<br />
immediately the next morning<br />
to catch us by surprise. Having<br />
spent months preparing the<br />
soldiers for the most unpleasant<br />
<strong>of</strong> wars, preparing them to cope<br />
with violence and death, we<br />
had not thought through the<br />
immediate effects <strong>of</strong> the ceasefire.<br />
Some were clearly still<br />
spoiling for a fight, some were<br />
disturbed by what they had<br />
seen or done, some felt cheated<br />
that they had not met the<br />
enemy; fortunately the majority<br />
were just relieved to be alive<br />
and delighted by the result. But,<br />
whatever, it was clearly going<br />
to be a time when we needed<br />
the comfort <strong>of</strong> each other’s<br />
company – I as much<br />
as anybody else.<br />
<strong>The</strong>n there was the problem <strong>of</strong><br />
loot. <strong>The</strong> understandable desire<br />
to return from the war with a<br />
souvenir was an overwhelming<br />
one and, as we could have<br />
predicted, the soldiers were<br />
as imaginative as ever in<br />
what they hoped to smuggle<br />
home. Putting aside the legal<br />
requirements, the danger <strong>of</strong><br />
collecting the spoils <strong>of</strong> war was<br />
immense. <strong>The</strong> area was strewn<br />
with unexploded mines and<br />
bomblets, and the deserted<br />
bunkers and even some dead<br />
bodies were booby-trapped.<br />
<strong>The</strong> control measures we<br />
applied were not popular but<br />
very necessary.<br />
Correct Decisions<br />
It was then time to sleep and,<br />
if that was not possible, think.<br />
Irrespective <strong>of</strong> the disaster Iraq<br />
is today, my views have changed<br />
little on what happened to us<br />
and whether we got it right.<br />
I remain convinced that the<br />
cease-fire was called at the<br />
optimum moment. From the<br />
brigade’s point <strong>of</strong> view we<br />
had defeated the enemy and<br />
stopped before his destruction<br />
was complete. This seemed to<br />
us to be honourable; enough<br />
people had already died.<br />
Practically, we would have had<br />
some difficulty in pushing on to<br />
Basra without at least a day’s<br />
break. We were extremely tired<br />
and making mistakes, we had<br />
very little water and there was<br />
none available in the immediate<br />
area. Our field hospitals were a<br />
long way behind us.<br />
Political Conundrums<br />
Also by 28th February it<br />
was clear that General<br />
Schwarzkopf’s plan to annihilate<br />
the Republican Guard with<br />
a left hook through Iraq had<br />
failed. <strong>The</strong> expectation that<br />
the American Marines and<br />
Arab Coalition Forces would<br />
take days to fight through<br />
the defences in Kuwait and<br />
perhaps draw in Iraqi reserves<br />
as well never materialised. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
were proud and determined<br />
– nothing was going to stop<br />
them reaching the city gates.<br />
Saddam Hussein had no time to<br />
dispatch his Republican Guard<br />
as reinforcements, even if he<br />
ever intended to. VII US Corps’<br />
target was a will-o’-the-wisp by<br />
27th February. <strong>The</strong> majority <strong>of</strong><br />
the Iraqi soldiers were already<br />
on their way back to Baghdad.<br />
President Bush had another<br />
awkward problem, presented<br />
by the media’s reporting <strong>of</strong><br />
the ‘turkey shoot’ at the Muttla<br />
Pass. It seemed that he would<br />
almost certainly lose support<br />
from the Muslim world if he<br />
allowed another such incident to<br />
happen. <strong>The</strong> political conundrum<br />
as to whether Saddam Hussein<br />
should have been removed from<br />
power is perhaps more difficult<br />
to comment on without the<br />
interference <strong>of</strong> hindsight, but I<br />
remember thinking at the time<br />
that no-one wanted a vacuum<br />
in the Middle East, nor did the<br />
Americans want to be seen<br />
as king-makers. Militarily and<br />
politically the cease-fire called<br />
on 28th February was therefore<br />
inevitable.<br />
Road to Basra<br />
Re-subordination<br />
I also remain firm in my view<br />
that our re-subordination from<br />
the American marines to the<br />
VII US Corps was regrettable.<br />
Politically, we would have<br />
gained most glory if we had<br />
been involved in the liberation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Kuwait City itself. Militarily,<br />
we joined what the Americans<br />
termed ‘the main point <strong>of</strong> effort’<br />
and, despite being involved in<br />
some <strong>of</strong> the hardest fighting, we<br />
were seen after the war as the<br />
troops who held open the door<br />
for the American Army in its<br />
pursuit <strong>of</strong> the Republican Guard.<br />
That was not what our planners<br />
had envisaged.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Media<br />
I worry now, as I did then,<br />
about the effects <strong>of</strong> the<br />
media on modern warfare.<br />
I detected, during the initial<br />
settling-in period, the belief<br />
among reporters that they<br />
should encourage emotion. If<br />
an interview could be turned<br />
to probe fear or shock, this<br />
seemed to win favour at home.<br />
<strong>The</strong> intrusion, if challenged, was<br />
justified as caring and in the<br />
31 32
public interest. But don’t the<br />
public, and indeed the armed<br />
forces, shape their behaviour<br />
to the media’s demands<br />
Did we not confess in the<br />
Gulf, under this examination,<br />
to being frightened Well, <strong>of</strong><br />
course we were – but was it<br />
not unpatriotic to ask us to say<br />
so And then the reporting<br />
<strong>of</strong> the very clinical nature <strong>of</strong><br />
modern weapon systems, and<br />
their effects on the bunkers and<br />
buildings in Baghdad, led the<br />
public, particularly the American<br />
public, to lose touch with the<br />
reality <strong>of</strong> war; a grim, ghastly<br />
and bloody affair. Such reporting<br />
also heightened the public<br />
concern over casualties. This is<br />
also a dangerous preoccupation.<br />
I wonder if commanders can<br />
now be ruthless enough, in a<br />
television age, to pursue the<br />
enemy to the limit, if the stakes<br />
are anything less than national<br />
survival.<br />
Iraqi Tactics<br />
During January 1991, Saddam<br />
Hussein and his generals<br />
were much criticised over<br />
their tactical handling <strong>of</strong> their<br />
forces in Kuwait and Iraq. ‘<strong>The</strong>ir<br />
defences are similar to those<br />
used on the Western Front in<br />
1916’ was a common cry. I felt,<br />
even at the time, this was a<br />
little disingenuous. <strong>The</strong>re were,<br />
after all, very few options open<br />
to them. <strong>The</strong> defensive strategy<br />
was centred on Basra and<br />
consisted <strong>of</strong> three layers or lines.<br />
<strong>The</strong> front, manned by the ragtag<br />
conscripts, was nevertheless<br />
well prepared on the Kuwaiti-<br />
Saudi Arabian border. Behind<br />
this came the regulars, and<br />
then in reserve the Republican<br />
Guard. <strong>The</strong> Iraqi engineers had<br />
built an elaborate network <strong>of</strong><br />
interconnecting roads, allowing<br />
for easy redeployment and<br />
logistic supply.<br />
But that was their problem.<br />
Once a single vehicle moved,<br />
the sophisticated American<br />
surveillance systems spotted<br />
it and the resultant onslaught<br />
from the air was devastating.<br />
But it was only later that I came<br />
to the conclusion that Saddam<br />
Hussein probably did not care<br />
what happened to any <strong>of</strong> his<br />
forces except the elite. His<br />
aim was all but achieved the<br />
moment his troops entered<br />
Kuwait and then refused to<br />
withdraw. He had demonstrated<br />
to the Muslim world, by standing<br />
up to the Americans, that he<br />
was their natural leader. Most<br />
<strong>of</strong> his huge conscript army<br />
was expendable. It was, after<br />
all, too large; he was having<br />
trouble feeding and paying<br />
it. <strong>The</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> one hundred<br />
thousand was but a small price<br />
to pay to achieve his misguided<br />
ambitions. <strong>The</strong> Republican<br />
Guard, on the other hand, was<br />
essential to his survival.<br />
Saddam Hussain<br />
Political Negotiations<br />
I turn to the subject <strong>of</strong> political<br />
negotiations between the<br />
belligerents. <strong>The</strong>re was hardly<br />
a single one <strong>of</strong> us in the desert<br />
who did not pray for a peaceful<br />
solution to the crisis, despite<br />
the fact that we recognised that<br />
the quickest route home lay<br />
through the defeat <strong>of</strong> the Iraqi<br />
forces. This hope was probably<br />
British Armoured Fighting Vehicles<br />
naive. Once the Coalition was<br />
ready to fight, the temptation for<br />
the politicians to find a military<br />
solution to the problem must<br />
have been overwhelming.<br />
Decision Making and the<br />
Passage <strong>of</strong> Information<br />
I continue with observations<br />
on decision making and the<br />
passage <strong>of</strong> information and how<br />
we made our plans. <strong>The</strong> formal<br />
decision making process, the<br />
estimate, was time consuming.<br />
In our fast moving war <strong>of</strong><br />
manoeuvre the decision point<br />
had to be reached as quickly<br />
as possible so an opportunity<br />
to outwit the enemy was not<br />
missed. <strong>The</strong> debate is now<br />
whether or not an intuitive<br />
decision should be taken in<br />
the interests <strong>of</strong> speed without<br />
testing it against the long and<br />
more formal process <strong>of</strong> the<br />
estimate or appreciation.<br />
In the desert we learnt once<br />
again the value <strong>of</strong> issuing clear<br />
and unambiguous orders. In our<br />
peacetime exercising, particularly<br />
when training without troops<br />
on the ground, we had tended<br />
to send out overcomplicated<br />
instructions. Messages and<br />
orders must be simply stated<br />
and entirely clear. This becomes<br />
even more essential when lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> sleep distorts the mind, which<br />
happened to us after two days<br />
<strong>of</strong> fighting. All our soldiers were<br />
briefed in minute detail about the<br />
plan and their part in it. This has<br />
to have been one <strong>of</strong> the keys to<br />
our swift advance.<br />
Logistics<br />
<strong>The</strong> logistic support was<br />
Herculean. Thirty-five thousand<br />
British soldiers were deployed<br />
to the Gulf with four hundred<br />
thousand tons <strong>of</strong> equipment,<br />
munitions and freight, and<br />
thirteen thousand five hundred<br />
vehicles. From Al Jubayl, when<br />
the decision to move west was<br />
taken, twenty-three thousand<br />
tons <strong>of</strong> ammunition, six hundred<br />
and fifty tons <strong>of</strong> rations and<br />
nearly two million litres <strong>of</strong> petrol<br />
were moved over two hundred<br />
miles to a logistics base called<br />
Alpha in only nineteen days.<br />
During the ground war the<br />
logisticians were prepared to<br />
cope with a daily consumption<br />
<strong>of</strong> one thousand tons <strong>of</strong><br />
ammunition, half a million<br />
litres <strong>of</strong> fuel and three-quarters<br />
<strong>of</strong> a million litres <strong>of</strong> water. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
also delivered to us half a million<br />
parcels and nine million letters.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Unequal Contest<br />
<strong>The</strong> Desert Rats were involved<br />
in an international coalition<br />
pitted against a moderately<br />
sized regional state. It now<br />
appears to have been a<br />
ridiculously unequal contest,<br />
with the Iraqi strength probably<br />
over-estimated. But we had<br />
studied their success in a<br />
different sort <strong>of</strong> war against<br />
Iran and then focused on<br />
the quantities <strong>of</strong> manpower,<br />
artillery and tanks rather<br />
than on an investigation into<br />
human qualities. We had lived<br />
in harsh conditions through a<br />
long preparatory period and<br />
expected, when we went into<br />
the attack, to meet all sorts <strong>of</strong><br />
horrors which didn’t materialise.<br />
And so we must be careful<br />
about the lessons we take from<br />
a war where we defeated a<br />
technologically inferior enemy<br />
on featureless terrain and met<br />
very few reverses.<br />
British artillery<br />
7th Armoured gather in Iraqi POWs<br />
However, it must be <strong>of</strong> immense<br />
value for the future that a new<br />
generation <strong>of</strong> soldiers now<br />
understands the realities <strong>of</strong> war.<br />
We won’t, I hope, pretend that<br />
for us it was violent. We had,<br />
after all, complete air supremacy<br />
and almost total domination on<br />
the ground, with our superior<br />
equipment and with the enemy<br />
having been bombed by the<br />
Coalition air forces for over<br />
six weeks.<br />
But we won the land war so<br />
quickly because we were<br />
aggressive and used to full<br />
advantage the staggering<br />
artillery firepower available to<br />
us. Also our outstanding tanks<br />
could pick <strong>of</strong>f the enemy at<br />
three thousand yards’ range;<br />
our infantry was well equipped<br />
and trained; we could, and did,<br />
fight at night. We moved with<br />
remarkable speed, covering<br />
some two hundred miles in<br />
four days. We destroyed three<br />
hundred enemy tanks and<br />
armoured personnel carriers<br />
and took eight thousand<br />
prisoners <strong>of</strong> war. I believe that<br />
even if the enemy had been<br />
more resolute we would still<br />
have been unstoppable.<br />
Major-General Cordingley,<br />
educated at Sherborne<br />
and RMA Sandhurst has a<br />
distinguished military career<br />
including command <strong>of</strong> the<br />
famous 7th Armoured Brigade<br />
(the ‘Desert Rats’) throughout<br />
the Gulf War. He was awarded<br />
the Distinguished Service<br />
Order for leadership and<br />
bravery. He has held several<br />
notable appointments and is<br />
closely connected to the Help<br />
for Heroes and Macmillan<br />
Cancer Support charities.<br />
He is also a published<br />
author, scholar and is in<br />
much demand as a lecturer<br />
on leadership, team-building<br />
and decision-making, as well<br />
as a media commentator on<br />
international affairs.<br />
33 34
Countries and Leaders<br />
affected by the Arab Spring<br />
Abidine Sakande and Johannes Wullenweber<br />
35 36
Left: Photomontage <strong>of</strong> the Tunisian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens<br />
<strong>The</strong> Tunisian<br />
o<br />
Thomas O’Dell<br />
o<br />
How did the Revolution start<br />
<strong>The</strong> Tunisian Revolution <strong>of</strong>ficially started on the<br />
18th December 2010, although the event that caused<br />
it, the self-immolation <strong>of</strong> Mohamed Bouazizi, took<br />
place on 17th December. Bouazizi was the sole source<br />
<strong>of</strong> income in his family <strong>of</strong> eight, and was treated<br />
unfairly and illegally by a female police <strong>of</strong>ficer, as<br />
many street vendors in his position were used to.<br />
However, Bouazizi decided that he had had enough<br />
<strong>of</strong> this treatment and decided to do something<br />
about the corruption in the government. Without<br />
informing any friends or family, he went to the police<br />
headquarters, covered himself in a flammable liquid,<br />
and set himself on fire.<br />
This action provided the spark – pardon the pun<br />
– that lit the gunpowder; this gunpowder being<br />
the 23 years <strong>of</strong> oppression brought on Tunisia by<br />
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Initially the<br />
people sought change by peaceful marches, but, after<br />
the police violently attacked the marchers, (reminds<br />
me <strong>of</strong> a particular event in the USA in 1963...) riots<br />
broke out, firstly across Sidi Bouzid, the city where<br />
Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself, but then spread<br />
throughout Tunisia. Those protesting did now no<br />
longer want reform – they were calling for the end <strong>of</strong><br />
President Ben Ali’s regime.<br />
How did the Revolution end<br />
<strong>The</strong> main revolution ended with the ousting <strong>of</strong><br />
President Ben Ali on 14th January. However, many<br />
protests continued afterwards, as people were<br />
unhappy with the new government. Following Ben<br />
Ali’s departure from <strong>of</strong>fice, the army took control <strong>of</strong><br />
Tunisia, with Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi<br />
taking over as acting President for a short while.<br />
Some rioters used the occasion to continue stealing<br />
and vandalising, but some were displeased with<br />
Ghannouchi’s cabinet reshuffles, and wanted more<br />
change and a better chance <strong>of</strong> liberty. Ghannouchi<br />
was a high-ranking <strong>of</strong>ficial in President Ben Ali’s<br />
government, and the people <strong>of</strong> Tunisia wanted a<br />
whole new beginning.<br />
What were the significant events <strong>of</strong> the Revolution<br />
After Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, riots<br />
and protests started in Sidi Bouzid and then spread.<br />
By 27th December, protests had reached Tunis, the<br />
capital <strong>of</strong> Tunisia. On 6th January, strikes started,<br />
with 96% <strong>of</strong> Tunisia’s lawyers refusing to work in<br />
protest about unprovoked beatings. Teachers also<br />
joined this strike as they had been victim to the same<br />
treatment.<br />
On the 14th January, the military finally ousted<br />
President Ben Ali as he fled to Malta. However, several<br />
members <strong>of</strong> his party, the Constitutional Democratic<br />
Rally (RCD in French) remained in the government.<br />
Protests continued over this as the people wanted a<br />
completely new government. <strong>The</strong> army pledged its<br />
allegiance to the revolution, strengthening the cause<br />
<strong>of</strong> the rebels, and weakening the position <strong>of</strong> the RCD.<br />
To meet the demands <strong>of</strong> the protesters, Mohammed<br />
Ghannouchi removed six <strong>of</strong> the former members<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ben Ali’s government. This meant that aside<br />
from Ghannouchi himself, only two former Ben<br />
Ali government members remained in the interim<br />
37<br />
38
Right: Photomontage <strong>of</strong> the Egyptian Revolution by Thomas Gibbens<br />
government – and these two ministers had not been a<br />
key part <strong>of</strong> the RCD, meaning that the revolutionary<br />
demands had been met.<br />
However, on the 28th January, another protest<br />
started, because Ghannouchi was still in government.<br />
Protesters claimed that he was still propping up the<br />
old regime, and that they wanted an entirely new<br />
government, with no remnants from the Ben Ali era.<br />
Naim Garbousi, a protester from the central town <strong>of</strong><br />
Gefsa, summed up the attitude, “<strong>The</strong> new line-up is<br />
a theatre. <strong>The</strong> symbols <strong>of</strong> the old regime are left, like<br />
Ghannouchi. Why is he insisting on staying We are<br />
10 million people, there will surely be someone who<br />
can replace him.”<br />
Even after elections were announced for July, protests<br />
demanding Ghannouchi still continued. Eventually,<br />
after a protest <strong>of</strong> over 100,000 people on 27th<br />
January, Ghannouchi resigned, and was replaced by<br />
Beji Caid el Sebsi. Two other ministers resigned, but<br />
protestors called for the whole interim government<br />
to go. Eventually, on 9th March, the RCD was<br />
closed down after a court case. Ben Ali’s secret police<br />
were also dissolved. However, elections were delayed<br />
because <strong>of</strong> internal elections in the new government.<br />
What were the outcomes <strong>of</strong> the Revolution<br />
<strong>The</strong> outcomes <strong>of</strong> the Tunisian Revolution reached<br />
both a national and international level. Tunisia<br />
managed to secure itself a brand new government and<br />
President, with much <strong>of</strong> the oppression by President<br />
Ben Ali’s regime removed.<br />
on the 20th October. Syria is still, at the time <strong>of</strong> this<br />
publication, in civil war, with the military retaining all<br />
the advantages over the protesters<br />
Why is this Revolution important<br />
This revolution is important because <strong>of</strong> the actions<br />
<strong>of</strong> one man the whole Arab world has been turned<br />
upside down. Tunisia was the first Arab nation<br />
to successfully overthrow its dictator, setting an<br />
example to other nations – a message <strong>of</strong> hope, that<br />
freedom was possible. If Tunisia had failed, as the<br />
forerunner <strong>of</strong> the Arab Spring, it would have looked<br />
weak, and other Arab peoples that had followed the<br />
Tunisian people’s example would have lost morale and<br />
hesitated. If the Tunisian revolutionaries had failed to<br />
overthrow President Ben Ali, the dictators in Egypt,<br />
Yemen, Libya and countless other countries would<br />
still be in power, and would no doubt be exacting<br />
some form <strong>of</strong> twisted punishment upon those who<br />
dared to oppose them. However, they succeeded, and<br />
so the Arab world, and indeed the whole world, will<br />
never be the same again.<br />
However, the impacts <strong>of</strong> the Tunisian Revolution<br />
were felt across the Arab world. After Mohammed<br />
Bouazizi’s self-immolation, many people in similar<br />
dictatorships copied his actions. <strong>The</strong> Egyptian<br />
people managed to overthrow their President, Hosni<br />
Mubarak, as their situation was very similar to the<br />
Tunisian one, and so did the people <strong>of</strong> Yemen with<br />
their President, Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, not all<br />
countries managed to achieve Tunisia’s easy success.<br />
Both the Libyan people and Syrian people have<br />
been faced by ruthless military opposition – unlike<br />
Tunisia, where the military supported the protestors.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Libyan Civil War lasted from 15th February to<br />
23rd February, with Muammar Gaddafi being killed<br />
39<br />
40
1001<br />
Egyptian Knights:<br />
A Drama in Three Acts<br />
After over four thousand years in the shadows<br />
<strong>of</strong> the pyramids <strong>of</strong> Giza, Cairo emerged in the<br />
world’s headlines throughout last year. This<br />
article will explore the historic acts that occurred<br />
in Egypt in 2011, the unrest that currently<br />
occupies its capital and the pressing questions<br />
that its population now faces.<br />
ARAB BROKEN SPRING<br />
After years <strong>of</strong> oppressive rule and poor leadership,<br />
Egyptians felt little hope concerning their future.<br />
However, Tunisia’s fall provided the spark which<br />
resulted in wide spread protests from January 25th,<br />
2011. After a short period <strong>of</strong> protests, Mubarak<br />
stepped down from <strong>of</strong>fice leaving Egypt on<br />
February 11th without a leader. <strong>The</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong><br />
Defence, advised by senior military figures, took<br />
his place as president.<br />
<strong>The</strong> ensuing nine months witnessed a struggle<br />
between the increasingly visible Muslim<br />
brotherhood and the military, the former <strong>of</strong> the two<br />
wishing a rapid transition to civilian rule and the<br />
latter seeking to safeguard their privileged position.<br />
Protests broke out sporadically, cumulating in an<br />
enormous peaceful protest on November 18th,<br />
which, unfortunately, degenerated into violence<br />
throughout the following days with evermore<br />
strident demands for an end to military rule.<br />
Nevertheless, on 28th November, elections for the<br />
new People’s Assembly began peacefully, proving<br />
immensely popular but delivered a surprisingly<br />
strong showing for the Muslim brotherhood and a<br />
shock result for the hard-line Salafis who received<br />
around a quarter <strong>of</strong> the vote.<br />
IN de NILE<br />
<strong>The</strong> revolution raised huge expectations <strong>of</strong> rapid<br />
change for the better. However, Egyptians are now<br />
confronted with the reality <strong>of</strong> transforming ideals<br />
into practical changes. Ongoing changes represent<br />
an impatience for quick results and an absence <strong>of</strong><br />
the fear that previously inhibited expressions <strong>of</strong><br />
dissatisfaction. Not a day passes now without a<br />
strike or protest in favour <strong>of</strong> higher wages, improved<br />
conditions and more jobs. At the same time,<br />
following the elections a new government has still<br />
not been formed as this is the prerogative <strong>of</strong> the<br />
president who will not be elected until May or June<br />
2012. This means that important economic and civil<br />
issues are not being dealt with. One manifestation<br />
<strong>of</strong> this is sadly a general disregard for law and order.<br />
Oppressive fear <strong>of</strong> the police, which existed before<br />
the revolution, has now vanished with both trivial<br />
and serious results; street vendors operate where they<br />
wish with no fear <strong>of</strong> being removed and a significant<br />
increase in violent crime.<br />
In this atmosphere <strong>of</strong> thwarted aspirations, most anger<br />
is now focusing on the military, who are still in overall<br />
control and an immediate transition to civil rule is still<br />
regarded as somewhat <strong>of</strong> a panacea.<br />
NOW FOR THE HARD PART...<br />
A number <strong>of</strong> fundamental questions now present<br />
themselves to Egypt.<br />
Will the military give up their power <strong>The</strong>ir complete<br />
withdrawal from politics seems hard to imagine given<br />
their extensive economic and social authority (they<br />
currently control many factories and their influence<br />
through conscription is vast). However, popular<br />
demands for real power to civilian administrations will<br />
be hard to ignore. It is likely the military will attempt<br />
to retain reserved rights in some areas, for example,<br />
over the military budget.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Muslim brotherhood won the election and is<br />
expected to be dominant in the new government.<br />
Another question is whether they will use this power<br />
to turn Egypt into a Sharia state. <strong>The</strong>re is no question<br />
that the Salafis, who are the second largest group in<br />
parliament, would want this but the implications for<br />
Egyptian society and its impressive tourist industry<br />
would be pr<strong>of</strong>ound. Finally, strong individuals have<br />
traditionally governed Egypt, whether he or she be<br />
sultan, king or president. <strong>The</strong> country must now wait<br />
until May or June for a new leader. Logically, given<br />
the success <strong>of</strong> the People’s Assembly Elections, the<br />
new president will be an Islamist.<br />
Initially, the brotherhood had said they would not<br />
put forward a presidential candidate but have recently<br />
changed their policy. So who then, will govern<br />
Egypt has been through a remarkable twelve months<br />
and the expectations <strong>of</strong> change are high. However,<br />
the country now faces the most difficult stages in its<br />
struggle for a better future.<br />
Article and some photography by Amy Haines<br />
Graffiti <strong>of</strong> an Army General<br />
41 42
<strong>The</strong> Libyan Revolution<br />
& the Overthrow <strong>of</strong> Gaddafi<br />
Last year, the news became filled with stories <strong>of</strong><br />
uprisings in the Middle East that has been termed<br />
the ‘Arab Spring.’ Although an oversimplification, it<br />
could be said that these uprisings were routed in the<br />
people’s dissatisfaction with their totalitarian regimes<br />
and a contingent desire for greater democracy. In<br />
Libya, an oil rich country in North Africa, one such<br />
revolution took place and NATO’s involvement in<br />
the conflict increased the world’s attention towards<br />
it. <strong>The</strong> motives behind this intervention have been<br />
called in to question especially due to the presence<br />
<strong>of</strong> large oil reserves in Libya. Indeed, Britain’s<br />
relations with the Libya (especially its government<br />
and leader, Colonel Gaddafi,) prior to the start <strong>of</strong><br />
the Revolution, were already controversial. Former<br />
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s, decision to<br />
initiate talks with Colonel Gaddafi had been the<br />
subject <strong>of</strong> considerable criticism and that had<br />
intensified following the Scottish government’s<br />
decision to release the Lockerbie bomber on<br />
compassionate grounds.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Libyan revolution was driven to an extent by<br />
the workers, the youth and the poor. But it was<br />
also fuelled by local and tribal loyalties, creating a<br />
disjointed ‘revolutionary coalition’. <strong>The</strong> situation in<br />
the country made the headlines in February 2011<br />
when conflict broke out in Benghazi, and remained<br />
Jenny Elwin<br />
at the forefront <strong>of</strong> media attention till its culmination<br />
in August, when the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi<br />
was overthrown. Prior to being supplanted, and<br />
subsequently killed, Gaddafi had been in control for<br />
more than 40 years. He came to power in September<br />
1969 after leading a coup against King Idris, in<br />
a rather less bloody struggle than the one which<br />
resulted in his own downfall.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Libyan revolution was the result <strong>of</strong> a<br />
combination <strong>of</strong> factors, but primarily, it resulted<br />
from the desire for new leadership and an end to<br />
the corruption that existed under Gaddafi. <strong>The</strong><br />
hope for change stems from the youthful age <strong>of</strong> the<br />
population (with 2/3 being under 30) and the lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> opportunities afforded to them by the regime. In<br />
recent years, high unemployment (30%), the lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> a political voice, and the increased cost <strong>of</strong> living<br />
amplified the atmosphere <strong>of</strong> despondency about the<br />
future. One <strong>of</strong> the most interesting contributory<br />
factors to the revolution was the role played by<br />
modern technology, and especially the internet.<br />
Today’s society, with its emphasis on social media,<br />
allowed Libyans to hear news <strong>of</strong> revolutions in other<br />
Middle-eastern countries and additionally made it<br />
possible for news to be communicated to people<br />
outside <strong>of</strong> Libya once the conflict began.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Revolution began in February, with protests<br />
in Benghazi, Libya’s second biggest city. <strong>The</strong><br />
protests quickly spread to other important cities<br />
and throughout the rest <strong>of</strong> the country including<br />
the capital Tripoli where thousands <strong>of</strong> civilians<br />
gathered to voice their opinions. (In contrast, the<br />
media controlled by the state was filled with images<br />
<strong>of</strong> Libyans waving support flags and shouting in<br />
support <strong>of</strong> Gaddafi.) <strong>The</strong> Libyan leadership responded<br />
violently to the demonstrations, using the air force<br />
to bomb protestors. Throughout his period in<br />
power, Gaddafi had kept the Libyan military weak<br />
and internally divided, fearing it would become<br />
strong enough to pose a challenge to his authority.<br />
Consequently, he enlisted the help <strong>of</strong> mercenaries<br />
(roughly 2500) from other countries including Chad,<br />
Sudan and Niger to tackle the demonstrators.<br />
In March, following scenes <strong>of</strong> Libyan forces bombing<br />
and shelling their own citizens in rebel held areas,<br />
the West decided to intervene. Under a UN mandate<br />
to use force only to prevent the military force being<br />
used to the detriment <strong>of</strong> the Libyan civilians, NATO<br />
quickly interpreted this to empower their intervention<br />
on the rebel side. Both American and European air<br />
forces did so with missile strikes, beginning on March<br />
19th. A large coalition <strong>of</strong> NATO forces mustered in<br />
Italy or out at sea and under American leadership<br />
ensured that no Libyan government air force could<br />
target rebel held areas. Furthermore, NATO air<br />
forces successfully destroyed large numbers <strong>of</strong> Libyan<br />
government heavy weaponry such as tanks, artillery<br />
guns and rocket systems. Consequently, by late May<br />
the NATO strikes had helped the rebels, who had<br />
gained territory in both the east and the west <strong>of</strong> the<br />
country. Indeed, evidence appears to be emerging <strong>of</strong><br />
the rebels receiving more than just the mandated air<br />
protection for its civilians. Reports so far suggest that<br />
Western governments have helped the rebels in other<br />
ways too. For example, weapons were air dropped in<br />
by the French, the US <strong>of</strong>fered rendition <strong>of</strong> prisoners<br />
and NATO as a whole has provided technical and<br />
intelligence support. On the 21st <strong>of</strong> August rebels<br />
poured into Tripoli, for the most part, greeted by<br />
celebration and little resistance. It took just a few days<br />
to end the fighting that had been waged indecisively<br />
for the previous six months. After two days <strong>of</strong> street<br />
fighting, subsequent to entering the capital, the<br />
rebels established control. On the 23rd August, they<br />
reportedly infiltrated Gaddafi’s fortified compound,<br />
although by that time he had gone into hiding, and<br />
various members <strong>of</strong> his family had fled to Algeria.<br />
Two months later, on the 20th October, his death was<br />
reported. Originally it was alleged that he was killed<br />
in the cross fire, but videos from mobiles subsequently<br />
emerged <strong>of</strong> Gaddafi apparently begging for mercy<br />
before he was shot in the head.<br />
Retired German General Egon Ramms, has stated<br />
that NATO’s role in toppling Gaddafi’s rule was<br />
a ‘decisive one’. To an extent, General Ramms is<br />
correct. At the beginning <strong>of</strong> the conflict it seemed a<br />
civil war would ensue, in which the rebels would be<br />
outnumbered. <strong>The</strong> United Nations Security Council’s<br />
decision for military action, helped tip the balance in<br />
the rebels’ favour. In part, this was because the pro-<br />
Gaddafi forces were better equipped than the rebels,<br />
whose efforts were hampered by internal conflict and<br />
insufficient training. Within a week <strong>of</strong> the air strikes<br />
commencing, a ‘no fly’ zone had been established over<br />
Libya. However ultimately, it was the rebels on the<br />
ground that were the driving force <strong>of</strong> the revolution.<br />
Allegedly, there was a certain amount <strong>of</strong> debate in<br />
America as to whether the use <strong>of</strong> cyber warfare might<br />
43 44
Right: Photomontage <strong>of</strong> civil strife in Syria by Thomas Gibbens<br />
be permitted to tackle Gaddafi. However, this idea<br />
was ultimately rejected, due to fear that it would<br />
set a precedent for other countries, China and Russia<br />
in particular, to follow suit. Nevertheless, the action<br />
which was taken was not without its flaws; the air<br />
strikes were intended to protect civilians, but they<br />
caused the deaths <strong>of</strong> civilians too. Indeed, many<br />
observers noted how NATO’s airpower arrived<br />
when the rebels’ ground forces were prevented<br />
from advancing.<br />
After the rebels took over, a provisional government,<br />
the Transitional National Council, was put in place<br />
under the Prime Minister Abdel Rahim el-Keeb. El-<br />
Keeb had previously worked as an electronics engineer<br />
and was a known critic <strong>of</strong> Gaddafi prior to the leader’s<br />
death. At present, Libya’s future remains uncertain,<br />
however plans are being made for a constituent<br />
assembly to be decided by June <strong>of</strong> this year. <strong>The</strong><br />
Constituent Assembly will have the ability to create<br />
a government whilst a new constitution is being<br />
written. This is hopeful progression, but some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
problems <strong>of</strong> Gaddafi’s regime are still in existence.<br />
For instance, Amnesty <strong>International</strong> has reported<br />
that torture is still being used on prisoners.<br />
<strong>The</strong> task, which faces the new leadership, is<br />
undoubtedly a hard one. This is exacerbated by<br />
widespread expectations that Gaddafi’s overthrow<br />
would bring an immediate increase in Libya’s<br />
prosperity. Initially, instability was caused by tribal<br />
divisions and fear <strong>of</strong> the permeating influence <strong>of</strong><br />
Islamists. Moreover, divisions between the rebels<br />
that existed before the revolution’s success, has<br />
widened since Gaddafi’s death, as it eradicated the<br />
negative cohesion which existed between them.<br />
For instance, there have been clashes between<br />
rebel forces in January <strong>of</strong> this year, fuelled by<br />
their dissatisfaction at the rapidity and character<br />
<strong>of</strong> the change occurring. Despite the transitional<br />
government’s request, few have disarmed to any<br />
noticeable extent. But whilst there has much debate<br />
as to the type <strong>of</strong> government and society which<br />
would replace Gaddafi’s autocracy, normality has<br />
been able to resume in some areas. By mid November<br />
oil production, the country’s most significant<br />
industry, had restarted. However, reports suggest<br />
that this production is 40% <strong>of</strong> what it was before<br />
the conflict began.<br />
Nevertheless, damage done to this industry is not as<br />
detrimental as it could have been; Libyan <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
have reported that no serious harm was done to 40 <strong>of</strong><br />
the most important oil and gas fields.<br />
<strong>The</strong>refore, the current situation in Libya is an unstable<br />
one and the future uncertain. It should be noted that<br />
the fate <strong>of</strong> the country is being given less prominence<br />
in the news now, than when the conflict began. One<br />
must also question the responsibility the West has<br />
towards the citizens <strong>of</strong> Libya due to the decisive role<br />
they played in Gaddafi’s overthrow. Because <strong>of</strong> our<br />
active involvement in the conflict, I believe we have<br />
a moral duty to assist with rebuilding the country<br />
too. Unfortunately, it seems likely (as it has happened<br />
before) that the media find something new to print in<br />
their pages. Consequently, it is very likely that we will<br />
forget about the people <strong>of</strong> Libya whose fate the West<br />
decided when NATO intervened in 2011; or at least,<br />
until the Media’s attention is drawn back to Libya by<br />
a further crisis that affects the West.<br />
Fighting outside Gaddafi’s Compound<br />
Rebel fighters stomp on Gaddafis head<br />
45 46
What does Turkey’s relationship<br />
with Syria mean to the region,<br />
the West and to itself<br />
As this article is being written,<br />
historic events have come to pass<br />
in the region. <strong>The</strong> Arab spring was<br />
a shot in the arm for democracy in<br />
the world. <strong>The</strong> peaceful nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the Egyptian and Tunisian protests<br />
showed that the much-recited call<br />
to arms by terrorist groups such as<br />
al-Qaeda was wrong. In particular,<br />
the people in those countries now<br />
see Turkey as the shining example<br />
for a Muslim democracy. However,<br />
Turkey’s greatest test now is that<br />
posed by Syria: what should it do<br />
about its close neighbour’s civil war<br />
and the problems spilling over the<br />
border in to Turkey<br />
At the turn <strong>of</strong> the century Turkey<br />
was viewed very differently<br />
from how it is today. It was<br />
very politically unstable (from<br />
its creation in 1923 there have<br />
been four coups d’états: in 1960,<br />
1971, 1980 and 1997). It was<br />
seen in the Middle East as too<br />
western orientated, as it has been<br />
traditionally close to America<br />
since the end <strong>of</strong> World War II.<br />
Arabian nationalists regarded it<br />
with suspicion because <strong>of</strong> Ottoman<br />
domination <strong>of</strong> the Middle East,<br />
while Islamists regarded its<br />
secularism with disgust. Turkey kept<br />
to itself in the region and was more<br />
occupied with its internal problems,<br />
Kaan Tuncel<br />
and so was generally neutral towards<br />
the disputes in other countries in<br />
the region, all except one…<br />
Turkey has had more than its<br />
fair share <strong>of</strong> troubles with Syria.<br />
Although there are minor disputes,<br />
such as local dam projects and<br />
the region <strong>of</strong> Hatay, the greatest<br />
point <strong>of</strong> tension has been Syria’s<br />
support <strong>of</strong> the PKK. <strong>The</strong> PKK<br />
(Kurdistan Workers Party,) is a<br />
Kurdish organisation that aims<br />
to achieve greater rights for the<br />
Kurdish population in Turkey. It<br />
has been recognised as a terrorist<br />
organisation by Turkey, the US,<br />
the UK and the EU. <strong>The</strong> PKK<br />
regularly plants bombs in Turkey<br />
(such as the bomb attack in<br />
Central Ankara on 20th September<br />
2011 which killed 3) and attacks<br />
the military with guerrilla tactics.<br />
For this reason, Turkey has been<br />
very confrontational with Syria<br />
over its support <strong>of</strong> the PKK.<br />
Examples <strong>of</strong> Syrian support for<br />
the PKK range from allowing<br />
them to have safe heavens in the<br />
Baqaa valley to giving its leader<br />
Abdullah Ocalan residence in<br />
Damascus. This has led to Turkey’s<br />
government claiming it would<br />
take any steps necessary to destroy<br />
the PKK’s bases in Syria, strongly<br />
hinting at military action.<br />
1<br />
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13737946 viewed on the 1st <strong>of</strong> November 2011<br />
As Syria started to change its<br />
approach to the PKK, a thawing <strong>of</strong><br />
relations between the two countries<br />
started. In 2004 the Turkish Prime<br />
Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,<br />
visited Syria to sign a free trade<br />
agreement; trade between the two<br />
countries has flourished, growing<br />
from $730 MN to $2,270 MN<br />
in 2010 1 . This has not been an<br />
isolated case and indeed, this<br />
Turkish-led thaw has led to it<br />
gaining more credibility throughout<br />
the Middle East. <strong>The</strong> previous<br />
American-appeasing view has been<br />
challenged, as many in the region<br />
were delighted in 2003 when<br />
Turkey refused to allow American<br />
forces to invade Iraq through its<br />
border. <strong>The</strong> election <strong>of</strong> the mildly<br />
Islamic AK party in 2003, coupled<br />
with the booming economy (which<br />
is now the 17th largest in the<br />
world) has made Turkey a shining<br />
example around the Arab world <strong>of</strong><br />
a successful Islamic government.<br />
However, the Arab Spring caught<br />
Turkey by surprise. Despite<br />
reluctant support for the Libyan<br />
and Egyptian revolutions, Turkey<br />
now has to decide what approach<br />
to take with its other important<br />
neighbour. <strong>The</strong> consequences <strong>of</strong> any<br />
action will be significant and far<br />
reaching. Turkey shares an 822km<br />
border with Syria, and so far there<br />
have been around 24,000 refugees<br />
who have fled into Turkey because<br />
<strong>of</strong> the violence 2 . Turkey could risk<br />
further destabilising the country if<br />
it starts to support the opposition<br />
outright, but the situation might<br />
also do that if nothing is done.<br />
<strong>The</strong> foreign minister was quick<br />
to point out that Syria is a more<br />
complicated situation than Egypt<br />
or Libya, and there is a big risk <strong>of</strong><br />
sectarian conflict 3 in the Ba’ath<br />
party ruled country 4 . This risk <strong>of</strong> a<br />
second insurgency war in the region<br />
(and the second one with a border<br />
with Turkey), is a big one.<br />
This is perhaps the reason why<br />
many <strong>of</strong> Turkey’s western allies are<br />
accepting that Mr Erdogan keeps<br />
his line with Syria’s President,<br />
Bashar Assad, open. Mr Erdogan<br />
is insisting that Mr Assad starts<br />
to introduce democratic reforms<br />
to help stabilise the country. This<br />
is currently seen in Turkey as the<br />
most viable option, as there is little<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> an alternative to Assad<br />
who could keep control in such an<br />
unstable country. Turkey does not<br />
just want to give democracy to the<br />
people, it wants to create a strong<br />
regional partner that will both help<br />
it promote further stability and<br />
create strong economic ties.<br />
That being said, it is becoming<br />
obvious that the Turkish<br />
government is losing its patience.<br />
Mr Erdogan has said that when<br />
he talked with Bashar Assad about<br />
removing emergency power, the<br />
president agreed with him but<br />
has failed to implement this 5 . Mr<br />
Erdogan later on went on to say<br />
the head <strong>of</strong> Syrian forces, who<br />
is Bashar Assad’s brother, was<br />
“chasing after savagery” 6 and that<br />
Turkey would have no choice but<br />
to support a UN resolution to<br />
intervene in Syria. Nonetheless, it<br />
is important to note that Turkey<br />
also shelters in the province <strong>of</strong><br />
Hatay the main armed wing <strong>of</strong><br />
the Syrian opposition, namely the<br />
Free Syrian Army. However, Mr<br />
Erdogan has also stated that the<br />
government does not supply the<br />
movement nor allows anyone else<br />
from doing so either.<br />
This is not an attempt to shift<br />
its policy, but rather adopt a<br />
contingency. Turkey will still try<br />
to achieve the best outcome for<br />
itself and the region with the least<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> intervention as possible,<br />
because <strong>of</strong> Arab views opposing<br />
breaches <strong>of</strong> another country’s<br />
sovereignty. (But it reserves the<br />
means <strong>of</strong> upping its involvement<br />
should it feel the need to do so.)<br />
This inevitably means working<br />
with the local Syrian government<br />
as much as possible, and Turkey<br />
will always try to take the path<br />
<strong>of</strong> least resistance. To outside<br />
observers, this approach might<br />
seem weak but such a view would<br />
overlook the complex nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the situation both currently on the<br />
border as well as the ramifications<br />
that would most certainly arise in<br />
the region should Turkey flex its<br />
military muscle.<br />
Rather, it is important to see the<br />
complexity <strong>of</strong> the state <strong>of</strong> affairs<br />
which faces Turkey. <strong>The</strong> Middle<br />
East is a region plagued with<br />
factional violence, worsened by two<br />
countries (Iran and Saudi Arabia)<br />
that manipulate the region to suit<br />
their own needs. Turkey is a country<br />
that has had a rich history <strong>of</strong> leading<br />
the Muslim world, as the seat <strong>of</strong><br />
the last Caliphate and in recent<br />
years has been making something<br />
<strong>of</strong> a comeback. Neither Iran, nor<br />
Syria will want to see a strong and<br />
democratic Turkey with ties to the<br />
West. Syria will be Turkey’s first real<br />
test <strong>of</strong> how it will try and prevent<br />
a further outbreak <strong>of</strong> cross-border<br />
violence, which has erupted in<br />
this ancient region so many times<br />
before. This is an exciting prospect<br />
for everyone interested in its long<br />
overdue democracy.<br />
2<br />
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/04/09/syrian-uprising-ceasefire-turkey-shooting-refugee_n_1411743.htmlref=middle-east viewed on the<br />
12th <strong>of</strong> April 2012<br />
3<br />
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13737946 Paragraph 3, under “Exploring Alternatives” viewed 11th November 2011<br />
4<br />
http://www.baath-party.org/eng/constitution.htm viewed on 11th November 2011<br />
5<br />
http://www.dunyatimes.com/en/p=12662 viewed 11th November 2011<br />
6<br />
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-246848-turkish-pm-erdogan-calls-ongoing-syrian-crackdown-savagery.html viewed 11th November 2011<br />
47 48
Where to now,<br />
Israel<br />
Israel’s Foreign Policy Challenges<br />
<strong>The</strong> Arab Spring <strong>of</strong> 2011 has posed Israel a real<br />
foreign policy problem. Despite being the oldest<br />
democracy in the region, Israel has not welcomed the<br />
pro-democracy changes in its near neighbours with<br />
the same ringing endorsements heard from around<br />
Europe. Indeed the silence from Tel Aviv, at these<br />
extraordinary developments especially in Egypt,<br />
has caused its diplomatic corps some considerable<br />
embarrassment. Part <strong>of</strong> the reason for this is that prior<br />
to the Arab Spring, Israel was enjoying a prolonged<br />
period <strong>of</strong> peace and strength, hitherto not experienced<br />
since its birth in 1948. Its neighbouring governments<br />
in Turkey, Jordan and Egypt were on personal friendly<br />
terms with Israel’s military and political leaders. Its<br />
Palestinian political opponents were divided internally<br />
and lacking key friends within the region and beyond.<br />
All <strong>of</strong> these factors have changed to some extent and<br />
now cause considerable unease within Israel’s viper’s<br />
nest <strong>of</strong> political factions. Moreover, in the last year,<br />
Iran has continued the development <strong>of</strong> its nuclear<br />
programme which has resulted in more than just<br />
voices <strong>of</strong> caution in Israel and elsewhere. Together,<br />
these events have led to a series <strong>of</strong> foreign policy<br />
blunders by Israel which has not endeared them to the<br />
new regimes <strong>of</strong> their neighbours. This threatens the<br />
peace in this already volatile region.<br />
<strong>The</strong> close personal relationships between Mubarak’s<br />
Egyptian regime and Israel had been the cornerstone<br />
<strong>of</strong> peace for the region. With both states having<br />
ties to opposing blocks throughout the region and<br />
beyond, this alliance had cemented a peace since the<br />
Arab-Israeli wars <strong>of</strong> 1948-1973. Mubarak himself<br />
Mr M. Jennings<br />
had been the perpetual link in this chain <strong>of</strong> peace.<br />
That is why he was so popular in the West and<br />
why the US in particular did not welcome news<br />
<strong>of</strong> his regime’s crumbling. <strong>The</strong> new, military led<br />
government is a caretaker and Israel has no choice<br />
but to be patient, wait and hope that it can forge<br />
links with its successor. Israel does not do patience<br />
well. That patience could be strained to breaking<br />
point if a radical Islamist individual, as is likely,<br />
succeeds in their quest to become the new President<br />
<strong>of</strong> Egypt. <strong>The</strong>n, an Islamist, anti-Israel government<br />
would be formed and who knows what the future for<br />
both countries would be<br />
Israel has also become concerned by events to the<br />
north. <strong>The</strong> secular state <strong>of</strong> Turkey has been a close<br />
supporter <strong>of</strong> Israel over many years. It has suited<br />
not just the economies <strong>of</strong> both countries to remain<br />
allies but this alliance has helped open doors for both<br />
countries in many other ways. For example, Turkey’s<br />
alliance with Israel has helped bring closer ties to the<br />
EU. However, the relatively new, pro-Islamist and<br />
popular Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is<br />
pursuing a different agenda. Following the diplomatic<br />
gaff by Israel when its commandos stormed the<br />
Turkish aid ship and killed ten aid workers on its<br />
way to Gaza in May 2010, Turkey’s government<br />
has sought not only to pursue a non-Israeli aligned<br />
foreign policy but also stake a claim for leadership<br />
<strong>of</strong> other Arab states such as Jordan. It is seeking to<br />
be the dominant power in the region and so far, is<br />
having considerable success at Israel’s expense.<br />
Turkish success owes much not just to changes in<br />
personnel across the Middle East following the<br />
Arab Spring but also to its strategically important,<br />
geo-political location bridging Asia and Europe as<br />
well as the physical link between the Black Sea and<br />
the Mediterranean. More than just oil has to be<br />
shipped through the Dardanelles. Nonetheless, the<br />
oil-dependent West can not afford to make enemies <strong>of</strong><br />
Turkey, especially given the volatile nature <strong>of</strong> Russia,<br />
the other key petro-chemical exporter from Eastern<br />
Europe. So Turkey’s diplomatic strength is Israel’s<br />
current weakness.<br />
Iran has made no secret <strong>of</strong> its progress towards<br />
manufacturing nuclear fuel cells, which, it claims are<br />
for civilian purposes only. This energy programme is<br />
very popular in Iran but has caused alarm around the<br />
world. This is because the manufacturing techniques<br />
to make nuclear fuel can easily be transformed to<br />
create nuclear weapons-grade material. Intelligence<br />
reports published by the <strong>International</strong> Institute <strong>of</strong><br />
Strategic Studies, here in London, reveal that Iran<br />
has been creating the right nuclear weapons-making<br />
equipment and collecting appropriate nuclear<br />
material for many years over a large number <strong>of</strong><br />
inaccessible locations, such as beneath mountains<br />
and in deep mines shafts. In other words, Iran not<br />
only is probably making nuclear weapons at this<br />
very moment but is almost certainly trying to hide<br />
it and prevent it from being sabotaged. This has not<br />
fooled Israel or its Intelligence forces. It surely can be<br />
no coincidence that 5 Iranian top nuclear scientists<br />
have been murdered within the last 18 months and<br />
many believe that they have been despatched by<br />
Mossad-led teams. Of more concern is what Iran<br />
intends to do with its nuclear capacity when it comes<br />
on-line in 2013. Since Iran’s regime under President<br />
Ahmadinejad has openly expressed its hatred <strong>of</strong><br />
Israel (its continued existence), and its allies, more<br />
countries than just Israel have good reasons to fear<br />
Iranian nuclear power. Consequently, the UN has<br />
extended its sanctions for Iran’s continued violation<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>International</strong> law, in having an unsanctioned<br />
nuclear energy programme. Meanwhile, President<br />
Obama and his government have worked hard<br />
(during this Presidential election year, another<br />
coincidence) to patch up their relationship with<br />
Israel’s government, much to the benefit <strong>of</strong> both<br />
regime’s poll ratings. But domestic support and the<br />
backing <strong>of</strong> the USA will not be enough to protect<br />
Israel should Iran chose to use its nuclear weapons.<br />
Only diplomacy with Iran or regime change in<br />
Tehran can seemingly avoid these two countries<br />
creating a Middle Eastern nuclear Cold War.<br />
<strong>The</strong> last and most problematic cause for Israel’s<br />
troubles has been the brave and clever change in<br />
tactics by the Palestinian government. Despite<br />
being internally divided between Fatah and Hamas<br />
(the much more militant Islamist organisation)<br />
the Palestinian cause has long been associated with<br />
terrorism and anti-Semitism. <strong>The</strong>se features have<br />
held back their attempts to seek not only a viable<br />
agreement with Israel that would play well amongst<br />
their own people but also have hindered their own<br />
efforts to seek support from other states. With talks<br />
between Israel and Palestine halted and deadlocked<br />
over Israel’s continued building <strong>of</strong> settlements in<br />
the West Bank, the Palestinian government changed<br />
tack in the summer <strong>of</strong> 2011. Rather than repeat<br />
well worn arguments in the foreign ministries and<br />
media around the world about Israel’s negotiating<br />
tactics or even table further motions at the UN<br />
seeking condemnation <strong>of</strong> Israeli occupations, actions<br />
in Gaza or the building <strong>of</strong> further settlements<br />
in the West Bank, the Palestinians began the<br />
process <strong>of</strong> seeking international recognition <strong>of</strong><br />
a Palestinian state. On 31st October 2011, they<br />
achieved their first and arguably most crucial victory<br />
in persuading UNESCO (the United Nations<br />
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization,)<br />
a very important and influential part <strong>of</strong> the UN.<br />
Only Israel and the US voted against the proposal.<br />
Consequently, Israel and the US are increasingly<br />
isolated from world opinion, which favours a two<br />
state solution to the Israel-Palestine question anyway.<br />
49<br />
50
Right: Photomontage <strong>of</strong> recent events in Iran by Thomas Gibbens<br />
Mubarak, Netanyahu and Obama<br />
inducements probably in trade than it does at present.<br />
Regarding Iran, a stark and clearer although much<br />
less palatable choice faces Israel. Either employ a<br />
pre-emptive military strike against all the key nuclear<br />
targets and hope that such action is a) successful and<br />
b) will not lead to war or, engage diplomatically with<br />
Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s government. This<br />
government has been a key ally <strong>of</strong> Hamas, the radical<br />
Islamist Palestinian party and authority in Gaza. What<br />
price for peace would Iran seek and, more relevantly,<br />
can Israel afford to pay it So, Israel’s negotiations<br />
with Iran will inevitably have consequences at home<br />
that few Israelis want. Arguably though, the most<br />
important issue for Israel’s future stability concerns its<br />
relationship with Egypt.<br />
Israel will have to step much more carefully with the<br />
new pro-Islamist regime in Cairo. If Israel and Egypt<br />
fail to re-establish a peaceful alliance, then what<br />
will replace, if anything, the cornerstone <strong>of</strong> peace in<br />
the Middle East And if nothing replaces that, will<br />
internal conflicts boil up and expand out <strong>of</strong> the Arab<br />
states with Israel becoming a target again for Arab<br />
pan-Nationalism<br />
With Israel so far isolated what can now stop<br />
this process <strong>of</strong> Palestinian statehood becoming a<br />
legal reality<br />
So, where to now, Israel How shall it approach the<br />
revitalised Palestine government and its claim for<br />
statehood Much may depend upon the outcome<br />
<strong>of</strong> the 2012 US Presidential election. Should a<br />
strong, pro-Israel, Republican candidate win the<br />
election, then Israel will feel less pressured to reach<br />
an accommodation with the Palestinian government.<br />
Similarly, the Israeli Netanyahu government simply<br />
may not be willing or even able to reach an agreement<br />
with President Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Palestinians on any <strong>of</strong> the key issues preventing a<br />
long term peace. If that is the case, how long will<br />
the Palestinian people remain docile before another<br />
outburst <strong>of</strong> cross-border incidents and reprisals<br />
Furthermore, Israel cannot ignore the growing<br />
strength <strong>of</strong> Turkey nor can it continue to make so<br />
many gaffes with its neighbours. It will have to reengage<br />
with its northern neighbour and <strong>of</strong>fer it greater<br />
Matthew Jennings is Head <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong> at <strong>Ardingly</strong><br />
<strong>College</strong>. Educated at Manchester Grammar School<br />
and University <strong>College</strong> London where he received a<br />
Law Degree. In 1995, he was awarded a Masters in<br />
War Studies at Kings <strong>College</strong>, London. Since then<br />
he has been a member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>International</strong> Institute<br />
<strong>of</strong> Strategic Studies.<br />
51 52
<strong>The</strong> Arab Spring and the<br />
Question <strong>of</strong> Military Intervention<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>essor J. Ralph<br />
Academics like to draw parallels.<br />
A year on from the start <strong>of</strong> the Arab Spring it is<br />
tempting to compare these events to the 1989<br />
revolutions. <strong>The</strong>se swept away the communist<br />
regimes that had held Eastern Europe in their<br />
grip for almost half a century. Most <strong>of</strong> these<br />
revolutions were, thankfully, peaceful; and this<br />
time last year many were celebrating what<br />
seemed to be peaceful transitions in Tunisia and<br />
Egypt. As in 1989, however, spring turned to<br />
winter and the hopes that a regional revolution<br />
could remain peaceful gave way to the reality<br />
<strong>of</strong> civil war. <strong>The</strong> international politics <strong>of</strong> 1990’s<br />
Europe, was in many ways, dominated by the<br />
violence in the Balkans. After the Arab Spring<br />
<strong>of</strong> 2011, the international politics <strong>of</strong> the Middle<br />
East looks set to be dominated (the question <strong>of</strong><br />
Iranian nuclear capabilities aside) by the violence<br />
in Syria. Further parallels exist in the fact that the<br />
United Nations Security Council is not always<br />
certain about how to respond. <strong>The</strong> Russian and<br />
Chinese veto <strong>of</strong> the resolution proposed early<br />
this year illustrates this.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se kinds <strong>of</strong> crises prompt much discussion<br />
about the responsibility <strong>of</strong> “outsiders”. Should<br />
they intervene to prevent or ease humanitarian<br />
emergencies Do humanitarian principles and<br />
national interests merge as Tony Blair insisted,<br />
or is the appeal to humanity a rhetorical veil<br />
that disguises the selfish interests <strong>of</strong> outsiders<br />
Can ‘humanitarian intervention’ remain politically<br />
neutral or does outside interference inevitably<br />
alter politics in a way that denies national selfdetermination<br />
And, most fundamentally, who<br />
decides the answers to the questions Should a<br />
state that answers these questions in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
intervention press ahead against the objections<br />
<strong>of</strong> other states<br />
Can that state really claim to be acting on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the “international community” when<br />
other states think the common interest is best<br />
pursued through a policy <strong>of</strong> non-interference<br />
When drawing their comparisons academics<br />
should acknowledge that historical lines never<br />
run precisely in parallel. This is because lessons<br />
are learned and applied in ways that alter<br />
the course <strong>of</strong> contemporary events. Take the<br />
Balkans for instance. Western governments<br />
were initially reluctant to intervene. <strong>The</strong> national<br />
interest was defined narrowly. <strong>The</strong> Balkans<br />
was considered to have its own history which<br />
implied that outsiders should not interfere.<br />
Finally, the consensus at the Security Council<br />
did not stretch beyond support for neutral<br />
peacekeeping missions. <strong>The</strong>n we had the<br />
massacres at Srebrenica and elsewhere. <strong>The</strong><br />
outrage prompted shifts in the answers to the<br />
key questions.<br />
<strong>The</strong> UK shift was facilitated by a change in<br />
government. New Labour had promised to put<br />
‘ethics’ at the centre <strong>of</strong> its foreign policy. This<br />
prompted a greater willingness to intervene<br />
forcefully on behalf <strong>of</strong> human rights and led to<br />
Tony Blair’s 1999 insistence that it was right<br />
for NATO to intervene to stop the violence<br />
in Kosovo. From his perspective the national<br />
interest did merge with the humanitarian impulse<br />
to ‘do something’. <strong>The</strong> Balkans certainly had its<br />
own history but it was also part <strong>of</strong> a “European”<br />
and even “global” history and its people<br />
were part <strong>of</strong> a “European” and “international<br />
community”. Foreign governments did have “a<br />
responsibility to protect” and the lesson from<br />
Bosnia was that NATO had to intervene early.<br />
<strong>The</strong> problem was that the Russians in particular<br />
didn’t agree. Its threat to veto a Security Council<br />
resolution authorizing the use <strong>of</strong> force meant<br />
NATO had to construct original legal arguments<br />
to square its actions with the UN Charter.<br />
Essentially, Russia’s position on Kosovo was<br />
presented as being unreasonable in the face <strong>of</strong><br />
previous resolutions, which had identified the<br />
humanitarian situation as a threat to international<br />
peace and security. <strong>The</strong>se previous resolutions,<br />
it was claimed, ‘implicitly authorized’ NATO to<br />
use force.<br />
In this respect, the mood <strong>of</strong> western governments<br />
was shifting. <strong>The</strong>y were less willing to let the lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> consensus at the Security Council paralyse<br />
their response to humanitarian emergencies.<br />
<strong>The</strong> question that remained, however, was this:<br />
could NATO still claim to be acting on behalf<br />
<strong>of</strong> the ‘international community’ when it had<br />
seemingly by-passed the UN If not, was NATO’s<br />
intervention an example <strong>of</strong> liberal imperialism<br />
Not everyone is concerned by the charge <strong>of</strong><br />
liberal imperialism. If NATOs intervention helped<br />
ease or prevent a humanitarian emergency in<br />
Kosovo then that might, by itself, be enough for it<br />
to claim legitimacy. Yet there are potentially costs<br />
to adopting this approach.<br />
<strong>The</strong> first is illustrated by the diplomacy leading<br />
up to the Iraq War. When the French threatened<br />
to veto a resolution authorizing the use <strong>of</strong> force<br />
Blair dismissed it as ‘unreasonable’. <strong>The</strong> invasion<br />
was legitimate, he argued, because previous<br />
resolutions “implicitly revived” the authority to use<br />
force against Iraq that had existed since the first<br />
Gulf War in 1991. <strong>The</strong> US and UK again pressed<br />
ahead without UN support. Unlike NATO’s<br />
intervention in Kosovo, however, the Americanled<br />
invasion <strong>of</strong> Iraq did not turn out well for<br />
Blair. Supporters <strong>of</strong> the invasion have since<br />
acknowledged that Security Council deliberations<br />
got it right. Had the US and the UK accepted<br />
that they alone could not decide the best policy<br />
then, the critics argue, they would have avoided<br />
making a mistake.<br />
A reason for listening to the Security Council<br />
therefore might be that the discussions there<br />
deliver better outcomes. But that doesn’t<br />
necessarily hold. One might also argue that the<br />
Kosovo intervention delivered a good outcome<br />
and had NATO listened to the Security Council<br />
the outcome would have been much worse.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re is no easy way <strong>of</strong> determining when a veto<br />
is unreasonable.<br />
53 54
It does seem that the present governments<br />
<strong>of</strong> the UK and the US are reluctant to act<br />
outside <strong>of</strong> a clear Security Council mandate.<br />
Of course, if a nation decides to act without<br />
UN support it cannot easily call on others for<br />
assistance. It has to bear the burden itself.<br />
This was the lesson that President Obama and<br />
Prime Minister Cameron drew from Iraq. Security<br />
Council support then is not simply a question <strong>of</strong><br />
legitimacy; it is a means <strong>of</strong> sharing the burden.<br />
This very much informed the approach toward<br />
the 2011 crisis in Libya.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re was no doubt in this case that Resolution<br />
1973 (2011) authorized the use <strong>of</strong> force. <strong>The</strong><br />
Russians and others (e.g. Brazil, India, China<br />
and South Africa) still had concerns, however.<br />
<strong>The</strong>ir fear was that the NATO-led coalition<br />
was using force to pursue a political agenda<br />
(regime change) rather than a humanitarian<br />
one (protection <strong>of</strong> civilians). As noted, it is<br />
difficult to see how an external intervention<br />
for humanitarian reasons can maintain political<br />
neutrality, and there is an argument to suggest<br />
that regime change was the only proper way to<br />
protect the Libyan people.<br />
Regime change, in other words, was implicit in<br />
the “protection <strong>of</strong> civilians mandate”. <strong>The</strong> idea <strong>of</strong><br />
“implying” a mandate from a resolution however<br />
does not reassure the Russians – it sounds too<br />
much like Kosovo and Iraq. By vetoing resolutions<br />
on Syria, Russia and China seemed to be saying<br />
they had had enough. <strong>The</strong>y were not going to<br />
allow NATO or anyone else to use the same<br />
arguments again. <strong>The</strong> concern that western<br />
governments are implying mandates from<br />
resolutions and using humanitarian interventions<br />
to push political agendas is not new. It has,<br />
as I’ve illustrated here, a recent history that<br />
stretches back to the 1990’s. This has raised<br />
concerns about the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> western-led<br />
interventions. On the other side <strong>of</strong> the coin,<br />
there are reasonable concerns about the use <strong>of</strong><br />
the veto and this has raised doubts about the<br />
legitimacy <strong>of</strong> Security Council deliberations. It is<br />
a difficult issue to resolve. We are at a situation<br />
now, however, where it is more difficult for<br />
western governments to convince their domestic<br />
constituencies to support the use force for<br />
humanitarian reasons without Security Council<br />
backing. <strong>The</strong>y do not want to bear another burden<br />
like Iraq or Afghanistan. This increases the<br />
political significance <strong>of</strong> objections at the Security<br />
Council, which in turn reduces the likelihood <strong>of</strong><br />
future interventions.<br />
Jason Ralph is Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> <strong>International</strong><br />
<strong>Relations</strong> at the University <strong>of</strong> Leeds and a<br />
British Academy Mid-Career Fellow. He is<br />
author <strong>of</strong> Defending the Society <strong>of</strong> States.<br />
Why America opposes the <strong>International</strong> Criminal<br />
Court and its vision <strong>of</strong> World Society (Oxford<br />
University Press, 2007).<br />
Further Reading<br />
• Blair, T (1999) Doctrine <strong>of</strong> the <strong>International</strong> Community, 24 April 1999.<br />
Available from http://tna.europarchive.org/20081210084625/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297<br />
• Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams (2011) ‘<strong>The</strong> new politics <strong>of</strong> protection Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the<br />
responsibility to protect’, <strong>International</strong> Affairs 87 (4) 825-50.<br />
• Jason Ralph (2011) ‘After Chilcot: ‘<strong>The</strong> doctrine <strong>of</strong> international community’ and the UK decision<br />
to invade Iraq’, British <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Politics and <strong>International</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> 13 (3): 304-25.<br />
• Wheeler, NJ (2002) Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in <strong>International</strong> Society. Oxford:<br />
Oxford University Press.<br />
Defining a U.S. Role<br />
in the Arab Spring<br />
Not the least significant aspect <strong>of</strong><br />
the Arab Spring is the redefinition<br />
<strong>of</strong> heret<strong>of</strong>ore prevalent principles <strong>of</strong><br />
foreign policy. As the United States<br />
is withdrawing from military efforts<br />
in Iraq and Afghanistan undertaken<br />
on the basis (however disputed)<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.S. national security, it is reengaging<br />
in several other states in<br />
the region (albeit uncertainly) in the<br />
name <strong>of</strong> humanitarian intervention.<br />
Will democratic reconstruction<br />
replace national interest as the<br />
lodestar <strong>of</strong> Middle East policy Is<br />
democratic reconstruction what<br />
the Arab Spring in fact represents<br />
What are its criteria<br />
<strong>The</strong> evolving consensus is that the<br />
United States is morally obliged<br />
to align itself with revolutionary<br />
movements in the Middle East<br />
as a kind <strong>of</strong> compensation for<br />
its Cold War policies (invariably<br />
described as “misguided”), in which<br />
it cooperated with nondemocratic<br />
governments for security objectives.<br />
<strong>The</strong>n, it is alleged, supporting<br />
fragile governments in the name<br />
<strong>of</strong> international stability generated<br />
long-term instability. Even granting<br />
that some <strong>of</strong> the Cold War policies<br />
were continued beyond their utility,<br />
the Cold War structure lasted 30<br />
years and induced decisive strategic<br />
transformations, such as Egypt’s<br />
abandonment <strong>of</strong> its alliance with<br />
the Soviet Union and the signing<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Camp David Accords. <strong>The</strong><br />
pattern now emerging, if it fails to<br />
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger<br />
establish an appropriate relationship<br />
to its proclaimed goals, risks being<br />
inherently unstable from its very<br />
inception, and could submerge the<br />
values it proclaimed.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Arab Spring is widely presented<br />
as a regional, youth-led revolution<br />
on behalf <strong>of</strong> liberal democratic<br />
principles. Yet Libya is not ruled<br />
by such forces; it hardly continues<br />
as a state. Nor is Egypt, whose<br />
electoral majority is overwhelmingly<br />
Islamist; nor do democrats seem<br />
to predominate in the Syrian<br />
opposition. <strong>The</strong> Arab League<br />
consensus on Syria is not shaped by<br />
countries previously distinguished<br />
by the practice or advocacy <strong>of</strong><br />
democracy. Rather it reflects, in<br />
large part, the millennium-old<br />
conflict between Shia and Sunni<br />
and an attempt to reclaim Sunni<br />
dominance from a Shiite minority.<br />
It is also precisely why so many<br />
minority groups like Druzes, Kurds<br />
and Christians are uneasy about<br />
regime change in Syria.<br />
<strong>The</strong> confluence <strong>of</strong> many disparate<br />
grievances avowing general slogans<br />
is not yet a democratic outcome.<br />
<strong>The</strong> more sweeping the destruction<br />
<strong>of</strong> the existing order, the more<br />
difficult the establishment <strong>of</strong><br />
domestic authority is likely to prove,<br />
and the more likely is the resort<br />
to force or to impose a universal<br />
ideology. And the more fragmented<br />
the society grows, the greater the<br />
temptation to foster unity by<br />
appeals to a vision <strong>of</strong> a merged<br />
nationalism and Islamism targeting<br />
Western values or social goals.<br />
We must take care lest revolutions<br />
turn, for the outside world, into<br />
a transitory Internet experience<br />
– watched intently for a few key<br />
moments, then tuned out once<br />
the main event is deemed to be<br />
done. <strong>The</strong> revolution will have to<br />
be judged by its outcome, not its<br />
proclamations.<br />
Humanitarian concerns do not<br />
abolish the need to relate national<br />
interest to a concept <strong>of</strong> world order.<br />
For the U.S., a doctrine <strong>of</strong> general<br />
humanitarian intervention in<br />
Middle East revolutions will prove<br />
unsustainable unless linked to a<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> U.S. national security.<br />
Intervention needs to consider the<br />
strategic significance and social<br />
cohesion <strong>of</strong> a country (including the<br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> fracturing its complex<br />
sectarian makeup) and evaluate<br />
what can plausibly be constructed<br />
in place <strong>of</strong> the old regime.<br />
American public opinion has<br />
already recoiled from the scope <strong>of</strong><br />
the efforts required to transform<br />
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.<br />
Do we believe that a less explicitly<br />
strategic U.S. involvement<br />
disclaiming an American national<br />
interest will make nation-building<br />
less complex Do we have a<br />
55 56
preference as to which groups<br />
come to power Or are we agnostic<br />
so long as the mechanisms<br />
are electoral If so, how do we<br />
avoid the risk <strong>of</strong> fostering a new<br />
absolutism legitimized by managed<br />
plebiscites What outcomes are<br />
compatible with America’s core<br />
strategic interests Will it be<br />
possible to combine strategic<br />
withdrawal from key countries and<br />
reduced military expenditures with<br />
doctrines <strong>of</strong> universal humanitarian<br />
intervention A discussion <strong>of</strong> these<br />
issues has been largely absent from<br />
the debate over U.S. foreign policy<br />
regarding the Arab Spring.<br />
Whether the Arab Spring in<br />
fact enhances the scope <strong>of</strong><br />
individual freedom or instead<br />
replaces feudal authoritarianism<br />
with a new era <strong>of</strong> absolute rule<br />
based on sect-based permanent<br />
majorities will not be disclosed<br />
by the initial proclamations <strong>of</strong><br />
the revolutionaries. Traditional<br />
fundamentalist political forces,<br />
reinforced by alliance with radical<br />
revolutionaries, threaten to<br />
dominate the process while the<br />
social network elements which<br />
shaped the beginning are being<br />
marginalized.<br />
America should encourage regional<br />
aspirations for political change. But<br />
it is not wise to seek an equivalent<br />
result in every country at the same<br />
pace. America will serve its values<br />
as well by <strong>of</strong>fering quiet counsel<br />
as by issuing public declarations,<br />
which are likely to produce a sense<br />
<strong>of</strong> siege. It is not an abdication <strong>of</strong><br />
principle to tailor the U.S. position<br />
on a country-by-country basis and<br />
attune it to other relevant factors,<br />
including national security; indeed,<br />
this is the essence <strong>of</strong> a creative<br />
foreign policy.<br />
For over half a century, American<br />
policy in the Middle East has been<br />
guided by several core security<br />
objectives: preventing any power<br />
in the region from emerging as a<br />
hegemon; ensuring the free flow <strong>of</strong><br />
energy resources, still vital to the<br />
operation <strong>of</strong> the world economy;<br />
and attempting to broker a durable<br />
peace between Israel and its<br />
neighbours, including a settlement<br />
with the Palestinian Arabs. In the<br />
past decade, Iran has emerged as<br />
the principal challenge to all three<br />
<strong>of</strong> these objectives. <strong>The</strong>se interests<br />
have not been abolished by the Arab<br />
Spring; their implementation has<br />
grown more urgent. A process that<br />
ends with regional governments<br />
either too weak or too anti-Western<br />
in their orientation to lend support<br />
to these outcomes, and in which<br />
American partnerships are no longer<br />
welcomed, must evoke American<br />
strategic concerns – regardless <strong>of</strong><br />
the electoral mechanisms by which<br />
these governments come to power.<br />
Within the framework <strong>of</strong> these<br />
general limits, American policy<br />
has significant scope for creativity<br />
in promoting humanitarian and<br />
democratic values.<br />
<strong>The</strong> United States should<br />
be prepared to deal with<br />
democratically-elected Islamist<br />
governments. But it is also free<br />
to pursue a standard principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> traditional foreign policy<br />
to condition its stance on the<br />
alignment <strong>of</strong> its interests with<br />
the actions <strong>of</strong> the government<br />
in question. <strong>The</strong> U.S. conduct<br />
during the Arab upheavals has so<br />
far been successful in avoiding<br />
placing America as an obstacle to<br />
the revolutionary transformations.<br />
This is not a minor achievement.<br />
But it is just one component <strong>of</strong> a<br />
successful approach. U.S. policy<br />
will, in the end, also be judged by<br />
whether what emerges from the<br />
Arab Spring improves the reformed<br />
states’ responsibility towards the<br />
international order and humane<br />
institutions.<br />
Dr. Kissinger served in the Army<br />
and graduated summa cum<br />
laude from Harvard <strong>College</strong><br />
later receiving M.A. and Ph.D.<br />
degrees in 1952 and 1954. From<br />
1954 until 1969 he was a faculty<br />
member <strong>of</strong> Harvard University,<br />
in both the Department <strong>of</strong><br />
Government and the Center<br />
for <strong>International</strong> Affairs.<br />
Subsequently, Dr. Kissinger<br />
served as National Security adviser<br />
and as Secretary <strong>of</strong> State under<br />
Presidents Nixon and Ford.<br />
In 1973, he received the Nobel<br />
Peace Prize. Dr. Kissinger is the<br />
author <strong>of</strong> numerous books and<br />
articles on United States foreign<br />
policy, international affairs and<br />
diplomatic history.<br />
This work originally appeared in<br />
the <strong>International</strong> Herald Tribune,<br />
April 2, 2012 and we are grateful<br />
to both IHT and Dr Kissinger for<br />
permission to republish.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Last Word...<br />
<strong>The</strong> articles in the first issue <strong>of</strong> Timeline have explored the Middle<br />
East and have illustrated numerous constants, from the importance<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jerusalem to the domination <strong>of</strong> the region by aggressive rulers.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se remain as true today as they did back in the eleventh century.<br />
In addition, the Middle East is the lynchpin <strong>of</strong> three continents<br />
with three separate religions <strong>of</strong> Islam, Judaism and Christianity. At<br />
the heart <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> the conflicts between rulers from each region<br />
has been their religious differences and competition over Holy sites.<br />
Indeed, many <strong>of</strong> the earlier articles have highlighted this. <strong>The</strong>se<br />
religious differences live with us to this day.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Middle East has held a special attraction for many in the West since Christianity settled in Europe. Prior<br />
to that time, the region <strong>of</strong> modern day Israel was still vital to trading links between Europe, North Africa and<br />
Central Asia. Nowadays, oil is the economic imperative that prompts outside interest and on occasions even<br />
Western involvement in the region. Yet, while the Middle East sits astride the richest natural resources in the<br />
world, much <strong>of</strong> that wealth is held by a few super-elite <strong>of</strong>ten from the same family or tribe. Events across the<br />
region over the last two years have illustrated how the people living under the firm rule <strong>of</strong> these elites have<br />
become unwilling to do so. Not only have Tunisians and others wanted greater protection <strong>of</strong> their civil rights but<br />
also tangible economic opportunities especially for the ordinary working man and woman. <strong>The</strong>se desires, albeit<br />
not particularly new, have brought them in to conflict with their own governments time and time again. Yet<br />
something different happened in 2011. <strong>The</strong>se complaints grew in number and did so courtesy <strong>of</strong> the powerful<br />
media used by the protestors. This was the new dimension that transformed protests in to rebellions. This process<br />
was vividly brought to the attention <strong>of</strong> many in the West by digital technology and social networking sites.<br />
Protests and brutal suppression were beamed around the world within minutes <strong>of</strong> it happening by an empowered<br />
ordinary class <strong>of</strong> activist; a true Peasant’s Revolt. In most countries <strong>of</strong> the Middle East this power struggle has yet<br />
to be resolved. For example, it remains unclear whether Egypt is evolving into a democracy or whether another<br />
form <strong>of</strong> authoritarian control will supplant the previous regime. Libya has yet to proceed as far as that and has<br />
far greater divisions to deal with. Those may well hinder its path towards a peaceful multi-party democratic state.<br />
Syria holds elections while simultaneously fighting a civil war in a dozen cities. Other states too, such as Yemen,<br />
Bahrain and Palestine have yet to resolve their own civil disorders. Consequently, the Arab Spring is not only still<br />
alive, it is ever-changing. And so are the methods <strong>of</strong> protest. <strong>The</strong> battle lines remain with the authoritarian forces<br />
<strong>of</strong> government, police and army on the one side verses the protesting masses armed with banners, BlackBerries<br />
and iPhones on the other. Similarly, the aims <strong>of</strong> the protestors from Bahrain to Egypt have changed a lot since<br />
the first few months. <strong>The</strong> more militant groups have resisted calls to accept moderate reforms by placating<br />
leaders. <strong>The</strong>se protestors have ceased just demanding jobs and civil rights. <strong>The</strong>y are now calling for root and<br />
branch constitutional reforms and holding their oppressors accountable before their own courts. Across the<br />
Middle East it will be some time yet before we can say with certainty that the rebellions <strong>of</strong> the Arab Spring have<br />
become revolutions for a new Arab world. While western governments hope that strong, pro-western democracies<br />
will emerge in the Middle East, many fear that these dreams are unrealistic. Already ultra-Nationalist and<br />
Islamist groups have gained considerable political support in Egypt, Libya and Syria. Some have demonstrated<br />
a willingness to bypass democratic niceties to achieve their aims especially in Libya and Syria. Furthermore, an<br />
Islamist President has been elected in Egypt and more may follow in the Arab Spring’s fledgling republics. It<br />
remains unclear at this stage how these new regimes will change the previous dynamic <strong>of</strong> stable relations between<br />
the previous Arab dictatorships and the West as well as with Israel. So will the Arab Spring turn in to an Islamic<br />
Winter Only time will tell….<br />
Mr M. Jennings<br />
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Next Issue <strong>of</strong> Timeline<br />
Volume 2: <strong>The</strong> Americas: A New World<br />
We are now taking submissions for our next issue <strong>of</strong> ‘Timeline!’ As well as receiving articles we also<br />
want to hear your views about what you have read in this issue. So why not send in a letter to the<br />
editor for publication in the next issue<br />
<strong>The</strong> theme for the next issue <strong>of</strong> ‘Timeline’ is the Americas. This region has shaped world events<br />
over recent years but also has an extraordinarily rich cultural heritage. <strong>The</strong>re are fascinating stories<br />
to be told and questions to be answered. Perhaps YOU might want to submit an article on one <strong>of</strong><br />
the following: the ancient civilisations and indigenous peoples <strong>of</strong> the Americas, the era <strong>of</strong> European<br />
entanglement with them from 1492 onwards, the quest for Independence in the North and Latin<br />
American countries, the American Civil War, the growth <strong>of</strong> the USA, the building <strong>of</strong> the Panama<br />
Canal, the 1920s, Gangsters and the Mafia, the Wall Street Crash and Depression, the New Deal,<br />
America’s involvement in two Worlds Wars, McCarthyism, the Space Race, the Cuban Missile<br />
Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, the Civil Rights Movement, the Falklands War, Hollywood,<br />
9/11, America’s foreign (and domestic) policy challenges, President Obama’s first term and the 2012<br />
US Presidential elections. <strong>The</strong>se are just some <strong>of</strong> the possible topics that could feature in the next<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> ‘Timeline.’<br />
If you are interested in submitting an article please make sure it is in word.doc format, 12 point and<br />
between 750 and 1500 words in length unless by prior arrangement with the Editor. We are happy<br />
to publish submissions from current Students, Parents <strong>of</strong> Students, Staff and indeed OAs. Please<br />
send all queries, letters, requests or submissions to:<br />
<strong>The</strong> World Trade Centre Twin Towers 9 11<br />
matthew.jennings@ardingly.com<br />
Copy Deadline is Easter 2013<br />
Matthew Jennings<br />
Head <strong>of</strong> <strong>History</strong> and Editor <strong>of</strong> Timeline<br />
Back Page: Egyptian Protestors in 2011<br />
Dr Martin Luther King Jnr. 1963<br />
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<strong>Ardingly</strong> <strong>College</strong> Haywards Heath West Sussex RH17 6SQ<br />
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