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To contract or not to contract? - Reed Smith

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TO CONTRACT OR NOT TO CONTRACT<br />

Feature<br />

Auth<strong>or</strong>s <strong>To</strong>m Hibbert and Ge<strong>or</strong>ge Hoare<br />

<strong>To</strong> <strong>contract</strong> <strong>or</strong> <strong>not</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>contract</strong><br />

The recent case of<br />

(1) Maple Leaf<br />

Macro Volatility Master Fund (2)<br />

Astin Capital Management Limited v Rouvroy<br />

and a<strong>not</strong>her<br />

[2009] EWHC 257 (Comm)<br />

serves as a reminder of the English courts’<br />

general reluctance <strong>to</strong> accede <strong>to</strong> arguments<br />

based on non-enf<strong>or</strong>ceability and <strong>contract</strong>ual<br />

uncertainty.<br />

Indeed, Maple Leaf<br />

follows earlier<br />

auth<strong>or</strong>ities, such as Bear Stearns Bank Plc v<br />

F<strong>or</strong>um Global Equity Ltd [2007] EWHC 1576<br />

(Comm), in demonstrating the English courts’<br />

desire <strong>to</strong> hold <strong>contract</strong>ual parties <strong>to</strong> their<br />

bargain. An awareness of this approach is useful<br />

f<strong>or</strong> practitioners, as the fallout from the credit<br />

crunch will mean the steps taken in f<strong>or</strong>ming a<br />

<strong>contract</strong> will come under greater scrutiny.<br />

MAPLE LEAF<br />

The case involved a dispute between Maple<br />

Leaf, a Cayman inc<strong>or</strong>p<strong>or</strong>ated hedge fund,<br />

and Astin, an investment manager, on the<br />

one hand, and the seni<strong>or</strong> executives of a<br />

French drinks company on the other. The<br />

defendants sought <strong>to</strong> raise €30m <strong>to</strong> fund<br />

their acquisition of shares in a large French<br />

holding company.<br />

The parties negotiated a termsheet with<br />

Maple Leaf as lender, which was signed by<br />

Maple Leaf, Astin and the defendants but <strong>not</strong><br />

by a<strong>not</strong>her party <strong>to</strong> the termsheet. Following<br />

the subscription f<strong>or</strong> securities by Maple Leaf,<br />

the defendants attempted <strong>to</strong> re-negotiate<br />

the termsheet. This caused Maple Leaf <strong>to</strong><br />

seek repayment of the loan. In response the<br />

defendants argued that the termsheet was<br />

neither binding n<strong>or</strong> enf<strong>or</strong>ceable.<br />

<strong>Smith</strong> J found that the following questions<br />

arose:<br />

whether the parties intended <strong>to</strong> make a<br />

<strong>contract</strong>ually binding agreement; and<br />

whether the agreement was <strong>to</strong>o uncertain<br />

<strong>to</strong> be a <strong>contract</strong>.<br />

Intention <strong>to</strong> create legal relations<br />

The defendants argued that by signing the<br />

termsheet, they did <strong>not</strong> intend <strong>to</strong> enter in<strong>to</strong><br />

KEY POINTS<br />

The English courts take a robust approach <strong>to</strong> arguments concerning <strong>contract</strong> f<strong>or</strong>mation<br />

and <strong>contract</strong>ual certainty.<br />

Although the f<strong>or</strong>mation of a <strong>contract</strong> is traditionally analysed in terms of whether an offer<br />

has been accepted, the law does <strong>not</strong> require rig<strong>or</strong>ous compliance with an analysis along<br />

these lines.<br />

The intention <strong>to</strong> create legal relations is assessed objectively, by a reasonable man versed in<br />

the relevant business, with the particular market practice being significant.<br />

In the current economic climate, it is likely that parties will seek <strong>to</strong> avoid the<br />

consequences of arrangements reached with other parties which have become<br />

commercially unprofitable <strong>or</strong> which they are no longer able <strong>to</strong> perf<strong>or</strong>m. This often<br />

leads <strong>to</strong> disputes, with one party attempting <strong>to</strong> enf<strong>or</strong>ce the terms of the ‘agreement’<br />

while the other claims the ‘agreement’ reached is neither binding n<strong>or</strong> enf<strong>or</strong>ceable <strong>or</strong><br />

is <strong>to</strong>o uncertain <strong>to</strong> constitute a binding agreement.<br />

a <strong>contract</strong> as they said that such documents<br />

were <strong>not</strong> considered legally binding.<br />

Instead the termsheet simply signaled a<br />

non-<strong>contract</strong>ual commitment <strong>to</strong> continue<br />

negotiations.<br />

Under English law, an agreement merely <strong>to</strong><br />

negotiate is <strong>not</strong> recognised as an enf<strong>or</strong>ceable<br />

<strong>contract</strong>. In Walf<strong>or</strong>d v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128,<br />

the House of L<strong>or</strong>ds approved L<strong>or</strong>d Denning’s<br />

comments that agreements <strong>to</strong> negotiate are<br />

unenf<strong>or</strong>ceable because they are <strong>to</strong>o uncertain<br />

<strong>to</strong> have any binding f<strong>or</strong>ce, with the courts<br />

applying ‘the general principle that where<br />

there is a fundamental matter left undecided<br />

and <strong>to</strong> be the subject of negotiation, there is<br />

no <strong>contract</strong>’.<br />

In Maple Leaf, <strong>Smith</strong> J declined <strong>to</strong> find<br />

that, when they signed the termsheet, the<br />

defendants considered they were entering in<strong>to</strong><br />

a legal and <strong>contract</strong>ual<br />

commitment. However,<br />

this did <strong>not</strong> assist the defendants. In deciding<br />

whether the parties entered in<strong>to</strong> a <strong>contract</strong>,<br />

the courts n<strong>or</strong>mally apply an objective test.<br />

The relevant legal principles are explained<br />

in the judgments of Bingham J and Lloyd LJ<br />

in Pagnan Spa v Feed Producers Ltd [1987] 2<br />

Lloyd’s Rep 601.<br />

The first question <strong>to</strong> ask is how a<br />

reasonable man versed in the relevant business<br />

would have unders<strong>to</strong>od the exchanges<br />

between the parties. The fact that the parties<br />

recognised that their agreement would be<br />

inc<strong>or</strong>p<strong>or</strong>ated in<strong>to</strong> a f<strong>or</strong>mal, m<strong>or</strong>e detailed,<br />

document is <strong>not</strong> inconsistent with an<br />

intention <strong>to</strong> be legally bound. As Lloyd LJ<br />

stated in Pagnan, ‘there is no legal obstacle<br />

<strong>to</strong> the parties agreeing <strong>to</strong> be bound while<br />

deferring imp<strong>or</strong>tant matters <strong>to</strong> be agreed<br />

later’. Applying this principle <strong>to</strong> the facts of<br />

Maple Leaf, <strong>Smith</strong> J held that, on an objective<br />

assessment, the termsheet evinced an<br />

intention <strong>to</strong> be bound <strong>contract</strong>ually.<br />

Agreement <strong>to</strong>o uncertain<br />

<strong>Smith</strong> J <strong>not</strong>ed that the courts are reluctant <strong>to</strong><br />

conclude that what the parties intended <strong>to</strong> be<br />

a commercial agreement is <strong>to</strong>o uncertain <strong>to</strong><br />

be <strong>contract</strong>ually effective (Sykes v Fine Fare<br />

[1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53; Trentham v Archital<br />

Luxfer<br />

[1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 25).<br />

As part of the funding agreement, the<br />

securities subscribed f<strong>or</strong> by Maple Leaf<br />

were <strong>to</strong> be transferred <strong>to</strong> a special purpose<br />

vehicle (‘SPV’) which s<strong>to</strong>od as security f<strong>or</strong><br />

the repayment of the funding. In return,<br />

the defendants agreed that they would<br />

place other securities in the SPV as further<br />

collateral.<br />

The termsheet did <strong>not</strong> define in detail who<br />

the members and direct<strong>or</strong>s of the SPV were<br />

<strong>to</strong> be, n<strong>or</strong> how the SPV was <strong>to</strong> be prevented<br />

from disposing of the collateral. These were<br />

matters of such imp<strong>or</strong>tance, the defendants<br />

argued, that no <strong>contract</strong> could be concluded<br />

without the parties’ agreement upon them.<br />

Notwithstanding that these outstanding<br />

fact<strong>or</strong>s were imp<strong>or</strong>tant, the judge did <strong>not</strong><br />

accept the defendants’ argument. As the<br />

agreement provided that the defendants<br />

were <strong>to</strong> take ‘all steps <strong>to</strong> establish SAV<br />

[unders<strong>to</strong>od <strong>to</strong> mean SPV]’, this required<br />

them <strong>to</strong> establish a company that would<br />

fulfil the role contemplated by the agreement<br />

but with the defendants aff<strong>or</strong>ded discretion<br />

as <strong>to</strong> its nature. If they did <strong>not</strong> establish<br />

the SPV, they b<strong>or</strong>e personal liability. Thus<br />

the agreement was <strong>not</strong> <strong>to</strong>o uncertain <strong>to</strong> be<br />

w<strong>or</strong>kable.<br />

314<br />

June 2009<br />

Butterw<strong>or</strong>ths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law


Biog box<br />

<strong>To</strong>m Hibbert is a partner and Ge<strong>or</strong>ge Hoare is an associate at <strong>Reed</strong> <strong>Smith</strong> in London.<br />

Email: thibbert@reedsmith.com and ghoare@reedsmith.com<br />

BEAR STEARNS<br />

Maple Leaf, unsurprisingly, has striking<br />

similarities <strong>to</strong> the earlier judgment of <strong>Smith</strong><br />

J in Bear Stearns.<br />

In this case, from March 2005, F<strong>or</strong>um and<br />

Bear Stearns negotiated the sale of F<strong>or</strong>um’s<br />

loan <strong>not</strong>es issued by two Parmalat companies,<br />

with the main focus of the negotiations being<br />

the price. In a telephone conversation in July<br />

2005, F<strong>or</strong>um agreed <strong>to</strong> sell the loan <strong>not</strong>es <strong>to</strong><br />

Bear Stearns f<strong>or</strong> €2.9m.<br />

Both parties agreed that their respective<br />

lawyers would prepare the transactional<br />

documents. They were aiming f<strong>or</strong> a settlement<br />

date by early September, although Bear<br />

Stearns made it clear that it could <strong>not</strong> commit<br />

<strong>to</strong> a settlement date.<br />

A dispute arose as <strong>to</strong> whether the<br />

telephone conversation had created a binding<br />

<strong>contract</strong>. F<strong>or</strong>um argued, inter alia, that no<br />

<strong>contract</strong> was f<strong>or</strong>med because:<br />

the parties had simply made an<br />

‘agreement <strong>to</strong> agree’; and<br />

the parties did <strong>not</strong> intend <strong>to</strong> create legal<br />

relations.<br />

‘Agreement <strong>to</strong> agree’<br />

F<strong>or</strong>um submitted that the parties deferred<br />

reaching agreement about the settlement<br />

date, and argued that cases such as May &<br />

Butcher v R [1934] 2 KB demonstrated that<br />

an agreement is <strong>not</strong> <strong>contract</strong>ually concluded<br />

if it leaves significant matters subject <strong>to</strong> the<br />

parties’ future agreement.<br />

Based on the evidence of the negotiations,<br />

<strong>Smith</strong> J did <strong>not</strong> conclude that the parties<br />

had arranged that there would be further<br />

discussions about the settlement date in <strong>or</strong>der<br />

that they make a binding commitment and so<br />

complete their <strong>contract</strong>.<br />

The discussions were only relevant <strong>to</strong><br />

when the parties might expect settlement<br />

<strong>to</strong> take place, and the judge held that the<br />

parties intended <strong>to</strong> enter in<strong>to</strong> a <strong>contract</strong><br />

without any express term as <strong>to</strong> the<br />

settlement date.<br />

Intention <strong>to</strong> create legal relations<br />

On this point, <strong>Smith</strong> J also stated that<br />

the relevant principle <strong>to</strong> apply was how<br />

the reasonable man, versed in the relevant<br />

business, would have unders<strong>to</strong>od the<br />

exchanges between the parties.<br />

He <strong>not</strong>ed that in deciding whether<br />

parties evinced the necessary intention <strong>to</strong><br />

create <strong>contract</strong>ual relations, it is imp<strong>or</strong>tant <strong>to</strong><br />

remember the market in which the parties were<br />

conducting their negotiations. Expert evidence<br />

showed that the distressed debt market almost<br />

always operated on the basis of <strong>or</strong>al deals.<br />

Explicit w<strong>or</strong>ds were needed <strong>to</strong> avoid a binding<br />

<strong>contract</strong> being made at the point at which the<br />

price was agreed. On the facts, when F<strong>or</strong>um<br />

accepted Bear Stearns’ firm bid of €2.9m it<br />

showed an intention <strong>to</strong> conclude the <strong>contract</strong>.<br />

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS<br />

A legacy of the credit crunch is a likely<br />

increase in litigation in which <strong>contract</strong>ual<br />

parties seek <strong>to</strong> avoid <strong>or</strong> enf<strong>or</strong>ce purp<strong>or</strong>ted<br />

agreements. Such cases will turn on the<br />

factual matrix and the particular market in<br />

which negotiations take place.<br />

However, the English courts take a robust<br />

approach <strong>to</strong> arguments concerning <strong>contract</strong><br />

f<strong>or</strong>mation and <strong>contract</strong>ual certainty. Both<br />

Maple Leaf<br />

and Bear Stearns demonstrate this<br />

and the following conclusions can be drawn:<br />

Intention <strong>to</strong> create legal relations<br />

This is assessed objectively, by a reasonable<br />

man versed in the relevant business, with the<br />

particular market practice being significant.<br />

In both cases, the court <strong>to</strong>ok the view that<br />

the parties intended <strong>to</strong> be bound, in spite of<br />

the fact that further significant terms still<br />

had <strong>to</strong> be agreed. In the Bear Stearns case, the<br />

parties had only reached an <strong>or</strong>al agreement<br />

by telephone f<strong>or</strong> the price of the <strong>not</strong>es.<br />

Although concerned with the distressed debt<br />

market, this principle could well be applied <strong>to</strong><br />

other markets where <strong>contract</strong>s are agreed by<br />

telephone.<br />

Acceptance of an offer<br />

Maple Leaf<br />

is significant f<strong>or</strong> <strong>Smith</strong> J’s<br />

comments about the ‘proper approach’ <strong>to</strong><br />

the question of whether a party entered in<strong>to</strong><br />

a <strong>contract</strong>. He states that f<strong>or</strong>mation of a<br />

Feature<br />

<strong>contract</strong> is traditionally analysed in terms<br />

of whether an offer was accepted. However,<br />

‘the law does <strong>not</strong> require rig<strong>or</strong>ous compliance<br />

with an analysis along these lines’.<br />

The court will, if appropriate, ‘assess a<br />

person’s conduct over a period and decide<br />

whether its cumulative effect is that he has<br />

evinced an intention <strong>to</strong> make the <strong>contract</strong>’.<br />

In supp<strong>or</strong>t of this, the judge referred <strong>to</strong> The<br />

Zephyr<br />

[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58 and Trentham.<br />

On the facts of Maple Leaf, a <strong>contract</strong>ual<br />

party was bound by the agreement, even<br />

though it had only agreed <strong>to</strong> an earlier<br />

version of the <strong>contract</strong>. The question <strong>to</strong> apply<br />

was whether what was introduced in<strong>to</strong> the<br />

new version would have been regarded by a<br />

reasonable invest<strong>or</strong> as introducing a new term<br />

in<strong>to</strong> the bargain rather than an acceptance<br />

of the terms already agreed. In Maple Leaf,<br />

"The distressed debt market almost always operated<br />

on the basis of <strong>or</strong>al deals."<br />

<strong>Smith</strong> J ruled that there was no such new term<br />

introduced and so held that the party had<br />

entered in<strong>to</strong> the <strong>contract</strong>.<br />

Uncertainty<br />

The courts remain reluctant <strong>to</strong> find an<br />

apparently binding agreement unenf<strong>or</strong>ceable<br />

due <strong>to</strong> uncertainty, especially if a party has<br />

taken steps <strong>to</strong> implement the <strong>contract</strong>.<br />

Such a position has a long hist<strong>or</strong>y, with<br />

the House of L<strong>or</strong>ds <strong>not</strong>ing in Hillas & Co<br />

Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 L.T. 503 that<br />

businessmen ‘often rec<strong>or</strong>d the most imp<strong>or</strong>tant<br />

agreements in crude and summary fashion<br />

… [I]t is acc<strong>or</strong>dingly the duty of the Court <strong>to</strong><br />

construe such documents fairly and broadly<br />

without being <strong>to</strong>o astute <strong>or</strong> subtle at finding<br />

defects’.<br />

Courts are even m<strong>or</strong>e unlikely <strong>to</strong> deem<br />

an agreement <strong>to</strong>o uncertain if a party has<br />

taken steps <strong>to</strong>wards implementing its side of<br />

the bargain, as the claimants did in Maple<br />

Leaf. As L<strong>or</strong>d Denning stated in Sykes, when<br />

‘an agreement has been acted upon and the<br />

parties … have been put <strong>to</strong> great expense in<br />

implementing it, we [the courts] ought <strong>to</strong><br />

imply all reasonable terms so as <strong>to</strong> avoid any<br />

uncertainties.’<br />

•<br />

TO CONTRACT OR NOT TO CONTRACT<br />

•<br />

Butterw<strong>or</strong>ths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law June 2009 315

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