OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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There is a full scale civil war and the wave of violence and religious radicalization spreads over Pakistan, effectively contributing to increased insecurity and destabilization of Pakistan. Implications US and her allies continue implicating Pakistan as an abettor of terrorism. Continuous presence of US forces in a volatile neighbourhood would pose serious threats to the internal stability of Pakistan in particular and the region in general. Drone strikes continue breaching the sovereignty of Pakistan thus inviting public wrath, unless, a regime change in Pakistan post 2013 general elections reverses the situation. Pakistan may have to bear extra burden in terms of more refugees from Afghanistan. Pakistan military overstretches to new extremes. Narco trade and its nexus with terrorism increases. Pakistan’s economy remains under continuing stress. There are four possible policy options for Pakistan:- PART-V POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN Constructive Engagement: Continue existing policy with necessary modifications and finetuning. (Recommended) Regional Approach: Try to seek a solution in concert with Afghanistan’s neighbours, Russia and China and other regional players. Not advisable. (Not recommended) Neutrality: Not affordable in view of the porous border and direct impact of Afghan situation on Pakistan. (Not recommended) Aggressive Engagement: Try to keep Afghanistan under Pakistan’s sphere of influence, seek to manipulate internal politics, seek strict harmonization of Afghan policies with those of Pakistan. Not advisable.(Not recommended) Elements of Proposed Policy Conclusion Support Afghan-led and Afghan-owned solutions. Coordinate with all key stake holders, namely US, Iran, Russia, CARs, Turkey and China through existing bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral forums and creating new forums where necessary. Work closely with Afghanistan and other stake holders to eliminate terrorism and extremism. Develop modern border control mechanisms, without restricting legal cross border movement. Neutrality in dealing with Afghan factions and ethnic groups. Develop close ties with Afghanistan in conformity with norms of inter-state conduct. Build mutually beneficial partnerships in transit, trade, connectivity and energy corridors at the intra and inter regional levels. Intensify cooperation under OIC, ECO, SCO, UN, NAM, CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) and SAARC. Develop mechanisms for orderly return of refugees. Afghan situation remains highly volatile and complex. The success of the transitional process depends on resolving the political conflict, which in turn depends on the success or failure of the reconciliation process. There are lingering fears that Afghanistan may once again descend into a chaotic situation after the planned drawdown of US/NATO/ISAF forces in 2014. This would be the likely scenario if the reconciliation process failed. The situation would further aggravate if the regional players jumped in to fill the vacuum and support their respective proxies, the way they did during the 1990s. This OPINION Vol.1 No.1 90 June 2013
scenario would have grave implications for Pakistan in terms of aggravation of the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism, with devastating impact on Pakistan’s national security, foreign relations, national cohesion and unity, economy and image. In the more likely scenario, Afghanistan, while tumbling through odds, would ultimately stabilize in the mid to long term perspective. The first decade or so after the drawdown would, in any scenario, be highly volatile and full of challenges for both Afghanistan itself, as well as Pakistan. This scenario is based on the assumptions that: the reconciliation process would succeed in bringing about a power sharing arrangement with the dominant Taliban faction; the potency and cohesion of ANSF would be ensured; financial support to the Kabul set-up would be guaranteed; regional players would not have the temptation to fill any vacuum. And these rather optimistic assumptions are in turn based on the facts that: the US has finally turned around towards reconciliation (Kabul regime was already convinced); the Taliban, on their part have shown willingness to engage in negotiations; the regional players have vital stakes in peace and stability in Afghanistan and do not stand to gain anything from the continuing violence and turmoil. The interests of internal as well as external players, thus, practically converge at this juncture, on restoration and peace and stability in Afghanistan, rather than continuation of the conflict and violence. Researcher: Supervisor: By: Amb Aslam Khan, Brig Rizwan Rafi, Col William Sterling (USA), Lt Col Shuja Anwar Brig Najeeb Ahmed Endnotes 1 www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm 2 Johnson Thomas H., Afghanistan’s post-Taliban Transition--the state of state-building after war, p1, accessed at http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pubs/Central 3 Brumberg, Daniel and Shehata, Dina, Conflict, Identify, and Reform in the Muslim World-Challenges for US Engagement. United States Institute for Peace, Wahington.2009.P.175. 4 ibid 5 Steve Coll, “Looking for Mullah Omar”, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/23/120123fa_fact_coll, Accessed October 21, 2012. 6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases dated 15 and 30 November 2012 accessed at: http://www.mofa.gov.pk 7 Javid Ahmed, Elections 2014 – Afghans Chance to Get it Right,http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/10/election_2014_afghanistans_chance_to_get_it_right. Accessed October 2, 2012. 8 Chicago Summit Declaration – 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htmmode=pressrelease.Accessed October, 6, 2012. 9 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and US Policy, Congressional Research Services. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/174244.pdf. Accessed September, 30, 2012. 10 Rotberg Robert, Building a new Afghanistan Lahore, (Lahore, Vanguard Books, 2009), 102. 11 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Rise of the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); A. Giustozzi, Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects (New York: The Century Foundation, June 2010). 12 Mullah Omar, in “First interview with the Islamic Emirate Magazine,” undated, probably late 1990 or early 2000s; www.alemarh.com, via Archive (page saved Aug 2001). 13 Institute for the Study of War, “Hizb-i-IslamiGulbuddin (HIG)” http://www.understandingwar.org/hizb-i-islamigulbuddin-hig 14 A profile of the faction and its activities is provided in: Joshua Partlow. “In Afghan War, Haqqani Group Is ‘Resilient’ Foe.” Washington Post, May 30, 2011. 15 “Thus, ideal cooperation between Afghanistan and the region depends on the degree to which regional issues such as the Kashmir problem can be resolved.” Haroun Mir, “Afghanistan”, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, “Is a Regional Strategy Viable for Afghanistan” p.9 OPINION Vol.1 No.1 91 June 2013
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O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
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MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
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Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
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post-Arab Spring transition in the
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Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
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Infrastructural Development It
Page 17 and 18:
Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
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Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
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of peace negotiations, saying that
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
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Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
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Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
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COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
Page 31 and 32:
US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
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Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
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• Determine the punishment regime
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other states, or produce counter na
Page 39 and 40:
Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
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protecting Indian investments overs
Page 43 and 44:
India’s Military. Indian military
Page 45 and 46: India has neither been able to prod
Page 47 and 48: In an idealistic scenario, where In
Page 49 and 50: Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
Page 51 and 52: come to dominate the 21 st century
Page 53 and 54: In the face of the growing importan
Page 55 and 56: Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
Page 57 and 58: power in central and provincial gov
Page 59 and 60: Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
Page 61 and 62: Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
Page 63 and 64: the region of Northwest Africa, wes
Page 65 and 66: Transparency International report f
Page 67 and 68: leading to the best case scenario.
Page 69 and 70: Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
Page 71 and 72: PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74: the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87 and 88: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 89 and 90: Tranche 1: began transition in July
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95: influence and eastern and southern
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109 and 110: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 111 and 112: INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117 and 118: or the establishment of stability a
Page 119 and 120: Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123 and 124: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 125 and 126: American Operational Art - WW II O
Page 127 and 128: war began. By early 1951, the fight
Page 129 and 130: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 131 and 132: WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
Page 139 and 140: • Terrorists now have transnation
Page 141 and 142: hierarchical organizations. Technol
Page 143 and 144: Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
Page 145 and 146: PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
Page 147 and 148:
Commission for Human Security, co c
Page 149:
3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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