OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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insurgents and actual insurgents in all areas where they have been and continue to operate, regardless of ISAF operational tempo. The ISAF Commanding General, General John Allen, told journalists in October 2011 “that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously assessed.” The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”) The Taliban is by far the largest opposition armed group in Afghanistan, accounting for more than 80 per cent of the total number of insurgents. Although Mullah Omar’s leadership is largely undisputed, the extent to which the Taliban leadership is able to control its rank and file is a matter of debate. It relies on a mix of incentives, rewards, and direct orders to ensure a degree of compliance. 11 The Taliban’s “stated goals” are three-fold: 1) consolidation (iqrar) of an Islamic system; 2) unite the country and prevent it from being divided; and 3) provide security and peace in the country.” 12 Hizbi-Islami Hizbi-Islami is the second-largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, accounting for perhaps 10 percent of the strength of the insurgency. Hizbi-Islami’s relations with the Taliban are often troubled, and the two groups have fought each other in the recent past; as of early 2011 they seem to have patched up and are fighting together again. 13 Al Qaeda Al Qaeda had a small presence in Afghanistan by late 2010, with probably tens rather than hundreds of cadres operating in Afghan territory. These cadres operated mainly as advisers, specialists, and trainers, giving them a greater value than their small numbers would suggest. It is difficult to judge Al Qaeda’s strategy in Afghanistan, but certainly they oppose negotiations and will try to do whatever they can to sabotage them. Their likely strategy is to keep the Afghan front open as long as possible in order to weaken the American enemy and prevent future intervention in the Arab world. Haqqani Faction or Network (HQN) The Americans believe that the HQN is arguably the most lethal threat to Afghan security. It is reported that the Haqqani Network are also in league with the Pakistani Taliban, who are fighting the Pakistani Army, which are allegedly a tacit supporter of Haqqani. Regardless of its anti-Karzai stance, this organization remains closer to Al Qaeda than to the Afghan Taliban. Al Qaeda fighters, which are operating in Afghanistan, are reportedly embedded with Haqqani fighters. 14 It is alleged that the network’s targeting of Indian interests within Afghanistan encourages the speculation of a tie to Pakistan. US Security Policy, 2014 Transition, and Beyond The policy goal of the Obama Administration is “to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for global terrorism.” However, the criteria for reaching this goal have for the most part revolved around the level or degree to which the government of Afghanistan and the ANSF can defend the country, govern effectively, and develop economically. The US’s mission is now moving fast toward changing from a “combat leadership to a mentoring and over-watch” role by mid-2013. In Kabul in May 2012, President Obama signed the critical U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement with President Karzai. This agreement is critical in establishing both a long-term commitment between the two nations and provides a political framework, which will define relations between the United States and Afghanistan. Additionally, Afghanistan has signed other partnership agreements with many of the NATO Allies or ISAF partners notwithstanding other regional countries, notably India. The UN/Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) determined that the ANA would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to approximately 134,000. The ANSF was able to reach that level in September 2011, one month in advance. Due to the anticipation of an ISAF drawdown and the desire to approach the required force ratios to conduct counterinsurgency in accordance with US doctrine, a larger target size of 352,000 was set. This end strength was set for November 2012, but was reached by the end of September 2012, two months ahead of schedule. As the ANSF and the corresponding state security apparatus is funded almost entirely through international donations, the subject of sustaining the ANSF after 2014 was and remains a major issue. The Obama administration’s goal for the drawdown of US forces is for partner drawdown to coincide with US forces and in relative proportion as follows: OPINION Vol.1 No.1 82 June 2013
Tranche 1: began transition in July 2011 consisting of three relatively stable provinces: Kabul, Panjshir, and Bamiyan. Tranche 2: began transition in December 2011 and focused on the provinces of Balkh, Dai Kundi, Takhar, Samangan, Nimruz, and areas of Kabul province, which had not already transitioned. Tranche 3: began transition in June 2012: The successful completion of this tranche will mean 75% of Afghanistan’s population will now be in areas where the ANSF is responsible for security. The fifth and final tranche is planned for completion by mid-2013 an important milestone in NATO’s Lisbon roadmap. PART- III ROLE OF NEIGHBOURING STATES AND REGIONAL PLAYERS Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional players have legitimate interests and stakes in the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan. Each one of them is affected, in varying degrees, by the fallout of the Afghan crisis. Following is an assessment of the interests and roles of these states. Islamic Republic of Iran Iranian interests in Afghanistan include; enhancing Iranian influence and leverage in Afghanistan, strengthening Shia and pro Iran factions in the Afghan dispensation, preventing the return to power of Taliban and removal of US forces from Afghanistan. In addition, it is also in the quest for development of communications links in collaboration with India to turn ChahBahar port into a hub of transit and trade with landlocked Afghanistan and Eurasia. Iran would also like to secure its borders with Afghanistan, control of narcotics and trans-border crimes and return of Afghan refugees from its soil. As Iranian and US interests generally converge on Taliban, enhanced role of non-Pashtuns, and Indian role in Afghanistan, Iran’s role in the context of the 2014 drawdown is expected to remain generally positive and non-confrontational, despite the growing tensions between the two sides over Iranian nuclear programme. Withdrawal of the bulk of foreign forces itself is a significant incentive for Iran, though it will remain wary of continued US footprint. The Central Asian Republics (CARs) The common interests of CARs include; eliminating the threats of terrorism, extremism, separatism and control of narcotic drugs and trans-border crimes flowing out of Afghanistan. In view of the strong convergence of interests, the CARs are likely to play a supportive role in the 2014 transition. Peoples Republic of China While maintaining low political profile, China is trying to establish solid economic foothold in Afghanistan through expansion of trade ties and investment in the mining and energy sectors. China is the largest investor in Afghanistan. Chinese interests in Afghanistan include: restoration of peace in Afghanistan and elimination of the threats of terrorism, extremism and separatism, and engagement in mutually beneficial cooperation in transit and trade, mining and energy fields. China would also like to prevent Russia and India military foothold in Afghanistan. While US military bases in Afghanistan may not be of permanent nature. China’s interests dictate that it goes along with the process led by the United States. Slowly and gradually gaining strategic, political, and economic foothold in transformed Afghanistan. Russian Federation Russian interests at the present juncture include; gaining strategic, political, and economic foothold in transformed Afghanistan; eliminating the threats of terrorism, extremism and separatism; preventing permanent US military bases in Afghanistan; control of narcotic drugs and trans-border crimes flowing out of Afghanistan and engagement in mutually beneficial cooperation in transit and energy fields. Russia’s interests dictate that it goes along with the US led transition in 2014. Russia, along with China and Iran, is likely to oppose long term US footprint. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 83 June 2013
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O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
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MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
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Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
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post-Arab Spring transition in the
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Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
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Infrastructural Development It
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Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
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Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
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of peace negotiations, saying that
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Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
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Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
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Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
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COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most compl
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US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
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Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
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• Determine the punishment regime
Page 37 and 38: other states, or produce counter na
Page 39 and 40: Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
Page 41 and 42: protecting Indian investments overs
Page 43 and 44: India’s Military. Indian military
Page 45 and 46: India has neither been able to prod
Page 47 and 48: In an idealistic scenario, where In
Page 49 and 50: Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
Page 51 and 52: come to dominate the 21 st century
Page 53 and 54: In the face of the growing importan
Page 55 and 56: Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
Page 57 and 58: power in central and provincial gov
Page 59 and 60: Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
Page 61 and 62: Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
Page 63 and 64: the region of Northwest Africa, wes
Page 65 and 66: Transparency International report f
Page 67 and 68: leading to the best case scenario.
Page 69 and 70: Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
Page 71 and 72: PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74: the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80: can cause capital flight, which is
Page 81 and 82: Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
Page 83 and 84: Conclusion of other hostile element
Page 85 and 86: 58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
Page 87: Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
Page 91 and 92: PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
Page 93 and 94: Indian and Chinese involvement in d
Page 95 and 96: influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98: scenario would have grave implicati
Page 99 and 100: In present day Asia, three big demo
Page 101 and 102: Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
Page 103 and 104: The increase in glacial melting may
Page 105 and 106: Demography. Unplanned expansion of
Page 107 and 108: Legislate to ensure energy efficien
Page 109 and 110: 26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
Page 111 and 112: INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
Page 113 and 114: During the conflict, leaders/offici
Page 115 and 116: Pakistan, India, without any formal
Page 117 and 118: or the establishment of stability a
Page 119 and 120: Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
Page 121 and 122: The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
Page 123 and 124: Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
Page 125 and 126: American Operational Art - WW II O
Page 127 and 128: war began. By early 1951, the fight
Page 129 and 130: • Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
Page 131 and 132: WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
Page 133 and 134: 35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
Page 135 and 136: are not necessarily new. The four e
Page 137 and 138: Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
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• Terrorists now have transnation
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hierarchical organizations. Technol
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Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
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PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
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Commission for Human Security, co c
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3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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