OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

insurgents and actual insurgents in all areas where they have been and continue to operate, regardless of
ISAF operational tempo. The ISAF Commanding General, General John Allen, told journalists in
October 2011 “that the numbers of insurgents may be far fewer than the 25,000 previously assessed.”
The Taliban (“Quetta Shura Taliban”)
The Taliban is by far the largest opposition armed group in Afghanistan, accounting for more
than 80 per cent of the total number of insurgents. Although Mullah Omar’s leadership is largely
undisputed, the extent to which the Taliban leadership is able to control its rank and file is a matter of
debate. It relies on a mix of incentives, rewards, and direct orders to ensure a degree of compliance. 11
The Taliban’s “stated goals” are three-fold: 1) consolidation (iqrar) of an Islamic system; 2)
unite the country and prevent it from being divided; and 3) provide security and peace in the country.” 12
Hizbi-Islami
Hizbi-Islami is the second-largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, accounting for perhaps
10 percent of the strength of the insurgency. Hizbi-Islami’s relations with the Taliban are often troubled,
and the two groups have fought each other in the recent past; as of early 2011 they seem to have patched
up and are fighting together again. 13
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda had a small presence in Afghanistan by late 2010, with probably tens rather than
hundreds of cadres operating in Afghan territory. These cadres operated mainly as advisers, specialists,
and trainers, giving them a greater value than their small numbers would suggest. It is difficult to judge
Al Qaeda’s strategy in Afghanistan, but certainly they oppose negotiations and will try to do whatever
they can to sabotage them. Their likely strategy is to keep the Afghan front open as long as possible in
order to weaken the American enemy and prevent future intervention in the Arab world.
Haqqani Faction or Network (HQN)
The Americans believe that the HQN is arguably the most lethal threat to Afghan security. It is
reported that the Haqqani Network are also in league with the Pakistani Taliban, who are fighting the
Pakistani Army, which are allegedly a tacit supporter of Haqqani. Regardless of its anti-Karzai stance,
this organization remains closer to Al Qaeda than to the Afghan Taliban. Al Qaeda fighters, which are
operating in Afghanistan, are reportedly embedded with Haqqani fighters. 14 It is alleged that the
network’s targeting of Indian interests within Afghanistan encourages the speculation of a tie to Pakistan.
US Security Policy, 2014 Transition, and Beyond
The policy goal of the Obama Administration is “to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a
safe haven for global terrorism.” However, the criteria for reaching this goal have for the most part
revolved around the level or degree to which the government of Afghanistan and the ANSF can defend
the country, govern effectively, and develop economically. The US’s mission is now moving fast toward
changing from a “combat leadership to a mentoring and over-watch” role by mid-2013.
In Kabul in May 2012, President Obama signed the critical U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic
Partnership Agreement with President Karzai. This agreement is critical in establishing both a long-term
commitment between the two nations and provides a political framework, which will define relations
between the United States and Afghanistan. Additionally, Afghanistan has signed other partnership
agreements with many of the NATO Allies or ISAF partners notwithstanding other regional countries,
notably India.
The UN/Afghan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) determined that the ANA
would expand to 171,600 and the ANP to approximately 134,000. The ANSF was able to reach that
level in September 2011, one month in advance. Due to the anticipation of an ISAF drawdown and the
desire to approach the required force ratios to conduct counterinsurgency in accordance with US
doctrine, a larger target size of 352,000 was set. This end strength was set for November 2012, but was
reached by the end of September 2012, two months ahead of schedule. As the ANSF and the
corresponding state security apparatus is funded almost entirely through international donations, the
subject of sustaining the ANSF after 2014 was and remains a major issue.
The Obama administration’s goal for the drawdown of US forces is for partner drawdown to
coincide with US forces and in relative proportion as follows:
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 82 June 2013