OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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other states, or produce counter narratives, are more likely to succeed. The US narrative of ‘Weapons of<br />
Mass Destruction’ against Iraq and the recent West-sponsored narrative of freedom, which lead to the Arab<br />
Spring, are examples.<br />
Conclusion<br />
A nation can turn the disadvantages of being coerced to their advantage, i.e. by becoming coercers<br />
themselves, in order to pursue and achieve national interests. But this is possible only when the sum total<br />
of its Elements of <strong>National</strong> Power, i.e. military, economic, political and diplomatic are in tune with its<br />
<strong>National</strong> Aim, purpose, objectives and interests. No further proof of this statement is required other than to<br />
cast a cursory glance at the world map and see who are the coercers and who are the coerced states: and for<br />
what reasons.<br />
Researchers:<br />
Superviser:<br />
DIG Moazzam, Brig Cartwright (UK), Lt Col Shabeer and Lt Col Riazat<br />
Air Cdre Wasim Hussain<br />
Endnotes<br />
1 Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), 11.<br />
2 Lowenfeld International Economic Law (OUP Oxford 2002)<br />
3 http://www.brandywine.psu.edu/Academics/faculty_sjc2.htm<br />
4<br />
NDU hand book: Elements of <strong>National</strong> Power<br />
5 Quoted in G. Till, Sea Power: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 285.<br />
6 This is a less mathematical summary of Pape’s Denial Theory.<br />
7 Bruce Jentleson,Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the Contemporary World(The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief,<br />
December 2006), 3. http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/pab06CoerDip.pdf Accessed on 8 October 2012.<br />
8 Alexander L. George, “Theory and Practice,”in Alexander L George and William Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. (San<br />
Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 2 nd edition, 1994),10.<br />
9 “Think Quest, An Overview of Crises,” accessed October 10, 2012,http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/index.html<br />
10 Bruce Jentleson.<br />
11 Yahia H. Zoubir, The United States and Libya: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. (The Journal of North African Studies, 16, No. 2,<br />
2011): 275-297. Accessed on October 11, 2012.http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20<br />
12 Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, 15.<br />
13 Michael Klare, For Oil and EmpireRethinking War with Iraq. (Current History, March 2003).<br />
14 Leon Sigal, Negotiating with the North.(Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 2003).<br />
15 Brandon M. Boylan, Moving beyond Coercive Diplomacy: A New Policy Approach toward Iran’s Nuclear<br />
Ambitions.www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2009/5 Accessed on October 12, 2102.<br />
16 Malou Innocent,The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy with Iran. (Federation of American Scientist, August 1, 2012).<br />
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/limits-coercive-diplomacy-iranaccessed on 13 Oct 2012.<br />
17 Tom Sauer, Coercive diplomacy by the EU: the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis.(Third World Quarterly, Volume 28:3, April 13,<br />
2007). http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20 accessed on October14, 2012.<br />
18 Ibid<br />
19 Malou Innocent.<br />
20 Tom Sauer.<br />
21 Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig,The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. (Security<br />
Studies, Volume 14:2, 2005).http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsst20accessed on October 15, 2012.<br />
22 Ibid.<br />
23 S. Kalyanaraman. Operation Parakram: An Indian exercise in coercive diplomacy. (Strategic Analysis, Volume 26:4, 2002).<br />
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20Accessed on October 15, 2012.<br />
24 Ibid.<br />
25 Sharad Joshi. The Practice of Coercive Diplomacy in the Post – 9/11 Period.(Institutional Repository at the <strong>University</strong> of Pttsburg,<br />
October 2006), 77.<br />
26 William Burr, The United States and Pakistan’s Quest for the bomb. (<strong>National</strong> Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.<br />
333).http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm Accessed on 30 October 2012.<br />
27 Ibid<br />
28 Liam Collins, United States Diplomacy With Pakistan Following 9/11. (A Case Study in Coercive Diplomacy, 16 May 2008).<br />
29 For example, the sarin gas attacks in Japan between 1994 and 1995.<br />
30 David L. Asher, Victor D. Comras and Patrick M. Cronin.Coercive Economic Statecraft and U.S. <strong>National</strong> Security.(Center for a New<br />
American Security Jan 2011), 5.<br />
31 Michael H McMurphy, Coercion and Land Power.(Monogram of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, May<br />
1, 2000), 9.<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 31 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>