03.01.2015 Views

OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

proportionate validity of any threats and the ‘stick’ must not be overplayed because it is unlikely to get<br />

international support or be credible. Lastly, it will be more about ensuring stability than risking instability.<br />

LESSONS LEARNT AND WAY FORWARD<br />

Coercive statecraft has a long history, although geographically non-contiguous countries could live<br />

in isolation and function in a “business as usual” environment. However, due to globalization, the world is<br />

a smaller place. Although wars are still being fought, the frequency has dropped, giving rise to coercion as<br />

a preferred statecraft option.<br />

Coercive statecraft is viewed as more effective in asymmetric situations; conventional diplomacy<br />

works better amongst equals. But as an indispensable component of contemporary security, coercion<br />

merits thorough study, although it is not sufficiently consistent to be captured by theories. Thus, it should<br />

be handled carefully and used within a larger toolkit. The case studies indicate that coercive statecraft is<br />

more of an art than a science.<br />

Coercive statecraft also emphasizes the intangibles of a state’s Elements of <strong>National</strong> Power. Most<br />

studies agree that success in coercion depends largely on the coerced side, in particular its motivation to<br />

challenge and willingness to take risks. The coercer, especially in deterrence, cannot control the situation<br />

unless the coerced side has a low motivation to challenge.<br />

In order to obviate the chances of aggravating further the relationship among states, it is<br />

recommended that coercion is implemented with positive tools such as conflict resolution or some<br />

incentives such as financial help.<br />

Strategic coercion is about the challenger deciding on his terms for using the threat of force or the<br />

use of force. Nuclear weapons are neither entirely irrelevant, but nor do they dominate. Likewise, military<br />

superiority is not the only key and military balance is often unimportant. Thus decision-making models are<br />

central to coercion.<br />

Deterrence, though sometimes overly emphasized, is not always effective in application. On the<br />

contrary, “general coercion” with its long-term impact is not studied enough, although it is far more<br />

effective.<br />

If a nation is united and motivated to defend its legitimate national interests and ready to bear any<br />

cost for pursuing its own goals and objectives, it will have a large capacity to resist coercion.<br />

<strong>National</strong> decision makers need to accurately assess the art of the possible, both as coercer and as a<br />

potential coercion target. States with fully functioning institutions and diplomats, effective intelligence<br />

services and think tanks, that can coordinate objective, tailored and multi-layered analyses of regional and<br />

global politics, tend to provide such assessments.<br />

There is less chance of employing successful coercion against nations with geostrategic<br />

importance or who remain aligned and relevant to great powers. Whenever Pakistan comes under coercive<br />

pressure, factors that always emerge are its close relationship with Great Powers and its geostrategic<br />

position.<br />

At the first sign of coercion, coerced states have to take difficult decisions about their response.<br />

Democratic institutions that constantly take stock of changing global and regional environments respond<br />

better to emerging challenges.<br />

A state vulnerable to coercion cannot passively observe events. They should anticipate worldwide<br />

developments and proactively influence situations that directly affect their interests. Dynamic,<br />

constructive, pragmatic, flexible and proactive diplomacy can avoid or reduce the chances of being<br />

coerced.<br />

The role of national leadership during difficult times cannot be underestimated. Leaders with<br />

charismatic qualities like vision, character and articulation, sensitivity to national interests, courageous risk<br />

taking and unconventional behaviour, can make the nation stand behind him while taking difficult but<br />

correct decisions. States with such leadership find themselves in less difficult situations or cruise through<br />

hard times more smoothly.<br />

Under the present global information and media revolution, the environment is shaped more by<br />

international actors who influence states and masses through narratives, which are becoming a key<br />

coercive statecraft tool. States having the vision to strategize narratives that justify their actions against<br />

<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 30 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!