OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University
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to coerce Pakistan in 2001 failed due to these factors. A weaker nation can coerce a stronger nation if it can<br />
exploit the coercer nation’s vulnerabilities and sensitivities. Pakistan successfully did so following the<br />
Salala attack; getting a bargain that better served its interests.<br />
Factors Shaping Future Coercive Modalities<br />
FUTURE OF COERCIVE MODALITIES<br />
Multistate Associations. It is becoming increasingly rare for states to act unilaterally, due to the<br />
steady increase in inter-state treaties, associations and understandings. Many states belong to<br />
several key organizations that will shape and constrain relations with third party states. This means<br />
that any coercive strategy is more likely to need the international support or be multilateral and<br />
coalition based. However, the need for multilateral support may have exceptions, not least when<br />
there are advantages to not having it. US coercion against Iraq prior to 2003 is one example.<br />
Inter-State Conventional War. The likelihood of conventional inter-state wars is decreasing.<br />
Although the UN has limited power, states increasingly recognize the need for a UN mandate.<br />
Even powerful states, such as the USA, have seen the consequences of not obtaining such a<br />
mandate (e.g. in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq). This implies that threatening war is more<br />
likely to be a hollow threat, as the coerced state will be able to gauge international support for such<br />
a threat.<br />
Proxy Wars. Concerns about the impact of terrorism are increasing. Not least because of<br />
concerns about how deadly terrorist actions could become: in extremis, a credible concern that<br />
terrorists could obtain a Weapon of Mass Destruction 29 . Recent history has shown that fighting a<br />
proxy war by supporting militant organizations is a dangerous game. Support for the Mujahedeen<br />
against the Soviets led to the problems the Taliban are now causing across the region. In many<br />
cases, support from external powers of militant groups for short-term gains has led to the spawning<br />
of terrorist groups that subsequently become a threat to the sponsoring state.<br />
International Finance as a Coercion Tool. It is becoming more possible for powerful states to<br />
use financial power as an effective way of coercing weaker states. This new tool has been used by<br />
the US against North Korea and is an expansion of traditional economic sanctions through the<br />
addition of a more precise economic weapon. 30<br />
Worldwide Information Explosion. A key statecraft skill was to know everything about your<br />
adversary’s intentions while making sure they knew nothing about yours. The worldwide<br />
explosion in information availability, such as Wiki Leaks, has made the former easier but the latter<br />
increasingly difficult. There is therefore a trend towards more transparent diplomacy as anything<br />
less will have little credibility.<br />
Resource Security. While states have used coercion in the past largely for political reasons, to<br />
ensure territorial security, or to increase material wealth, future coercion is more likely to be about<br />
resource security.<br />
Stability Maintenance. Globalization makes it harder for states to isolate themselves from<br />
shocks, such as economic failure, in other states. There is therefore a greater willingness to<br />
prevent states failing. Another side to stability maintenance is that, in general, as states become<br />
more powerful, they become less popular with and more of a concern to neighbours. It is likely<br />
that the international community will increasingly work towards constraining both the US and<br />
China.<br />
A Future Coercion Framework based on Contemporary Analysis<br />
Several authors on contemporary coercive statecraft have identified these trends. It is possible to<br />
construct a framework for developing future coercive statecraft by blending these trends with elements of<br />
previous coercive assessment theories. For the basic framework, Alexander George’s classic model, as<br />
explained by Major Mc Murphy, 31 has been used as the starting point, with the 4 tasks becoming 4 steps:-<br />
Step One: Selection of the Aim<br />
• Decide the demands/ objectives.<br />
• Determine the time pressure.<br />
<strong>OPINION</strong> <strong>Vol.1</strong> <strong>No.1</strong> 28 <strong>June</strong> <strong>2013</strong>