OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

Indian Coercion of Pakistan – Operation Parakaram
The Issue. On 19 December 2001, an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi left all six
attackers and eight security force members dead 21 . India contended that the group had acted at
Pakistan’s behest and demanded that Pakistan ban the groups allegedly involved and extradite
twenty alleged terrorists, including the supposed mastermind of the 1993 Bombay blasts that killed
hundreds 22 . India simultaneously began deploying roughly five hundred thousand troops along the
border.
Proportionality. Options available to India were limited. Economic and trade sanctions were out,
given the low levels of trade between the countries. Limited strikes against alleged terrorist camps
would have served no purpose and general war was impossible due to Pakistan’s nuclear status.
Pakistan could not be isolated diplomatically, given its role in the campaign against terrorism.
Only military mobilization could be used to pressurize Pakistan 23 .
Reciprocity. India ignored the basic principles of ‘stick and carrot’ and did not agree to any
confidence building measures offered by Pakistan. At the same time, India had nothing to offer by
way of reward to induce Pakistan’s compliance 24 .
Threat Credibility. The credibility of India’s threat was compromised by Pakistan’s first use
nuclear doctrine in the event of a conventional war waged against Pakistan 25 . Furthermore, India’s
conventional capabilities were not overwhelming enough to support planned military strategies.
Coercions US – Pakistan
Conclusions
Nuclear Programme. In 1979, the US tried to force Pakistan to accept IAEA inspections and
stop uranium enrichment. Pakistan, noting no such conditions for the Indian nuclear programme,
did not agree. The US adopted a carrot and stick policy by offering arms supplies but cutting aid
and giving an "ultimatum" 26 . Despite intense pressure, Pakistan refused to allow inspections. In
the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan believed Washington was "reconciled to
a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability” 27 . However, the US continued to coerce Pakistan, which
the latter disregarded, especially after the Indian nuclear test in 1998.
Post 9/11 Attack. Pakistan and US had problematic relations, due to issues like Pakistan’s
nuclear explosions and alleged support of the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s help was essential for
logistics, intelligence sharing and space utilization in the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan so the
US coerced Pakistan into supporting the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite being
coerced, Pakistan made its own demands to gain a better-negotiated agreement: aid to revive the
economy, and making it clear that its strategic nuclear/ missile assets and its Kashmir stance would
not be negotiated 28 .
Post Salala Attack. US-Pakistan relations plummeted again when a US air strike killed 24
Pakistani soldiers on the Salala check-post. US officials claimed the attack was defence against
firing across the border. However, Pakistan declared the incident a deliberate attack, ordering the
US Army to evacuate a base used for US drones and suspending a NATO supply route. The latter
put Pakistan in a strong coercive position. Pakistan demanded an apology from the US, the
discontinuation of drone attacks and no future border-post attacks. The US resorted to coercion by
threatening sanctions. Due to the proportionate credibility on both sides, the issue was settled by
compromising and accommodating each other’s demands.
The Cuban Missile Crisis showed that coercion can only be successful against an equally powerful
country if demands are limited and proportional; there is a credible threat and incentives for compliance.
Economic coercion succeeds if augmented by carefully crafted carrot and stick policies and credible
punitive measures, as shown in the Libya case. A weaker nation can successfully resist coercion if
demands lack legitimacy, go against vital interests and the threat is not credible due to the coercer’s
vulnerabilities, as evident from North Korea’s and Pakistan’s resolve over nuclear programmes,
disregarding US coercion. The success of the coerced nation is linked to the motivation to challenge and
the willingness to take risks. Iran and North Korea’s successful diplomacy, not submitting to US demands,
are cases in point. Coercion can be resisted if the target nation possesses a nuclear weapon and/or strong
conventional forces, or if other geopolitical realities strongly favour the target nation. The Indian attempt
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 27 June 2013