OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

threaten their security. Coercer credibility of the ability to react on nuclear proliferation was a key
factor.
US Coercion of North Korea
The Issue. Since the Korean War, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) -US relations
have been through several crisis situations. The latest began in October 2002 over the DPRK’s
uranium enrichment programme. The US firmly maintained that the DPRK should not be allowed
to possess nuclear weapons and applied pressure through mechanisms such as the Six Party Talks
(US, North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia). However, Pyongyang rebuffed this
coercion and ratcheted up its own coercive diplomacy.
Coercive Diplomacy. After failure of the Six Party Talks, North Korea conducted first nuclear
weapon test in October 2005. Coercive diplomacy was then ratcheted up. The UNSC imposed
economic sanctions and threatened further measures. The strategy seemed to have some effect, as
North Korea announced a return to the six-party talks.
Proportionality. The coercer’s demands were too high: they were against the vital interests of
the adversary, so the asymmetry of interests favoured the adversary, making it more likely to
resist 12 . Both the US and North Korea had certain irreducible objectives, which caused them to
stick to their stated positions. The Bush Administration’s demands had unclear settlement
conditions because the US, chastened by North Korea’s secret nuclear programme, refused to
discuss concessions until its nuclear weapons programme was dismantled. The regime-change
agenda went beyond the fundamental interests of the US, making Pyongyang’s resolve stronger
and the American threat credibility weaker.
Reciprocity. North Korea declared the US/ UN imposed economic sanctions as an act of war 13 .
However, the US declined to ease sanctions unless the nuclear programme was abandoned. North
Korea demanded direct bilateral talks, which the US thought too much of a concession. North
Korea offered some concessions in the October 2002 talks 14 , but these were not up to minimum US
demands.
Coercer’s Credibility. Nuclear weapons, especially the deterrence capability, enable reverse
coercion, i.e. by the target state on the coercer. Pyongyang had much less to lose than members of
the US alliance in the region (South Korea, Japan and large number of American troops).
Coercion in the context of nuclear weapons reduced US coercive credibility.
Coercion of Iran
The Issue. Relations between the US and Islamic Republic of Iran have remained thorny since
the latter’s formation in 1979. Iran’s avoidance of nuclear inspections has aggravated the tension.
Consequently, President Bush called Iran a member of the “Axis of Evil” 15 in 2002 and applied
coercive statecraft.
Coercive Diplomacy. The US adopted a two-track policy. On one hand, coercive diplomacy of
economic and trade sanctions, Stuxnet 16 , threats of military strikes and attacks on its nuclear
scientists, on the other, diplomatic engagement offering incentives.
Reciprocity. US coercion remains unsuccessful due to its failure to organize a focused and
multifaceted programme. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, whereby nonnuclear
signatory states agreed to remain non-nuclear weapon states provided they got support in
establishing civilian nuclear programmes 17 . Iran claimed to be pursuing Uranium enrichment for
peaceful purposes. However, demanding ‘no enrichment at all’ seems excessive and illegitimate 18 .
Multilateral UNSC sanctions were, therefore, not supported by Russia and China. Demanding
Iran's complete capitulation without relief from sanctions is a maximalist position, with less
chance of success 19 .
Coercer’s Credibility. Unilateral economic sanctions do not sufficiently threaten Iran 20 .
Military strikes, due to the secrecy of nuclear facilities, would be disproportionate and therefore
not credible. Military action by the USA would destabilize the region against US interests.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 26 June 2013