OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

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27 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Initiatives and Actions to Combat Terrorism.Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office Washington, DC. January 2011. http://www.saudiembassy.net/files/PDF/Reports/Counterterrorism.pdf. Accessed on October 20, 2012 28 Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. UK: C. Hurst & Co, 2002. 29 “Al-Zawahiri Praises Iraq’s Al-Qa`ida, Urges Pakistani Soldiers to Disobey Orders,” al-Sahab, April 29, 2006. 30 Usama bin Ladin, “Remove the Apostate,” posted on the al-Buraq Islamic Network website, September 20, 2007. 31 Shahzad, Syed Saleem. Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban. London: Pluto Press, 2011. 32 Ibid. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 22 June 2013
COERCIVE STATECRAFT "The most complete and happy victory is this: to compel one's enemy to give up his purpose, while suffering no harm to oneself." Introduction Byzantine General Belisarius Coercive statecraft is rooted in history. A history in which man has tried to minimize force: not so much to avoid the loss to the opponent, but more to avoid the loss of one’s own energies, resources, efforts and potential. Therefore this, in a way, can be termed a selfish approach, albeit with ultimate positive results. Coercive statecraft has many dimensions and states have used various methodologies to coerce the target state into compliance: some successful, others not. Coercive statecraft needs studying because, if successful, the strategy can prevent conflict escalating to full-scale war. Secondly, policy makers can learn from previous crises, thus lending policy-relevance to current and future governmental decision-making. Thirdly, building theory in the political and decision sciences becomes a distinct possibility. Fourthly, these statecraft applications enrich our understanding of past and current approaches from Pakistan’s point of view, along with learning the art of crisis management and national security decision-making. Aim To provide an understanding of coercive statecraft in contemporary politics, by analyzing future coercive modalities, with a view to recommending pertinent lessons. Scope An overview of coercive statecraft. Applications of coercive statecraft. Future of coercive modalities. Lessons learnt. Instruments of Statecraft AN OVERVIEW OF COERCIVE STATECRAFT Statecraft employs and combines pressure and persuasion to achieve political aims and uses military, political and economic instruments of power to advance a state’s interests. Diplomacy applies this power by persuasive measures short of war, but there is a long history of coercive force associated with negotiation and diplomatic leverage. It therefore follows that coercive statecraft is a challenging yet prevalent practice. Australian analyst Coral Bell called it “no-man’s land that lies between defence and diplomacy.” 1 The instruments of statecraft can be divided into three categories:- Persuasive Statecraft. Persuasive tools are used to get other nations to alter their stance, even when such a change is believed to be against their interests: the tools persuade them otherwise. Persuasive tools attain this by power of argument and not by using threats or offering any benefit in return. Cooperative Statecraft. Cooperative tools include luring a nation by offering benefits and at the same time exercising influence over that nation or state. In simple terms, it is the policy of offering ‘carrots’. Practical manifestation of this will be via economic, military and technical help to entice other state. Coercive Statecraft. Coercion is about forcing a state to act involuntarily by the use of threat or intimidation or some other form of pressure and force. The history of coercive tools can be traced back to the origin of statecraft. Coercive tools are used when states are entangled in a situation where persuasion and incentives have totally failed to achieve end results and coercion is the only tool left for achieving their objectives. OPINION Vol.1 No.1 23 June 2013
Page 1 and 2: O P I N I O N VOL.1, NO.1 JUNE 2013
Page 3 and 4: MESSAGE OF PATRON The depth of know
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS Part-1 Global / R
Page 7 and 8: Introduction SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
Page 9 and 10: Hydropower Resources. Tajikistan is
Page 11 and 12: post-Arab Spring transition in the
Page 13 and 14: Opportunities • Russian aspiratio
Page 15 and 16: Infrastructural Development It
Page 17 and 18: Introduction AL QAEDA AND THE MUSLI
Page 19 and 20: Attacks in mainland USA - 09 Sep 20
Page 21 and 22: of peace negotiations, saying that
Page 23 and 24: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Aft
Page 25 and 26: Reactive Strategy against Al Qaeda.
Page 27: Deportation / Repatriation of Illeg
Page 31 and 32: US Coercion of USSR - Cuban Missile
Page 33 and 34: Indian Coercion of Pakistan - Opera
Page 35 and 36: • Determine the punishment regime
Page 37 and 38: other states, or produce counter na
Page 39 and 40: Introduction RISING INDIA - A CRITI
Page 41 and 42: protecting Indian investments overs
Page 43 and 44: India’s Military. Indian military
Page 45 and 46: India has neither been able to prod
Page 47 and 48: In an idealistic scenario, where In
Page 49 and 50: Introduction RISING POWERS AND GLOB
Page 51 and 52: come to dominate the 21 st century
Page 53 and 54: In the face of the growing importan
Page 55 and 56: Better Security Hope in Sight Prosp
Page 57 and 58: power in central and provincial gov
Page 59 and 60: Introduction ARAB UPRISING - A CRIT
Page 61 and 62: Abd-al-Rab Mansur Al Hadi assumed p
Page 63 and 64: the region of Northwest Africa, wes
Page 65 and 66: Transparency International report f
Page 67 and 68: leading to the best case scenario.
Page 69 and 70: Recommended Areas for Immediate Att
Page 71 and 72: PART - 2 National Security ‣ Glob
Page 73 and 74: the establishment of the Bretton Wo
Page 75 and 76: Globalization and Poverty Alleviati
Page 77 and 78: years and yet an air of distrust st
Page 79 and 80:
can cause capital flight, which is
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Imperatives for Reaping the Benefit
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Conclusion of other hostile element
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58 TasneemNoorani, “MFN Status an
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Elections 2014 Joint appeal to the
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Tranche 1: began transition in July
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PART- IV FUTURE AFGHAN SCENARIOS AN
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Indian and Chinese involvement in d
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influence and eastern and southern
Page 97 and 98:
scenario would have grave implicati
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In present day Asia, three big demo
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Major Conclusions. Major conclusion
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The increase in glacial melting may
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Demography. Unplanned expansion of
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Legislate to ensure energy efficien
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26 http://www.pmd.gov.pk/rnd/rnd_fi
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INDO - PAK CONFLICTS; 1998 TO DATE
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During the conflict, leaders/offici
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Pakistan, India, without any formal
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or the establishment of stability a
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Researchers: Supervisor: Brig Asim
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The Stone Age of Campaigning. Durin
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Technological Advancements - WW 1 F
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American Operational Art - WW II O
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war began. By early 1951, the fight
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• Freedom of Action for Afghan Fi
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WW-2 • Joint Warfare. • Amphibi
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35 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Ame
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are not necessarily new. The four e
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Fifth Generation Warfare Theoretica
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• Terrorists now have transnation
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hierarchical organizations. Technol
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Conclusion Force Multipliers. Avail
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PART - 4 VIEWS ‣ Human Security O
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Commission for Human Security, co c
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3 P.H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, “W
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