OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Strategy against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates. The political
developments with regards to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts can broadly be divided into two phases
as under:-
President Musharraf’s Era. Strategic framework during the previous regime was, “All elements
of national power particularly political, socio-economic and military be effectively articulated
within national and international context to eliminate the menace of terrorism”.
Post 2008 Elections Period. Newly elected government came up with National Counter Terrorism
Policy in the shape of 3Ds, i.e. Dialogue, Deterrence and Development. In support of this strategy,
the Army’s employment was based on four distinct stages of Clear, Hold, Build and Transfer.
Within this purview, the Army devised its ‘Concept of Engagement’, cardinal aspects of which are:-
Military means must be politically driven backed by popular support
Convergence of military and political components
Conduct effect based operations using minimum essential force to achieve well-defined
objectives
Reduce own and exploit terrorists’ vulnerabilities
Enhance faith in cause and keep morale in focus
Operational Framework. Pakistan’s counter actions can be divided into various stages:-
Beginning (2001 – 2003)
Capturing many senior Al Qaeda operatives
Operation Al Mizan, in ‘No Go Areas’ of Khyber and Kurram Agencies
Al Qaeda infiltration in southern and northern agencies of FATA
Fighting and Talking (2003 – 2009)
Kinetic operations and peace deals
Peace deals provided breathing space to Al Qaeda and its affiliated religious militant
organizations
Debated as unsuccessful period
Confronting the Devil (2009 Onwards)
Termed as a watershed year in Pakistan Army’s efforts against Al Qaeda and its affiliates
Strategy for the “clearance” phase of the concept i.e.: “depopulate, clear and repopulate”
Army seems to be struck in holding phase due to slow pace of political prong
Great success as evident from the shrinking areas under control of Al Qaeda and its
affiliates
Short Falls in Addressing Al Qaeda and its Affiliates. The efforts made by the Pakistani
Government to control Al Qaeda’s terrorist threat have produced some concrete results. However, some
missing links are as under:
Consensus Building. Primary shortfall of Pakistan strategy was that besides taking decision to
cooperate in GWOT, it could not build the correct perception through consensus about the menace of
terrorism.
Harnessing FATA. Pakistan could not harness FATA through its tribal culture before al Qaeda
dissected it and brought substantial change in it by empowering the commoner militant young
leadership 31 .
Capacity to Tackle the Militant Outflow due to US Invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan could not
assess its own capability of tackling Al Qaeda/militants outflow from Afghanistan after US invasion,
which led to creation of safe haven for active and sleeping cells of Al Qaeda.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 18 June 2013