OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. After Soviet invasion, the legitimacy given by US to these holy
warriors then known as “Mujahideen” gave moral superiority of engaging state power and made this
area center of Islamic militants from all around the world.
Post-Soviet Retreat from Afghanistan. Many of these fighters decided to stay in this region after
Soviet retreat. They bought property and permanently settled here after inter marriages thus
actualizing in Pakistan.
Current Reasons
Need for Safe Haven. Retreating Taliban and Al Qaeda forces after their defeat in Afghanistan
needed a safe haven from where they could incite the guerrilla war and trap US and its Western
Allies in Afghanistan 29 .
Policy Change against Religious Militant Organizations. After joining GWOT, Pakistan
disassociated itself from religious militant organizations and left these potent organizations
unsponsored and easy target for Al Qaeda to assume their patronage.
Need for New Al Qaeda Affiliated Leadership in Pakistan. The need of new Al Qaeda affiliated
leadership due to collapse of its own leadership’s arrest, could be easily addressed in recognition of
commoner young militant leaders of FATA.
Lust of Power by Young Tribal Commoner Leaders. The lust of power of young tribal
commoner leader was long awaiting to scrap old fiefdoms of the tribal elders and could be
legitimized with affiliation with Al Qaeda. The tribal chiefs were either killed or fled to the cities.
Their fiefdoms fell into the hands of this new generation, who were totally committed to Al Qaeda.
Availability of Affiliate Militant Organizations and Sympathizer Political Parties. Al Qaeda
already had affiliate religious militant organizations and sympathizer religious political parties in
Pakistan, which proved to be the main recruiting source for furthering Al Qaeda’s mission.
Indigenous Affiliated Religious Militant Organizations. Al Qaeda works with partners as a
conglomerate that exports and imports resources and tactics to survive and grow. Certain Pakistani
religious militant organizations affiliated with Al Qaeda also have differences amongst each other and with
Al Qaeda’s grand strategy; however, Al Qaeda is trying to keep them on board by compromising interests
and bringing consensus. Major affiliates include:
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (HUJI)
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Co (LeT, SeS & JeM)
Funding of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. There is little proof available on the foreign funding for Al
Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, but based on circumstantial evidence it is possible to point out the
possible bankers. Al Qaeda and its Pakistani affiliates are suspected to be funded through foreign countries
from Middle Eastern affiliates of Al Qaeda through hundi / hawala system of payment, which has been
checked to quite an extent, but is still operational. Local and foreign funding through madrassas and trusts
is also believed to be in the list. Additionally, narco money, criminal activities of Al Qaeda and its
affiliates in shape of bank robberies and kidnapping for ransom, timber mafia and transporters and
extortions paid by locals out of developmental funds and compensations are known to be the sources of
funding for Al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Al Qaeda’s Pakistan Strategy. Al Qaeda’s strategy in Pakistan remains intentionally opaque,
wherein it would use Pakistan as logistic base and safe abode for its fighters; it has now gone onto an
increased confrontation with the Pakistani state. A review of Al Qaeda’s statements pertaining to Pakistan,
militant activity in the country and the alliances Al Qaeda has fostered among Pakistani factions reveals
that their strategy to shape Pakistan’s militant environment and promote hostilities against the Pakistani
government 30 .
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 17 June 2013