OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

Conclusion
Force Multipliers. Availability of actionable intelligence both through technical and nontechnical
means at right time is the best force multiplier. Availability of helicopters for quick
transportation of troops to take action on intelligence is also a critical requirement.
Mission Oriented Orders. Changing nature of battlefield demands shifting of focus from
situation and enemy to process and method. Initiative is now more important than obedience and it
all depends on self-discipline, not imposed discipline.
Force Protection. The contemporary and future battle space is characterized by a lack of
identifiable fronts, flanks or rear areas, by the proliferation of highly lethal weapons, by the
presence of a variety of combatant groups- each with their own capabilities and the need for the
armed forces to establish a persistent, pervasive and proportionate presence in population centers.
Force Protection should now be sought to both conserve the force and contribute to the
achievement of the mission.
Population Protection. In intra state wars, military operations cannot be conducted unless they
are owned by the local government and population. Militaries will thus be required initially to
perform some policing tasks in the absence of local law enforcing agencies. Conversely it may lead
to a security vacuum that could be exploited by insurgents. Population Protection operations thus
need to be dovetailed in training and planning.
Importance of New Technologies. With modern surveillance and fire power means a small group
of soldiers can now create effects on the battlefield as produced by a second generation brigade.
Nano and artificial intelligence technologies can significantly alter tactics.
Winning a 4GW Conflict. 4GW wars are fought in societal contexts and hence won or lost in the
moral sphere. Winning at the tactical and physical levels might not result in victories at operational
and strategic levels. Armies were considered stronger parties historically owing to their firepower
and command over the technology but owing to restraints on utility of means are now weaker
parties in 4GW.
While armies have to win future wars on the battlefield they may have to be lost on the table. As
West destroyed states in Afghanistan and Iraq it created a happy hunting ground for modern day
empowered warriors. More mistakes were committed by dismissing choice of the people thus resulting into
present sorry state of affairs. Fighting has to be aimed at creating peace and thus has to be civilized as was
educated by Islam. Finally, in the panel’s view, 4GW is an evolving, interesting yet imperfect concept as it
twists history and defies trinity in a bid to create something new and does not stand the test of being a
“Strategic Theory”. Global order is already transitioning from unipolarity to multi-polarity and possibility
of conventional conflicts over control of resources cannot be altogether ruled out. As nation states are
marginalized even further, more lethal hybrid wars with or without state support and possibly with the use
of 5GW means like bio and nano technologies are foreseen. Future threats are complex and menacing thus
asking us to shun old mindsets and develop empowered social and political structures to deal with them
more effectively.
Researchers:
Supervisor:
Endnote
Lt Col Kashif Mughal, Lt Col Asim Rahim, Lt Col Kashfi and Col Purwantoro (Indonesia)
Brig Babar Iftikhar
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Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: Free Press, 1991.
Heinz Guderian, Achtung – Panzer! The Development of Armored Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential, London Arms and
Armour, 1992, translated by Christopher Duffy.
William Lind, Col. Keith Nightingale, Capt. John Schmitt, Col. Joseph Sutton, Lt Col. Gary Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the
Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 22
Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and The Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century Zenith Press. 2004.
Thomas X. Hammes, “Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges.” Military Review (May-June 2007): 15 – 16.
Michael Evans, “Elegant Irrelevance Revisited: A Critique of Fourth Generation Warfare”, Global Insurgency and Future of Armed Conflict,
pp 67 – 74.
Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz and the Nature of War on Terror”, Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007) pp 196 – 218.
Antulio J. Echevarria II, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
November 2005), 4.
ibid
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 137 June 2013