OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

aimed at denying breeding grounds for these grievances through effective management, better
integration and by adopting people centric policies.
Reforms for Capacity Building of LEAs. In most of the developing countries LEAs lack
requisite capability, capacity and integration to fight future wars owing to a host of reasons. Police
reforms should remain the starting point and be followed by civil armed forces to improve
recruiting, development of better hierarchical structures and training to fight cybercrimes.
Inter – State Cooperation. Future warriors are likely to exploit black holes in international law
and discords between nation states to operate beyond national boundaries and closer to seam to
avoid stringent laws and effective LEAs in one state thus bringing into light requirement of
integrating efforts globally and in particular with neighbours and regional countries to deal with
these threats. This is easier said than done.
Capacity Building to Fight 5GW and Open Source Warfare. Creating cyber and space
commands at national and armed forces level to fight cybercrimes, while at the same time,
exercising control over proliferation of bio and nano technologies and developing national capacity
by integrating human and technical elements to protect vital services against hacking remains vital
to fight 5GW. Finally, legislating and then implementing laws against attack on vital assets like
pipelines and grid stations and creating mechanisms to provide comprehensive security to them
should also be pursued.
Recommendations at Army Level
Changes in Military Culture. Earlier generations of war seemed obsessed with order on the
battlefield thus turning militaries into well oiled machines while countering terrorism forces a
change. Difference between the nature of the modern battlefield and the traditional military culture
can be addressed by redefining military cultures by accepting that initiative is more important than
obedience.
Ability to Adapt and Learn. Use of information technology will improve adaptation of
insurgents while also giving them ability to quickly share techniques and lessons learnt from one
geographical zone to another. As David Kilcullen puts it in ‘Accidental Guerrilla’, unless we adapt
to today’s protean adversary and the merging modes of human conflict, “we are destined to
maintain and upgrade our high-end, industrial age square pegs and be condemned for trying to
force them into contemporary and increasingly complex round holes.”
Adaptive Campaigning. Armies may not be able to dominate all aspects of future war but their
role might be a bit toned in support of other elements of national power. As armies shrink in size
and the complexity of intra state problems increases in size and context, militaries will have to
carefully articulate their actions for more enduring results in support of the governmental
departments. This is referred to as adaptive campaigning.
Information Operations and Strategic Communication. Strategic communications is an upand-coming
tool in the adaptive campaigning process and can be used for affecting changes in
societal behaviour by understanding and responding to the thinking of population at large.
Information operations aim at wining the psychological contest with real and potential enemies. A
Whole of Government approach is required for development of Information Action objectives and
Strategic Communication themes by developing credible narratives.
Impact on Tactics and Operational Art in Fourth Generation Operational Art. Principal
notions of operational art apply in 4GW, although context is somewhat changed.
Reduced Emphasis on Operational Art. In fourth generation the first change would be that a
campaign framework may be largely provided to the operational commander for implementation.
In this context, Operational Art is likely to be a little more circumscribed than envisaged and might
involve orchestration of tactical actions, through one or more lines of operation, to ultimately
achieve the directed strategic accepted enduring conditions.
Blending of Tactical and Strategic Levels. As the opponent's political infrastructure and civilian
society become battlefield targets, blending of tactical and strategic levels will be witnessed. In
future wars, spaces will remain important for the operational art and an operational commander
will have to aim at denying critical spaces like population centres etc.
OPINION Vol.1 No.1 136 June 2013