OPINION Vol.1, No.1 June 2013 - National Defence University

• Terrorists now have transnational reach and affiliates and are hence able to unleash
appalling attacks that will over shadow even attacks of 9/11.
• Insurgencies are more complex as they combine ideology with hard core ideologues as
leaders and unsatisfied citizens acting as foot soldiers. Insurgencies thus present both
political and military challenges and can only be defeated through ideas. Al-Qaeda is a case
in point as Salafist theology forms its bedrock and through its ideology it attracts the Muslim
population besides justifying use of terror.
Future Insurgencies. Future insurgencies will differ significantly from those of the 1960s 22 as:-
• Historically, insurgencies were limited to a certain area; however future insurgencies will
have transnational character like Al Qaeda 23 .
• Increased fusion as a result of technology will allow national and transnational actors to
swarm a state from within besides isolating it from international support 24 .
• A number of insurgent groups with entirely different motives will co-exist in a geographical
zone in a marriage of convenience 25 .
• Power of narratives can be judged from the fact that a single narrative can nullify or
seriously question intentions and thus put additional constraints and restraints over use of
force and political liberty of action thereby outweighing progress as was observed time and
again in SWA and Swat.
• In history, insurgents were the initiators but now local armed forces can be portrayed as
initiators through use of narratives and manipulation of media thus by implication projecting
insurgents as victim instead of monster.
• In the classic insurgencies, insurgent was dependant on population however; present and
future insurgents may be wealthier thus changing the economic relationship between
insurgent and population.
• Insurgent tactics and weapons like IEDs, remote control bombs and sniping etc will
simultaneously target security forces and the population thus weaning away the population
besides raising questions about efficacy of some classical tactics like patrolling etc.
Future of Fourth Generation Warfare. 4GW can then take the shape of either ‘compound 26 or
hybrid wars’. 1971 India – Pakistan war in now Bangladesh and Vietnam War 27 are examples of
compound wars in which irregular forces attacked weak areas while opposing conventional forces
took advantage of resultant dispersion to concentrate. But in Compound Wars, forces lacked
required fusion thus allowed the opponent to regroup and protract the conflict.
Possibility of Transition to Fifth Generation Warfare. Future warriors will not be contend with
compound wars and as technologies improve, might focus on lesser but more lethal attacks. Future
warriors hence can either transit to 5 th GW or more complex hybrid wars. Evolution into 5GW
seems distant as access to bio and nano technologies remains elusive for non-state actors, controls
on air travel are further tightened and sea mode of travel comes under focus as a result of creation
and operationalization of proliferation security initiative (PSI). The options of future terrorist while
so limited might see him waging ‘open source warfare’ 28 in which networks of peers rather than
the hierarchies will be relied upon. Multiple, smaller attacks are becoming a rational choice and
already we can witness this in attacks on pipelines across Balochistan which caused losses worth
millions. Even possession of bio and nano technologies thus might not fundamentally change
character of war into 5GW in the absence of any durable war fighting idea and this new threat
might also unfold as advanced form of Hybrid war.
Transition to Hybrid Wars. Few important characteristics of Hybrid Wars or Sub conventional
wars (SCW) 29 will be as under:-
• Fusion of conventional and unconventional capabilities due to technology may be even more
complex while also improving adaptation and learning.
• Blurring and blending of lethality of state conflict with the protracted nature of irregular
warfare will be witnessed 30 .
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